from Solidarność to freedom

25 YEARS

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Warsaw - Gdańsk • August 2005

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from Solidarność to freedom

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FROM *SOLIDARNOŚĆ* TO FREEDOM
International Conference
Warsaw-Gdańsk
August 29-31, 2005

Conference Chairman: **Bronisław Geremek**

Programme Director: **Eugeniusz Smolar**
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The Solidarity Center Foundation **Lech Wałęsa Institute**
Warsaw-Gdańsk 2005

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The approaching 25th anniversary of the founding of NSZZ "Solidarność" prompts us to take a look back at history and ask questions about our future.

The path blazed by "Solidarność" has opened new civilizational opportunities. The non-violent revolution of "Solidarność", waged for the right to dignified living standards and societal development, tore down the walls and severed the restraints on freedom. It triggered the stunning economic transformations both here in Poland and across the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe. The political victory of Solidarity contributed to the fall of the communist regimes and the peaceful reunification of Europe.

I am convinced that the 25th anniversary of the events that unfolded in August 1980 gives us an exceptional opportunity to reflect on the legacy of "Solidarność" – a truly unique social movement and the first trade union independent of the communist authorities.

And thus I was pleased to welcome the initiative of the Solidarity Center Foundation and the Lech Wałęsa Institute to organize the international conference "From Solidarność to Freedom", celebrating the 25th anniversary of "Solidarność". This initiative has sought to engage many international and domestic milieux – at the same time as being a common endeavour undertaken in the spirit of solidarity and mutual responsibility in the struggle for human rights and freedom. This conference also provides an excellent opportunity to express our profound gratitude to our friends the world over, without whom the victory of "Solidarność" would not have been possible. It further affords us the occasion to take up new ideas on behalf of a better future.

I warmly welcome you all to the conference in Warsaw and in Gdańsk.



MESSAGE OF THE 1st NATIONAL CONGRESS OF DELEGATES OF "SOLIDARNOŚĆ" TO THE WORKING PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE

The delegates gathered in Gdańsk at the first Congress of Delegates of the Independent Autonomous Trade Union "Solidarność" send to the workers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Hungary and all the nations of the Soviet Union – greetings and expressions of support.

As the first independent trade union in our post-war history we feel the brotherhood of our fates. We assure you that despite the lies told in your countries, we are an authentic, 10-million-strong workers' organization created as the outcome of workers' strikes. Our aim is the fight for the improvement of the living standards of all working people. We support all of you who have decided to enter the difficult path of struggle for a free union movement. We believe that soon your representatives will be able to meet our representatives in order to exchange union experiences.

Gdańsk, September 8, 1981.

The mass media, controlled by the communist authorities in Poland, the USSR and the entire Soviet Bloc, carried out a swift attack against this Message and Solidarność.

On September 10, 1981 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev stated:

"*Yesterday I acquainted myself with the Message to the nations of Eastern Europe, drafted at the Polish Solidarność Congress. It is a dangerous and provocative document. It doesn't consist of many words, but they all point in one direction. Its authors would like to spread havoc in the socialist countries, and encourage all sorts of groups of dissenters…*"

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INAUGURAL SESSION

Gdańsk, August 29, 2005

Bronisław Geremek:

I wish to cordially welcome each and everyone of you, and to ask the host of today's meeting – *Solidarność*'s chairman, leader of the momentous events of August 1980, President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Wałęsa[1] – to take the floor and open our conference.

Lech Wałęsa:

Mr. President, Prime Ministers, Ministers, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Guests:

I'm wondering just where to begin. Perhaps I will start with the conclusion of the Second World War. But I'll be quick about it, so as not to be boring. Dear guests, as you all know in greater detail than I do, we Poles were incorporated into the Soviet state's sphere of influence against our will. For we were still bleeding and unable to defend ourselves. And yet we were really the only ones to challenge the Yalta order. In fact, Stalin himself was amused seeing that his efforts to impose a communist system on Poland was like "saddling a pig". We struggled to throw off that saddle – in the 40s and 50s with guns in hand, in the 60s and 70s through street protests. All these demonstrations were brutally crushed. Throughout that whole period of struggle we were being taught that we had no chance of liberating ourselves. As you all well know, over 200,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed in Poland, over a million not far across our borders – and on top of this, as we know today, there were nuclear missile silos. Thus, in that situation the more sensible Polish forces knew that liberation from the Soviet Bloc was impossible, that any such attempts would backfire. This is the reason why Poles postponed the fight for freedom until more propitious times.

Following numerous attempts and numerous mistakes, we Poles came to the decision to wrest what freedoms we could, but under one condition: that we all unite in a single movement. Hence the name Solidarność[2] – Solidarity. However, the sad fact was that there was no way to galvanize such mobilization. Then, near the end of the second millennium, we received a gift from heaven. In the summer of 1979

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[1] Properly pronounced *Vah·WEN·sah*.

[2] Pronounced *So·lee·DAR·noshch*.

the Holy Father, John Paul II, came to Poland, at a time when society was in a state of despair and hopelessness. The whole world was dumbfounded: what was happening in Poland? – a communist country in which almost everybody wants to listen to the Pope? I chuckle remembering how even those who for various reasons didn't share the Catholic faith learnt to make the sign of the cross. But the Holy Father did not incite us to revolt; he did not order us to fight. But he was so incredibly suggestive. We shall never forget his prayer from that summer: *Let Thy Spirit descend! Let Thy Spirit descend!!! And make anew the face of Earth – HERE on Earth*. Everyone was compelled to ponder things deeply. At the same time we discovered how numerous we were. The Polish nation was awakened, as were other nations. We began to organize and to hold disciplined strikes and demonstrations…

The Soviets, of course, were keeping a wary eye on us. They saw the steadfast Pope as invincible, unafraid of bullets,. They also saw the awakening of nations. I am convinced that they started to panic. And they recalled a man who once had quietly said over vodka that communism needed to be reformed. So, in order to save the situation, he was chosen First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He started to revamp communism by implementing *perestroika* and *glasnost*. We Poles were pleased indeed, because we knew that if anyone should try to overhaul anything over there, the whole machine will come tumbling down – and this will allow us to liberate our homeland. And that is exactly what happened. Gorbachev managed to reform neither communism, nor the Soviet Union, nor anything – but the failure of his ideas was to be our success. Ironically perhaps, he even got a Nobel prize for this "failed success". So don't worry if certain solutions fail, because even then you may get a Nobel Prize…

Unfortunately for Gorbachev, as we know, little went smoothly. At some point the Soviets realized that things in the Soviet Union had taken a wrong turn – thus, when Gorbachev had gone on holiday, they carried out a coup d'etat. They sent tanks into Moscow's streets and thought they could halt the changes. Once again we were lucky: a man climbed up onto one of the tanks. Whether he was drunk or sober, no one knows – but he climbed up there and stopped the counterrevolution. That man was Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin, defying Gorbachev, pulled Russia out of the Soviet Union and then, together with Ukraine and Byelorussia, dissolved the Soviet Union. Had he not done this, Ladies and Gentlemen, all the dramatic events of the preceding two years – such as Poland's Round Table elections and the fall of the Berlin Wall – all those momentous changes would have been reversed by the Soviet Union, which beforehand, of course, would have pointed its missiles at strategic capitals. At the spectre of those missiles, the other superpower would have asked us very nicely to recognize that the world is divided. We would have received some meagre freedoms and a few dollars – of course, on condition that we behave fittingly. But Yeltsin commandeered that tank! And that is why at the close of the millennium – indeed, at the end of an era – our generation was so very lucky: we succeeded in overcoming the divisions imposed by borders and antagonistic

systems. Thanks to the fall of communism and the ensuing civilizational progress, we have entered the era of intellect, information and globalization.

On closer inspection, however, we recognize there is a problem in that virtually all of the structural and programmatic solutions applied down to the end of the 20th century do not suit our new era. Before, there were two superpowers and a balance of power. Today there is just one, and its role is not exactly clear. There is the UN, a highly deserving organization, but one created for different times, when the two blocs needed to be restrained from open conflict. To date, solutions have been chosen by voting, but how ought we proceed in today's era of globalization? What to do, for example, when the Chinese enter the world arena? They will always manage to outvote everybody – both Europe and the United States. Let's imagine that they will want to make Poland join them – they will be able to achieve that by vote, as well. But we do have a choice: we either calmly deliberate and make a decision on how to act and what new democratic measures to devise, or we get to work and ensure that there are at least 20 children in every household. But my sincere belief is that this generation – one which peacefully wrought these global changes that have engendered today's enormous possibilities – will come up with new ideas for the future shape of globalization.

Globalization cannot continue in the same way it works today, with less than 10 percent of humankind amassing fortunes, and 90 percent not having anything. This is not a sustainable option for globalization. I am not suggesting a revolution, but only reflecting on a new economic system, on how to triple the number of capitalists in the world, because otherwise we won't be able to survive. Yet more difficult questions remain. How should trade union issues and political and economic problems be solved in globalization? In its draft constitution, Europe wanted us to keep things simple. Freedom should be the backbone for everything: for individual freedom, freedom of association, economic freedom – and no subsidies. The market should control everything, even moral issues – and God should be there just for private matters. What a beautiful theory! But it is packaged in the old style. For what we need today are values, and this is why I support another concept, namely, that we must educate people to be conscientious, to uphold values. We must reward them for their good deeds, and punish them for their bad ones. This is possible, as well as cheap and safe. In my opinion, if we want to live in safety, if we want to live in prosperity, then the most affordable option in the era of globalization is to put all our effort into creating people of conscience. Together we must concentrate on how to achieve this, necessarily availing ourselves of all those great possibilities our generation has created. When it comes to reform, and when it comes to revolutionary reform, you can expect to see Lech Wałęsa earnestly engaged till the day they close his coffin.

I wish us all a fruitful discussion, fruitful in that it will help us marshal our views and give rise to consensus. I don't know what you'll make of my own thoughts, but if they prove to be of any use, I'll be overjoyed. If not, you have wasted but half an hour listening to me. Let me again wish us all profitable deliberations.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you, Mr. President. I would now like to ask the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, to take the floor.

Aleksander Kwaśniewski:

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In today's world there may not be a more important word than 'solidarity'. The one who is in solidarity with others is not alone. The one who is in solidarity with others does not feel helpless. The one who is in solidarity with others, can change the world!

Twenty-five years ago the people in the Gdańsk Shipyard were in solidarity. Out of their courage a ten-million-strong movement was born that changed the course of history.

Today I want to thank all those brave people. I believe that all Poles owe you their gratitude – including those who were not in *Solidarność* then. Who did not understand that you were right. Who did not want to or could not support your cause. And even those who fought with you then. For we *all*, I stress, all are living in a free Poland. Yes, our free Poland would not have been possible without you, Mr. President, and without many of you present here today!

As the President of the Republic of Poland I wish to offer words of admiration and respect to the great leader of Poland's August, Mr. Lech Wałęsa. Twenty-five years ago I was not standing with you on one side. However, today I have no doubts but that your vision of Poland led us in a proper direction. Indeed, thanks to your courage, today we together can promote the welfare of our homeland.

Today's anniversary presents a fine opportunity to mention other legendary figures from Poland's *Solidarność*, people such as: Bogdan Borusewicz, Zbigniew Bujak, Andrzej Celiński, Władysław Frasyniuk, Andrzej Gwiazda, Marian Jurczyk, Bogdan Lis, and Anna Walentynowicz. Then there are the advisors who had a significant impact on the shape of *Solidarność*'s famed 21 Postulates and the course of the whole freedom movement: Bohdan Cywiński, Bronisław Geremek, Jacek Kuroń, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Adam Michnik, Karol Modzelewski, Jan Olszewski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Władysław Siła-Nowicki, Andrzej Wielowieyski. Forgive me for not listing them all. It simply would be too difficult. But with deep respect we salute every effort and every striving for the good that contributed to the great work of NSZZ *Solidarność*. We shall remain grateful for them all!

It was no mere accident that this great cry for freedom resounded in Poland. Thus, with great respect we also reflect on the organizations and people who well before August had the courage to demand human dignity and civil rights. Let us not forget the social upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976. And let us ever remember the steadfast efforts of KOR, the Worker's Defence Committee, the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, the Confederation for Independent Poland, the Movement of Young Poland, and the Free Trade Unions.

Nor should we fail to recall the manifestations of intellectual independence, the "flying universities", the underground publications. And we need be especially appreciative of the role of the Catholic Church in Poland, which created oases of freedom. In this vein we must above all cherish the influence, as President Wałęsa mentioned a moment ago, of that great and historic figure, our countryman Karol Wojtyła – Pope John Paul II. For the immediate wellsprings of the *Solidarność* movement date back to the year 1979, when during the Pope's first pilgrimage to his homeland, Poles stood tall and were witnesses to that unforgettable appeal to "make anew the face of Earth – HERE on Earth".

Our collective memory as Poles has also preserved centuries-old traditions of democracy, parliamentarianism, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and tolerance. Our memory harbours the history of numerous uprisings and struggles for independence. Albeit unexpected and extraordinary, the phenomenon of Poland's *Solidarność* was in this context something that revealed our national spirit as forged across the generations. Yes, it is true that in 1980 Poland surprised the world – but those who really knew us Poles were not surprised.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the 20th century brought immense suffering to the world. Wars, totalitarian systems, ideologies of destruction. Many started to doubt that ordinary people could change anything and grew sceptical of the meaning of their actions. And yet at the end of the century *Solidarność* restored people with their confidence. The confidence that joined hands are stronger than walls. Than fortified borders and police cordons. That is why *Solidarność* was one of the most important and most creative experiences of the past century. It awoke whole nations from their slumber and transformed political systems because it changed people. It infused them with new energy.

The epic story of *Solidarność* entails a great lesson. First of all it teaches us that nothing is impossible in history, that there is no such thing as being irrevocably fated to a captivity without escape. Though the road may be long, hope always leads to freedom. This lesson also teaches us that concerted, collective effort has great power. Moreover, the *Solidarność* movement showed how to carry out historical transformations without violence. And here is something I particularly want to stress today, namely, that *Solidarność* did so inclusively. No one was asked where they came from as long as they had good intentions. This is why *Solidarność* succeeded in bringing together people of diverse professions and biographies. It was open to all of those who wanted to change Poland for the better.

The legacy of *Solidarność* rests in this message: that the energy of the whole of society is necessary to build Poland's prosperity. A shared homeland and a shared future – these are our most important duties, and ones which need bind us above divisions.

Jacek Kuroń, who passed away in 2004, was undoubtedly one of the finest symbols of this wisdom and willingness to build a common Poland in solidarity. This man, who despite the suffering he was made to bear, never really stopped

loving people – or believing in them. When others tried to hijack the idea of solidarity, to fence it off against the external world, he committedly went about trying to put it in practice. He wanted to attract as many people to it as possible, to encourage and convince them. He knew that if we as a country, as a society, have a chance, we can only make use of it in acting together. Like in a family, like at home, every mind and every pair of hands can contribute, can add a brick to this building where we all live and will live together.

Pope John Paul II stressed this civic, patriotic – but above all human, even spiritual dimension of *Solidarity* in his famous homily delivered at Zaspa in Gdańsk. In reference to Saint Paul's words on "bearing each others' burdens" he said: "*Solidarity* means one person and another. If a burden, then a burden born together, jointly. Never one against the other. Or ones against others [...] There can be no fight stronger than solidarity". This was the Pope's teaching. And these words were quoted in the film that commemorated his person on the day of mourning in the Polish Parliament. These words sounded so strong, so convincing and so extraordinarily timely. Not one against the other or ones against others. No fight can be stronger than, or take precedence over solidarity. Today, at a time of heated political campaigns, which are after all natural for a democratic order, this appeal must be taken to heart once again.

Let this lesson of the experience of the *Solidarność* movement and the lesson of human solidarity be useful instructions for us today. Let us try – just like then – to respond to great historic challenges in a positive way; not to attack, not to reopen old divisions, not to condemn, and not to exclude. Of course, democracy is the art of allowing the competition of different ideas. Of course, democracy takes competition for granted – but we should not let the things that divide us supersede those which we Poles have in common.

I am also convinced that *Solidarność* poses a lesson for the unifying Europe. As long as the motor of integration was to build collectively – the solidarity of richer countries with the poorer ones just now coming into the community – the European project was a success. But when national egoism is heard, when local interests start to prevail – crisis starts. Europe must understand this lesson. Europe can and should face modern challenges in an effective way. Europe needs solidarity. Both the historical *Solidarity*, written or spoken with a capital letter, and the daily solidarity that builds a solid future for the continent and for the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen – the road that we followed during those sixteen months of *Solidarność*, through the ensuing traumatic experience of Martial Law – which as I have stressed, was evil – through the priceless agreement of the Round Table and the subsequent recovery of freedom and the triumph of democracy – this is rightfully called "the longest Polish insurrection". This is how a civil society was reborn. An impressively sensible and responsible society – courageous, but at the same time cognizant of reality. And vigilant, lest the radicalism of actions stifle new dreams. We created a "self-limiting revolution", as Professor Jadwiga Staniszkis

observed. A movement was born that effectively destroyed an authoritarian system, but without resorting to violence. It was a new – and ever so fruitful – experience that led us out of the cruel fate of Polish history.

We won an extraordinary opportunity then. For especially during the *Solidarność* period of August 1980 the stereotype of Poland and Poles started to change. Every month and every year we proved that we deserve greater respect. I believe that the presence of so many of the world's distinguished persons here today is also confirmation of the fact that the image of Poland and Poles is changing. How valuable are the words Adam Michnik wrote just a few days ago: "Usually perceived as a country of haughty cavalrymen attacking enemy tanks, and apart from that as a country of drunkards and crackpots, anti-Semites and hayseeds – here was Poland becoming an important country watched closely and respected. Not only was our courage admired but our prudence, as well. Not only the patriotism and honour of Poles, but also our sense of measure and realism".

It is wonderful not only that we could change our image, but also that we gave grounds for this change. Social and patriotic solidarity was our weapon. Acting together was our weapon. Not allowing ourselves to be divided, or for individual or private interests to seize the upper hand. Not permitting some to fight against others. To act and communicate like a Pole to a Pole. This principle allowed us to follow the road of dialogue – and through the agreements we then hammered out, to create the chance for free elections, for independence, and systemic transformation.

The patron of all those events, all those successes – and I want to stress the word *successes*, as we oft'times seem reluctant, too timid, as it were, to use that word – the patron of all that seemed impossible, unthinkable and imaginary – and yet what became fact – is August of 1980. We are secure, we are in NATO, we are surrounded by neighbours who are also members in that Alliance. For the first time in a thousand years we are in the same political and military alliance with our great German neighbour. We have wrested an astounding civilizational opportunity in the form of our presence in the European Union. We are surrounded by neighbours, states and nations, which not without their own enormous sacrifice, but also following the road of August 1980 and *Solidarność*, are striding towards democracy and respect for human rights. Here I mean "the Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the huge efforts of Ukraine, the Baltic Countries, and all of all those in Central and Eastern Europe who are building solidarity in the 21st century. We are a democratic country, a market country, a country which creates great opportunities for young people. Among them are more than 2 million university students, many of whom have pursued their studies at foreign universities and bring honour to Poland – for they are outstanding young people, with excellent minds.

The Poland of the last 16 years, despite all her weaknesses, despite all the difficulties, despite the quarrels, and despite the many egregiously unfair appraisals, is a country of success. A country that can boast of a historic success born in the difficult time of August 1980. Let us remember this. Even today – 25 years later. Let

us remember that *nie ma wolności bez solidarności* – there is no freedom without solidarity. But let us also remember that there is no solidarity without trust and mutual respect.

Ending my 10 years as Poland's President, if I could wish my fellow countrymen something for the next years, it would be freedom and solidarity and much more mutual respect.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you Mr. Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, for your address.

The 25th anniversary observances of the August Accords and the birth of *Solidarność* are above all an act of commemorating the Polish road to freedom, of honouring those who gave their lives in the fight against the totalitarian system, those legions of Polish workers who had the courage to fight for their rights and the rights of their country, and those millions of people from all walks of life who made *Solidarność* a powerful social movement capable of opposing communism and the post-Yalta order in Europe. We need also call to mind all those people in Europe and the world over who greeted the Polish August of 1980 with joy and hope, and who then backed the new movement and assisted Polish society during the 500 days of *Solidarność*'s independent activities, as well as later in the years of its underground existence. This year's commemoration is also a time to remember the beginnings, when the dream of freedom and justice went hand in hand with the feeling of responsibility, when the heart and mind in tandem defined people's actions, and the evil of communism somehow spawned its very opposite. Czesław Miłosz once said that the Poland of *Solidarność* seemed to confirm that sometimes the most beautiful flowers bloom at the edge of the precipice. Gathered around Lech Wałęsa today are the people who created that movement, those who wrote about it, who informed the world about it, who in real time recorded its history and who analyzed its successes and failures. But our purpose is not to recall the past with admiration or with bitterness – or with both – but to ponder the place of the phenomenon that was *Solidarność* in the history of Poland and of Europe. This means examining the sources and historical particularities of the Polish movement, its relation to the Helsinki human rights paradigm, its perception and influence in other Eastern bloc countries and, finally, inscribing it into Europe's shared memory. For in so doing does the chance arise of rescuing *Solidarność* from oblivion here in Poland, and maybe even of discerning its emblematic role in European awareness as a founding legend of our united Europe.

Europe was divided after World War II in accordance with the outcome of military operations: the frontiers of the Soviet empire and the communist system were marked out by the Red Army's advance. International conferences confirmed them. The system of power was imposed against the will of nations, but the citizenry's passiveness was stipulated as a minimal requirement for its functioning.

The great revolts in the cities of this "second Europe" disrupted that order ever more frequently. This especially concerns Poland. In conjunction with the revolt in East Berlin, the uprising in Budapest and the Prague Spring, it was Poland that was scene to a unique and dramatic series of acts of resistance. Indeed, Poznań in 1956, Warsaw in 1968, Szczecin in 1970, and Radom and Ursus in 1976 were expressions of social anger and desperation, but they also provided testimony that beneath the cloak of passivity lay hidden a fundamental cleavage dividing the ruling and the ruled. Nonetheless, a feeling of hopelessness vis-a-vis the Soviet empire persisted, for the USSR had not hesitated to undertake military interventions in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and this same threat – under the guise of the "Brezhnev doctrine" – was held up before Poland. Each of Poland's revolts had created a brief period of liberalization, but each had ultimately ended in the defeat of national and societal aspirations. The feeling gained root that the West, even if not indifferent to these efforts to achieve freedom, did not support them, viewing them as it did, as condemned to certain failure. The Cold War strategy aimed at eroding the USSR's potential in economic, technological, as well as – if one may use shorthand – moral confrontations with the West generated little hope in the societies of the captive countries. It was only with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, controversial though it was among dissidents, that public opinion became convinced that under Western pressure an evolution would take place in Eastern bloc countries towards fundamental European standards. In the West's political and opinion-making milieux, however, it was not held that opposition entities could have any real influence on politics and the outcome of the Cold War, the strategic foundations of which did not encompass such concepts as social movements or civil society.

The events of the summer of 1980 in Poland, as a culmination of the long series of outbreaks of social anger, created an entirely new quality. The wave of protests in various parts of the country was a reaction to the series of price rises introduced on July 1. It was especially the July strikes in Lublin, though short-lived, that showed the workers' high degree of determination and that engendered an unprecedented solution-approach for the communist authorities: negotiations as a way of quelling worker revolts. The strike in the Gdańsk Shipyard from its very beginning differed from other strikes in that it was planned by democratic opposition activists from Gdańsk. Apart from addressing the shipyard workers' flash-point issues, the strike in Gdańsk was the result of the steady spread of political activism to ever broader circles of Polish society. After several days of striking and the rejection of the shipyard management's proposal of August 16, the strike swelled. The famous plea by Jacek Kuroń for protestors to set up their own committees instead of burning party committees was heeded and implemented. The Inter-factory Strike Committee (ISC), representing 150 factories from the Baltic Coast, was created, a group to head the united action emerged, and the charismatic leader of the movement – Lech Wałęsa – entered into the spotlight. The list of 21 Postulates formulated on August 18 was presented to the political

authorities and made public in the form of billboards hung on the shipyard gates – the famous "Gdańsk manifesto" later declared by UNESCO as a "Memory of the World" heritage document. The programme outlined in the 21 Postulates begins with an extraordinary stipulation: quoting the 87th convention of the International Labour Organization, Polish workers demanded the right to form trade unions that were to be independent from the party. There are also other demands on the list: the right to strike, freedom of speech, the release of political prisoners, a cessation of repressions, and the hiring of managerial staff with respect to competence criteria – and not party membership. All of these are political demands *par excellence*. Such was also the character of the postulates concerning economic reforms and the annulment of social privileges for the militia, the security service and the party apparatus. This time material postulates did not take centre-stage.

Therefore, the programme advanced by the Gdańsk workers had an unparalleled political dimension. It posed fundamental problems to the regime as such, in that the very first postulate, concerning the creation of independent trade unions, was at odds with the principle of the communist party's leading role and with the nature of official political discourse, which treated trade unions as the "transmission" of the ruling party's will. Thus, and though it was concealed by a veil of silence and reticence, the problem of power was tabled at the very outset. Poland's communist rulers relentlessly sought ways to retain power, while those they ruled over endeavoured, if not to break the regime's monopoly on power, at least to weaken it. Władysław Gomułka is quoted as having said, "just as Polish noblemen once destroyed their noblemen's state, so too would the working classes bring about the collapse of the workers' state". The very language of this phrase and the way it is formulated gives poignant testimony to the ruling apparatus' "false consciousness".

The negotiations between the ISC and the government delegation passed through dramatic moments of tension when it came to matters pertaining to the regime. This primarily concerned the creation of independent trade unions, a matter which entailed accepting the principle of pluralism on the part of the communist authorities, and a declaration recognizing the leading role of the communist party on the part of the workers. The fact that an agreement was reached did not stem from the two sides' agreement that compromise in regime matters was possible. Compromises were accepted in all other questions, but here more of a temporary camouflaging of conflicting views took place. Both sides harboured the hope that within the framework of the negotiated rules they would be able to achieve their own goals and aspirations. The signing of the Gdańsk Accords was nonetheless an extraordinary event. The very fact of negotiating political and social issues between the authorities and the ISC as a public, representative body was something that undermined the fundamental principles of the totalitarian system. It could, however, be treated as a sociotechnical tool wielded by the authorities to ease tensions and stifle the spirit of revolt. After all, the open signing of the agreement before the eyes of Polish society and the world community – transmitted, as it was,

by radio and television – was a sensational fact, for it expressed the new order of the whole political system. It resolved an intense social conflict without resorting to force, through direct public contact between the ruling and the ruled, and without using democratic procedures. Hence, it could be treated as a possibility for the evolutionary departure from communism. The imposition on December 13, 1981 of Martial Law against *Solidarność* flew in the teeth of this, but in 1989, after over seven wasted years, this was precisely the scenario that was implemented. In the event, the Gdańsk Accords revealed the communist system's exhaustion and bankruptcy, as well as the fact that the "power of the powerless" may indeed be sufficient to regain freedom.

On the Sunday afternoon of August 31, 1980 Lech Wałęsa, having just signed the agreement in the BHP hall, said: "We got everything we could in the current situation. And we'll get the rest as well, because we have what's most important: our independent, autonomous trade unions". And that is exactly what happened.

But we need ask ourselves: is the fact that these events took place in Poland an outcome of mere chance, an interesting coincidence – or is it the result of certain key and unique features of Polish reality? The series of social revolts in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and finally 1980 is truly impressive. But why did it occur in Poland?

We should point out two particular characteristics that above all else distinguished Poland from other countries of the Eastern bloc. One was the survival of private land ownership and individual farming. Forced collectivization, which was imposed on every country subordinate to the Soviet Union, was ended in Poland after the "thaw" of October 1956 and annulled in great measure. The second unique feature is the power of the Catholic Church in Poland. The efforts to make the Church dependent on the regime's authorities proved to be largely ineffective on Polish soil, and the policy of direct confrontation, as expressed in the imprisonment of the Primate of Poland, Stefan Wyszyński, was soon to prove quite unsuccessful. This stemmed not only from the power of the Church's hierarchy and of its institutional structures, a power that underlay the authorities' particular attitude towards the Church, but also from Polish society's deep tie to religious faith. In the modern European catalogue of relations between the authorities and the Church, the case of Poland is a special one in that the Church took shape as a source of resistance against foreign powers and of national bonds during the times when the Polish state did not exist. In Poland there was no traditional union between "the altar and the throne". Moreover, in the conditions of the communist regime, the Church naturally evolved into a moral buttress in the fight against the ideology and political system forcibly imposed on Poles, as well as into a place of freedom in a captive country. In the case of the 1980 break-through it is hard to overestimate the meaning of Karol Wojtyła's election and John Paul II's subsequent 1979 trip to his homeland. During that visit Poles gathered in churches and public squares and heard a voice of hope that praised human dignity.

Poland was probably the weakest link in the whole Eastern bloc, and this also explains the particularities of the Polish situation and Poland's initiating role in social

protests. These spread with varied amplitude over the country, but were always strong in worker milieux. Yet when analyzing why August 1980 took place on the Baltic Coast, one should not use the notion of the "weakest link". The reasons are rather of a positive nature. The vast work yards of the Coast, along with the mines and ironworks in Śląsk (Silesia), represented the greatest concentrations of heavy-industry workers. This had symbolic meaning, for in the official propaganda shipworkers, miners and ironworkers were upheld as the most prestigious and avant-garde social group. Sociological research from the late 70s depicts a fractured society lacking intermediate group bonds: at the bottom end was a feeling of close family bonds – at the top, the feeling of national and religious bonds. In the case of where professional and local bonds were nonexistent, the groups of heavy-industry workers were an exception. They had a somewhat higher level of skill and education and an above-standard material situation; moreover, they were conscious of both their common good and the national good. Their feeling of dignity and responsibility for public affairs also had a marked influence on the fact that the events of August took place on the Coast. Finally, it was here on the Baltic that a fairly large number of brave activists, through the distribution of underground publications and their structural organization, were able to co-ordinate strike preparations. They also created a communication network with other cities that, together with the wide international coverage, gave the events in Gdańsk a nation-wide significance. Gdańsk was able to speak for the whole country. And with the prolongation of the Gdańsk strike, the threat of a general strike was becoming more and more imminent.

Due to the social and political dimension of the events in August, analyses defined them, both in Poland and abroad, as a revolution. Timothy Garton Ash wrote of a "Polish revolution", Jadwiga Staniszkis wrote of a "self-limiting revolution", Jacek Kuroń spoke of an "evolutionary revolution", Krzysztof Pomian indicated the presence of a "national awakening" in this "citizen's revolution". Norman Davies underlined the moral dimension in the Polish movement. Problems of definition emerge from the fact that the Polish experience of August 1980 is difficult to assess in terms of previous European historical experience. The participants of those events did not evince revolutionary consciousness: they most probably would not have called themselves revolutionaries, just as they did not accept official propaganda's accusations that they were counter-revolutionaries. After all, what sort of a revolution is one without victims, acts of revenge, guillotines or public hangings! There was, however, the will to freedom, which was opposed to the totalitarian system. There was the will to start something new, which is what Hannah Arendt considered the essence of revolution. There was the regaining of the right to freedom and the transformation from subject into citizen. This was an anti-totalitarian revolution, and one against which tanks were sent on December 13, 1981. One recalls the words of Poland's 19th-century poet Cyprian Norwid: "Huge armies, generals almighty, / Police – secret, uniformed, and of sexes two / Against whom are they united? / Against a few thoughts…nothing new!"

An anti-totalitarian revolution is marked by the fact that – unlike other revolutions – it is aware of its own weakness and of its adversary's power in terms of pure force, and hence it does not attempt to take power, but demands democracy and the legal subjecthood of the citizen. It acts in the name of freedom and human rights, renouncing the use of force. It invokes a mass civilian movement and causes extreme regime change without using extreme measures. This was the course of events in Poland from August 1980 to the Round Table and the elections of 1989; this was also characteristic of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and the political breakthrough in Hungary in 1989. This was the model for the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia and the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine. In Eastern bloc countries, where there had been no popular upheaval and where political changes did not have an anti-totalitarian character, hybrid regimes were created, where democratic procedures and private ownership were respected, but the change from subject to citizen did not occur and a state of law did not coalesce. Freedom still had a concessional character: the Deianira tunic of communism, described by the American historian Martin Malia, still poisons the life of these countries.

The anti-totalitarian revolution also has an ideological structure. In social upheavals and mass movements the spontaneity factor dominates over the programme. However, in the August events and later in the *Solidarność* movement one may aptly recognize certain ideological foundations. Of first place is that of the idea of solidarity. It loomed during the Gdańsk events, when the shipyard strike turned into a strike of solidarity, when the shipyard bulletin came out under the name of "Solidarność" and finally when the newly-founded trade union proclaimed itself as independent and autonomous and took the name of "Solidarność". Besides this coincidental aspect, one has to recognize the simple message behind the name, opposed to the ideology of class struggle and state omnipotence. Zbigniew Brzeziński is accurate in saying that the name "Solidarność" "proclaims the birth of a united consciousness and of mutual trust, of an alliance of different societal milieux and groups". The notion of solidarity also expressed the belief in the power and importance of national and religious bonds. It was accompanied by a hearkening to the past, as expressed by the demand to honour the victims of December 1970, put forward from the very beginning of the shipyard strike, and by the observances of national holidays that *Solidarność* organized. On the other hand, the concept of solidarity carried a strong belief that society's unified rallying around positive projects and programmes creates the opportunity for effective action aimed at restoring "common sense" in the economy and public life.

The second element of the ideological structure was the special way of conceiving workers' rights and interests. It was once said that Solidarność was the last proletarian revolution in European history. However, it should swiftly be added that this was a special kind of "proletariat", one that – contrary to the "Communist Manifesto" – had its own homeland and pronounced sense of patriotism. Moreover, it carried a feeling of responsibility for the entire national

community, and hence it formulated its demands in categories of the regime's functioning and its reform, and did not advance only material claims. Nor did Poland's then "proletariat" come out against class enemies: rather, it hammered out agreements with other social groups. Both the Gdańsk agenda with its 21 Postulates and the activity of *Solidarność* during the 500 days of its legal functioning extended well beyond the framework for a trade union. But indeed, the movement we are today honouring does closely reflect the tradition of 19th- and 20th-century workers' pleas for "bread and freedom". Conventions ratified by the People's Republic of Poland were called upon in the demands for the creation of independent trade unions, for the right to strike, as well as in professional claims – but the demands for workers' rights were treated as demands for human rights. For it was natural in this context to demand freedom of speech, the free flow of information and the freeing of political prisoners. The highlighting of human rights created a natural basis for linking political and social matters.

When politics entered *Solidarność*'s activity it retained an element of the "antipolitics" of Gyorgi Konrad and Vaclav Havel. The self-limiting character of Poland's liberation movement was expressed in the utopia of civil society, as opposed to the state. The first was seen as the realm for freedom, the second as the realm of violent coercion. The resolution passed at the *Solidarność* congress in September 1981 entitled "The Self-governing Republic" foresaw the virtual separation of society from the state. The first was to rule itself, the second – though it had a guaranteed monopoly on power – was limited by the personal freedoms defined in the Helsinki Final Act. This created negotiation space for both sides. Therefore, if the *Solidarność* movement of 1980 is to be considered a revolution, it has to be said that it was the first revolution through negotiation. The third characteristic of the ideological structure was that of having ruled out any direct confrontation with the opposing side. This is why it may be stated that *Solidarność* was European history's greatest movement for change that did not resort to violence.

That was the nature of the *Solidarność* movement. To outside observers it might have been seen as a dream doomed to fail. And yet it brought about a successful departure from communism. Communism had lost the economic and political confrontation with the free Western world, but it might have persisted for decades more simply through the inertia of the divided Cold War world. But the example of the Polish freedom movement and the courage and determination of Central and Eastern European societies caused the communist system to topple in 1989. We well remember the subsequent fall of the Berlin wall, Germany's reunification, and the disappearance of this continent's division into a free and unfree Europe. Europe's unification in 2004 was the direct outcome of this. And this is why in European awareness and shared memory there need be a place for the Polish August of 1980 and for *Solidarność*. The model of anti-totalitarian revolution that was then created continues to serve as a powerful example.

Mr. President, our discussion must press on. I now wish to turn the floor over to Mr. Eugeniusz Smolar, programme director of our conference.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Ladies and Gentlemen! Welcome dear friends. There are so many of you – so many friends of *Solidarność* from around the world – that it is impossible to count all of you. Some of you hold important functions in your respective countries, like Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Rybachuk. But somehow you made the time to come. Others came at their own expense just to be here with us. For there are times when it is important to be in Poland, in Gdańsk, in Warsaw, and at this conference. Thank you all very much.

This conference is organized by the *Solidarity* Center Foundation and the Lech Wałęsa Institute. I would now like to ask Mr. Bogdan Lis, one of the Gdańsk Shipyard strike leaders, president of the executive board of the *Solidarity* Center Foundation, to take the floor. Bogdan, please.

Bogdan Lis:

I am deeply moved today by the fact that, 25 years after the signing of the August Accords, we have succeeded in gathering so many trusted friends of *Solidarność* from all over the world, along with so many *Solidarność* activists, many of whom hail from the first *Solidarność*, and who in recent years have lost contact with each other. Today they can shake hands for the first time in many years and refresh those friendships.

Ladies and Gentlemen, before I continue I would like to ask the technical staff to play something, a fragment of a recording from the second round of the 1st National "Solidarność" Trade Union Congress, which took place in 1981 [in what followed those attending the conference heard the chairman of *Solidarność*'s deliberations thank Mr. Andrzej Piwno for having translated a letter from Romania. He then read that letter: "To the First Congress of *Solidarność* in Gdańsk. We wish the congress of free Polish trade unions complete success. We are grateful for the Manifesto to the working class people of all the socialist countries. The Manifesto caused us joy and has strengthened our friendship. We are your supporters. Thank you again for the Manifesto. Signed: Julius Filip, Cluj, Romania"].

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will now quickly tell you what later happened to this letter and this man. On the 13th of December, after Martial Law was imposed, Julius Filip was arrested. Sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, he served six and a half years, including 540 days in a tiny concrete cell with chains bound to his feet. This Romanian man, Julius Filip, is here today at this conference. Julius, please stand and let us salute you!

This conference was organized with people like Julius in mind. It was organized for the people of *Solidarność* the world over. I suppose during these next few days many of you will reflect on whether it was worth serving six and

a half years in Romania, in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, or in Poland in order to be free today.

I wish you all fruitful proceedings and that our conference be a great success. Thank you very much.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

We shall commence our conference with the first panel, chaired by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, former *Solidarność* activist and Prime Minister of Poland. Krzysztof, it is your session.

1st SESSION
The Helsinki Final Act and the Politics of Human Rights

Chair: *Jan Krzysztof Bielecki*, former *Solidarność* activist and Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, 1990-1991;
Guests: Professor *Zbigniew Brzeziński*, former National Security Advisor to President Carter (1977-1981);
Timothy Garton Ash, author of one of the first books on *Solidarność*;
Jean-Bernard Raimond, French Ambassador to Poland (1982-1985), French Foreign Minister (1986-1988);
Sergei Kovalyov, Russian human rights activist.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Welcome, Ladies and Gentlemen. I would like to begin by reminding you that the 21 Postulates declared by the Inter-factory Strike Committee, first written on paper, then on billboards, contained no less than 8 points which can be found in the Helsinki Final Act. I suspect that neither ISC members nor the two young men who painted the postulates on the boards knew about this. An intuitive yearning for the respect of human rights was therefore with us since the very beginning. It was during that time that we caught the virus of freedom, and we became so infected, we were so conscious of this freedom that giving it up was not an option. Even during Martial Law, when we were a much smaller group than the 10 million we knew before, we felt that freedom and human rights are worth fighting for and we refused to give up. This is what led to the victory of *Solidarność*.

It was partly thanks to people such as Professor Brzeziński, who did an amazing job, that this Polish virus developed so actively inside us. Professor Brzeziński introduced the issue of human rights into international relations and this gave us hope; hope for another miracle, this miracle which has been discussed today already at some length.

Zbigniew Brzeziński

In talking about human rights and international affairs, and particularly in doing so in today's concept, context, a context of celebration, of triumph, of a heroic historical transformation, it is probably not inappropriate to note a very simple but singular fact. Two European governments, located close to where

we're meeting, are not represented. And it is food for thought as to why they're not represented. But I would also hazard the thought, to which I'll later return, that we are witnessing a momentary relapse. That also the countries ruled by these governments before too long will experience what *Solidarity* accomplished, what many other European countries are today enjoying – namely real democracy, real freedom. And therefore their absence is a signal that a very profound change within them is approaching. They're not immune to it. They'll not be able to stop it. But to speak of human rights and international politics, we'll return back to more than 30 years. The notion of human rights in international affairs became important in the first half of the 1970s. But it is also important to remember that this was not a particularly auspicious moment. This was a time when the Soviet Union seemed almost invincible. This was a time when the Soviet Union seemed to be riding the crest of history. This was a time when the Soviet leaders were still boasting that by 1980 the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in economic power. Now this was a time that the Soviet Union seemed to be reaching out for strategic superiority. The mood at the White House at the time was one of Spenglerian pessimism. Namely, that the West was declining, and what was necessary is some sort of an accommodation that would stabilize international conditions. In effect, a bargain in which the status quo would be guaranteed by the taunt for some nominal acknowledgment of the importance of human rights. Human rights for status quo – that was the devil's bargain that was being negotiated in the first half of the 1970s. That concept in the West, and particularly in the United States, underwent a fundamental change in the second half of the 1970s, and that continued into the 1980s. And here I have in mind in a bipartisan spirit the role played both by President Carter and by President Reagan. Both of them redefined the strategic meaning of human rights. Human rights was established not as a means of stabilizing the status quo, but as the historic inevitability of our time, the consequence of which would be a change in the status quo. In effect, in was a redefined notion of human rights making human rights the meaning, the substance of an ideological offensive designed to transform existing political realities. In the days in which I was serving in the US government, in the second half of the 1970s, three important initiatives were undertaken in that connection. And all three of them were continued, and expanded, by President Reagan. And I acknowledge this with approval and gratitude. The first initiative was for the United States to undertake deliberately political activities designed to help the non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union. That was an important break with the past. Indeed, it was an initiative that was strongly opposed at one point by some elements in the US government, on the grounds that, as there is an American nation, there was now also a Soviet nation. And hence it would be counterproductive and indeed a cause of international tension for the United States to be supporting non-Russian national movements. Yet that decision was very deliberately made in 1978, and

the United States undertook a number of activities designed to strengthen the capacity of patriotic Poles, Ukrainians, and others to promote the idea of their own national independence. The second important political initiative that was made was the decision of late 1979 to actively and directly support the Afghan resistance movement in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That had never been done before in the course of the Cold War. The United States had never before engaged in direct support of activities designed to inflict pain and casualties on the Soviet army. And the resistance of the Afghans certainly was related to the deepening crisis that the Soviet Union encountered in the 1980s, to the effort to revive the Soviet system by *perestroika* and *glasnost*, and which ultimately produced a defeat which everyone sensed in the world, and involved a reversal of what hitherto had appeared to be an almost inevitable progression to the greater and greater power and size of the Soviet Bloc. The third decision, the most momentous of all, was the decision to help the *Solidarity* movement when it made its appearance in Poland. There was, to be sure, a great deal of uncertainty after the proclamation of Martial Law: would the movement be crushed, would the past be repeated, would Poland experience what Hungary experienced in 1956, or in a less bloody fashion, what Czechoslovakia experienced after 1968? But here the fact that this did not happen is not due to efforts in the West, but is due almost entirely to the courage and dedication and perseverance of the *Solidarity* movement and of the Polish people. With consequences that we are familiar with and about which our speakers have already spoken so eloquently. The political triumph, because of that courage and perseverance, eventually undid the Soviet Bloc, and in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, it undid the Soviet Union. And thus it is no exaggeration to say that the success of *Solidarity* represents one of the truly great historical upheavals in the political history of mankind. I would rank it on the same level as the American Revolution, the French Revolution and Gandhi's anti-imperialist peaceful revolution in India. It reflected the political maturity of the Polish people, it reflected the political rationality of its leadership and it was a catalytic development, with the consequences we're all familiar with. The fact that today we have the leaders of an independent Ukraine and of Georgia, not to mention of many of Poland's neighbours, speaks for itself. But I feel very confident in asserting that this process is very much still alive and it will make itself felt before too long in the two countries which are not represented here today. The thrust of history in this particular case is, I think, clear; its direction is clear-cut and its eventual success is inevitable. And there is a reason for that, a broader reason. Namely, that the very special characteristic of our time is that we're living in a phase of massive, unprecedented global political awakening. Hitherto, political alertness, political consciousness worldwide was a relatively isolated phenomenon. Since the French Revolution 216 years ago it has gradually spread through Europe, reaching the far East, then to the imperial and colonial regions

of the world. But today it is a pervasive reality worldwide. The population of the world today is politically awakened and it demands, and insists upon, political, ethnic, cultural and religious dignity. And its ability to assert that demand peacefully and responsibly depends on the maturity and literacy of the publics. One of the key reasons for *Solidarity* was that it appeared in a society that had been politically mature and politically literate for decades. One of the reasons it has now succeeded in Ukraine is that the Ukrainian people have become politically alert, politically awakened, and with a sense of political responsibility. This is a pervasive process, but it doesn't manifest itself all at once, everywhere. It is a progressive process, one which requires recognition of the stages of political development. And for that reason it is also important to realize, particularly for us Americans today to realize, that democracy cannot be fostered on the basis of any single formula, any single prescription, any single arrogant assertion that democracy can be taught from outside and fostered from outside. It has to come from within, from the growth of a sense of political responsibility, from a mature craving for political dignity, and can express itself in a variety of ways. The notion of building democracy on the basis of compulsion, on the basis of imposition from abroad, is a form of imperialism. And there is no room for imperialism in the world today. This is one of the consequences of the fact that the population of the world is now politically awakened. It is in this context therefore, that the quest for human rights has to have a global dimension. And what *Solidarity* teaches us is that solidarity on a national basis can also be solidarity on an international basis, and eventually on a global basis. The only relevant concept for the political future of mankind is a global civil society, a global civic solidarity. And for that there is an additional reason for all of us to be grateful to all of you who are here in this room today. Thank you.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you. I think Professor Brzeziński and numerous representatives of successive United States government circles deserve words of gratitude for their efforts and actions to make the impossible possible.

When after Martial Law some impetus was taken away from our movement, I remember that, when I was looking for a flat in which the *Solidarność* leader Bogdan Borusewicz could hide, one of my friends told me "You know, Chris, you have to be realistic, better join the boy scouts and stop living in an illusion". But it was thanks to those illusions that we were able to survive – partly because of the fact that both in Poland and abroad so many people were supporting us. Professor, we thank you for that – you supported us.

The next speaker is Professor Timothy Garton Ash, who, after many years as a specialist on German affairs, in the 1980s started concentrating on Poland and our region. From then on he has accompanied us by discussing in his writings our region's liberation from totalitarianism.

Timothy Garton Ash

Thank you very much.

Presidents, Prime Ministers, Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,

I'd also like to start on a personal note. Like many people in this room, I was lucky enough to be in the Lenin Shipyard with the strikers 25 years ago, and then to follow at first hand the whole development of *Solidarność* over the next 16 months and indeed over the next decade. It was a, if not *the*, formative experience, political experience of my life. As Wordsworth wrote of the French Revolution, "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very heaven". I wonder what the interpreters made of that. But youthful political enthusiasms can be dangerous things. All too often it turns out that the cause you've embraced believing it was good, turns out to be a total failure. And if it succeeds, it turns out to have been not that good – as was the case with many youthful enthusiasts for communism in the 20th century. I feel very lucky simply, that with many others, the cause I chanced upon was that of *Solidarity*, which I think we can say today, was both a good cause and success. And I think that President Kwaśniewski was right to remind us that for all the reservations we might have today for the politics of Poland, for what happened to *Solidarity* after 1989, it is not only a good cause but a successful one. I'd like to refer back to what Bronisław Geremek said in his marvellous lecture. This self-limiting, evolutionary, peaceful, negotiated Polish revolution was actually the beginning of the re-definition of 'revolution' *tout court*. Not just in Central Europe, but in the world as a whole. It was actually the beginning of the end of the Jacobin-Bolshevik model of revolution which had prevailed in 1789, in 1917, and the beginning of what is now in fact the default model of revolution in the world. Professor Brzeziński referred to this talking of Ukraine.

Solidarity in 1980-81, Ladies and Gentlemen, was the first velvet revolution. But even then, with all the enthusiasm, one tried to keep a critical distance and to be fair to actors on all sides, particularly because *Solidarność* itself placed such a high value on truth against a political system, one of whose main instruments was systematic, organized lying – the Orwellian big lie. And I would like in the same spirit to attack, to address our subject today – the Helsinki Final Act and the Politics of Human Rights – because I believe that we have today something I call the "Helsinki myth". There used to be the Yalta myth, now we have the equal and opposite Helsinki myth. The great French philosopher Henri Bergson talked about the illusions of retrospective determinism, the almost irresistible temptation to believe that what happened in history somehow had to happen, that history proceeds like a French boulevard, in a straight line from one *rond-point* to the other. Well, of course it's not like that. History is a long and winding road, and at every point there are many possibilities and options, and thus it was with *Solidarity*. But now we are told the story as if there was a straight line in Helsinki in 1975 to the achievement of freedom in 1989. There are also, I would say

adapting Bergson, the illusions of retrospective *Solidarity*. That is to say, with hindsight everyone in the West was always on the side of *Solidarity*, on the side of the dissidents all the time, as we know. Well, I think the historical truth was a little more complicated, and that's what I want to address. And the first point I want to make echoes what Zbigniew Brzeziński just said. If you ask what were the primary causes of the birth of *Solidarność* 25 years ago and of everything that followed in the 1980s, the primary causes were internal domestic causes and causes inside the Soviet Bloc. Everything that the West did was at best only a secondary, if not a tertiary cause. And I think it's very important for us in the West to remember that. To put it picturesquely, I would say that that young worker in Ursus, Zbigniew Bujak, distributing his initial 12 copies of a smudged edition of the samizdat journal "Robotnik" probably had about as much impact as the whole policy of an average medium-sized West European state. Those are roughly the proportions. Or to put it in a very crude schema, if you ask what was the balance in percentages in domestic causes, causes in the Soviet Bloc, and the role of the West, I would 60% domestic, 25% developments in the Soviet Bloc, 15% the West. By the way, I'm including as a domestic actor a certain distinguished Polish priest who at that time was living in Rome, John Paul II. You might shift the percentages a bit for the sake of argument, perhaps in 1989 we could say 40% domestic, 40% Soviet Bloc – notably developments in the Soviet Union, 20% the West. But I would suggest for discussion in this room that the whole role of the West never got above 20% of the total causality, as it were. And I think that the notion that not only can we support new velvet revolutions, but that we can, as it were, we from the West, notably from Washington, impose them, I think that this notion is very important for us to reflect upon. Yes, we should reflect upon Gennady Garasimov's famous "Sinatra Doctrine" replacing the "Brezhnev Doctrine" – 'You did it your way'. That's very important for us in the West to remember. For as we of course all know, success has many fathers, and all claim a part in the success.

My second point is this: this turns to the role of the West. It's often pointed out that for the Soviet Union, for Brezhnev, Helsinki was to be the confirmation of Yalta, of the post-War division. For the West, it is claimed, it was to be the beginning of overcoming Yalta. But the truth is that even in the West there were very different intentions and expectations at the time of signing the Helsinki Final Act. There were many different Helsinkis. I vividly recall a meeting chaired by Bronisław Geremek in Warsaw in 1990, when doctor Henry Kissinger came to speak. And doctor Kissinger said, in his inimitable fashion, "It gives me great pleasure to be here in Eastern, I mean Central Europe". "And here", he said, "in Eastern, I mean Central Europe, what I first of all think of", this is doctor Kissinger speaking, "is of how we designed and desired the Helsinki Final Act and put human rights in the very centre of the Helsinki Final Act". Well, for anyone who knows a little American diplomatic history they would know that doctor Kissinger didn't want the Helsinki Final Act at all. He regarded it as a

concession to the Soviet Union, which wanted it very badly as a confirmation of Yalta. His aide Helmut Sonnenfeld said in 1975 of Helsinki, "We sold it for the German-Soviet treaty, we sold it for the Berlin agreement, and we sold it again for the opening of the MBFR". Just a bargaining chip. And the great irony, of course, is that the mutual balance force reduction talks, which is Washington's prize, went nowhere at all and Helsinki went everywhere. But it was a bargaining chip. And as for human rights, doctor Kissinger was famously of the view that human rights had no place on the agenda of relations between states. But success has many fathers. Equally, the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany at that time, its *Ostpolitik*, was not at all about encouraging the kind of developments that started in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk in August 1980. On the contrary, it was about *détente* from encouraging reform from above and indeed developments such as those of *Solidarność*. These unstable, unpredictable developments from below were rather feared than hoped for, because the belief was that they would upset the whole apple-cart of *détente*, inevitably provoke Soviet intervention and put the clock back. So the reaction to what happened in 1981 was extremely ambivalent. To put it in another way, to personalize it slightly, if I may, the object of German Helsinki policy was not to secure the rise of Lech Wałęsa, but rather to secure the irresistible rise of late Polish communism's great hope, Mr. Mieczysław F. Rakowski. It happened differently. I could go on.

There were many different Helsinkis, many different intentions; the question is what was it that made this such an extremely pivotal moment in European history? For that was undoubtedly Helsinki's effect. A major effect in which human rights moved to the centre of the European agenda, and in which Western states did come to support the emergence of movements for human rights in Central and Eastern Europe. I would put it to you that three main sorts of political actors helped to bring that about. The first was, and I put this quite simply, the Americans. First of all, Americans not in the executive arm of government in the Nixon administration. People like Millicent Fenwick, who produced a marvellous initiative for Helsinki observance, the Helsinki Watch committees. Only later follow Americans in the executive arm, particularly in the Carter administration. I do not think we would have had the Helsinki process as a human rights process without the Carter administration. I think it is very right that we pay tribute in this room, once again, to Professor Brzeziński and the Carter administration. Who, of course, when they came to this city in 1977, made an explicit linkage between respect for human rights and another 200 million dollars of credits and other *douceur* from the West. Just the kind of linkage we need.

The second actor who made Helsinki a human rights process were the Central and Eastern European dissidents and opposition leaders from many different countries, and the churches and individual citizens who took Helsinki at its word. Like, for example, the many individual East Germans who read the Helsinki Final Act on the front page of *Neues Deutschland* and then, being perhaps slightly literal-minded applied to emigrate from East Germany, because that's what the Helsinki

Final Act said they could do. In this country it was notably KOR, but also other opposition groups, and it was the church of Karol Wojtyła, a church which now preached not just the rights of believers of the Church, but the rights of each and every individual human being – universal human rights.

Thirdly, and I think in third place, there were some West European activists and some governments or at least some ministers or diplomats, some of the time, who did embrace that agenda at an early stage. Our French colleague will talk in a moment about France. I was rather pleased, in my thinking for this talk, to come across this comment by the British representative at the Belgrade Review Conference of Helsinki in 1977. I quote, "A great British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin once said when he was asked to define his foreign policy, 'I want to be able to go down to Victoria Station and buy a ticket to where the hell I like. That is what I want to do. I want to see a Europe in which any citizen can go to a pavement kiosk and buy a copy of the Times, Le Monde, The Herald Tribune Political, Pravda. I want to see a Europe in which a young girl from one country who falls in love with a young man from another can be assured that no barrier will be put up to prevent them from joining each other, marrying and setting up home. I want to see a Europe in which any citizen who wants to criticize his government for excessive bureaucracy or for policies which seem to him contrary to the spirit of Helsinki will feel free to do so publicly without fear of the consequences. I want to see a Europe in which the web of contacts between people is woven even tighter and wider, until it will bear any burden placed upon it. I do not", he said in 1977, "expect to see such a Europe tomorrow or even in 10 years time, but I am certain that this is a vision which must inspire us on the road to Madrid and beyond". 30 years after the Helsinki Final Act, with the enlargement of the European Union in May last year, that vision has been realized. So much so in fact, that I must say to my delight, I can now order a drink in Polish in any bar in London. I would also say that very soon under the impact of *Solidarity* the Helsinki process became increasingly a process which was about human rights. American journalists started referring to the 'Helsinki human rights declaration', where of course human rights are only in the preamble. There was actually strengthened Western solidarity in the diplomacy relating to the Helsinki process. At the Madrid Review Conference there was, for example, the famous 'night of silences' on the 5th of March 1982 when Soviet representatives tried to get another meeting scheduled, and all the Western representatives, NATO and neutral, simply sat silent. The night of silences. The Helsinki process from then on developed irresistibly towards the culmination of 1989. There was a great Helsinki effect, there is no effect without a cause. But that effect was often certainly the opposite of what Leonid Brezhnev intended when he first started pushing for the Helsinki Final Act. It was also something very different from what many Western governments and politicians intended and expected at the time. And I think in the interest of historical truth it's important to remember that.

May I finish, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends, by just offering a tiny reflection prompted by this story, prompted altogether by the experience of *Solidarity*, of Poland, on the relation between myth and reality. Or to put it in a different way, between idealism and realism. I said there is a Helsinki myth. This is not just a retrospective myth. For the Helsinki myth, as I've tried to suggest to you, was developed at the time, notably by people behind the Iron Curtain, in Central and Eastern Europe. It was in a sense a myth of the West, developed by people living in what was then called 'the East'. Politically, geopolitically, the East. But also by some in the United States and Western Europe. It was in a sense a highly idealized West. If you like, it was the West of the great American Westerns. Standing tall for human rights, fighting for freedom. Those American Westerns that were so popular in Poland, so that the most effective election poster probably in the history of the 20th century was that of *Solidarność* in the elections of June 1989 – Gary Cooper, guns at the ready, *Solidarność* badge on his lapel, and nothing underneath but the words, "*Solidarność*, at high noon, June 4, 1989". That was the West as it was gleamed in Poland. And recalling that wonderful poster, that great poster, made me think of another Western that I recently saw. Many of you will know it, I'm sure. It's been shown in Poland many times, namely, "The Man Who Killed Liberty Valance", which ends with a newspaper man, always the strictest observer of the facts and the truth, a newspaperman saying this famous line: "In the West", meaning the American West, "when the legend becomes fact, you print the legend". I would say that, in a curious way, that is true of the Helsinki of human rights and the emergent West. There was a myth, but the myth was created and nurtured at the time and the myth helped to create its own reality. In the end it became the reality of freedom. Thank you very much.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. I think that when Professor Ash spoke of ordering drinks in Polish, he narrowed down the professions we represent in London. Today, London is also the workplace of Polish construction workers, accountants, lawyers, bankers and plumbers. Since we've come to plumbers, I would like to ask Minister Jean Bernard Raimond, French ambassador to Poland during Martial Law, to take the floor.

Jean Bernard Raimond [translation from French]:

The first free elections in Poland in June 1989 are a triumph for *Solidarność*. It was one seat short of complete control of the Senate, while in the Sejm it won all the seats save those reserved for the Polish communist party. The people of Central and Eastern Europe immediately comprehended the revolutionary import of this event, beginning with the Germans. On September 10 Hungary opened its border with Austria. On November 9 the wall tumbled in the centre of Berlin, at the Brandenburg Gate. In Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel, thrown in prison in February

and released in May, became President of the Czechoslovak republic on December 29. In Bulgaria, Todor Jivkov resigns on November 10. Only Romania frees itself of Ceausescu at the cost of bloody manifestations. German reunification is on the way, with negotiations between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl having commenced after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9. The last event of historic proportions was the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Pope John Paul II, on December 1 in Rome. Thus, in the space of a few months, the world witnessed the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist system, born in Petrograd in 1917, and imposed on Central and Eastern Europe by Stalin in the aftermath of the Second World War. The nomination as prime minister of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic close to John Paul II, and a former detainee of the military coup of December 13, 1981, opens a new era in European and world history.

How ought we to interpret this revolution, whose most compelling illustration came with the tumbling of the Berlin Wall – an event for which the world had lost all hope? This unprecedented European crisis, a veritable acceleration of history, has three principal sources which are inextricably linked. First, the Polish *Solidarność* movement uniting workers and intellectuals, and the strike at the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk; second, the influence of John Paul II, the first Slavic Pope in history, elected in 1978; and finally, the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985.

Solidarność

In the autumn of 1980 I was in Warsaw negotiating the renewal of our agreements on cultural cooperation. In Kraków I met with university rectors glowing with optimism that the Gdańsk accords had marked a decisive step towards pluralism. At the same time in nearby Nowa Huta an enthusiastic Lech Wałęsa was haranguing the working class. On leaving Paris I was told that the Polish crisis is essentially economic in nature. That evening, however, back in Warsaw, Stanisław Gajewski, former Polish ambassador in Paris, said to me: "Don't believe a word of it, we are dealing with a very serious political crisis, and one which is undermining the regime". Thus it came as no great surprise when, on December 13, 1981 in Paris, I learned to my great worry and consternation of General Jaruzelski's coup d'état, by which he meant to curb the effort to destabilize of the communist system.

Back in Warsaw in August 1982, this time as ambassador, I was aware that opposition leaders, beginning with Lech Wałęsa, were being detained. The military authorities were attempting to reinstate a Marxist-Leninist regime and preparing to de-legalize *Solidarność*. All the opposition was either in prison or had fled to the underground. I kept up contact with the Church and the entourage of Primate Glemp, who had assumed the task of speaking out to the Polish people in the name of all the suppressed revolutionary leaders. The situation was sombre, even sinister. Telephone connections were cut, and international calls were redirected to functionaries who politely told us that our conversation was being

listened in on. Relations with France were execrable. I recall being summoned by the Polish foreign minister on twenty one occasions in two and a half years in order to receive a reprimand addressed either to my government, or myself personally. On the other hand, I remember feeling deeply moved when near the end of the Mass conducted to celebrate the opening of Warsaw's Catholic Academy in October 1982, the Primate turned to the altar and, with all the bishops gathered behind him, intoned the chant "God save Poland", which was to become *Solidarność*'s anthem. In this paradoxical country, despite the police nature of the regime, it was possible to keep in touch with the opposition, which, whenever free, never hesitated to express its grievances. In early 1983 I was at last able to have a longer conversation with Bronisław Geremek, freed at Christmas 1982. This conversation cost us, and him especially, police reprisals.

Upon leaving Warsaw on January 31, 1985, after the murder at the end of 1984 of Father Popiełuszko, I bore in my mind two clear ideas. The first was that of all the past attempts at ending Soviet domination or the communist system (1953, 1956, 1968) the Lenin shipyard strike was the most radical, since it was the working class which, together with intellectuals, opposed the regime of which it was purportedly both leader and champion. The second idea, just as important, was that systemic change, something which had failed to materialize in East Berlin, Budapest or Prague, was even less likely to transpire in Warsaw if nothing changed in Moscow.

John Paul II

When Karol Wojtyla was elected Pope in 1978, leaders such as Gierek and Brezhnev grasped that the ascension of a Polish Pope would have profound political consequences. Instead of facing Cardinal Wyszyński or the Archbishop of Kraków, they had now to deal with the Pope himself. It was in Poland that John Paul II rose through the echelons of the Church hierarchy, becoming the Bishop of Kraków in 1958, the Archbishop in 1964 and Cardinal in 1967. He was never a nuncio, nor a member of the Curia. It was well-nigh impossible to be more Polish than the Pope.

During his first visit to Poland in 1979 he brought his compatriots a message of freedom and non-violent resistance. This message was later to be presented to the entire world in June 1981 at UNESCO in Paris. It was this UNESCO address, among the greatest by any statesman in post-World War II and Cold War history, that provoked Paris' cardinal Lustiger to assert, on that very day, that "Today Communism is dead". Karol Wojtyła, a philosopher lecturing at the Jagiellonian University and KUL (the Catholic University of Lublin), was eminently present through his articles and other works in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Kraków's oppositionist-intellectual Catholic weekly then edited by Jerzy Turowicz. But he was also present through his action and engagement. He walked alongside the workers during demonstrations of support for Cardinal Wyszyński. And maintained contact with the most active militants, ones such as Kuroń and Michnik, former communists and founders of KOR (the Workers' Defence Committee).

The Pope's second visit to his homeland in 1983, after the ban on *Solidarność* came into force in October 1982, and notwithstanding the fact that Martial Law was only temporarily suspended and Bronisław Geremek was back in prison, brought precious moral support to the underground and to the opposition, which at the time exhibited relative weakness. If one were to add up the millions of Poles who participated in the open-air Masses, those who watched on television, albeit broadcast only regionally, as General Jaruzelski trembled before the Pope, along with those who listened to the Polish radio broadcasts, it is easy to conclude that almost the whole of Poland heard Karol Wojtyła speak out in 1983. More extraordinary still was the feeling that the Pope and the Poles were meeting privately, with the government, the party, and the Sejm suddenly gone, vanished. The Pope spoke freely, the Poles raised their arms in homage to *Solidarność*, each open-air Mass creating a kind of extraterritoriality, an unbounded liberty of sorts. One would forget about the Militia, the prisons, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, the Soviet Union – millenary Poland was sovereign and free.

Whatever the outcome, whatever the future, in 1983 John Paul II proffered his compatriots a miraculous feeling: consolation for the present and encouragement for the future. I managed to find a sentence I addressed to my government at the end of the Pope's visit: "the migration of the entirety of Poland towards the Pope was like free elections, the implicit dream of all of *Solidarność*'s demands". Though strengthened by John Paul II's challenge to the whole Soviet system, one he spread throughout his homeland at the heart of Europe, *Solidarność* still faced, in 1983, a long and arduous task.

Mikhail Gorbachev

In 1987, when foreign minister, I selected Poland as the objective of my first visit in the "other" Europe it then was. My next stop was Hungary, the region's most liberal country. Having spent some thirteen months in Gorbachev's Soviet Union, I was expecting an improvement to the situation as compared to when I had left Warsaw two years earlier in 1985. Indeed, beginning with Zbigniew Bujak, I was able to meet with all of those underground leaders whose acquaintance I had not had the chance to make during my previous stay. Yet I grasped the enormity of the remaining challenge when I heard Bronisław Geremek and his colleagues congratulate me for successfully completing an interview with *Tygodnik Powszechny*, saying that it is still pluralism that is ultimately going to have the upper hand.

In early 1988 the situation in Europe and the USRR was in actual fact paradoxical. Mikhail Gorbachev was prepared to set the Soviet Union on a path leading to a state of law. He had just concluded the first disarmament agreement with Washington on the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Force), which concomitantly called for international control and the destruction of nuclear missiles. He was in the process of disengaging the Soviet Union from all local conflicts, and consequently of completely abandoning the Soviet expansionism of

Khrushchev and Brezhnev in Africa, Latin America, Asia, not to mention Afghanistan. Conversely, the post-war European heritage of Stalinist imperialism remained largely intact, despite the Polish exception of *Solidarność*. It was 1988 that saw the situation considerably evolve: in Moscow the reformers were pitted against conservatives, and there was unrest in Central Europe, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, as well as in Poland, where price hikes in Gdańsk and Nowa Huta provoked a wave of strikes. Relations between Hungary and Romania were very tense, with numerous demonstrations occurring in Budapest.

The pivotal event occurred in August 1988, again in Poland, when following the latest tensions between the authorities and *Solidarność* announcement was made of Round Table talks – in effect the harbinger of the imminent revolution. Hence Poland's spectacular, and definitive, evolution gathered speed in 1988, the same year that saw the party conference in Moscow and the resulting institutional reforms, accompanied by the announcement of partially free elections in the USRR for 1989. These two scenarios – Polish and Russian – are almost identical, but are they independent of one another? Was there not complicity in 1988-89 between Mikhail Gorbachev and General Jaruzelski? In January 1989, after two days of furious debating, the General got the Central Committee to approve a resolution on the restitution of trade union pluralism. On January 22 *Solidarność* decided to negotiate with the authorities, despite the recent murder of two opposition priests. Thus, on February 6 fifty-seven representatives of the regime, the opposition and the Church partook in the inauguration of Round Table talks in Warsaw's government palace. The negotiations were tough, and on several occasions almost broke down. The Round Table agreements were finally signed on April 6th 1989 – history was made. They stipulated the reinstatement of trade union pluralism, the democratization of political institutions and admission of the opposition to Parliament. On April 17 the ban on *Solidarność* was lifted. For all those who, like myself, had lived through Martial Law, this was the exact antithesis of General Jaruzelski's policy. Is it sufficiently appreciated as such? It was the contrary of normalization, the utter defeat of the Brezhnev doctrine. At the very moment that Poland's Round Table talks were nearing conclusion, elections for the Congress of People's Deputies took place in the Soviet Union. The first round on March 26 was marked by the success of numerous nationalist reformers and the defeat of the party's official candidates. In the second round, the reformers again brought home victory. As for this defining moment in history, allow me to quote Bronisław Geremek: "I do not believe that the decision of 1989 was made by Gorbachev himself, but I am convinced that it could not have been made without him. If Polish communist leaders did not resort to violence despite the means to do so, it was because of their awareness that this did not sit well with new Soviet policy, the policy of Gorbachev. They knew very well that they could not count on Soviet support".

Let us just add that Mikhail Gorbachev himself on several occasions, as at the UN or in Strasbourg in 1989, made it clear that he had renounced the Brezhnev doctrine. The USSR would no longer intervene in the internal affairs of Central and Eastern European states.

Conclusion

Is it really all that surprising that the initial rupture, one capable of unsettling the structure of the Cold War inherited from World War II, came about in Poland? One day in Kraków and at the Royal Castle of Wawel suffices to make us mindful that Europe is not solely of Mediterranean and Western stripe, but that one of the sources of its civilization lies in the very centre of the continent. It was not by chance that in Potsdam, and especially in Yalta, the fate of Poland constituted one of the principal points on the agenda. When Roosevelt was advised by Hopkins to cede control of the observance of the Atlantic Charter, Poland became one of the principal victims. Neither was it by chance that Stalin's first strategic move had been the 1944 establishment of the Lublin Committee, foreshadowing the progressive introduction of communism in Central Europe. It was Poland, along with Ukrainian and Lithuanian, that witnessed the advent of the most radical form of challenge to the Marxist-Leninist system – the Lenin shipyard strikes with the demands for trade union pluralism, the gateway to political pluralism. The working class itself rebelled against the regime which was its purported embodiment. And, as we were at the very centre of European civilization, the intellectuals supported, and sometimes guided, the workers' movement so that it could deal a death blow to the Soviet empire.

The example of Lenin – who arrived in Petrograd in 1917 and, gainsaying the Bolshevik leadership, decided that the time was ripe not so much for a bourgeois revolution, but for a socialist one – has taught us that even in the 20th century the individual can give direction to history.

In 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 20th century, marked by totalitarianisms, gave way, in a peaceful manner, to an entirely new world. No doubt it was the profound motions of History that engendered the fading of ideologies, but we owe the return of freedom and truth to the combined activity of several outstanding personalities: Lech Wałęsa and his circle of intellectuals struck at the very heart of Marxism-Leninism by rousing the working class to rise against a regime that claimed to be its embodiment; John Paul II, armed with a faith verging on mysticism and brought up on the phenomenology of Husserl, a disciple of Hegel, inspired people with a vision of non-violent resistance to totalitarianisms; and last but not least, Mikhail Gorbachev did not hesitate, both in the Soviet Union and outside it, to call into question the weary Marxist-Leninist system, at whose summit he was placed by his peers who, to use Gromyko's phrase, chose the most intelligent among them.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you Mr. Minister. I would sincerely like to ask those willing to take part in our discussions to sign up on the list being passed around.

I would now like to ask Mr. Sergei Kovalyov to take the floor.

Sergei Kovalyov [translation from Russian]:

I have entitled my remarks, "Hope and hopelessness – from the Soviet Union to Russia".

In the middle of the previous century, a new political ideology, based on the principle of individual rights and freedoms, was formed. What earlier had existed only as an important theoretical advantage, characterizing human and legal dignity, at that time made its way into the postulates of state policy. The most important postulates were to be found in important international declarations, agreements, and sometimes even in institutional documents. Some of them are included in UN statutes. The many demands to make legal and humanitarian principles universal were backed by the endless appeals of a host of great thinkers, ones such as Einstein, Russell or Sakharov, for the development of new political thought. In consequence this meant that states are responsible not only before their own citizens, but in fact before the whole of humanity.

The paradox, however, was that the international political establishment was not prepared to accept, not to mention implement, the ideals of universal values – and this is still the case today. Moreover, political elites use these ideals as a new way of expressing the traditional rhetoric of *Realpolitik*. However, the objectives and principal methods set by traditional politics and the aforementioned ideals and values are, to put it mildly, hard to reconcile. Despite this, the early Eastern European and Soviet social movements incorporated these values into their standards of action against the communist system. Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of these movements is not my task today. In speaking about my country, I will quote the experiences of our Polish friends.

Now, getting to the essentials – we worshipped the same ideology. I would say that we were national teams of the international fraternity of dissidents. International, because the ideal of freedom is universal, global. Andrei Sakharov, when asked in an interview what the intelligentsia can do, once said: "Only one thing. Create ideas". So we created these ideas, but to accomplish our task we needed something more. The Soviet Union was full of educated and intelligent people. However, there was no one who had ever seen a court with their own eyes. I mean here a normal, independent court. Or a parliament, or independent reporters. Out of all the communist nations, it was us who were isolated the most and for the longest time. Our discussions on legal issues were reminiscent of inventing the wheel. But I don't find the childishly low level of modern legal knowledge and of democratic thought that Russian dissidents had in the beginning appalling in any way. Every beginner is a dilettante beginner, but he also has

an important advantage – he is a budding neophyte who is ready to take on challenges that are unrealistic and impossible to accomplish. Our endeavours most probably were of no use to legal thought. We quickly got rid of this ignorance, but we did make advances in other domains – in the ethical or, if you wish, psychological sphere. Firstly, regardless of our religious beliefs, laicism, or agnosticism, we discovered for ourselves a religious way of thinking. We came to understand that around us, in our Soviet reality, we could not count on our efforts to bear visible effects. Regardless of this one must act correctly and wisely, according to one's own principles, including the following: "do what you must and what will be, will be". And another thing: if you are free, no one will be able to take this freedom away from you. This statement sounds quite trivial in the overintellectualized Europe of today. But these discoveries were important to us in that Godless country – a country which in the 60s lacked spirituality.

Our resistance against the regime was an individual one, even when the first organizations were being created. This was not political opposition. It was moral disagreement with reality. We were very elitist, we kept our distance from the younger generation. We were of the opinion that the young have the obligation to study. Also, we were horribly afraid of workers. It was a fear of the Russian revolt, a thoughtless and pitiless revolt, as Pushkin put it. What a burdensome legacy this revolutionary country bequeathed us!

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, the situation was different. Poland, of course, was under foreign pressure. Communism had been imposed by a country that was known to the Polish nation through the events of the 19th century, 1920, September 17, 1939, the spring of 1940. It was a country the Poles well knew because of Katyń, Charków and Miednoje, the bloody Warsaw Uprising and post-war repressions. But history stays quiet if we do not talk about it. And it would have long stayed quiet if not for the intellectual and various other forms of protest adopted by Kuroń, Michnik, Lipski, Romaszewski, Lipiński, Macierewicz, Naimski and many others. And of course if not for the perseverance and great bravery of Lech Wałęsa. Thanks to their common actions the Poles have already assured themselves a secure and proud place in Europe.

Our situation is less optimistic. As with the past's Stalinist institutions, today's national institutions are not functioning to serve the people. The division of power is a myth. The submissive state administration and parliament act under the influence of the authorities – decisions are made not in accordance with the law, but according to state interests, just like in the previous era. The few remaining fair judges are being expelled from the juridical system. Special forces are hopeless when faced with terrorists, but quite efficient in supporting and perfecting trainings for spies. The end of the ruffian war in Chechnya is nowhere in sight. The Kremlin is sending qualified criminals to head the Chechnyan authorities. It is faking election results, which, taking into account the current situation in Chechnya, should not even be taking place. Apart from a few low-budget publishers, used by

the Kremlin to blind the naive West, the media are submissive and fearful. The most important state positions are occupied by the president's friends from the KGB – the institution that murdered several millions of our compatriots. A majority of society supports this, because it prefers Putin's eclecticism over democratic values. In the late 80s and early 90s, politicians called "democrats" were highly appreciated in society. Today they have become marginalized. Those responsible for this change are not only the "checkists" but also the democrats themselves, who have retold numerous lies, evinced an attitude of intransigent partisanship, and acted opportunistically, not in accordance with their conscience. They were too concentrated on popularity polls and counting votes – votes they no longer have today. Human rights activists are also partly responsible for the current situation. They still have not realized that their main occupation is not law, but politics. A politics for tomorrow – a politics which does not manipulate the law for its own ends, but which is subject to it. Their aim must be to make the authorities accept the rule of law, which is both above politics and outside it. We must demand the creation of a mechanism which guarantees the primacy of this principle! We must demand civic control over this mechanism!

A Russian *Solidarność* may yet one day be created. However, our country is faced with the enormous threat that our mass movements may turn out to be not an Orange Revolution, but a red and black one. This is quite a serious threat, but at the same time an important challenge. My country needs a strong democratic opposition, one which does not yet exist. My hopes lie with the civic organizations that exist from election to election, but which should plan more long-term projects and objectives. My hopes may become reality if politicians begin to understand three things. Firstly, that civil social structures cannot be used as political instruments. Quite the opposite – it is the politicians who should be the instruments of civil society. Secondly, that we should prepare ourselves for a long, tiring and bleak task, one which will not yield rapid political effects. Such is the nature of civic organizations, not political parties. Finally, it is high time we stop lying to ourselves and others!

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. Let us start the discussion. The first to speak will be Daniel Fried, Under Secretary of State, former US ambassador in Poland. The next speaker will be Richard Davy. Dan Fried, the floor is yours.

Daniel Fried

I'd like to make two points to sum up, to my sense, a very important discussion. One is that *Solidarity*'s impact on the world and on my country has grown over the years. That is a general comment. To be more specific, we in the United States have come to realize slowly and over time, the ultimate indivisibility between security questions and questions of human rights. Tim Garton Ash and Zbig Brzeziński described the painful and halting process by which the United States and the West

went from our starting point of *Realpolitik*, in which human rights was regarded as an auxiliary factor at best, and a damned nuisance at worst, in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Bloc, to recognition that human rights is central, freedom is central to our calculation about the world today. That flows into a second point from this discussion, one which is another of Zbig Brzeziński's points, that the process of democratization in this part of the world and the world itself, which was accelerated by *Solidarity*, has not ended. Now it is true that the United States and Poland are accused occasionally of having helped ferment the so-called coloured revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. I'm certainly proud of the part my government played and Americans played in supporting democratic forces in Ukraine. But had the coloured revolutions, the Orange Revolution or the Rose Revolution been planned by some sort of US government committee, they would not have turned out half as well as they did, I can assure you. But we must also not limit our sense of democracy's relevance to the former communist world. It is true, as my former professor said, that the conditions in Poland were right for the triumph of democracy in 1989. But of course, at the time in 1980-81 and in 1989 itself, most of so-called informed opinion in the West believed that democracy would not succeed in Poland; that the only question before us was, in what manner democracy would fail in Poland. Whether it would fail as democracy had in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or Hungary in 1956. We should not therefore sell out or sell short the prospects for democracy in other parts of the world. Surely we must not impose. But we must help – as we did in Poland in 1980-81 and later in 1989. It is not a question of imposition, it is a question – and we have learned this from our Polish friends here – a question of solidarity.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you. Mr. Richard Davy, a leading commentator for the London "Times" in the 1970s and 1980s will now address us on the Helsinki Final Act. Following Mr. Davy will be Professor Osiatyński.

Richard Davy:

The Helsinki Final Act was a piece of paper. It would have remained a piece of paper if it had not been brought to life by *Solidarność*, Karta 77 and many other courageous groups and individuals within the Soviet empire.

But we should not forget the people who wrote that piece of paper: the stubborn European officials who laboured through nearly three years of often bitter negotiations to transform a Soviet proposal into a remarkable document that was almost the opposite of what the Soviet Union wanted.

As the negotiations drew to a close in Geneva at 4 a.m. on July 21, 1975, a senior member of the Polish delegation predicted to a senior member of the British delegation that when the text of the Final Act was distributed to provincial secretaries in Poland, the party secretary in Kraków would telephone the General

Secretary in Warsaw and tell him "You people must have been mad to agree to our signing this thing".

How right he was to be worried! And how right, too, were the Soviet Politburo to be "stunned" when they read the full text (according to Anatoly Dobrynin's account). They, like the Polish official, knew they had suffered a diplomatic defeat.

Yet, strangely, many commentators, particularly in the United states and some in Poland, chose to believe the opposite. They attacked the Final Act as a sell-out, another "Yalta" that legitimized the post-war borders and the Soviet sphere of influence. Even today, one hears the Final Act described as a bargain by which the West accepted the division of Europe in return for assurances on human rights.

What actually happened was that nearly every Soviet attempt to gain recognition of the status quo was rebuffed by the nine members of the (then) European Community, with important support from neutrals and non-aligned. Together they resisted strong Soviet pressure and occasional attempts at sabotage by Dr Kissinger, who saw no place for human rights in international relations.

As a result, far from endorsing the status quo, the Final Act called for radical change across a wide range of issues. It made the vital point that respect for human rights was "an essential factor for peace" in Europe, that individuals had the right to know and act upon their rights, that peoples had the right to self-determination and that states should "facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds" – this against particularly heavy Soviet resistance. Instead of legitimizing Soviet rule, it legitimized Western interest in the internal affairs of the Soviet empire.

In no way did it change the status of borders, legally or otherwise. The Soviet Union had wanted them declared immutable. Instead they were declared "inviolable", meaning, as the text explains, that they may not be assaulted, but can be changed by peaceful means, which simply re-states the Charter of the United Nations.

Nor was the Soviet Union able to gain Western recognition of the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine", under which it claimed special rights to intervene within its empire. It wanted the ten principles guiding relations between states to apply only to relations between states with "different social systems". Had it won this important battle it would have been left with a free hand within its own sphere. Instead, the final text applied the principles to relations with "all other participating states" – meaning, of course, that the Soviet Union should respect the rights of its subject states.

The Soviet negotiators also failed in their persistent attempts to protect their control of information, human contacts and cultural traffic. They tried hard to exclude references to individual and private contacts; they wanted to subordinate all contacts to conditions such as "non-interference" or respect for the "cultural foundations" of states; and they tried in vain to restrict contacts to the specific purpose of "fostering peace" (to be defined, of course, by Soviet officials).

Despite some compromises, the result was an explosive package that brought the Soviet empire almost nothing but trouble. This was achieved because most of

the governments of Western Europe were determined that there could be no true peace or détente in Europe without respect for human rights and European values. They deserve more credit than they received at the time.

***Jan Krzysztof Bielecki**:*

Thank you, Mr. Davy. I shall now ask Mr. Wiktor Osiatyński to take the floor. The next speaker will be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

Wiktor Osiatyński:

I would like to add a few details mainly to what was said by Timothy Garton Ash on the history of the Helsinki agreements and *Solidarność*. For I think the Helsinki agreement created certain conditions which *Solidarność* both complied to and expanded in a very interesting and special way. The Helsinki Final Act included something which rarely happens in history, one regulation, one point which greatly influenced the fate of the world. I mean the article that did not exist in other human rights agreements or in the Universal Declaration, and which states the following: "The individual has the right to know his rights". I have been searching for the person who suggested this article (I heard it was someone from the British Home Office) and have tried to understand how was it that the Russians overlooked it. Anyhow, this point was the basis for the creation of many human rights organizations. The first was the Moscow Helsinki Group, then Poland's Workers' Defence Committee, the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, and other Polish organizations. I think that between 1976 and 1980 something of worldwide importance happened in Poland. First of all, meaning was injected into the principle of human rights, and secondly, human rights became a practical uniting factor for the Polish nation. Before then, the Polish nation felt its historical, cultural, linguistic and religious community, but it was very starkly divided into the elites, demanding privileges, and the masses, demanding human mercy. This division was most sadly visible in the difference between the intelligentsia's protest in 1968 and the workers' protest in 1970. In 1968 many workers really did not know what students and the intelligentsia were protesting against. In 1970, in turn, students and the intelligentsia were unable to support the workers' revolt on the Coast. In 1968 the students and intelligentsia were quoting the communist constitution in their support, but already in 1976 – the Helsinki Final Act and human rights. In 1980, just four years later, the Gdańsk Accords included eight points demanding political freedom. This was something revolutionary and new. How did it happen?

During that time, there were two concepts of freedom and human rights – the Western and the Eastern. The communist concept stated that there is no freedom without bread, the Western that political and individual rights, the so-called individual freedoms, are more important. Well, I think this is worth studying in more detail, studying the way in which cooperation between the Workers' Defence Committee, the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, free trade

unions and other organizations led to the synthesis of these two concepts. For *Solidarność* showed us that there is no bread without freedom. Why is there no bread without freedom? The Polish economy was collapsing partly because of the fact that there was no feedback mechanism for decision makers. In capitalist countries it is the market which maintains this function, but we did not have a market at that time, and the only possible feedback, or a similar mechanism, was political freedom – free trade unions, political opposition and its parties, a free press and freedom of speech. I fear that this is a seldom appreciated detail, but one which shows how in just four years in Poland the concept of rights, which unified two concepts into one, was created. This concept later became, at least for some time, a new political philosophy uniting the nation. For those four years, the Polish intelligentsia moved away from the concept of privileges and towards human rights, and the masses, or at least their leaders, abandoned the concept of mercy and began to fight for their rights. It was this attitude that gave birth to *Solidarność* and that has become a lasting contribution to the concept of protecting human rights.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. Now Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski will address us. Octavian Bratila will be next.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski:

We spoke of the role of law in the context of humans rights in international politics. It could be worthwhile to say one or two things about the condition of this law. To put it shortly, today this law is an almost fully comprehensive one. From time to time there is talk of a new generation of human rights, but this is not crucial. The crucial aim of today is to make this very important law, which regulates human rights and basic freedoms, enter into force. The main issue has been the method of upholding human rights. From his own experience, notably his White House experience, Professor Brzeziński reminded us of two instances: one in which diplomatic pressure of varied strength was used as a method of achieving a goals, and one instance, in which armed forces were used – Afghanistan.

One must also mention other methods that stem from international law. I mean human rights control by international watchdogs and the creation of an international system of human rights tribunals. These already operate well in Europe and quite decently in Latin America, too. As for the other continents, practically every aspect of this domain is still a symptom of wishful thinking.

The next issue, one which morphs with the politics of human rights in the international dimension, is the universalism of these rights. The fundamental problems are civilization differences, ones often reiterated during various debates. These differences are of historical, cultural, ethnic and other natures, but we must always remember that basic human rights must be equal for all, regardless of such differences.

Finally I would like to note that well calibrated politics of the kind briefly alluded to by Professor Brzeziński as well as the other speakers – Mr. Garton Ash, Mr. Kovalyov, Mr. Raimond – does not cover all the possibilities. This is because in politics, international law plays a very large role. But I would say that politics and diplomacy do not always profit from this. Recently however, there have been changes in this respect. The first such change is the introduction of absolutely valid law into legal treaties and into their scopes. In the past, states could change practically every valid norm through manipulation of treaties. Today this is no longer possible. For the countries of the world have achieved a consensus on legal codes, on a given universally valid law, and treaties conflicting with these codes or with human rights shall not be binding. The second point, one which has surfaced in recent international law developments, is the confirmation of the existence of norms that are valid amongst all states. These are international commitments which one state owes all other states and subjects of international law for reasons of mutually accepted values and the common interest in the realization of rights. And this is a very important change, because the issue no longer concerns only the harmed state and the harming state, also with regard to human rights, but becomes a point of interest for all countries, each of which may act on the issue.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you. I would now like to ask Professor Octavian Bratila from Romania to take the floor. Mr. Andrzej Wielowieyski will follow.

Octavian Bratila:

I have the honour of speaking in the name of the thousands and thousands of people who were sent to Romania's communist gulags. My former comrades above all thank Mr. Wałęsa and the Polish nation for giving us the rays of hope. I also thank the Polish Catholic Church. I thank Mrs. Madelaine Albright for her work on behalf of human rights. I wish to thank Mr. Zbigniew Brzeziński, who so wisely advised the President of the United States. We in Romania felt his work. I thank you. Together with all our great and dear friends, I thank the Polish people for giving us *Solidarność*. *Solidarność* is not dead, *Solidarność* is alive, and it will live a long time, so long as there will be people on Earth. Please don't forget the Romanian adage: "Hope dies the last".

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. Now we will listen to Mr. Andrzej Wielowieyski. Bogdan Borusewicz will be next.

Andrzej Wielowieyski:

Solidarność was a great historical surprise, a sort of miracle, as Krzysztof Pomian put it. We must of course try and understand how it came to be. Professor

Ash claims the reasons were mainly of an internal nature. I fully agree with him. But I do not agree at all with Professor Geremek, who said that it was first and foremost the factories, the heavy-industry working class who made this possible. This is partly true, but this was an insufficient, inadequate cause, even if we add to it the independent trade union movement and all the conscious activists working there, leaders like Wałęsa or Borusewicz – even then, it was insufficient. For we witnessed a completely unpredictable, unusual event in a totalitarian system – a general strike, something that had never happened before. Yes, there were strikes in Radom and in Ursus, in Warsaw and in Lublin, but there was no effort to meld them into a general strike. In Gdańsk, however, in just two days over one hundred factories went on strike. After four or five days 500 factories were striking.

I think that an important cause, surely not the only one – there were many causes, after all – but an important cause was the post-1970 communist terror, during which hundreds of people were killed on the Coast, and thousands were sacked or arrested. I have in mind the many weeks spent in jails on the concrete, making the arrested run the gauntlet, and terrorizing workers in all possible ways in order to make workers' communities forget about revolt or even dreaming of change. I think that the source of the great victory lies also in these actions and in their consequences. For that weakly knitted society up on the Coast – lacking, as it did, a deep historical community – only an experience of dire threat could provoke large scale social integration. And this was exactly the feeling! One of threat, the feeling that if we don't stay together till the very end, they will finish us off, they will destroy us in such a way that life will become pointless. The Shipyard became a symbol, the flagship of that fight, and it brought about an amazing degree of social integration in the face of the common threat. I think that we need reflect more deeply on this.

The historical paradox, therefore, is that the actions undertaken by the system's defenders, their measures designed to save the system, had a significant, indeed causative impact on society's subsequent victory against them.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you. Bogdan Borusewicz will take the floor, and Dr. Felice Besostri from the University of Milan will follow him.

Bogdan Borusewicz:

Because Mr. Chairman expressed his surprise at the fact that in the 21 Postulates there were elements of the Helsinki accords, I would like to say that if anyone from our community had read just one book, the next material he had on his list of works read was the Helsinki document. So yes, we knew the document well, and it is no coincidence that there are direct references to Helsinki among the strike's postulates. Helsinki also puts a certain end to the discussion which was taking place in the West and which we in Poland were familiar with. I have in mind the question if we in Central and Eastern Europe have the same right to democracy

and freedom as the citizens of Western countries. This was something that was not generally and straightforwardly accepted. There were discussions on whether we Poles wanted democracy and freedom – and the answer was not always clear. We ourselves also asked if the nations of the USSR want democracy and freedom. Helsinki laid an end to this discussion in the sense that governments decided that our nations do have the right to these freedoms.

In the countries we lived in, we were isolated from others – from the Russians, from Czechoslovakia's people. And we in the opposition were isolated here in Poland. Despite these difficulties, a huge impulse for the creation of the Workers' Defence Committee came from the meeting of human rights activists organized in the mid-70s in Moscow. A committee was created which included people such as Sakharov, Kovalyov and others. They were in a far worse situation than we Poles, yet despite this they decided to act openly in the name of human rights. This had a direct influence on the decision in Poland to create the Workers' Defence Committee, because we told ourselves that if the Russians have decided to do this in their situation, then what are we in Poland waiting for? This also concerns the creation of Karta 77 in Czechoslovakia, which in turn was influenced by what was going on in Poland.

Thus, despite the closed borders, information did flow, and ideas did flow. A huge role was played by foreign correspondents. In Poland, these included Andrew Nagorski and Bernard Guetta and others, as well as Radio Free Europe, Radio Swoboda, the BBC, the Voice of America – their role was enormous. This gave us room for freedom. I therefore would like to thank those correspondents, many of whom were expelled from Poland.

Now for my final point. *Solidarność* was not created out of thin air. 1980 was a difficult period for the opposition, which nonetheless did manage to prepare certain structures and to prepare people. The August strike would have been completely different if these tasks had not been accomplished. But besides the fact that a mass organization – one which did not fit into the system, which was outside the system – was created, the very core of communist ideology was questioned. That ideology was based on the theory, one many of us still remember, of proletarian leadership. And it was this proletariat that said "No". In doing this, it undermined not only the organizational principle of the system, but also its entire ideology. And when the ideology had evaporated, all that was left was raw force. And this is what Jaruzelski ultimately resorted to.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. I would just like to remind you all that Bogdan Borusewicz was the organizer of the Gdańsk strike, its brain and an underground activist in the 80s. He was imprisoned only for a short while, but only because the security forces were unable to catch him for five years. In this respect he probably set the Polish record.

Dr. Felice Besostri, please.

Felice Besostri

Presidents,

Together with *Solidarity* and the ensuing fall of the communist regime, a common history for Europe began once again. For no clear division into East and West had previously existed in our history – nor in our geography. Fifty years of political divisions and political systems could not erase a European civilization with more than a millennium of shared culture. Three facts should be considered together. The Prague Spring, the creation of *Solidarność* and its first success with the August Accords, and Gorbachev's postulates for reform. In the first, a political party from the periphery headed up the changes and its leaders were imprisoned. In the second, a communist regime had the possibility of reforming the system with the help of a movement and through the representatives of civil society, especially the workers. The response to this was Jaruzelski's coup. The third was an attempt made in the very centre of the empire by the powerful Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We all know how that ended. All three situations disclosed the truth that communism was not reformable: neither from the top, nor from the bottom, neither from the periphery, nor from the centre. The only possibility was to organize a transition, peaceful if possible, from dictatorship to democracy. And this was the great service of *Solidarność*. Poland was also important for the Left in my country, which was forced to abandon its illusions on the communist regime and its reformability. Thank you.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

I would like to ask Gadin Kozhakhmetov, member of the Committee for a Just Kazakhstan, to take the floor.

Gadin Kozhakhmetov:

Dear participants of the conference! The adoption of the Final Act in Helsinki 30 years ago played a considerable role in the promotion of democracy and human rights behind the Iron Curtain, where the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Bloc countries were hidden. The *Solidarność* movement that took form in Poland 25 years ago has gone down in world history as the brightest example of the confrontation of society against the state, as embodied in the communist party's ruling position. It is aptly stressed that it was not ill-defined social forces that constituted the opposition to the communist regime in Poland, and later in other countries of the Eastern Europe, and not even the interests of separate societal groups, but rather it was emotionally coherent ideals and values – those of freedom, democracy and human rights.

A revolution happened in Poland in the first half of the 80s as a result of the mass opposition that had formed against the totalitarian system. Its historical significance was sealed with its contribution to the liberation of the peoples of Central and Eastern European, and in its shining example to the whole international community. Five years ago 106 countries of the world adopted the

Warsaw Declaration on the way to the Community of Democracies in the capital of Poland, a country that adheres to those ideals and values, and where democratic principles and practice were so shiningly expressed. That declaration came as a beacon to the democratic forces in the countries still under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. It was a sign that they are not alone. That the progressive part of the world community recognizes its responsibility for the promotion of democracy and human rights not only in their own countries, but in others, as well. That responsibility is placed not only on the governments of these countries that signed the declaration, but on the civil societies of those countries, including the civil society of the one in which the *Solidarność* movement was born 25 years ago. And precisely for that reason, I appeal to you to promote analogous processes in the countries of Central Asia. To lend them assistance, and to offer support to the democratic movements there. To promote them, and to exert influence on their governments. To lend them assistance at the international level in the aim of achieving the observance of generally accepted democratic principles and standards by the authorities of the states of the Central Asia. Such support will be the brightest demonstration of real solidarity, something which has brought you freedom and democracy – as it surely will bring us, as well. As a first step of such support, I would like to call for the creation of a coalition for democracy in Central Asia today. Any organization or individual who is ready to assist the people of the region in their move towards democracy in Central Asia could become a member of this coalition. In the first place I am sending this measure to Mr. Lech Wałęsa, who asked for new initiatives at the start of our conference. I am asking for the personal support of Mr. Zbigniew Brzeziński, as well. As a second step, at 2 o'clock, immediately after this plenary session, The Movement for a Just Kazakhstan and the delegation from Kyrgyz are organizing a press conference on the second floor about the situation in Central Asia. Thank you very much.

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you. Now Mr. Isa Gambar, former Azerbaijani Prime Minister, will speak.

Isa Gambar:

I am one of the leaders of the democratic opposition in Azerbaijan. I am very grateful to be here at this anniversary. Azerbaijan, which has so many links with Poland, is still trying to implement the Helsinki accords. We are still peacefully fighting for free elections. Our next elections are on November 6, 2005, and given your experience and commitment to freedom and democracy, I would like to invite you all. I am asking you to come to Azerbaijan and observe our elections. Looking at this room, I am sure that even if only 10% of you came, we would have a fighting chance to win the elections and build a free democracy in a Muslim state. Thank you very much.

Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. I would like to ask Mr. Emin Huseynli of the Youth Movement Magam in Azerbaijan to take the floor.

Emin Huseynli [translation from Russian]:

I would like to thank the brave Polish citizens who stood in the ranks of *Solidarność*. The example of *Solidarność* was greatly important and influential not only in Central European societies, but also for the citizens of the former Soviet Union in their fight for democracy, justice and independence. When in Azerbaijan in the late 80s we were beginning our fight, we based our actions in large part on your experience.

In 1992 the democratic forces achieved victory in Azerbaijan and a former dissident, the leader of the National Front, was chosen President. Unfortunately, the eyes of the world were focused almost exclusively on East European countries and their integration. Taking advantage of this, the former Azerbaijani communists, helped by reactionist forces from Russia and Iran, overthrew of government. They regained their lost power and began to curb human rights.

It is twenty years since we began our fight against the totalitarian regime of Gajdar Alijew[1]. In a few months time, we will once again have the chance to make Azerbaijan a free country. In November, parliamentary elections will take place and all of Azerbaijan's democratic forces, joined together in the electoral bloc "Freedom", are united and adamant in their desire for Azerbaijan to join the rest of the world's democracies in just a few months' time.

We ask you not to forget about the Caucasian and Central Asian states. I know that my colleague has already encouraged you to take part in these elections as observers. We do not ask for anything more. We will build a democratic Azerbaijan ourselves, but we want to feel the presence of your moral support!

Krzysztof Bielecki:

Thank you very much. And with that we end this session. I would like to thank all the speakers and debaters. I hereby announce an hour-long break.

[1] Former head of the Azerbaijani KGB and leader of the communist party of the Azerbaijani Republic.

2nd SESSION
Solidarność, John Paul II and Christian Thought

Chairman: *Tadeusz Mazowiecki*, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland (1989-1990);
Speakers: *Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger*, Former Archbishop of Paris, apostolic administrator;
Archbishop Józef Życiński, Metropolitan Archbishop of Lublin.

***Tadeusz Mazowiecki**:*

I take great honour in chairing this session, which hosts such prominent personalities as Cardinal Lustiger and Metropolitan Archbishop of Lublin Życiński.

In Cardinal Lustiger, a great thinker, I see first and foremost a true friend of Poland and of the *Solidarność* of the past era. I had the opportunity to learn of this myself when in 1987 I made my first trip to Paris and talked to the Cardinal. I think that Cardinal Lustiger, together with French trade union leaders, grandly represent *Solidarity*'s international friends.

In Father Życiński, in turn, I see a man who represents *Solidarity*'s purest ethos in the various disputes currently taking place in Poland's difficult political and public circumstances. He represents that truth which states that whereas the memory of the past and its appraisal are indeed necessary, they should sow not hatred, but verity and respect for all people.

Before we move on to our main topic, I would like to express my esteem for the activists of yet another stage of our struggle, when the somewhat crumbling, as I see it, underground *Solidarność* had already become weaker, and people were becoming more willing to search for alternative solutions and a new wave of strikes began in 1988. I was in Gdańsk and I took part in the May 1988 strike. I remember how after the strike, when we were leaving the Lenin Shipyard, there was a general feeling of defeat. But I myself felt that there was a new, vibrant wave and that we had achieved something with that strike, though I didn't expect its consequences to be felt immediately. But just a year later the consequences came, great ones. I would like to pay homage and send my warm greetings to each and everyone who took part in those strikes, especially in the May and August strikes.

The topic of our session is John Paul II, the influence of the events being discussed here on Christian ethics, and the role of the Pope's first pilgrimage to Poland. I remember that when we were in the Gdańsk Shipyard in August 1980,

very many journalists asked us about the Pope's photograph hanging on the gate. I recall the discussions I had on the subject with Bernard Guetta, who began to understand the connection between the Pope and the workers' protests. It was only a year after the Pope's visit then, and already so much was underway. During that first pilgrimage, at a meeting of the Catholic intellectual group *Znak* with the Pope in Kraków, I had the chance to stand next to him. I told him how Poland had already changed during just those first several days of his visit. He pondered that a minute and then said to me, "Yes, I'm thinking what's next, what's next…" Today, we of course all know what happened next. His reply showed how deeply attuned he was to the imminent historical changes.

I would also like to recall the words uttered by the Pope to the *Solidarność* delegation in January 1981: "I am happy that the events which took place this past autumn, which began with those memorable weeks in August, presented an opportunity to reveal the solidarity that had attracted the attention of broad spectrums of world public opinion. Everyone has emphasized the great maturity of the Polish people, and especially of the working class, in tackling and solving the difficult problems which stand before them in this critical moment for the country, and in the context of events so commonly seen in today's world, their method of action so often being force and violence". And another quote, one which begins with reference to the crisis surrounding *Solidarity*'s legal registration, only after which we were allowed to travel to Rome: "The efforts of those autumn weeks were not directed against anyone. And neither is the great challenge that still stands before you. It is aimed solely at the common good. This right – indeed, obligation – to undertake such efforts belongs to every society and every nation. It is a right certified by the entire codex of international life. We know that down through the centuries we Poles were not once deprived of this right by force. But that has not made us abandon our trust in Divine Providence, nor has it weakened our will to start things afresh".

Your Eminence, the floor is yours.

Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger [translation from French]:

THE *SOLIDARNOŚĆ* EXPERIENCE AND CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

In those times there was the East, the Iron Curtain and the West. In France, the Soviet empire seemed as unshakeable as Egypt of the Pharaohs. This is why the first Gdańsk events filled us with admiration and amazement, but also with fear of repression against the Polish nation. But other news from Poland rapidly followed. First, the giant blow dealt to Marxist ideology: workers demanding respect from the communist authorities for human rights and democratic norms. Next, the evolution of a popular movement in which intellectuals and workers stood hand in hand. And finally, the Catholic faith of the Polish people and their respect for national history. These are the factors that made *Solidarność* unstoppable.

All of this created a picture which completely shattered Western stereotypes concerning workers' rights, class struggle, the Soviet regime, religion as "the opium of the masses", etc. *Solidarność* drastically changed the majority's views on these subjects, irrespective of their theoretical positions or political opinions.

When the first Gdańsk Shipyard strikes began in 1980, our view of the Polish situation had already been altered by the election of the Polish Pope in 1978 and his first pilgrimage to his homeland in 1979. Without this Pope, his words and his presence, *Solidarność* would not have been possible. But in order to have wholly understood the message of his addresses, one had to have Polish sensibilities and a Polish heart, as Archbishop Józef Życiński later remarked.

In France, the Pope and *Solidarity*'s discourse was interpreted as an element of the power struggle between the Polish people and its communist authorities. Today it seems obvious to me that the *Solidarność* experience was much more than just a milestone in the fight against communism. There is more to it than simply a national revolt against foreign tyranny and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

1) The inconceivable for Marxism-Leninism

Solidarność arose among the Polish people as a visceral response to their long-lasting Soviet oppression. Marxist-Leninist analysis does not, or rather cannot, take into account the fundamental truth of the human condition. In fact, it does not – or again, cannot – discern it, due to its ideology. Calling itself a materialistic historical science, it must first create its subject, in order to then define the rules governing it. This action, essential to every science, creates a type of artefact which takes the place of real human life. This self-styled science can then be used in practice, but only within the bounds of what it has selected and rejected as its subject. But when applied to humankind's rich and complex social reality, it is deeply injurious. This was the situation the Polish people found itself in when the Gdańsk strikes began.

The *Solidarność* experience fully disclosed the reality that communism preferred to ignore or reinterpret according to its own rules. This is what I call "the inconceivable" for Marxism-Leninism. *Solidarność* is the solution to Marxism-Leninism in the way it first lays Marxism-Leninism bare and then debunks and overthrows it. Let me stress that such overthrow was impossible without first discerning the real human experience ever ignored by communist ideology. Marxism claimed a monopoly in political rationality. *Solidarność*, on the other hand, by disclosing the reality unrecognized and "inconceivable" by communism, tore the ideology to shreds.

2) The reality revealed by Solidarność

What was this unrecognized reality like? The Polish nation, humiliated by the police state, survived thanks to solidarity long before the organization *Solidarność* itself was formed. For centuries the faith and prayer of Poles had been the basis of Polish culture and history. The power of these factors must therefore be considered

not only as a weapon against the regime, but above all as a source of mindfulness of Polish reality and as a "reality of remembrance", both of which impacted national consciousness. But the solidarity felt by Poles also had to become an idea, one expressed in a program of hope and for future direction. Together with the workers, this was the job of the movement's intellectual leaders.

The experience of solidarity describes the very essence of the human life. It defines the capacity of each person to relate to others. It moves the conscience, and its ability to tell good from evil, and bespeaks the responsibility of every person when faced by evil. The private and social turmoil suffered by an oppressed nation engenders a unique anthropology. Work constituted the central element of the official ideology, but the workers who fought for dignity made themselves be heard as flesh and blood people, not as a means of production. In this way, the real man became the central element of the political struggle.

For *Solidarność* to be born, what was necessary was to unite thought and action. Intellectuals knew how to rationally plan the situation. Moreover, they knew how to give a name to what the nation was feeling and thinking. The word *Solidarność* magnificently captured those thoughts and feelings.

We should also consider the phenomenological aspects that made possible the experience of actual reality by setting it free from the manacles of Marxism's Hegelian dialectic. These phenomenological patterns can be seen in the Pope's discourse during his trips to Poland, but also in a book written by a friend of his from Lublin, Father Józef Tischner. Thankfully, that book – entitled *Spotkania* ("Encounters") – was translated into French. The thoughts it contains provided some of the tools that helped in the process of regaining conscience that Solidarność initiated. And the actions – such as the strike itself and the leadership of Lech Wałęsa – speak for themselves.

3) Ethics, politics, religion

When humanism made its way into social thought a brand new method of acting was born: that of *Solidarność*'s ethos, which is an "ethos of conscience", something capable of creating relations with others based on dignity and of organizing itself along democratic lines. The road to freedom is accessible only through a respect for the differences between people and their opinions. The Christian roots of *Solidarity* are commonly recognized as such because of the fact that they testify to the inviolability of human dignity.

This is why men and women of divergent religions together with non-believers can also apply this dignity and jointly fight for freedom. On the one hand, there is the dialogue, based on mutual respect for all men and women. On the other, there is ideology, which murderously tries to eliminate differences between people with force and fear. This dialogue constitutes another component of the *Solidarność* experience.

The great impact of the Catholic Church on *Solidarność* should not, however, be considered a purely tactical manoeuvre. The Church and its leader John Paul II

knew how the great spiritual treasure bestowed upon humankind by the Saviour can be put to use in the fight for human dignity. For *Solidarność* to be born, there had to be, simultaneously, a historical covenant between the nation and its faith, memory of the nation's vicissitudes over the centuries, and a period of profound crisis that, like an enormous storm, laid bare the sea-floor and all that had lain hidden on it. The revealing of the true human and social condition, which I label as "inconceivable" for the regime, was made possible in the *Solidarność* experience by the fervent faith of the Polish nation.

4) The situation's unfolding

In its early stages, all that *Solidarność* had to do to get people to act was call upon the *Solidarność* ethos, which represented the antithesis of communist ideology. It was then crucial to remove politics from totalitarian discourse. The time had come to inspire political choices and actions with the ethos of *Solidarność*. And finally, in the democratic system, there came a need to lift the nation out of the apathy wherein it had been forced by totalitarianism and to teach free citizens how to draw conclusions about society from the responsibility ascribed to each of them.

When politics are ruled by the logic of power and the struggle for power, how should politics be defined in order to avoid succumbing to ideology? Creating such an ideology would in fact entail a negation of what it is being fought for. In the modern world, it is increasingly difficult to get a satisfactory answer to this question.

5) Solidarność – a hope?

What I have said thus far leaves me with a feeling of incompleteness. For today – in the age of globalization, in the face of newly reigning ideologies – there exists a similar danger of not recognizing the real nature of the human condition and of human dignity. A truly thin line separates the correct judgement of the situation from a revived "inconceivability". And yet it is so important that expression of the "inconceivable" be understood by all humankind, just as in the past it was understood by all Poles. Is this not what the current debate on the future of Europe are about? In world opinion also, polemics are dominated by the language of revolt and power struggles. This could be seen during the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. But such polemics fail to isolate the problem. For they merely antagonize, and fail to let the unknown, and often injured, reality speak for itself.

We should once again endeavour to instil the "inconceivable" side of human reality into common conscience. John Paul II blazed and followed this path. But it is by no means enough to declare what the world's rulers fail to conceive. And this fact must be spread among humankind and communicated openly. When the world was mourning for John Paul II, I heard the nations of the world regaining their consciousness of the dignity and shared future of humankind. John Paul II

proffered this hope to people of all faiths – to non-believers, as well – over his 25 years of journeying across our world, gathering huge crowds in churches, and bearing witness to the truth.

Is this not the birth of a brand new solidarity, one arising from the moral conscience of all people and nations? By upholding Christ as the full affirmation of human nature and dignity, the Second Vatican Council made a huge step forward for the future of humankind. Today, with our world's pervasive economic and financial reductionism, the question remains as to how we need include the "inconceivable" of human reality into the everyday considerations of means and ends, priorities, and the difficult decisions that demand difficult sacrifices. This is the challenge for today.

However, it is important to add that this challenge concerns not only theoretical reflection, but also practical knowledge, wisdom and sound historical judgement. Should we fear that the contradictions at the beginning of this 3rd millennium will lead to some dramatic crisis? If so, may the ensuing "tsunami" of social awakening be one of solidarity.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki:

I deeply thank the Cardinal for his presence here and for his address. I am indeed grateful for his analysis of that moment, of the current situation, the current tasks, and of the questions that must be posed and which require reflection. I would like to assure you that the days following the Pope's death, particularly the reaction of the young generation, gave us in Poland something as pure as that memorable August of 1980.

I would like to ask Archbishop Życiński to take the floor.

Archbishop Józef Życiński:

SOLIDARNOŚĆ AND THE TEACHING OF JOHN PAUL II

Before the Berlin wall tumbled another wall had to be torn down – the wall of psychological fears, of helplessness and lack of faith in oneself. John Paul II played a crucial role in this process, liberating the sense of worker dignity and demonstrating the spiritual aspect of human labour. His imagination was well ahead of his time, and led him to a critical evaluation of the division into spheres of influence symbolized by Yalta. Numerous milieux considered the possibility of questioning this division, yet they placed it in a distant and indeterminate future. Speaking on the issue in the mid 1980s, sir Isaiah Berlin, the distinguished Oxford social philosopher, expressed his conviction that the fall of communism would be the most wonderful event in his lifetime; however, it shall not occur for at least another hundred years[1].

[1] Beata Sygulska (2003) "Nil desperandum" in: *Oblicza liberalizmu*, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, p. 17.

Anthropology without hypocrisy

Where do we search for the intellectual roots of the Pope's spiritual revolution? I recall an August evening in 1980 when as guests to the Holy Father we participated in an academic session in Castel Gandolfo. One of the presentations analyzed the crises of great empires. It developed an analogy between the fall of the *Imperium Romanum* and the signs of crisis in the USSR. The first question concerned quantitative forecasts: how long can such a crisis last before it leads to an ultimate breakdown of the system? The answer was not optimistic: sometimes one had to wait even 200 years.

In the evening we gathered round the television set to watch the Polish news bulletin. We were presented with footage of the strike in the Gdańsk shipyard with, at its gate, an enormous portrait of John Paul II as the symbol of the workers' hope and dignity. I looked at his face glued to the screen. As we gazed at him, it seemed almost to drop, becoming still more touched and fraught. In the early morning hours of the following day we concelebrated a Holy Mass for our homeland and the striking workers. Several days later, in a letter to the Primate of Poland, the Pope expressed his support for the workers: "I pray that the Episcopate, led by the Primate, should once more aid the nation in its struggle for daily bread, social justice and in defence of its inalienable rights to life and development in freedom".

Asked "who brought down communism?" in an interview conducted in 1995 by Jaś Gawroński, John Paul II answered that communism fell because it was beset with an anthropological fallacy – a spurious conception of Man. In conversations with the bishops he discreetly implored them not to accentuate his role in the fall of communism. He was first and foremost the shepherd of human souls and remained unimpressed with the role of a subversive of political systems. However, he raised no objections when insightful documentary analyses, such as those by George Weigel, ascribed to him an important role in tearing down the ideological barriers that divided Europe.

Emphasizing the role of truth, human dignity, and the struggle for freedom that is stronger than totalitarian limitations, the Pope appealed to the fundamental role of conscience. This is why, when expressing his grief following the tragedy at the "Wujek" mine of December 1981, when striking miners were shot and killed, the Pope called upon General Jaruzelski: "General, I appeal to your conscience, to the consciences of all those with whom decisions now rest"[2].

During the first visit to his homeland, speaking next to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw, the Pope construed Christ's sacrifice as including "the history of our homeland wrought by each of its sons and daughters for a thousand years – be it a nameless and unknown man, like the soldier by whose tomb we stand today". This perspective poured new hope into the souls of those hitherto treated as

[2] If the context does not suggest otherwise, most of the factual details come from G. Weigel (1999) *Witness to Hope. The Biography of Pope John Paul II*, New York: Clifford Street Books.

a nameless mass of "proles" implementing party directives. Demonstrating shared historical roots and a sense of common human fate created a bond far stronger than any division and permitted a view life from the perspective of beings sharing in freedom and solidarity.

The vision of man adopted at the time by institutional Marxism was quite different. It allowed no place for dignity and subjectivity. It was the party that ruled on the function of individuals, as well as on their dignity. This style stemmed from a well known tradition: when following Lenin's death Nadezhda Krupskaya sympathized with Trotsky, Stalin threatened that the party can nominate another to be the widow of the Bolshevik revolution's leader[3]. The all-powerful party determined both the domain of humanity and the particular shape of human dignity. This omnipotence was experienced during detention by Marian Spychalski, until 1970 the chairman of Poland's Provisional Council of State. He accepted this anthropology, where human dignity depended on party whim alone, when in 1955 he wrote from prison to President Bolesław Bierut: "I shall always be at the party's disposal, I shall under no circumstances dare to dispose of my person, which does not belong to me, without prior consent of the party and people's authorities"[4].

The August 1980 labour unrest was the result of a collision of two divergent anthropologies. There is reason to view Samuel Huntington's prognoses of an inevitable clash of civilizations with scepticism. Yet, it is a fact that Poland witnessed a clash of two radically different conceptions of man, whereby Coastal workers exposed the illusionary character of the anthropology founded on authoritarian declarations of a party that utilized rhetoric of the collective at the price of violating fundamental human rights.

It is in such context that we have to consider the spiritual resonance created in worker milieux by the Pope's fascinating anthropological vision that portrayed man as a unique being united with God, rooted in history, responsible for others, and aware of the great tasks faced by the builders of the Kingdom of Heaven. It was this vision of man that was evoked during the Pontiff's unforgettable homily delivered in downtown Warsaw's "Victory Square" on June 4, 1979: "For You Christ does not cease to be an open book of knowledge about man, his dignity and his rights. And at the same time of knowledge of human rights and dignity". The faithful gathered there with their fellow-countryman felt as if the book's co-authors, called upon to work together with God in order to "make anew the face of Earth, HERE on Earth". The book symbol returned on the day of the Pope's funeral, when strong gusts – the winds of history, no less – turned the pages of the book as we, observers of this telling symbolism, felt both gratitude and common responsibility.

Characteristically, there was never a hint of fear before the whirlwinds of history in John Paul II's stance. During our most daunting challenges he spoke to us in a language of hope, dignity, and trust in God. The language used during the

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[3] Cf. Józef Smuga (2002) *Rosja w 20 stulciu*, Kraków: Znak, p. 76.

[4] (2005) *Zwyczajny Resort*, Warsaw, p. 549.

period of worker unrest by the group that called itself the workers' party was very different. On the evening of August 23, 1980, in a memorable televised address, Ryszard Wojna warned against another partition of Poland. His discourse has survived to this day in milieux that have forsaken the Papal vision of history, that spread fear of future partitions, who attempt to treat history primarily as a tool of violence and conspiracy. There is reason to despair that the intellectual sympathizers of Ryszard Wojna's discourse incite so big an interest in a Polish history marked with subsequent partitions. This despair is all the more profound as the authors of such historiography were active in the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) until its dissolution in 1990. Thereafter they continued to appear in the role of critics of the August changes, drawing on social fear and dread. As an example of this pathology we can point to the work of Henryk Pająk, whose rhetoric is rife with Poland's impending partitions. And it is readily accepted by milieux that view Ryszard Wojna's discourse with more favour than the Pope's reflections on Poland's transformations.

In noting this important phenomenon it must be emphasized that John Paul II never used a language that included phraseologies of impending partitions of Poland, selling off the national wealth, traitors and collaborators. Such ideologically loaded language resembles the party's rhetoric; its popularity can in turn be explained by the social need for the type of discourse where the prospects of Cassandra-like threats replace rational arguments, imposing a simple picture over justified diagnoses.

Subjectivity and dignity

When in 1987 the Polish Pope addressed the authorities in the Royal Castle he said: "Each of these people has personal dignity, and the rights that go with it. It is in the name of this dignity that each and every one strives to be… a subject. And to be a subject means to participate in the making of the 'res publica' of all Poles". This was a revolutionary view of both society and of human subjectivity. Even the Pope's first pilgrimage to his homeland allowed us Poles to experience a sense of community, personal subjectivity and the motivational force of values. The Pope's presence in Poland released altogether new spiritual energies and awakened hope for a metamorphosis brought about by Christian testimony. The spiritual force of the Papal message ultimately turned out more to be more robust and lasting than the Berlin Wall.

It was with astonishment that the world reacted to the conduct of the heroes of the *Solidarność* uprising. John Paul II extolled them, saying: "The Polish worker stood up for himself with the Gospel in his hand and a prayer on his lips. The images that spread around the world in 1980 gripped hearts and touched consciences. This was because the fundamental question was not the otherwise important 'How much?', but rather 'In the name of what?', the question about the sense of human labour, about its very essence. The answer to a question so put

cannot do without recourse to the basic principals, as profound as man himself, and whose origin lies in God"[5].

In many of the Pope's statements and documents we discover the striking truth that the class struggle emphasized by Marxism is not the most important mechanism of development. In placing solidarity above class struggle John Paul II stressed that the fall, first of Nazism and then of Communism, "evinced the senselessness of large scale violence planned and carried out by these systems". Summing up, near the end of his life, the profound changes that accompanied the fall of those systems, he pensively wondered: "Will people draw conclusions from these dramatic 'lessons' of history?"[6].

The meaning of human labour

John Paul II also played an important role in demonstrating the personalist aspect of work. In the *Laborem exercens* encyclical the Pope elaborates some important truths: labour is not a commodity; its objective aspect does not suffice to determine its value, because they who work are always persons. It is a person's dignity that determines the value of labour. To the working world represented by the pilgrims in Gdańsk he said, in a way summarizing his encyclical written six years earlier: "In social life labour opens up the entire dimension of human subjectivity, but also the subjectivity of the society composed of working persons"[7].

This perspective again diverged from that adopted in the Marxist conception of work. In the USSR constitution of 1977 work was presented as a "duty of, and matter of honour for, every able-bodied citizen", with the emphasis that evasion of such duty "is incompatible with the principles of socialist society". Pursuant to the RSFSR Criminal Code, such incompatibility could be punished with two years in a work camp[8]. The imprisonment of the renowned poet Josif Brodsky suggests that these were not provisions of a purely theoretical nature.

John Paul II, on the other hand, incorporated accents from the poetry of Poland's 19th-century Cyprian Norwid in the encyclical *Laborem exercens*, stressing that work leads to resurrection. The philosopher and poet complement each other in the Pope's thoughts on the value of work. This encyclical, which, if it were not for the assassination attempt, was to be announced on May 15th, 1981, stated unequivocally that "in fact there is no doubt that human work has an ethical value of its own, which clearly and directly remain linked to the fact that the one who carries it out is a person, a conscious and free subject, that is to say a subject that decides about himself" (no. 6).

The gunshots in St. Peter's square delayed by four months the publication of the encyclical which stressed that trade unions were not an expression of "class

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[5] John Paul II, *Moc świadectwa*, an address to the pilgrims from the Szczecińsko-Kamieńska diocese, Częstochowa, June 18th, 1983.

[6] John Paul II (2005) *Pamięć i tożsamość*, Kraków: Znak, p. 171.

[7] John Paul II *Homily during Mass for the workers*, Gdańsk, June 12th, 1987.

[8] Cf. Józef Smuga, op. cit., p. 283.

struggle", but "a mouthpiece for the struggle for social justice" – an expression of concern for the just good. We are not dealing here with struggle "against" others. "It is characteristic of work that it first and foremost unites people. In this consists its social power: the power to build a community"[9]. Were the assassination attempt successful, the encyclical would never have been issued. John Paul II's teachings would lack a vital document pertaining to trade unions and social justice. It was ultimately announced on September 14th, 1981 – at the ceremony of the Raising of the Holy Cross. An important document was incorporated into Church history, bearing witness to the Clergy's concern for workers exploited by the bureaucracy of what called itself a workers' party.

Solidarity instead of class struggle

The historical significance of *Solidarność* consists in tackling ethical and religious questions which were removed from the public sphere both in society subject to the oppression of totalitarian communist state, and in welfare societies of the Western world. It is for that reason that *Solidarność,* deeply rooted in John Paul II's teachings on man, also opens up a new chapter in the discussion of the place and role of values in public life, pointing to the axiological horizon which is not well understood in modern communities dominated by pragmatism and consumption.

In many of the Pope's statements and documents stressing the role of social and spiritual solidarity we discover the striking truth that the class struggle emphasized by Marxism is not the most important mechanism of development. In placing solidarity above class struggle John Paul II stressed that the fall, first of Nazism and then of Communism "evinced the senselessness of large scale violence planned and carried out by these systems"[10]. Commending the non-violence that *Solidarność* adopted in this struggle the Polish Pope emphasized: "Struggle cannot be stronger than solidarity"[11]. This did not amount to rejecting struggle outright, but to anchoring it more deeply in the moral order.

The same motif returned during an audience in Gdańsk's Zaspa district in 1987. Its essence is conveyed in the statement: Solidarity before struggle. In the *Centesimus annus* encyclical published in 1991 we read that daunting social problems ought to be resolved "through dialogue and solidarity, rather than by a struggle to destroy the enemy through war" (no. 22). Instead of appealing to class struggle we ought to appeal to "the conscience of the adversary and [seek] to reawaken in him a sense of shared human dignity" (no. 23).

The tradition, whereby the feeling of solidarity dominates conflict and struggle, finds an interesting expression in actions inspired by the Gospel. In a period of forty years John Paul II influenced some weighty and symbolic signs of European solidarity. These included:

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[9] *Laborem exercens*, no 20.
[10] *Pamięć i tożsamość*, p. 170.
[11] Jan Paweł II, *Homilia podczas Mszy św. dla ludzi pracy*, Gdańsk, 12 czerwca 1987.

1965 – the address of Polish bishops to their German counterparts, wherein they ringingly stated, "We forgive and ask for forgiveness";

1981 – the manifesto of the I *Solidarność* Convention to workers in neighbouring countries, whose significance seems gravely underestimated in many a historical study;

2004 – the papal vision of integration, from Poland and Lithuania's "Union of Lublin" in 1569 to the European Union.

These facts all encountered strong resistance, and thereby unified variegated milieux. Resistance was the most adamant in 1965 when, quite independently of the communist authorities' encouragement, a broad spectrum of Polish society expressed its objections to the idea of asking for German forgiveness. Opposition to the papal vision of solidarity founded on the principles of social solidarity and concern for human rights was significantly weaker. At that time the government spheres resorted to truly Machiavellian propaganda tools. Poland's PZPR authorities founded, in March 1981, the "Grunwald" Patriotic Union, which combined nationalism and anti-Semitism. The universalism of the Church, in its accentuation of the inalienable dignity of the human person, collided with a fanatical version of anti-Semitism whose origins lay in the propaganda of the fringe National Radical Camp (ONR), active before WWII.

The weakest resistance appeared in the face of the papal vision of a Europe of the spirit. A symptomatic sign of such opposition was the visit in Rome in April 2004 of two Polish parliamentarians belonging to the League of Polish Families (LPR). In order to express their criticism of European integration they vainly sought an audience with John Paul II, whom they intended to convince of their arguments. Ultimately, no audience was granted. However, John Paul II was anguished whenever anyone questioned his vision of the great reconciliation, in which he saw an extension of the unity of the Coenaculum. What appears significant is the fact that the ideological opposition predominant at the time of the address of Polish bishops to their German counterparts could, forty years on, be attributed to inconsequential local folklore, and remained at odds with the prevailing social mood. The Pope's steadfast, future-minded efforts via pastoral influence finally replaced struggle in the name of conflicting party interests with solidarity.

A unified community of values

An atomized and divided society is easily manipulated. Thus, as soon as the logo appeared with its specific solidarity font, materials were published informing that the concept of solidarity is alien to Christian tradition. The authors of these texts explained that the notion has no Biblical basis, and its principal proponent was the freemasonry. All those who revelled in referring to the bogeyman of Masonic conspiracies were unpleasantly surprised by the Pope's construal of the theology of solidarity. Demonstrating God's fundamental solidarity with man, it stresses that solidarity as evinced in the life of many a saint constitutes a Christian virtue that builds union through love (*Solicitudo rei socialis*, no. 40).

An important document illustrating the Pope's solidarity with his compatriots was John Paul II's letter to Leonid Brezhnev sent on December 16, 1980. At a time when Poland was fraught with worries of being invaded, the Pope reminded about the Helsinki Conference and stressed that the social tensions that had recently shaken Poland could only be diffused in a spirit faithful to the provisions of its Final Act. These, however, require the cooperation of all of Poland's social forces. John Paul II expressed his hope that the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR would do everything in his power to alleviate these tensions by allowing actions to be undertaken whereby economic reforms go hand in hand with moral renewal.

In the darkest days of Martial Law, John Paul II was able to provide spiritual support for those experiencing a critical dose of challenges. When he visited his homeland for the first time since the imposition of Martial Law, moving words were uttered already at Warsaw's airport, ones emphasizing that he wished to be close to those who were suffering by invoking Christ's words "I was in prison and you visited me" (Mt 25: 36). "I myself cannot visit all the sick, imprisoned or suffering – but I ask of them to be close to me in spirit. To support me as they always have done. I have received a great many letters to that effect, especially recently". Those who were detained at that time immediately grasped that the Pope was speaking of them and to them.

The Pope himself admitted this in 1987 during an audience with the workers in Gdańsk. He stated directly: "I speak of you and I speak for you". There he also confessed personally: "Everyday I pray for you, in Rome or wherever else I may be, everyday I pray for my homeland and I pray for the working people, I pray especially for that unique and grand legacy of Poland's *Solidarność*. I pray for the people connected with that legacy, and especially for those who made or are making sacrifices as a result. And I shall not cease to pray, for I know this to be a matter of great import"[12]. Remaining faithful to this heritage does not permit replacing papal prayer with the conflict that accompanies bids for personal or group credit in the founding of *Solidarność*.

Witnesses to freedom

All that constitutes Poland he entrusted to the Lord our God. He did not fear. Trustful, he crossed the threshold of hope and undertook all the challenges borne by a time of great cultural change. Together with John Paul's spiritual testament we accepted that very heritage, and the responsibility both for the ethos of Poland's *Solidarność*, and for the spiritual solidarity of Europe, which he professed at the beginning of his papacy on Warsaw's Victory Square and Kraków's Błonie Fields, in Częstochowa and Gniezno.

Inspired by the spirit of *Solidarność*, today – twenty-five years after that great uprising – we ought to seek new challenges. We must avoid the simple

[12] John Paul II, *Words following Holy Mass*, Gdańsk June 12th, 1987.

generalizations suggesting that the advent of *Solidarność* put a definitive end to the communist system. We must remember that in China, Korea or Cuba millions continue to suffer as a result of the violation of human rights. Communism, which fell on the European continent, is still being imposed upon numerous societies, and propagates that same vision of man in which false ideology dominates the truth of human dignity. In the name of solidarity with those who suffer we must not allow ourselves to become entangled in petty disputes about who was first, who was bravest, or to whom most credit is due in the ranking of greatest patriots or destroyers of the Berlin Wall.

Among the challenges that must be tackled in today's global world, we have also to include the uncritical fascination with consumption and the law of profit, which are currently leading towards quite new anthropological fallacies. They are expressed, for instance, in the work of Andre Glucksmann, where he formulates the postmodern cultural commandment: Nothing inhuman is alien to me. We have already gone through inhuman systems of serfdom and violence in our part of the world, their symbols being Auschwitz and Kolyma. Thus, when countenanced with new forms of rhetoric praising yet another cultural revolution, we turn back to the Pope's anthropology. For it shows the clear empirical meaning of such values as: humanism and dignity, solidarity and the freedom of beings redeemed by Christ.

***Tadeusz Mazowiecki*:**

Thank you very much, Archbishop Życiński, for reminding us of the thoughts and experiences of those times, and for drawing conclusions for the present era.

Ladies and Gentlemen, there are three names on the comment list. I would like to ask Professor Minister Skubiszewski to take the floor. The next speaker will be Mr. Francis Blanchard, former General Director of the International Labour Organization in Geneva.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski:

I would like to add several thoughts to the statements delivered by His Eminence Cardinal Lustiger and His Eminence Archbishop Życiński. For I would like especially to emphasize the enormous value of human dignity in the social doctrine of the Church, which together with the imperative of love assumes a central character and is, when it comes to human rights, more than just one of the many human rights.

In the secular doctrine it is sometimes noted that human dignity is one of the basic human rights. Human dignity is determined by the respect for human rights. It also depends on respect for the basic freedoms. The relation between human dignity and human rights has a natural and defined character. The Church sees in human rights a great chance, a great opportunity to expand recognition of human dignity and to contribute to its universal promotion, as it is a trait that God the Creator gave His creatures. As we all know, John XXIII's *Pacem in Terri*s encyclical

marked the beginning of Papal statements in the domain of human rights. In his teachings, John Paul II indefatigably backed the concept of human rights; he strove for their application and supported them very systematically. It is for this reason that he was very aptly named the Human Rights Pope. Indeed, as early as 1979 he emphasized the meaning of the human being in his encyclical *Redemptor Hominis*. Archbishop Życiński pointed out this moment very clearly.

In the social doctrine of the Church, theological anthropology is the basis of human rights. These rights belong to a certain objective order created by God. Nonetheless, the Holy See, the Popes, including the recently deceased Pope, held instruments of secular law, both international and national, in high regard, and pointed to them frequently in their many statements. John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris* encyclical, the *Gaudium et Spes* apostolic constitution and the teachings of Paul VI and John Paul II, especially the 1991 *Centesimus Annus* encyclical, are important documents which define specific human rights that are relevant especially to the Church, taking into consideration its mission. These rights include: the right to life, the right to establish a family and to life in a united and harmonious family, the right to develop one's thought and to freedom in the search and acquisition of the truth, the right to work, the right to religious freedom. In a recent speech on the occasion of a meeting with the diplomatic corps, Pope Benedict XVI recalled these words, ones which represent a certain tangent point with international law. International law standards, together with European law standards, influence national law and national court jurisdiction. One of the main problems that appear is cultural divergence, the multitude of nations and peoples. This is the issue that was discussed today, namely the universality and inseparability of human rights.

Without a doubt, the Church takes into consideration many different cultures and a wide variety of social contexts and by no means does it turn a blind eye to the diverse traditions and historical development of specific countries and regions. Nonetheless, the social doctrine of the Church does not leave the slightest doubt on the fact that universality and inseparability are special characteristics of human rights. John Paul II described these characteristics as two driving principles, ones which simultaneously demand that human rights become deeply rooted in each culture and that they be strengthened in their legal aspects so as to make their full respect possible.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki:

Thank you very much. Monsieur Blanchard, please.

Francis Blanchard [translation from French]:

I remember that I was in Warsaw on May 13, 1981, the day when the Holy Father was shot in Rome. And all my life I will remember the crowds gathered in the evening before the Cathedral and on their knees, praying for the Pope's health. That day I was in Warsaw near the end of a relatively short trip, the aim

of which was to obtain the confirmation from the communist government that Lech Wałęsa would be allowed to come to Geneva to participate in the session of the International Labour Conference. I had doubts on the intentions of the communist government at the time, and I came to reassure myself, or rather remind the government of the obligations it held before the constitution of the International Labour Organization.

The government finally conceded due to pressure from all sides, and I had the joy and honour of receiving Lech Wałęsa, together with a delegation of his companions, among who was Bronislaw Geremek, whom I am happy to greet here today. That was a gathering where Wałęsa was received triumphantly. But he didn't expect, and neither did I for that matter, that it would take nearly another decade for *Solidarity*'s battle for liberty to be won.

I would like to share, Mr. Chairman, that a few years later – I think that it was in '84 or '84 – I had the honour of hosting you. You were on your way to Rome, you had a stopover in Geneva, and you explained to me the hopes you placed in the efforts that the International Labour Organisation had been developing to support *Solidarity*'s struggle.

I will remind you of two aspects related to our efforts to support *Solidarność*. As a consequence of the complaints deposited at the International Labour Conference by the syndicates, an investigative committee was set up, which the Polish communist government refused to receive in Poland. Therefore this committee worked in Geneva, received many remarks, witnesses, etc., and formulated a number of recommendations that centred on the idea of organizing round table talks. And this was the central recommendation of a report which I think will go down in history. But this was not the end of our troubles. I will add that the Poland's communist government deposited an enunciation form in 1985 which in theory was to lead to the departure of Poland from the organization in 1987.

It was at this time that I came to Gdańsk, against the wishes of the Polish communist government of the time, to meet Lech Wałęsa one night. Against, I stress, the wishes of the sentiment of the government. And we discussed the idea of a round table. I asked Lech Wałęsa whether he would accept a place at such a round table with representatives of the official syndicates. And his answer was very simple. On one condition: that it will acknowledge the principle of trade union pluralism. And I am happy in this regard that Bronisław Geremek this morning in his speech reminded us of the first of the 21 Postulates formulated by *Solidarność* and Lech Wałęsa and his companions, which was an acknowledgement and application of the 87th convention of the International Labour Organization on freedom of association.

And this is the reason for which I insist that *Solidarność*, Wałęsa and his companions achieved freedom for Poland, but also freedom for trade union association. Thank you.

***Tadeusz Mazowiecki*:**

Monsieur Directeur Generale, thank you for your contribution to our discussion. Now we shall have the benefit of listening to Henryk Wujec, an activist of the Workers' Defence Committee, *Solidarność*, and a great person in general. Please, Henryk, the floor is yours.

Henryk Wujec:

I would like to briefly talk about the meaning of the Papal pilgrimages during Martial Law. The influence of the 1979 pilgrimage on the creation of *Solidarność* is widely known. The 1983 pilgrimage aroused many controversies – maybe not everyone remembers this, but after Martial Law the underground *Solidarność* feared this pilgrimage. It was concerned that the Papal visit would be used by the Jaruzelski regime to legitimize itself, and that, by and large, it might well be harmful to *Solidarność*.

At the time, I was in prison. The pilgrimage was so important that there was even the possibility of a hunger strike, only no one knew what to direct it against. Luckily, it didn't take place. I asked the prison warden if I could listen to the Pope's address, for there were no loudspeakers in our cells (that made it easier to eavesdrop on conversations). I was led to an underground cell in an investigative pavilion. As I later learned it was a death cell, and that is where I listened to the Pope's welcome speech. Alone in that cell, I heard words that a persons remembers for the rest of their life. I would like to express my gratitude towards Archbishop Życiński for reminding us of them – "When I was hungry, you gave me food; when I was thirsty, you gave me drink; when I was in prison, you visited me". I knew that at that moment he was talking to us, to those of us in prison, to the entire underground *Solidarność*. Quite simply, that he had come to us. Those were the first words that dissipated all possible doubts. Then there was the visit to the church on Piwna Street, Saint Martin's Church, and the meeting with the families of the imprisoned activists – that was the moment when everyone understood that the Pope was showing strong support for *Solidarność*.

The Papal visit in 1987, when *Solidarność* was very weak – the strikes were not working out, our information campaigns had but meagre impact – was again a great awakening. The Pope's most important message from the Gdańsk district of Zaspa, delivered before an enormous audience, was the very word "solidarity" – solidarity not only as a symbolic word understood only to Poles, but as a word directed to the whole world. After this pilgrimage the hope and strength given to us in the words of the Pope made us somehow regain confidence and in a way revive our movement and force the authorities into bilateral talks to solve the problem of the legality of *Solidarność* and begin Poland's great transformation.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki:

Ladies and Gentlemen, in closing our session I would like to add three of my own comments. I hope that the Cardinal and the Archbishop will not consider the first of these unwarranted, when I say that August 1980 and the creation of *Solidarność* also gave something to the Pope Himself. *Solidarity* uplifted him in his contacts with millions of people. He was amazed by *Solidarity*, and when I reflect on what uplifted him so much, I would say that it was the fact that *Solidarity* bore witness to what he preached – that good can also be an active force in history, in the historic changes of the world. This is my first comment.

The second comment – John Paul II incorporated the notion of solidarity into Catholic social teachings, which had undergone an enormous evolution beginning with John XXIII, and which did not build models but instead shaped important ethical messages. For us, of course, there is the problem of the degree to which the Poland of the post-*Solidarność* revolution considered and implemented that message during those difficult, very difficult, decisions during the early transformation. Today this is still a problem, as we must now concentrate on the social aspects of Poland's new economic situation, that of being a market economy.

And my third comment. There is a need for international solidarity not only with the oppressed – those who do not yet possess freedom – but also for international solidarity in what concerns the division into a world of the rich and the poor. Just as we spoke here of human rights, of their role in international opinion and politics during those moments in history, today we must demand that the notion of solidarity be held in high regard, as high as human rights during the Carter era.

I would like to deeply thank our speakers, in particular Cardinal Lustiger and Archbishop Życiński. I now invite you all for a small break.

3rd SESSION
The *Solidarność* Experience

Chairs: *Jerzy Buzek*, *Solidarność* activist, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland 1997-2001;

Zbigniew Bujak, member of the highest union authorities of *Solidarność*, a leader of underground *Solidarność* for almost five years;

Participants: *Zheliu Zhelev*, President of Bulgaria 1990-1997;

Jiři Dientsbier, one of the founders of Karta 77, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia 1989-1992;

Gabor Demszky, one of the founders of the Alliance of Free Democrats, from 1990 to today – Mayor of Budapest;

Markus Meckel, former opposition activist in the German Democratic Republic, pastor, Member of the Bundestag.

Jerzy Buzek:

Ladies and Gentlemen, there are two of us as one will chair the session and the other will watch the time.

I would like to start with two short comments, but ones in my opinion of utmost importance. Judging from the conference programme, one might well come to the conclusion that only men were active in *Solidarność*, because there is no woman present on the Polish side. So I must stress that women played an enormous role in *Solidarność* – whether by their own oppositionist activity, in hiding activists during Martial Law, by rallying to the shipyard gates, monitoring the situation of the miners closed in the coalmines, and simply in tending to their homes. I would therefore like to greet all those ladies present here today. Today, none of them are sitting at the presidium table, but in five years time, on the 30th anniversary of *Solidarność*, they will surely play a more significant role in the celebrations.

Now my second comment. A lot has been said about how *Solidarność* was a non-violent movement, about the bloodless revolution. This is true, but nonetheless there were victims. Let us not forget about the miners shot dead in the Wujek coalmine in December 1981, nor about other victims of violence.

I would now like to remind all of us a short text, which is in a way the motto and main topic of our meeting here at this session:

MESSAGE OF THE 1st NATIONAL CONGRESS OF DELEGATES
OF "SOLIDARNOŚĆ" TO THE WORKING PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE

The delegates gathered in Gdańsk at the first Congress of Delegates of the Independent Autonomous Trade Union "Solidarność" send to the workers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Hungary and all the nations of the Soviet Union – greetings and expressions of support.

As the first independent trade union in our post-war history we feel the brotherhood of our fates. We ensure you that despite the lies told in your countries we are an authentic 10-million-strong workers' organization created in the outcome of workers' strikes. Our aim is the fight for the improvement of the living standards of all working people. We support all of you who have decided to enter the difficult path of fighting for a free union movement. We believe that soon your representatives will be able to meet our representatives in order to exchange union experiences.

I would like to note that this message was accepted on September 8, 1981 by a majority of votes as the official document of the Congress. After its announcement, the mass media, controlled by the communist authorities in Poland, the USSR and the entire Soviet Bloc, carried out a rapid attack against the Message and *Solidarność*. At a meeting of the politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev stated: "Yesterday I acquainted myself with the Message to the nations of Eastern Europe, drafted at the Polish *Solidarność* Congress. It is a dangerous and provocative document. It doesn't consist of many words, but they all point in one direction. Its authors would like to spread havoc in the socialist countries, and encourage groups of all sorts of dissenters…"

I would like to ask today's speakers whether they knew about the Message and what sort of impact it had on the opposition activities in their respective countries. I have two further questions – does *Solidarność* today have any meaning or lessons for other nations, and what if so – what kind? I personally believe there are obvious lessons, but I would like to ask our speakers to answer that – if only in terms of the example of our neighbours from Ukraine. How can we use *Solidarność* and its ideals to counter the plagues of today? Here I of course refer to terrorism. If the terrorists have something to say to other people, if they want to protect values fundamental to them, then let us remind them that *Solidarność* toppled a system without hurting anyone, without killing, without acting in any violent way whatsoever. This could be today's message, one to be sent out to the whole world. And it is important that our speakers try to answer both questions in relation to international affairs and its influence on dissident activities.

I will briefly introduce our first speaker – Zheliu Zhelev, former President of Bulgaria. Each and every country has a person or a few people who decide which way the changes will go, and through this they influence society's consciousness. Thanks to his books and articles, the Honourable Mr. President is precisely such a person in Bulgaria.

Mr. President, the floor is yours.

***Zheliu Zhelev**:*

When celebrating anniversaries of important events, there is a tendency to overestimate them, to ascribe an exaggerated role to them, to credit them an importance greater than they realistically deserve. In such circumstances, we are profuse with words like "historical" and "of global significance" when appraising them in the context of the past. This hyperbole is a way of expressing gratefulness and appreciation towards those having participated in the events for their selflessness and their acts of moral and political heroism.

This is not the case with the *Solidarność* syndicate founded twenty-five years ago. For it truly did further a cause with world-wide historical impact. Let me back this statement up with arguments.

Long before *Solidarność*, there were outcries in the Soviet empire, uprisings and even overt rebellions. Let us recall the uprising of the German workers in 1954 smashed by Soviet troops. Let us also recall the people's revolution in Hungary two years later in 1956, brutally crushed by Soviet tanks. Or the "Prague Spring", which ended in August 1968 with the occupation of the country by the troops of the Warsaw Pact. Last but not least, let us recall the two large uprisings in Poland in 1970 and 1976, ones which also were crushed by the communist authorities.

All these attempts to throw off the communist system failed because they were spontaneous and sporadic, ill-organized, and mostly because they still paid tribute to political and ideological illusions.

The leaders of the Prague Spring believed in the possibility of "socialism with a human face". In fact, the problem concerned "*communism* with a human face", i.e., free humans within a totalitarian system. In other words, a kind of wooden iron. This was an illusion for which Dubchek and his team paid dearly; the illusion that the communist system would yield to democratization. The Soviets' later *perestroika* paid tribute to the same illusion. Gorbachev was sincerely hopeful that the democratization of the Soviet system was possible without abolishing the monopoly of the Communist party, i.e., the single-party political system, and without dismantling the Soviet empire. For that dangerous illusion, his own life and the fate of his family were at stake during the *coup d'etat* of August 19, 1991.

And then in 1980 in the shipyards of Gdańsk appeared the syndicate *Solidarność*. At first glance, this was nothing more than yet another protest against communism, and one that was none too notable or promising. But this time there was a big 'BUT'. Because under that misleadingly modest appearance,

there was a real discovery: the discovery of a feasible and effective way of struggle against the communist system. First, a syndicate, and not a political party, was created. If this were a political party, and moreover an oppositional political party, it would immediately have been destroyed in the full majesty of law. But a syndicate is a civil organization built on professional bases, and because of that there was no reason for banishing it even when it acted as an opposition. Second, the syndicate was a large-scale organization, and could expand without limits. Every worker can join a syndicate because it defends his or her professional interests. Third, the syndicate in its struggle does not use conspiracy, plots and hidden activities. By principle, its struggle is open and public, and in that sense it is a typical example of a civil struggle. For that same reason, violence and terror are not the weapons of a syndic organization. The highest degree of "violence" still acceptable is that of civil disobedience.

With all these qualities, the syndicate of *Solidarność* proved to be invincible and indestructible. In spite of the threat of military intervention by the Warsaw Pact's armies, in spite of General Jaruzelski's declaration of Martial Law and related limitations on civil and political freedoms in Poland, *Solidarność* survived the communist system itself.

By the mere fact of its existence in the 1980s, *Solidarność* showed the other countries in the Soviet Bloc that the struggle against communism was possible and could be successful if large-scale and open. At first glance this seemed paradoxical, but it was true indeed.

For that reason, all the national, patriotic, and national-democratic forums that had appeared by the end of the Gorbachev's *perestroika* in the Soviet republics, tried to emulate *Solidarność*. They were not successful because they lacked the necessary amount of anticommunism. They continued to pay tribute to the illusion that the democratization of the communist system was possible without its destruction, and thus they refused to give up the basic idea of *perestroika*.

Solidarność was also an example for the anticommunist opposition in the countries of Central and Southeast Europe, in those which carried out the so-called "velvet revolutions". I am speaking about the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Forum in Hungary, and the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria. The latter was founded on December 7, 1989, but the civic organizations which composed it appeared rather earlier:

- January 16, 1988 – Independent Society for the Defence of Human Rights
- March 8, 1988 – Civic committee for ecological defence of the city of Rousse
- November 3, 1988 – The Club in support of "glasnost" and "perestroika" in Bulgaria
- February 8, 1989 – Syndicate "Podkrepa"
- March 9, 1989 – Committee for support of religious rights, freedom of consciousness and spiritual values
- April 8, 1989 – the ecologic movement "Ecoglasnost"

Moreover, during the summer and the autumn of 1989 there appeared:

- "Committee 273", in defence of political prisoners
- the Movement for Civic Initiative
- the Union of the repressed since 1945
- The independent student society, which very rapidly evolved into a Federation of independent student societies.

Immediately after the fall of Todor Zhivkov on November 10, 1989 all the parties forbidden by the communist regime in 1947 were restored, e.g., the Social-Democratic, Agrarian, Democratic and Radical-Democratic parties.

As one can see from the very names of the civic organizations created by the end of the 1980s in Bulgaria, they are of ecologic, rights-defence and syndic types. In other words, they used the very form introduced by *Solidarność*. Indeed, the syndicate "Podkrepa", which played a very important role at the beginning of our velvet revolution, was a virtual copy of *Solidarność*. With its militant character and large popular coverage and support it was the vanguard of the Union of democratic forces and the whole democratic, anticommunist opposition.

The importance of *Solidarność* for the world is rather indirect. *Solidarność* acquired this role not merely through having provided an example and model for successful political struggle against communism, but because via that role it became a link in a chain of events of world-wide importance.

In providing the model for the "velvet revolutions" in Central and Southeast Europe, *Solidarność* catalyzed the decomposition of the Soviet system and the abolishment of the Yalta division of Europe. The events evolved nearly in the following sequence: velvet revolutions took place in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The totalitarian regimes were overthrown in those countries. As consequences:

1/ the international organizations of the communist bloc were destroyed as well: the Council for Economic Aid, the Warsaw Pact, and finally the Soviet Union as a state system.
2/ the balance of power in the world was transformed. What is important here in that this led to the end of the Cold War.
3/ the community of non-aligned states as an alternative to the bi-polar world decomposed as a consequence of the disappearance of the Cold War.
4/ the reunification of Germany came in parallel with the decomposition of the Yugoslav federation.
5/ as a result of these events, the Yalta order imposed at the end of World War II by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt became null and void.

Zbigniew Bujak:

Thank you very much. The next speaker is a man who belongs to the pantheon of Czechoslovakia's opposition, the founder of Karta 77. If any of you have ever heard about a Czech intellectual and publicist who for many years had to earn his

living by working as a stoker or watchman, this is him, Jiři Dienstbier. Since 1989 he has held many high level offices in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic.

Jiři Dienstbier:

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends – and there are a lot of friends here in this room. Let me first make several very personal remarks. I learnt about the events in Gdańsk which led to the emergence of *Solidarność* when I was being held in Hermanice Prison together with Vaclav Benda[1] and Vaclav Havel. Of course for us this was very interesting information. We tried to follow what was happening. We had only the official newspapers and television news. But because over the years we had learnt to read those newspapers, we knew that something very important had happened. For instance, when Moscow's *Pravda* carried news that in Chelabinsk some hooligans had broken a window, we knew that there was a revolt that was suppressed by the army, because otherwise why would such news be in *Pravda*? Therefore we realized immediately that the events in Gdańsk were very important. We had additional information, because it was of course Czechoslovakia, and prisoners that were not of such interest as we were, were taken to work in factories in Ostrava. We always waited for them in the evening, because they brought us the latest news from the Voice of America, which they listened to with the regular workers in those factories. So we had quite good information. For us it was of course very good news. Especially when you are in prison you need a lot of good news. Particularly because we understood that a lot of our personal friends were involved in those events. After the defeat of the Prague Spring, we realized that, no matter if they're in Hungary, Czechoslovakia or several times in Poland in '56 and later, isolated revolutions do not have real chances of succeeding. We had to start cooperating, coordinating our actions. Helsinki helped us greatly. Zbigniew Brzeziński and Timothy Garton Ash spoke about the varying perceptions of Helsinki in the West. Our perception was totally different. When the communist regimes were forced to accept human rights, even if they had believed that human rights was just a superficial matter, we were hopeful. For if international pacts are binding on Czechoslovak law, and maybe also on Polish law, etc., our governments will be obliged to respect the law. So we founded Charter 77, our Polish friends created the Workers' Defence Committee KOR, and so on. And we started having regular meetings on the boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia, in the Karkonosze mountains. Zbyszek Janas[2] told me half an hour ago that there is even now some plaque commemorating these meetings. It's history – who knows, very soon there may be some statues there! But about some of the people sitting here, people like Zbyszek Bujak, Janek Lityński[3],

[1] Vaclav Benda – Karta 77 member, Catholic philosopher.

[2] Zbigniew Janas – co-organizer of the "Ursus" workers' strikes in 1976, activist in the Workers' Defence Committee and *Solidarność*.

[3] Jan Lityński – mathematician, Workers' Defence Committee member, *Solidarność* activist.

Zbyszek Janas and others – we were good friends a long time before 1989. It was similar with the Hungarians. Some of them are also sitting here: Gabor Demszky, Ferenc Köszeg[4]. I've seen Miklos Haraszty and many others. And we exchanged our materials, we informed each other. We even had some contacts with East Germany and even with Sakharov and some people in Moscow. And therefore we learned that our Polish friends had again launched a mass movement. Even though we were sitting in prison, the events in Poland gave us encouragement. The most important message contained in those events was that no matter how many uprisings Moscow's lackeys and Soviet armies defeated, uprisings would continue to emerge. And that ultimately we would win. For people in our countries simply never accepted the regimes that were forced upon us by the Soviet Union. But this was not only our perception.

After *Solidarność* was confirmed as the first official trade union in communist Poland, the chief of Hermanice Prison, one colonel Kosunic, the last real Stalinist I met in my life, summoned Havel, Benda and me and warned us that we shouldn't have any illusions: our friends would not soon become Polish ministers and deputies to the Sejm, because the communists will strangle them first. But several weeks later he called us again and told us that as all revolutions are prepared in prison, he would have to separate us. He then sent Havel and Benda to Lipkovice. But what this really meant was that we got additional valuable information, namely, that even the likes of Kosunic were afraid of what was happening in Poland. And they were quite right, because they understood very well that it showed the will of the people. We saw this fear very often with state security people during interrogations, as when they barked, "don't even think that there will be another Prague Spring. You see what we did in Poland with *Solidarność*". But there is one unique aspect to Jaruzelski's putsch. It was of course totally unacceptable on matters of principle, but we Czechs and Slovaks, with our experience of Soviet invasion and the total destruction of our society after 1968, something which was not overcome until 1989, we had some second thoughts. If it was true that Jaruzelski's putsch prevented a Soviet invasion, the consequences of which would have been absolutely horrific, then maybe Martial Law was not as bad as it looked at the time. But that, of course, was not Jaruzelski's single intention.

What is most significant in this vein is the fact that Polish society after *Solidarność* could not be dismissed anymore. We saw this, for example, with the matter of Father Popiełuszko's murder, when at his funeral tens of thousands of people came out to grieve and protest. And there was another thing: because there was no Soviet invasion and new puppets were not put in power, the logic was such for Poland's ruling communist junta that they just couldn't permit the smallest change. The development in the Poland and Hungary's communist parties was similar to the development of the Czechoslovak communist party in the 60s. It must have struck some people as odd when in 1989 a communist minister of foreign

[4] Ferenc Köszeg – Editor-in-Chief of "Beszelö", currently Chairman of the Hungarian Helsinki Foundation.

affairs received the Charlemagne prize for helping Germany's reunification in having opened the borders with Austria[5], and so on.

My next remark concerns Western help for our actions. I always insisted that our societies be kept open, that there should be no sanctions, no embargos, no boycotts. Because as long as our societies were open, our rulers had to behave more circumspectly, and I valued that. Indeed, in the 80s it was almost an obligation for any Western politician to meet with dissidents here. This gave us incredible authority and protected us from much harsher persecution. Lastly, one night during the Velvet Revolution, Timothy Garton Ash asked me as we were heading out to eat something, 'what do you expect?'. I replied that either a counter-revolution or a Western consumer society.

I am afraid that after 15 years we have lost a lot of our solidarity and its compassion, as developed in our country, in Poland, and in Hungary. When we had a clear enemy, we worked together. And yet when you ask what is the meaning of solidarity today for our countries in the fight against terrorism, then solidarity with those who suffer must be seen as an important element of overcoming terrorism. Thank you.

***Jerzy Buzek**:*

Thank you very much for that exceptional and extremely informative statement on the cooperation with the pre-*Solidarność* opposition and with *Solidarność* itself.

Our next speaker will be a representative of Hungary. In 1956, Hungary went through a tragic experience, and that may be the reason why it was especially difficult to restart opposition activities there. In 1979 our speaker signed the act of solidarity with Karta 77 and in the spring of 1981 he came to Poland to learn printing. He came just in time, because a year later he wouldn't have been allowed into Poland. In 1983 he was sentenced to six years in prison, but thanfully the sentence was commuted. Up until 1989, Gabor Demszky, for it is him I'm introducing, was an indefatigable opposition activist. Without interruption from 1990 till today he has been Mayor of Budapest. The floor is yours.

Gabor Demszky:

Ladies and Gentlemen, Budapest salutes Warsaw and the representatives of *Solidarność*. We are grateful for all you did for us.

For those in Hungary who grasp politics it had always been clear since 1956 that Central Europe would either become free from the Soviet totalitarian system as a whole, or it would not become free at all. It was also clear all along that Poland, in having by far the largest population and territory, and in preserving the independence of some of its institutions even in the totalitarian system, would have a decisive role in the region.

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[5] The person in question is Gyuli Horn, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in 1989 opened the Hungarian border with Austria for German Democratic Republic citizens. In 1990 he was granted the Charlemagne Prize of Aachen for his contributions to European unification.

Indeed, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 broke out from a demonstration of solidarity with the Polish 'Thaw' of October, 1956. The Prague Spring in 1968 coincided with student demonstration in Kraków and the economic reforms in Hungary. In August some leading Hungarian reform Marxist intellectuals publicly protested against the Soviet intervention. In the middle of the seventies, the establishment of KOR, the Workers' Defence Committee, had an influence – even if only in a small circle – on opposition intellectuals. And not much later, the Hungarian democratic opposition finally got crystallized in taking a stand for Karta 77. The 40 or so signatories of Karta 77 had become the core of a circle representing political values based on morals and nonconformism. In spite of the expected repression, its members took a stand for each other and for human rights. By 1979, 270 of us had signed a protest against the lawsuit brought against Havel and his counterparts and addressed it to the Hungarian leadership. These almost three hundred – mostly young – people provided the foundation for our independent institutions, press, the flying university, and the fund for the support of the poor.

We read, translated and disseminated the writings of the theoreticians of the Polish and Czechoslovak opposition. Adam Michnik's study of 1976 entitled *New Evolutionism* had the largest impact on us. Beside *The Gulag Archipelago*, this short work was perhaps the most important samizdat text translated into Hungarian. Michnik in his study goes beyond the traditional dilemma of "reform or revolution", and recommends the setting up of structures parallel to communist power. The establishment of independent public opinion, the creation of independent organizations for the protection of one's rights and the workers – such a movement that cannot be absorbed. This counter-establishment does not want to "overthrow the system". Rather, it opts to stay outside and openly demonstrate that we, the society and they, the party, are two separate worlds. The objective: the political emancipation and self-organization of citizens, as well as controlling the government. In the course of history few political concepts or projects have so come to fruition as those of Michnik. That was the foundation on which *Solidarity* came into being 25 years ago.

The birth of *Solidarity* on August 31, 1980 meant the beginning of a new computation of time in Central Europe. That was the first anti-bolshevist movement or organization of independence in the region that the communists were compelled to live together with – and for one and a half years. After that, the communists did manage to push *Solidarity* into the background and force it to go underground, but they could not eliminate it. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 lasted for two weeks, and although it was victorious in terms of domestic politics, in military terms it was defeated, and was followed by a bloody, seven years-long reprisal designed to crush society's resistance. To crush the Prague Spring of 1968 took as long as nine months, followed by two decades' of a stagnant "restoration" that had the impudence to call itself "normalization" in pushing several tens of thousands of opposition people to the margin of the society. Not even the coup d'état of December 1981 was sufficient

to eliminate *Solidarity* and the permanent opposition of the Polish society. The trade union and the free press went underground to continue operation, and those in power were sooner or later compelled to release the arrested leaders. Finally, the communists were compelled to negotiate and come to an agreement with *Solidarity*.

One of the reasons for this was that with respect to world politics, *Solidarność* was born under a favourable constellation of planets. In the second half of the seventies, the United States was just beginning to recover from the shock of defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. Kissinger's politics of equilibrium by the major powers was replaced by Brzezinski's determined and value-based national security strategy. During the intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was confronted – for the first time since 1949 – with a massive and invincible armed opposition by a nation it meant to conquer. As a response to this, President Carter, who came into office with a human rights programme, imposed an embargo on grains and began to provide training for the Afghan resistance fighters. Moreover, in a change of strategy, Carter targeted American rockets at Soviet rocket bases. President Reagan upon coming into office announced and then successfully realized a massive military build-up that was to leave the Soviet Union in ruins, economically crushed under its gerontocratic leadership. In addition to all this, there was the tremendous moral and political force arising from Karol Wojtyła's election as Pope.

The other reason of *Solidarity*'s success was of an internal political nature: it was rooted in the solidarity that was also expressed in its name. After learning the lessons of the defeat of the rising of intellectuals in 1968 and of workers in the 70s in Gdańsk, *Solidarity* was born on the one hand out of the alliance between intellectuals and workers, while on the other out of the constellation of anti-bolshevist political trends. And it was able to maintain this alliance. On the one hand, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik and their colleagues, the founding intellectuals of KOR, later to become advisors to *Solidarity*. On the other hand Lech Wałęsa had a decisive personal role in this, in his recognition of the significance of this alliance.

The strikes in Gdańsk resulting in the establishment of *Solidarity* had an impact on Hungary's internal politics as early as in July. Starting in 1978-1979, the Hungarian party leadership began to shift towards a liberalization of the economy and cultural policy to a minimal extent. Kádár got rid of many members of the politburo and the Central Committee who had undone the economic reforms of 1973-74 and pushed for a showdown with opposition philosophers and artists. The flexible and savvy György Aczél, who was his most trusted man, regained his former influence. During the summer of 1980, still before the establishment of *Solidarity*, a discussion was opened in a leading Hungarian literary and political weekly which enabled writers representing different trends and different levels of radicalism to demand greater cultural plurality and to provide information about underground literature. As a culmination of this discussion, István Eörsi, a leading writer of the democratic opposition, and Sándor Csóri, that of the popular national opposition, published real programme articles. As it would seem, the Hungarian

leadership was prompted by events in Poland to have this cautious, premature "mini-glasnost" kept well in hand.

During the next one and a half years, the official press gave detailed and continuous reports on the situation in Poland with overt antipathy, but in a factual manner. On the one hand, the Hungarian leadership was presumably unable to tell what direction the events might take there, on the other hand it was aware of the fact that a significant part of the population was receiving continuous information on events via Western radio, above all Radio Free Europe. Thirdly, they tried to present Hungary to the Hungarians – and not without success – as an island of quietude, prosperity and stability in Central-East Europe, as opposed to the uncertain political and economic situation in Poland.

As a consequence, the *Solidarity* movement had varied impact on the different groups of Hungarian society. The political leadership at the top of the social pyramid continued its milder course of domestic policy, but at the same time, instead of real structural economic reforms, it accelerated financing policy to maintain the standard of living by drawing Western loans in order to forestall the dissatisfaction of workers and civil servants. Apparently, all this made it necessary to continue with a relatively friendlier foreign policy towards the West within the constraints of the Soviet Bloc. But this also put a limitation on what measures could be taken against the opposition. Yet the activities of Hungary's democratic opposition grew stronger by the turn of the decade with regard to both membership numbers and the methods it applied. Of course, its strength is not comparable with that of the opposition in Poland even before August 1980. But that was the time when typed samizdat was replaced by samizdat duplicated by stencil, and the hard core of the opposition around János Kis[6] decided to launch an illegal political periodical openly publishing the name and title of the editors. The first issue of this periodical, called Beszélõ was published in December 1981...

Hungary's development was partly the consequence of an internal autochthonous development, but the events in Poland also had an important impact. Let me illustrate this through my own personal example.

I got acquainted with Karol Modzelewski back in 1979, when he met the representative of KOR in my Paris flat. I was learning Polish then. When *Solidarity* came into being I felt that it would utterly change the political situation of the region and I consciously prepared myself for the transposition of the Polish experiences. I decided to launch an independent publishing house; I bought a ton of paper and hid it in the cellar of my parents' home. In the meantime I trained myself to become a "Polish expert" with the help of Radio Free Europe, the more substantial Western press discussing *Solidarity* and the so-called "C-confidential" press review made for Hungarian political leaders, but leaked out to a broader circle. After the short trips made by László Rajk[7] and Bálint Magyar[8], I also went on a "study tour" for a month

[6] Janos Kis – philosopher and political scientist, author of numerous books and articles.

to Poland in May 1981. Equipped with a camera and a small tape recorder I carried out ordinary sociological and political science work on site and I learned to use simple printing techniques. Ewa Milewicz[9] helped me to meet the leading experts of *Solidarity*. I was in Poland during the great days of the "dual power" of *Solidarity* and the Communist party. I spent two weeks in Warsaw, where the trade union elections were held in preparation for *Solidarity*'s summer congress. By acquainting myself with the surrounding discussions I realized that those were right who said that *Solidarity* is more than a free trade union. In reality it was a huge political movement conjoined with social opposition, therefore its leaders represent not only the workers of the workshops that elect them in a number of steps, but represent the entire society gathered in *Solidarity*. On leaving Warsaw I went to Wrocław to see Karol Modzelewski, who had just resigned from his post as spokesperson for *Solidarity* after the agreement made in Warsaw following the provocation in Bydgoszcz[10], but as a founding father and as a member of the National Coordinating Committee, he continued to have significant influence in the movement. On coming home, I gave a presentation on my experiences concerning the Polish "renewal" in June, in Ferenc Köszeg's flat, organized by SZETA, the Fund for the Support of the Poor. As a reprisal, I was expelled from the editorial office where I worked, and from that time on I was unemployed until the 1990s when I became an MP and then the mayor of Budapest. Using my Polish experiences, I set up an independent publishing house called AB. In a few months time – ironically, during the days of Jaruzelski's coup d'état – the first AB publications were issued.

In addition to the engagement of the opposition in politics and having an independent, illegal press in the strict sense of word, the independent, opposition-led literary and artistic life began to boom again, mainly in Budapest. Alternative rock, mainly punk bands, had regular performances for audiences of several thousands singing songs that were openly against the system. One of the leading bands sang of Polish-Hungarian brotherhood in their most popular song. An independent modern literary periodical was launched that organized evenings where poems were recited on the *Solidarity* revolution, and later on Martial Law, which were also published by a cultural samizdat periodical. The legally existing

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[7] Laszlo Rajk – architect, Editor-in-Chief of "Beszelö".

[8] Bálint Magyar – historian and sociologist. His doctoral thesis concerned the post-War history of Polish agriculture. Two-time Minister of Education after 1989.

[9] Ewa Milewicz – Workers' Defence Committee activist, organizer of the "Solidarność" strike bulletin in Gdańsk Shipyard. A columnist for "Gazeta Wyborcza".

[10] In mid-March, farmers fighting for the registration of their trade union and representatives of *Solidarność* were to take part in a meeting of the Voivodeship National Council. *Solidarność* members were called upon to leave the meeting. When they refused, the militia was called in, and they were severely beaten. In reply, a protest strike began in Bydgoszcz. At first, the *Solidarność* National Coordination Commission declared a warning strike, and in the case of not punishing those responsible for the beatings and not coming to an agreement with the government – was to declare a general strike. A day before the general strike deadline, the so-called Warsaw compromise was reached between *Solidarność* and government representatives. The general strike was cancelled, and the authorities were to punish those responsible for the beating.

literary organization and periodical of young writers also turned more and more radical. This periodical was suppressed in 1983/84 with reference to an article on a trip in Poland, and its organization, which had the opposition philosopher Miklós Tamás Gáspár as an elected member of its management, was dissolved. Later, however, the authorities were compelled to withdraw this measure. The young writers turned more and more radical. And this made the Hungarian Writers' Association radical. Indeed, at its annual assembly meeting of 1986 it totally turned against the authorities.

At the same time, the response of the majority of Hungarian society to *Solidarity* was different from that of the opposition intellectuals. Although thousands sympathized with *Solidarity*, the deceitful party propaganda, which claimed that the reason for the bad economic situation in Poland was that "the Polish people do not work", was broadly effective. For that reason, many received the news on strikes with reservations, or even with hostility. The fact that, in contrast with Poland, Hungary's intellectual opposition did not manage to forge an alliance with the workers of the factories, the men of the streets and with the countryside, and could not counter government propaganda, also played a role. That was a time when the standard of living in Hungary began to deteriorate slowly but perceptively, and people were becoming anxious. Hungarians then still thought that the Soviet political leadership and army would again suppress Central-Europe's independence movements just as in 1956 and 1968, and they were worried lest they lose their undoubtedly much milder "goulash communism" of the Kádár era.

In December 1981, the majority of Hungarian society found that their pessimistic attitude to events in Poland was justified. Some years had to pass, Gorbachev had to come to power, and the Hungarian standard of living had to further deteriorate before Hungarian society realized that changes would take place sooner or later. It was only then that they grasped that *Solidarity* meant the beginning of a new computation of time in Central-Europe, and that the spirit of revolution can no longer be quelched. But at the same time, the Hungarian political leadership, with Kádár at the top, hardened in its fears for power, and – anticipating (rightly) his own political death – opposed Gorbachev's reforms. Although their hands were tied by the debts to the West, still they struck down on the opposition several times.

In 1983/84 I myself was also taken to court. In 1986, on the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution, and after the congress of the writers' association, the repression got even stronger. In 1988, before and after the party congress that brought about the fall of Kádár, we were arrested on two occasions, and the Imre Nagy memorial meeting was dispersed by the police. By that time, however, our underground paper was issued in tens of thousands of copies, and was also being disseminated in provincial cities. Lots of semi-legal independent circles and societies were set up, and environment protection and political demonstrations were held in the streets in Budapest. When the Gorbachev leadership overtly stated to the leaders of the satellite states that the Soviet army

would no longer intervene in their states, the state socialist regimes in Central Europe went down like ninepins in one and a half years' time. The Polish and Hungarian party leadership after the Kádár era understood the new situation earlier than others. The Round Table negotiations in 1989 were running parallel in Warsaw and in Budapest and were leading to free elections. Hungary's status again changed together with that of the other countries in the region, primarily together with the status of Poland. But this time – at long last – favourably so. *Solidarity* played the decisive role of catalyst in this process.

And so I'd like to take this opportunity to personally say thanks to Lech Wałęsa, leader of the *Solidarity* movement, for all his movement meant.

Thank you all for your attention.

***Zbigniew Bujak*:**

Thank you. Ladies and Gentlemen, the next speaker is an Evangelical pastor, a Bundestag Member who participated in GDR opposition activities from the mid-70s onwards. We have known each other for a long time and I have always admired him. Markus Meckel, the floor is yours.

Markus Meckel:

Ladies and gentlemen,

The founding of the independent trade union Solidarity 25 years ago sent out a signal. For the first time anywhere in the Eastern Bloc, and unlike in the GDR in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, resistance – strikes, uprisings, demonstrations, calls by the masses for freedom – resulted not in a violently quashed bloodbath, but in success. For the first time, there was a negotiated outcome: an independent, non-communist trade union.

We in the GDR were deeply moved by these events and followed them with great empathy; we were convinced that "tua res agitur", in other words that this was also about us, that there was a joint issue of freedom at stake. We were conscious that the founding of *Solidarity* and the fact that the communist leadership in Poland had been forced to recognize it constituted a breach in the system. And a breach in a rigid structure will shake the whole. Thus, the significance of the events of the summer of 1980 went far beyond Poland.

The GDR's communist party closed the country's borders to Poland and tried to prevent the "virus of freedom" from spreading. Old anti-Polish sentiment was dredged up by the communist media to immunize the population against this Polish spirit of freedom. A friend of mine who brought *Solidarity* materials from Poland was imprisoned for a year, and that was not an isolated case. Contact with Poland was made more difficult, and those who did not speak Polish had trouble in obtaining direct materials other than Western sources of information.

Fortunately, there were a few people in the ranks of the GDR's opposition and in the churches who could speak Polish and who secretly maintained contact, in

particular Günter Särchen[11], Theo Mechtenberg[12], Wolfgang Templin[13] and Ludwig Mehlhorn[14]. They did everything in their power to spread information about Poland and the work of *Solidarity*.

For those of us fighting for rights and freedom in the GDR, the founding of *Solidarity* was incredibly encouraging.

It showed that change from below was indeed possible!

With *Solidarity*, a new political player had arrived on the stage. A new political actor, one rooted in society, had become an unmistakable reality. For a long time, many people failed to grasp that, and continued to hope only for change from above. With *Solidarity*, it became clear that the struggle for freedom and rights was no longer just the private attempt of individuals to live in truth, to borrow Vaclav Havel's phrase.

Millions of people became active, and their struggle for freedom could no longer be ignored. The Polish Pope strengthened the people, gave them courage, guidance and spiritual support.

For those of us in the GDR, where we were so strongly confronted with people's fear, all of this seemed like a miracle. We thought such a thing would not be possible with the Germans. And how wrong we were! – as, fortunately, proved to be the case in the autumn of 1989, when in the GDR, too, people lost their fear and took to the streets. From the inside they tore down the Wall dividing Germany and the whole of Europe.

As in the other states Stalin occupied, there was opposition and resistance in East Germany from the very beginning of the Soviet occupation. After the Social Democratic Party was forced to merge with the Communist Party, thousands of people went to prison – or fled to the West. The bourgeois parties were adapted to the Communist system, and many committed democrats left the Soviet-occupied zone, or GDR. Over the decades, the emigration of critical, democratic potential from the GDR to West Germany was a drain on the opposition. Meanwhile, those who went to live in the West were not in exile, but rather built new lives elsewhere in Germany.

In spite of this, the old generation of opposition members was always being replaced by new members, ones who pursued their own path. In the early eighties, this movement grew stronger, not least because of the *Ostpolitik* pursued by West Germany and the CSCE process. For the CSCE made it easier to maintain contacts with the West again, something that had become difficult following the construction of the Wall, and ensured that more information reached us. We tried to build up contacts between the various opposition groups and to form networks. An important

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[11] Günter Särchen – columnist, leading oppositionist, maintained active contacts with Polish Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs, member of the Magdeburg Anna Morawska Society, which works for Polish-German reconciliation.

[12] Theo Mechtenberg – Catholic theologian, oppositionist, member of the Anna Morawska Society.

[13] Wolfgang Templin – philosopher, columnist, leading oppositionist from the late 1970s.

[14] Ludwig Mehlhorn – Polish-German reconciliation activist, member of the "Krzyżowa" Foundation for European Agreement, decorated with the "25 Years of Solidarność" commemorative medal.

role was played here by the churches – particularly the Protestant churches. However, in the GDR we never succeeded in reaching the workforce to any great extent.

But back to Poland. In December 1981, when General Jaruzelski imposed Martial Law and used every means at his disposal in an attempt to safeguard power and thereby prevent an invasion, this came as a shock to us in the GDR. In the course of 1981, Erich Honecker, the leader of the SED, had signalled to the Soviets that the GDR would take part in an invasion of Poland, and called for such an invasion in order to put an end to the "spectre of freedom". I know a number of people who, in light of this, refused, as a precautionary measure, to perform reserve duty.

Although to a far lesser extent than in the West, of course, people from the GDR also sent aid packages to private addresses in Poland that we circulated. And again, we drew courage from the news that *Solidarity* was continuing to operate underground.

Yet even underground, *Solidarity* showed a strength we found astounding. An intense debate about the future took place. Unfortunately, we had no opportunity at that time to discuss differences in assessment, for example of Ronald Reagan's policiers and NATO. We were very sceptical of the policy of an arms race seeking to provoke the economic collapse of the Soviet Union – the risk of war was, after all, very high, and it would have been waged primarily on German soil. At the time, we also knew little about *Solidarity*'s internal discussions on evincing openness towards the idea of German unity. That would have greatly encouraged us.

The Round Table discussions, *Solidarity*'s re-legalization, the semi-free elections of June 4, 1989, and then the elevation of the first non-communist prime minister – Tadeusz Mazowiecki – in the Eastern Bloc were signal manifestations of change in 1989. It was not just the Polish will for freedom which was on display, but also the Poles' sound judgement, common sense and the ability to negotiate pragmatically. Hungary, too, seized the scope of possibilities offered by Gorbachev's policy. Since freedom cannot be dispensed in small doses, developments accelerated there too, and the democratic opposition grew stronger.

In the GDR, too, events sped up from the start of 1989. The democratic opposition increasingly began to emerge from under the protective roof of the Protestant churches. In August, an initiative to found a social democratic party became public, which I launched together with Martin Gutzeit, who, like myself, was a Protestant clergyman. This was followed in September by other movements, such as the "New Forum", "Democracy Now" and "Democratic Awakening". A mass exodus of emigrants, supported by Budapest and Warsaw, shook the political power of the SED. Rooted in the churches and led by the newly founded democratic initiatives and movements, a broad wave of protest emerged. This peaceful revolution on November 9 brought down the Wall – the very symbol of German and European division. The communist authorities were forced to join Round Table discussions around a table borrowed from Poland. But this time, it was clear from the start that free elections would be held. We negotiated the electoral law and laid the foundations regarding the need to deal with our

communist past. After the election on March 18, 1990, the freely elected People's Chamber avowed our responsibility towards our neighbours arising from our history, which the SED had always denied. The freely elected government of the GDR, in which I served as foreign minister, negotiated the treaties necessary for German unification, relating to monetary union, international acceptance and the sovereignty of the unified Germany – the so-called "two plus four" talks – as well as the Unification Treaty. As foreign minister, one of my particular wishes was for Poland's western border to be permanently recognized under international law, which, after some irritation and resistance, was also ultimately achieved. The fact that the new Poland supported German unity, as well as the unified Germany's membership of NATO, was of great significance. And thus the way was paved for the exemplary success story of reconciliation, cooperation and joint efforts towards integration in NATO and the EU that followed from 1990.

I would like to close by looking at two challenges we face us today:

1. Our experiences of dictatorship should have taught us how important it is to pursue a clear international – and for us, in particular, European – policy towards dictators and despots. Dissidents and civil-society opposition movements, those who stand up for rights and freedom – for example in Belarus – need joint, and much clearer support from us in the European Union! We in the EU should create appropriate instruments for such a policy, for example a "European Freedom and Democracy Foundation", as also supported by Polish Members of the European Parliament.
2. The sixtieth anniversary of the end of the War has shown to what a small extent we in Europe share a common understanding of our history, for example in the assessment of communism in relation to National Socialism. That is something we must work on. However, it also involves paying appropriate attention and granting due recognition to dissidence and opposition in the communist period. This is a central chapter in the story of European freedom and democracy! And *Solidarity* has earned a place of honour in this European story of freedom!

Thank you.

***Jerzy Buzek**:*

We thank you for taking part in the discussion. The next speaker is a female representative of Hungary. But before we carry on, there is one personal matter that I must attend to – namely, many years ago at a *Solidarność* congress for formal reasons I didn't give the floor to Bogdan Borusewicz and we agreed that at the next *Solidarność* meeting he would be the first to speak. This is that next *Solidarność* meeting, so Bogdan will be our subsequent speaker.

Mrs. Judit Vásárhelyi from the Independent Ecological Centre in Budapest, the floor is yours.

Judit Vásárhelyi:

Ladies and Gentlemen, Chairman,

Thank you very much for your invitation to this very important conference on past events. But I would now like to report about the present, and perhaps about the future. I would like to make a few remarks about the spiritual heritage of *Solidarność* in Hungary. It happened that some Hungarian farmers this winter, better to say smallholders, did not receive their direct payments from the agricultural ministry after a year waiting to negotiate the fulfillment of their responsibilities, along with program issues of rural development. They were organized by the Farmer's Alliance. Some 1,500 tractors came to Budapest at the end of February for a planned 2 or 3 days. But it was three weeks later in – 10 degrees C when they signed an agreement with the government. The Budapest people received them with great solidarity, offering accommodation, food, news, hot tea, company, etc. They came and visited the farmer's gatherings, their masses, as well as all kinds of events. My family had seven farmers in our home. Every day, another suburban village served several hundred portions of lunch to the farmers. To describe things in a nut shell, after deep friendships were established even among families of different generations, and loads of gratitude was expressed, in some far-away village peasants dug up a relevant newspaper article from 1956 and learned that this solidarity of the Budapest people was not original, it was a sort of debt of gratitude, 50 years old, for all the food, sympathy and solidarity the villages sent into the capital being occupied by Soviet tanks. Yes, it was the same happy passion in '56, in '80 as well as this year among the people. Environmental groups also thought that they have to express their solidarity with the peasants, indicating that rural and urban people share the same future. They have a common fate in terms of the solidarity message. And they thought that the diversity of Hungarian nature, and the diversity of the landscape, along with cultural diversity might depend on the very existence of family farms. Thus did we arrive at a completely new form of solidarity. This is the future that generations need pay attention to. Thank you so much.

Jerzy Buzek:

Thank you very much. This is how civil society is created and functions. Now for Bogdan Borusewicz.

Bogdan Borusewicz:

Paradoxically, the creation of *Solidarność* in 1980 made direct contacts with our neighbours more difficult. Strange though it may seem, that was the case. We became completely isolated from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Before then, these contacts were relatively intense, especially with the Czechoslovaks, as in the meetings of the Workers' Defence Committee members with Karta 77. During the *Solidarność* era, it was easier to travel to the West, and *Solidarność* delegations visited Sweden, England, Japan, even South America, but not the GDR, not Czechoslovakia, and of course not the USSR – trips to those countries were out

of the question. Direct contacts with the opposition in those countries were created after Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government was created in 1989.

During this time, because our situation had radically changed, everything that was left in the union warehouses from underground activity – duplicators, offsets, paint, books, underground publications, as well as radio stations and radio transmitters – were sent to countries where they were needed, in particular to Lithuania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The first *Solidarność* delegation went to Ukraine to a People's Movement congress in Kiev and was the only foreign delegation. The Lithuanians put forward a question to us – this is no secret – concerning the possibility of setting up a government in exile in the case of an unfavourable turn of affairs in Lithuania. We even got to Mongolia and tried to help there, too. I would like to note that our aim was not to export revolution – we helped only where social revolt had already toppled the previous regime. The development of events in Belarus shows that once regained freedom can again be taken away. In the beginning of the 90s, there were 200,000 strong demonstrations in Belarus, much bigger than in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities last year. And yet the situation was reversed.

To finish, I would like to note that I don't fully agree with Mr. Gabor Demszky. I think that victory was not due entirely to conflicts in the Soviet Bloc and the arms race. We would surely have achieved less had we been limited to dissident activity. We were a democratic opposition that acted within the framework of a movement of 10 million people. In the underground, when a head-on attack was launched against us, tens of thousands of people were active in *Solidarność* on a daily basis. Of course before August 1980, fewer people were directly involved – around a thousand, maybe one and a half thousand. *Solidarność* was impossible to destroy thanks to its massive size, not only thanks to its experienced leadership.

Zbigniew Bujak:

Thank you.

Jerzy Buzek:

Bogdan Borusewicz decided to take revenge on me and spoke longer than the allotted time…

Zbigniew Bujak:

He is justified only by the fact that he has finally squared the accounts for all the equipment.

Jerzy Buzek:

The next speaker is someone who can speak of a great success – Mr. Oleg Rybachuk, deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Ukraine.

Oleg Rybachuk:

Thank you very much. Probably I have to follow the pattern of one of the gentlemen from Italy, who stated that his main language is Italian. Mine is Ukrainian, but I find myself speaking English as well. I wanted to thank you very much for the atmosphere which I find here. In my previous life, as is the case with Viktor Yushchenko, I was a banker, an economist. I have attended hundreds of conferences, but I don't think I could call any of them inspiring. They might have been factual, productive, informative – but not inspiring. What I find here is very inspiring and what I find here is highly unusual and very moving. Thank you very much again. For millions of Ukrainians, the word 'solidarity' is not only a word, but even a feeling. Maybe, like in the Oxford Dictionary, it is the feeling of not being lonely. And in the cold days and nights of just last autumn we Ukrainians truly felt what solidarity is in action. I remember in '92 when I first got to know Zbigniew Brzeziński how he used to torture me with one question: why are you so sure that you or your kids will be living in an independent Ukraine? It's much easier for me to explain to him why today than it was ten years ago. And Viktor Yushchenko says that we represent responsible government. I am really inspired by what has happened today and in continuing the discussion with Zbigniew Brzeziński I would like to have the opportunity to organize something like this in Ukraine, perhaps the 10th anniversary of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. That would provide a place where we could share views and develop new arguments. And I have one wish for that future conference: that whoever will be representing Poland won't have to say what President Wałęsa said today, i.e., that there are two neighbours who are not yet family members.

To put that another way, I hope that by that time there will be no exception, that ours will be a meeting or club of friends, all representing free, democratic, and prosperous countries in a united Europe. I warmly invite all of you to participate in that conference. Thank you very much again.

Zbigniew Bujak:

Thank you very much for your invitation. I would like to ask Stanislau Shushkevich of Belarus to take to floor. He is the leader who signed the act that dissolved the USSR. Later he was the first Chairman of the Supreme Council of independent Belarus. Today he is one of the leaders of the democratic opposition in Belarus.

Stanislau Shushkevich:

Archbishop Józef Życiński said that communism has collapsed in our part of Europe. Unfortunately, communism has not collapsed in Belarus. It has mutated into a sort of backward system that hampers the transition to a civil society and devours people of courage. It will take a long time to figure out ways of aiding Belarus, because the authoritarian government has created the appropriate

structures needed to maintain rule. The best example is the banning of the Union of Poles in Belarus, an organization that had functioned democratically.

I must admit that the influence of *Solidarność* was enormous in our country, although we didn't know a lot about *Solidarność* because there was an information blockade. Only representatives of the intellectual elite knew about such great Poles as Karol Wojtyła. I was also in a very good situation, because in 1974 I was at Kraków's Jagiellonian University as a physicist and I had the chance to listen to five sermons by Karol Wojtyła. I was a citizen of the communist bloc and I thought, why do they let him do this? In my country he would have been sent straight to prison. We also knew little about people who are an honour to Poland, and only a lot later did we learn about such people as Jerzy Giedroyc, Zbigniew Brzeziński, the late Jacek Kuroń, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who is present here, Bronisław Geremek, Adam Michnik, and Leszek Balcerowicz. But *Solidarność* itself was much harder to hide from us than these individuals. And when that representative of the working class – Lech Wałęsa – appeared, it was hard to trust our communist propaganda, which told us that the Poles were striking and did not want to work, that we had to feed them, the Czechs had to feed them, and so on.

Today, too, we are also living with an information blockade. In Europe everybody is astounded at this, and people often comment on the peculiarity of Belarus. After all, we have recently witnessed the "Orange Revolution", the "Rose Revolution", and the "Tulip Revolution". Yet in our country, a European country, there is no such revolution. But there is a dictatorship. I would like to say that there were efforts in 1991 and 1994 to take the path of democracy, but it didn't work out. In Belarus there are more pensioners than in the former USSR. And these people are Russian chauvinists. The fact that the concentration of military personnel was four times higher than in Russia also had its influence. As did the fact that for 20 years everything that was Byelorussian was quashed and that the Byelorussian elite was physically destroyed.

Nowadays we look to the examples of Asian countries – and we envy even Iraq! Yes, we envy countries like Iraq, because the Iraqi parliament is already working on a Constitution, and there will be a referendum. In Belarus we had a referendum after the cancellation of the democratic Constitution in 1994, and all this was backed by Russia. Russia says it is wonderful. And yet our legislature is such that you can throw a man in prison for writing about the President's lies. We want to have a state governed by the law – but if it is to work according to the present law, we will have a very hard time achieving that end.

We have learnt a lot from *Solidarność*, but we must become aware of the fact that if we don't creatively explore the *Solidarność* experience, if we don't find our own Lech Wałęsa, then it will be difficult for us to join the community of European countries. And that is precisely what we so aspire to do.

Jerzy Buzek:

Thank you. Now Mr. Česlav Okinčic, advisor to the President of Lithuania and another representative of Poland's neighbours.

Česlav Okinčic:

I would like to say a few words as a Pole from the East. Former Deputy Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament Mr. Motiena is representing Lithuania today, and he will also take the floor.

When *Solidarność* was created in 1980, we Poles from the East were listening to news from Poland. We prayed for your success. From Vilnius, Grodno to Vladivostok, enslaved people knew that *Solidarność* meant freedom. Today I would like to thank all of you for that. I would like to thank you for awakening our hope and our will to fight. Thank you for showing us the way.

We took an active part in the urgent struggle for the independence of our country. Our compatriots in Belarus are still fighting for their identity, for human rights. Let us not forget them. And as a Pole from Lithuania I would like to speak of how we raised our heads with pride when a Pole was chosen Pope, when *Solidarność* was created, when great Poles and friends of *Solidarność* – Zbigniew Brzeziński and the late Jan Nowak-Jeziorański – were advisors to the American administration. We Poles from the East were enormously proud to be part of the great Polish nation.

Zbigniew Bujak:

The next speaker is Yoshiho Umeda, who has lived in Poland since 1963 and took part in opposition activities – he cooperated with the Workers' Defence Committee, and later with *Solidarność*. In 1982 he was extradited from our country. In Tokyo he published the "Polish Bulletin" on the situation in Poland. *Umeda-san* is a translator of Polish literature and journalism into Japanese. He will now tell us about the situation in Japan, India and China.

Yoshiho Umeda:

I would like to briefly travel in time and space to Asia, the 1980s. I will first speak about Japan, as I myself am Japanese.

At the Gdańsk Shipyard strike, there was a certain Japanese reporter with whom I spoke at some length. This reporter wrote many, many articles, most of them published in the Japanese "Asagi shim". Some time later, Japanese trade unions asked to contact *Solidarność*. On November 14, 1980, we held the first meeting of *Solidarność* and a foreign organization in the Catholic Intelligentsia Club – it was a delegation from the trade unions' Tokyo headquarters and *Solidarność* signed its first international agreement. In May, a *Solidarność* delegation went to Japan and that is when we learnt about the influence of *Solidarność* in Japan. In fact, at the time there were efforts to unite the individual

trade unions in Japan, but because of the existence of quite a strong pro-Soviet fraction in the Tokyo unions, this was not possible. But when *Solidarność* was created, the pro-Soviet forces suddenly diminished. After a few years, the Japanese trade union movement was united, and one part of its name is *Solidarność*. The union is called Rengo, and Rentai in Japanese means *Solidarność*. *Solidarność* also had another effect. Japan's academic and scientific community was very much dominated by Marxists, and this Marxist fraction lost very, very much of its impetus under the influence of *Solidarność*.

I will now move on to India. After I was extradited from Poland in January 1982, I worked for a long time in the *Solidarność* office in Brussels, so I was in contact with many foreign unions and I also spoke with the Indian secretary general and with the leaders of the individual unions. One of them, from the HMS union, which has 4.5 million members, said that in their every office, even the smallest one, there is a *Solidarność* poster and a photo of Lech Wałęsa. "Every once in a while we organize rallies. We recently had a rally which was attended by 200,000 people, all supporting *Solidarność*", he told me. Well, I was shocked – this was an enormous moral gift to me, that even in a country like India they knew about *Solidarność*.

Now a little about China, Asia's most important country. I was in China twenty times in the 1980s after Martial Law was imposed. During my stays I learnt that in 1980, between August and November, the Singua Press Agency systematically published information about *Solidarność*. There was also a Singua correspondent in the Gdańsk Shipyard. But after November 20 information from Poland stopped appearing altogether. It turned out that the Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Chen Yun, began to sense the danger *Solidarność* might bring to China. So he introduced total censorship.

Once in a restaurant in North-East China, I met a gaunt looking Chinese man, who later turned out to be a very renowned sociologist. He spoke Japanese, and when I told him I once worked for *Solidarność*, he started crying. Then, suddenly, he asked me: "when you meet Mr. Wałęsa, please tell him that *Solidarność* is a star of hope for the Chinese people. And that we know everything about *Solidarność*, we learn from it, and we will surely profit from the *Solidarność* experience".

Jerzy Buzek:

Ladies and Gentlemen, judging from Mr. Umeda's speech, we may well have the prospect of one-and-a-half billion, well, maybe half a billion new *Solidarność* members. Now that's something!

The next speaker is John Taylor from the "Polish *Solidarity* Campaign", an organization created in Great Britain right after Martial Law was imposed, whose aim was to bring widespread aid to Poles.

John Taylor:

In the United Kingdom in the 1980s I was active in the "Polish *Solidarity* Campaign" and I also wrote a book about *Solidarity*. I feel very honoured to have

been invited to take part in this 25th anniversary conference. The Victoria Novotel has a lot more stars I believe than the dear old Hotel Morski in Gdańsk where I stayed 25 years ago. You've certainly put together a very impressive list of speakers, distinguished politicians from around the world, academics, journalists and of course former *Solidarity* activists. I have found the discussions very informative and very thought-provoking, particularly this afternoon's session. However I do have a criticism. I am surprised and disappointed at the lack of any trade union speaker from outside Poland, and I say this for two reasons. *Solidarność* consciously and deliberately took the form of a trade union. And not only its name, but its practice demonstrated the best principles of trade unionism. I would argue that its trade union form enabled the opposition of a few to become a mass movement of millions of people, something that politicians, bureaucrats, academics, journalists, and bishops could not have achieved. It seems to me that trade unionism provides a template for strong but disciplined social action and is a model for its swift expansion. Dr Zhelev from Bulgaria was the first speaker today to recognize this important fact. That's my first point, Mr. Chairman. The second is that in the early months of *Solidarność*, the Polish union received much valuable practical and moral help from trade unions elsewhere in Europe. For *Solidarność* was an inspiration for us in the West, too. I'm thinking particularly here of the French and Italian trade unions. So my question Mr Chairman is, why are they not represented among the speakers? Thank you very much.

Zbigniew Bujak:

Because it is not easy to address that question, we will postpone answering. I will now ask Professor Holzer, author of the first book on *Solidarność* in Polish, to take the floor.

Jerzy Holzer:

I would like to turn around the question underlying this session and ask: what does the Polish opposition, what does *Solidarność* owe to other Soviet Bloc countries? Is there anything it owes to them? The answer is of course simple, although I'm not convinced if it is necessarily true, that *Solidarność* learnt from the experiences of the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. That it learnt, to put it another way, from other peoples' mistakes. This statement is most probably partly true and partly false, but in fact something else is more important.

The Polish opposition, *Solidarność*, knew that in other countries there is also disapproval of the way the system functions, that there is disapproval for the basic rules of "real socialism". But was Polish opposition activity, before and after 1968, were KOR and *Solidarność* but a community of madmen on a deserted island in a vast communist ocean? No – there was Karta 77 in Czechoslovakia, there was substantial intellectual and publishing activity in the Hungarian opposition, there were groups of Protestants and Catholics in the GDR, there was Solzhenitsyn and

Sakharov, there were the Russian, Lithuanian samizdats and many other ones. I think that this was a very important factor for the consciousness of the Polish opposition and of *Solidarność*, that apart from its wide-spread character or the potential for action, Poland was not an exception, it was not the only country where resistance was taking place. To put it differently, the spectre of freedom and democracy was haunting Europe and becoming reality.

Today I think that we should thank all those people from the other communist bloc countries, those who contributed to enabling *Solidarność*'s activity and to the fact that *Solidarność* was aware of being part of a huge, multinational movement for freedom and democracy.

Jerzy Buzek:

Those were words that ably and admirably expanded our discussion. Maybe at the next such next meeting the subject of parallel opposition activity in Soviet Bloc countries will be discussed at more length.

The next speaker will be Mr. Kazimieras Motiena, Deputy Speaker of the first democratically elected Parliament in Lithuania. The floor is yours.

***Kazimieras Motiena*:**

Dear companions in the fight for freedom, dear co-founders and participants of the *Solidarność* movement. It is a great honour for me to be able to wish you all the best on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of *Solidarność*. We Lithuanians supported you during the Gdańsk strike and during all the events linked to *Solidarność*. Together with the rest of the democratic world we shared your determination and courage in striving for the quickest possible liberation from the yoke of communism. Your example inspired representatives of democratic Lithuania and in 1988 the Lithuanian Reform Movement Sajudis was created, which called on the people of Lithuania to fight for liberation from Soviet occupation and to re-establish the independent Lithuanian state. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Supreme Council proclaimed the act of the rebirth of the independent Lithuanian state. In a very courageous reaction to this move, John Paul II sent a telegram to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Episcopacy, in which he expressed his solidarity with the Lithuanian nation and wished it perseverance. Never will I forget the moment when, as the Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, I was granted the proclamation of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland stating its support for Lithuanian independence, nor will I forget the extremely long applause of the Polish Sejm's deputies which followed the adoption of this decision. That was the first document in the world adopted by the highest state authorities in support of Lithuanian independence.

And for this, please allow me once again to deeply thank the *Solidarność* movement and the Polish Sejm.

In January 1991, when the Soviet Union sent its military forces against Lithuania, in result of which people were killed, my country once again felt the support of neighbouring Poland. It was then that a deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Česlav Okinčic, who addresses us earlier, appeared before the Senate of the Republic of Poland and spoke of the Soviet forces in Lithuania. After this speech, Poland's highest authorities decided to immediately condemn the Soviet Union and demanded that Moscow begin peaceful negotiations with the lawfully chosen authorities of Lithuania. I thank the Polish nation, its Sejm and *Solidarność* for their support in that crucial period for Lithuania.

Today, on the day of the 25th anniversary of *Solidarność*, I wish all the best to all Poles, and I wish the leader of *Solidarność*, Lech Wałęsa, unity and accord in his actions on behalf of defending his country's freedom. Long live *Solidarność*, long live Poland!

Zbigniew Bujak:

Thank you very much. We would like to ask our friend, Ákos Engelmayer, to take the floor. Ákos fought in the 1956 Hungarian revolution, which interrupted his studies. In 1962 he married a Polish woman and settled down in our country, where he later obtained a degree at Warsaw University. He mediated in contacts between the Workers' Defence Committee and *Solidarność* and the Hungarian opposition. In the years 1990-1995 he was the Hungarian Ambassador to Poland.

Ákos Engelmayer:

I was a member of *Solidarność* from the very beginning till the very end. And I remember explaining in Budapest back in those days that Poland's communist regime will collapse, and everybody looked at me like a madman.

Secondly, I regret that Mr. Demszky's speech did not touch upon Polish-Hungarian relations, because they were not only a matter of a handful of oppositionists. The movement started as early as the second half of the 1970s. From 1986, the Polish-Hungarian *Solidarity* movement was active in Poland. In its consciousness, *Solidarność* reached back to the Hungarian tradition of 1956 – and I must admit, partly with shame, partly with pride, that on the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian uprising the first monument dedicated to Hungary's murdered was erected in this part of Europe, namely, in Podkowa Leśna not far from Warsaw. It is a plaque with an inscription in the two languages – Polish and Hungarian. In 1986, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Hungarian uprising, many books were published on the subject. Between 1976 and 1989 over 6,000 books were published in the Polish underground press. Not copies, but titles. At one point some 700 newsletters and newspapers were published weekly. So this movement was something much, much more serious than only the activity of a handful of oppositionists. And I would like to sincerely thank you for the fact that 1956 was revived more strongly in Poland than in Hungary.

***Zbigniew Bujak**:*

The next speaker is a representative of Azerbaijan, Ali Kerimli from the National Front, an opposition organization.

Ali Kerimli:

From the beginning of the 1990s, we, the citizens of Azerbaijan consider ourselves part of Europe. We ask you not to forget about the Caucasian and Central Asian states. We were once isolated from the world by a huge wall, and today feel happy over the successes of the Eastern European countries – Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Georgia, which are a motivation to us. We also wish for the attention of the world's societies to be concentrated on the democratic processes taking place in other former Soviet republics, for example in the southern Caucasus and especially in Azerbaijan, where parliamentary elections will take place in two months time. I know that my colleague has already encouraged you to take part in these elections as observers. But let me repeat that we want to feel the presence of your moral support!

Jerzy Buzek:

Thank you very much. We now have the honour of listening to Mr. Osadczuk, professor of political science at the Free University in Berlin. From 1950, Bogdan Osadczuk cooperated closely with Jerzy Giedroyc in the Parisian journal *Kultura*. He also wrote for the underground press in Poland and was an influential columnist for the Swiss *Neue Zürische Zeitung*. He is an unflagging advocate of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. He was an adviser to the presidents of the free Ukraine and Poland. Moreover, he is a Knight of the Order of the White Eagle.

Bohdan Osadczuk:

First a few words about what Poland gave to Ukraine. The process leading up to the Orange Revolution actually began in October, for that is when Ukrainians became interested in Poland and began learning about the Polish experiences.

I would also like to emphasize that in the early years after the War there was no real centre of information exchange. The Americans were the first to set up a network of radio stations which broadcast information both from different countries and about different countries. And this played a colossal role in the shaping of all of the opposition movements. In East Germany, this role was played by the American Rias broadcasting station.

One more thing to finish off. I think that too little, or perhaps nothing at all was said here about the role of the Parisian journal *Kultura* in the shaping of the new Polish mentality, in defeating nationalist, chauvinist views and in the creation of the possibilities for reconciliation with our neighbours. Without *Kultura* and its editor-in-chief Jerzy Giedroyc, these changes of mentality, ones which resounded

in *Solidarność*'s message to the Soviet Bloc countries quoted by Prime Minister Buzek, could not have taken place.

Jerzy Buzek:

Thank you very much. I would also like to sincerely thank all of our speakers and participants. And with that, we end tonight's session.

Warsaw, August 30, 2005

4th SESSION
Contemporary Threats and Challenges to Human Rights

Chairman: *Janusz Onyszkiewicz*, cooperated with the Workers' Defence Committee, a leading figure of *Solidarność*, Minister of National Defence in two post-*Solidarność* governments, Member of the European Parliament;
Participants: *Adam Rotfeld*, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for many years running, currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland;

Madelaine Albright, former US ambassador to the UN, Secretary of State in the Clinton cabinet – the first woman in US history to occupy the post;

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf, director of the London School of Economics for many years, Pro-Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University;

Antoni Nowicki, co-founder of the Helsinki Committee in Poland, former member of the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg, currently appointed International Ombudsman in Kosovo by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

A warm welcome to all of you, and especially to our panelists. Today's session is dedicated to the issue of human rights. I think it will be quite to the point for me to reach back to an aspect that has certainly been mentioned many times here, namely, that *Solidarność* – to use the language of those times – was all about human dignity, the dignity of people being humiliated by an oppresive communist state. The *Solidarność* revolution, which brought down the People's Republic of Poland and set off an avalanche effect, wiped communism off the face of the political map of Europe. That is what our revolution was all about.

Can we consider the human rights agenda already closed? Of course not. For this remains a focus around which the European Union, the United States and other countries construct their policies. Therefore, it is extremely topical to discuss the issue of the contemporary threats and challenges to human rights.

We have a panel of great politicians and analysts whose in-depth introduction would take too much time. So, having to forego all that, I will first ask Minister Rotfeld to take the floor.

Mr Minister, you are free to choose – for this is also part of the freedom *Solidarność* fought for – whether you wish to speak from the podium or from the rostrum.

Adam Rotfeld:

I will make use of this freedom and speak from the podium. The title of my remarks is the dilemma: *To Act or Not to Act in the Face of Threats to Human Rights?*

This question is indeed a rhetorical one. For there is no doubt but that there is only one possible answer: yes – we ought to act. Much more difficult is the answer to a different question – how ought we to act? What are the procedures, bases and instruments of action? In other words, not *whether* – but *how* ought the international community to react when faced with serious violations of human rights on the territory of any given country? We do not as yet have a clear answer here. This is due to many factors, the most important of which boils down to the fact that the contemporary system of international law has principally regulated relations between countries, not within them. This state of affairs is changing – however slowly – perhaps even too slowly, but it is changing nonetheless. Today, neither human rights nor the means of government are the exclusive domain of any given state, which cannot hold discretional power over them. States have the rights and legitimization to concern themselves with violations of human rights outside their own sovereign territory. In other words, adducing the principle of noninvolvement in the internal affairs of other states does not carry the same weight as it did only some 30 years ago. This concerns the situation whereby an increasing number of serious human rights violations occur in intrastate conflicts, and not only in interstate ones. The difficulty rests in the fact that the international system has undergone fundamental changes. However, they fail to be reflected in the rules and norms, as well as institutions of international law. I will begin by stating that ever since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, states have been the sole subjects of international relations. The 20th century saw international organizations become accepted as subjects to a certain degree. Today the number of non-state actors on the world stage has risen significantly – yet the regulations remain essentially the same. Despite the fact that – since the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 – universal agreements such as Pacts on Political and Civil Rights, and Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been signed, as have over 200 various conventions pertaining to this domain, it remains a widely held conviction that these matters still belong to the realm of internal competences.

This is connected with another fundamental query: what is a state? How should we define a state? The traditional definition comprises 3 elements: a determined territory, population (in other words, citizens) and efficiently exercised authority. The problem is that while it is generally possible to determine territory and population, determining authority is a twofold predicament. First, in many parts of Africa and Asia (but also in Europe) we are dealing with an increasing number of states designated as weak, failing or failed states. They lack the capacity to

efficiently control the situation as it develops in their territory. This is where terrorism and lawlessness thrive. Second, in the past all authority had to be effective. Today it ought to be exercised with deference to the rules of law. Authority must have a legal legitimization.

Sixty-one years ago, when the United Nations Charter was signed, the perception of world order and of the main threats to the international community was the result of historical experience. The lesson of both World Wars amounts to the saying that for something to be a threat it must be an act of aggression committed by great aggressive powers. This meant that international law based world order on rules and mechanisms that introduced far-reaching limitations on the ability to use force in international relations.

The United Nations Charter, which acts as a constitution of sorts in relation to the remaining norms of international law, due *inter alia* to its primacy over all other treaty norms, has limited this possibility to just two cases: self-defence and collective action based on Security Council resolutions. Concomitantly, by vesting appropriate prerogatives, including the ability to apply military measures, in the UN Security Council, the Charter created a mechanism allowing the United Nations to react effectively to serious breaches of the international order. However, the new solutions were nonetheless based upon the doctrines of national sovereignty and the balance of power, well entrenched since the Peace of Westphalia. The principle of non-involvement in internal national affairs, ensuing from the principle of national sovereignty, is still treated by many states and experts in international law as one of the cornerstones of the international system, its stability and security. From a legal point of view this rule meant that states possess full freedom of action within their jurisdiction. This freedom was limited only by certain customary rules concerning, for instance, the diplomatic protection that one state can demand from another in the case of violations of the rights and interests of its citizens in a foreign state. But even such protection was limited and consisted mainly in supporting the estate claims of its citizens. Some countries hold that this state of affairs remains in force. However, this is not the case. Moreover, it was not the case even 25 years ago. The events of August 1980 in Gdańsk and in the whole of Poland reminded the world that states have not only political, but also legal obligations towards their citizens and societies.

These rights, only signalled during the adoption of the UN Charter (when they were yet *in statu nascendi*), over the past 30 years – i.e., since Helsinki – have acquired the rank of fundamental international norms whose observance is no longer a purely internal affair between state and citizen, but also an obligation of the state both towards the entire international community and towards its citizens.

Since the adoption of key agreements in this domain in the 1960s, rising tension can be observed between the obligation of the state to respect citizens' basic rights and freedoms, and the principle of sovereignty that previously acted as the legal and political shield protecting the state from liability for violating these rights and freedoms. This is because the rise in the importance of human rights within the

system of international relations and norms engenders the shrinking of the sphere of issues left exclusively to states' own discretion.

The massive violations of human rights – in the post-Cold War era – in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or currently in Darfur, have made the international community aware of the need to supplement the existing instruments of action available in the current system of international security. One of the reactions against the crimes committed by leaders against their own citizens was the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal. The Tribunal's decisions have jurisdiction even over those situations whereby serious violations of human rights occur within the boundaries of a single country. The creation of the Tribunal over 50 years after Nuremberg and nearly 50 years after the subject was first discussed by the UN International Law Commission is not only a triumph for the proponents of the rule of law in international relations, but also evidence of increasing acceptance by members of the international community of the international legal character of their commitments towards their own citizens. We must hope that in time the USA will also join the Tribunal. That way it would acquire a universal character and become one of the mainstays of the new international order.

But today the Tribunal is not capable of filling the gap that exists in the current system of norms that pertain to securing an effective reaction of the international community in cases of crimes committed against innocent civilian populations. In effect we are witnessing declarations which do not square with actions. I have in mind, on the one hand, the debates within the principal UN bodies on genocide and declarations of "never again" – and on the other, the helplessness of the international community countenanced with the atrocities in Darfur and various other regions. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is, besides the lack of political will, also the lack of concrete and precise norms which should guide UN member states in the face of crimes and massive violations of basic rights within the boundaries of third countries. Today, the legal status does not correspond to social awareness.

From a procedural perspective there are three types of status whereby the international community may use force: the legal, the illegal and the non-legal, or a situation which has hitherto not been regulated – a twilight zone of sorts. It is our joint responsibility to fill this legal lacuna and eliminate the twilight zone of legal norms. This is also what I consider as the principal challenge in the process of reforming the United Nations. The expansion (or non-expansion) of the Security Council has no bearing on people's endangered lives. What does matter is states' political will to protect the lives of people under threat and the availability of appropriate instruments for action. The more rapidly states will perceive this key problem in the spirit of international solidarity, the more human lives will be spared from the threats engendered by ethnic or religious conflicts or civil wars, and from the brutality of those whose principal task ought to be to protect those very lives – namely the culpable governments.

The civilian population more and more frequently suffers not as a result of collateral damage done by one of the sides to a conflict, but instead itself becomes the main target of attacks by state authorities (as in the case of Cambodia, former Yugoslavia or Iraq) or of non-state structures, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo or Rwanda. This is a qualitatively new phenomenon. In the past it was the enemy's armed forces that constituted the principal target of hostilities, not the civilian population. On the other hand – for the first time since Europe's religious wars, i.e., the period that came to an end with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia – we are currently dealing with a situation whereby over the past 14 years only three of the 60-odd armed conflicts were international ones (the war in Iraq, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and between India and Pakistan). The remaining conflicts were internal in nature.

This state of affairs transforms the conception of how to ensure international security: the principal beneficiary is to be a unit – an individual human being or an ethnic group whose existence is under threat – and not, as has been the case till now – the state. The conception of human security incorporates national security in its purview. The latter is an integral and necessary component if the conception is to be implemented, whereas the reverse does not necessarily hold and is *de facto* not always the case.

Human security is a broader notion – it includes not only freedom from armed conflict, but also observance of human rights, of the rules of the state of law, and states' ability to guarantee adequate economic and social conditions for their citizens. This is closely liked to the process of democratization, since only in a democratic society can human security so understood be put into practice. What is at issue is that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes still exist in many parts of the world (for instance in North Korea, Cuba, or Belarus). These are relics of dictatorships and dictatorship-inspired human rights violations, caring only for the maintenance of their own grip on power. For such regimes societies are but a means to the realization of their ends and ambitions. But today, even they do not question fundamental rights and freedoms when presenting their position on the international arena.

Much seems to suggest that in the process of UN reform we are approaching the adoption, scheduled for the UN Summit in September, of the *principle of responsibility for protection*, construed as the international community's obligation to intervene in the case of a state's inability to guarantee the observance of human rights, or its massive violations thereof. Adoption of this principle would in effect mean a natural adaptation of norms and doctrine to the challenges of the 21st century. The principle itself raises no doubts. It is reflected in the Security Council's decisions concerning Somalia or in NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Irrespective of increasingly clarified actual practice and *opinio iuris*, the principle finds strong justification in the norms of international law and in the aims of the authors of the UN Charter. The proscription on the crime of genocide and other massive violations of human rights is an absolute norm – *ius*

cogens, which admits no exceptions. Full implementation of these norms, however, can only be guaranteed if states have the will to undertake decisive action, including armed intervention, when other means of persuasion or prevention fail. If not, these norms will not have the legal status peremptorily ascribed to them by the international community – they will be but moral norms. (Political-moral norms which are not deprived of legal purport include the provision of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other agreements adopted in the OSCE process.)

What corresponds to this right to protection, possessed in this sense by each and every human being, is the international community's obligation to undertake active steps wherever this right is violated. This is clearly stated in the draft Final Document prepared by the President of the General Assembly Jean Ping[1], who consulted the issue broadly with UN member states. The document unequivocally accepts United Nations' responsibility to rapidly and decisively undertake joint action in the Security Council and in cooperation with regional organizations whenever peaceful means fail.

Thus the present problem lies not in accepting the right to protection as a principle of international law, but in working out the criteria permitting its implementation in practice whenever need arises. Besides serious violation of human rights, these criteria should incorporate the following:

- observance of the proportionality of undertaken intervention,
- earlier exhaustion of other means of persuasion aimed at changing the violator's conduct,
- lack of ulterior motives for the decision,
- readiness for long-term engagement in activity aimed at stabilizing the situation in the state in question.

The institution which ought to have decisive say in this respect should still be the Security Council. However, it should adapt its rules of conduct to suit the specific challenges presented by massive violations of human rights or humanitarian law. One possible method of such adaptation would be an internal agreement among the big five to refrain from wielding their veto in such situations. Another requirement is to provide the organization with the operational capability to undertake effective measures whenever need arises.

In order for the right to protection to become fully accepted and entrenched as one of the central principles of international, it will be indispensable that the same criteria be applied to analogous situations. For human life and dignity carry the same value irrespective of the country or continent where human rights are fundamentally violated. The practical implementation of this principle should also placate those who claim that it could be misused as an instrument for threatening the sovereignty of the weaker by the stronger.

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[1] The final document of the 60th UN session postulates the creation of a Human Rights Council, which is to have greater competences and prestige than the already existing and disgraced UN Human Rights Committee.

I would like to conclude with two comments. First, I wish to point out that the evolution of the interpretation of legal norms pertaining to human rights over recent years now permits navigating this domain with increasing certainty. The moral obligation to side with those who have been wronged is accepted as indisputable. This came to be 25 years ago when the first independent mass movement was founded in any totalitarian regime. It was named NSZZ *Solidarność*. Most democratic states sided with *Solidarity* through active engagement of both governmental and non-governmental institutions. Since this was possible a quarter of a century ago, when legal norms and provisions in this domain were only beginning to take shape, it is all the more justified today, when our duty to act has become an incontestable fact. Second, for several years now we have had at our disposal a catalogue of rules describing how democratic states ought to act in a situation when their action is expected by societies or individuals fighting for democracy and respect of human rights. I have in mind the Warsaw Declaration adopted in June 2000 at the end of the first Conference Toward a Community of Democracies.

I am convinced that this document deserves not only to be remembered, but to be put into practice. This holds especially true for two of its postulates: 1) citizens' right and obligation to choose their representatives in regular free and fair elections, based on universal suffrage and equal suffrage, accessible to numerous parties, carried out by secret ballot, controlled by an independent election body and free from rigging and coercion; 2) the elected authorities' obligation to refrain from extra-constitutional actions and the elected leaders' obligation to abide by the law and act in accordance with their country's constitution and legally sanctioned procedures.

I trust that Madeleine Albright and Bronisław Geremek – who initiated that conference – will be able to say more elaborately, and more competently, to what extent the adopted document has lived up to their expectations.

Thank you for your attention.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Ms Madelaine Albright who, in a way, has already been called upon by Minister Rotfeld. Ms Secretary, the floor is yours.

Madeleine Albright:

Thank you and good morning. It is a pleasure to be in such distinguished company and to participate in a discussion that could not be more timely.

It is also great to be back in Warsaw. Twenty-four years ago I came to Poland to study the role of the press in reporting on the early days of the democracy movement. I was deeply inspired by the bravery of the Polish people. My own heritage is Czechoslovak, but in those days, I wanted to become a Pole because of what was happening.

As we all know, that movement did more than restore freedom to Poland after a struggle of ten years. It blazed a trail that others would quickly follow. In Hungary,

freedom emerged after a showdown lasting only ten months; in East Germany, ten weeks; in the Czech Republic, ten days; and in Romania, roughly ten hours.

It also made possible our effort, launched here in Warsaw five years ago, to build a community of democracies. That event and this one have in common not only their theme but also their host. Bronislaw Geremek is a true hero of democracy. His courage in the past helped tear down the Berlin Wall. His vision now is helping to ensure that the democratic tide remains a rising tide. The purpose of this conference is to help see that it does.

This morning, I was asked to talk about solidarity in the face of threats to human rights and democracy.

It is fair to say that much of history revolves around this very question. When there has been solidarity in time of danger, tyrants have been defeated and terrible disasters brought to an end. When we have failed to come to each other's aid, aggression has gone unchecked and unjust conditions have endured for generations. So my conclusion will not surprise you. It is better to have solidarity than not.

But where is solidarity most needed today? What are the biggest dangers to democracy and human rights?

This morning, I will identify three; the first is coercion; the second corruption; the third complacency.

Coercion can come from above, in the form of repression; or from outside in the form of terrorist attack. It can also come from within, as one group tries to intimidate another. In any of these cases, coercion violates the core premise of democracy – that political differences should be settled through a competition of ideas. Those who practice coercion do so because they are afraid to compete. They do not debate, neither do they listen. Instead, they build walls, jail dissidents, ban newspapers and try to place a stranglehold on truth.

As we all know, the ideology of coercion did not die with the Soviet empire; it lives on in such places as Burma and China, North Korea and Belarus, Zimbabwe and Cuba. This means that the spirit of solidarity must also live on. We have a duty to support those fighting for their rights against governments that deny them.

But governments today are not the only opponents of democracy and human rights. We are reminded of this regularly, but most recently in the streets and subways of London. As we respond to the terrorist threat, we must bear in mind not only the emotions of the moment but also the strategic aim of our adversaries. They want to divide the world. We must unite the world against terror and those who practice it. Terrorists are not simply a group of criminals who can be rounded up and put in jail. They are not a group of soldiers who can be beaten decisively on the field of combat. They are more dangerous than either of those two things. They are the product of a set of vicious beliefs that will migrate like an infectious virus until stopped.

And the way to stop them is to put forward a different set of beliefs that can compete successfully for the allegiance of the same minds vulnerable to the first. As Amos Oz has written, "extremist Islam can only be stopped by moderate Islam,

and extremist Arab nationalism can be curbed only by moderate Arab nationalism". If that is true, and I believe it is, our goal must be to strengthen the hands of moderates in the Arab and Muslim worlds. We must not forget that human rights and democracy are mortal threats to terror. They may not convert minds already trapped by hate, but they can help persuade the uncommitted that suicide bombing is not glorious, but shameful – not a defence of Islam, but rather a betrayal of it.

Obviously, the fanaticism that erupted so tragically on 9/11 and 3/11 and 7/7 did not arise overnight and will not go away soon. Like the foundations of communism, it must be made to crumble as its central fallacies are exposed, its leaders discredited and its foot soldiers defeated. To succeed in that, we must first understand that although weakness encourages terrorism, over-reaction spreads it. And if we respond to those who disrespect human life by disrespecting human life, we lose the war. If we respond to terror by giving a free hand to those who say they are dealing with terrorism by destroying all those who disagree with them, we are all losers.

We know that terror is a threat to human rights and democracy. As during the Cold War, we will do our best if democratic nations stand together, combining their strengths in support of peace and law, and in opposition to those who see mass murder as just another political tool.

A second threat to democracy is corruption. I mean that literally, in the sense that corrupt officials can rob democracy of its good name. The same is true of corrupt institutions, which betray the people. In politics as in war, the high ground is valuable, and when it comes to political rhetoric, democracy occupies the high ground. So there are quite a few leaders in the world today who call themselves democrats, but who are in reality autocrats or kleptocrats. They preside over systems where the rich get richer, those with the right connections can act with impunity, and elections are a sham. We cannot let them get away with it; we cannot allow democracy to become a synonym for cronyism, selfishness and greed. Democracy must deliver. It must lead over time to higher standards of living, to accountability and inclusiveness. Otherwise, as we have already seen in some cases, the public may turn in desperation to failed approaches from the past. One way to prevent that is to ensure that globalization does not lead to a marginalization of large segments of the population.

For several years, I have been chairing a study on worldwide attitudes toward globalization. What we have found, to our surprise, is that most people in most places actually like it. Healthy majorities think increased trade and foreign investment are good. Almost everywhere, people say they favour free markets and democratic values. In each country surveyed, multinational corporations were viewed more positively than anti-globalization protestors. And nearly everyone seems to like cell phones. At the same time, we found unhappiness about how the benefits of globalization are distributed. Too much goes to the already wealthy, runs the argument, too little to those in need. There are growing doubts about the merits of a free market economy. And there is a feeling that the richest countries have rigged the global system of investment and trade.

We know that, through history, trade has helped to create wealth and drive progress, and that protectionism usually backfires. Especially today, such an approach will not work, for prosperity depends on technology, which is fuelled by knowledge, which knows no boundaries, and has no reverse gear. It is not enough, however, simply to repeat the free trade mantra. Economic theory provides little comfort to those beaten down by the relentless competition of the marketplace. The social costs of globalization must be addressed more intensively in the future than they have been in the past. Wealthier nations must do more to assist the developing world through debt relief and technical help, and by ending the subsidies that freeze farmers from poor countries out of the market.

We must also do more to help countries develop and enforce the rule of law. I sometimes think the greatest gift a country could have is not oil or minerals or a deepwater port. It's a combination of first class bankers, public-spirited lawyers and professional bureaucrats. A country that runs its finances with transparency, accountability and integrity is going to attract investment. Investment leads to development. And development paves the way to prosperity. The result is not simply profits and payrolls from which individuals benefit. It is also increased faith in open politics and fair trade, free enterprise and democracy. When governments and the private sector cooperate through dealings that are open and above board, they send a message to all that the system works and that it is in the interests of all to roll up their sleeves and help it to work better still. That is rarely a spectacular process.

That is when the promise of globalization is translated into the reality of new businesses and jobs, a sense of pride and a better life. And in these uncertain times, it is the right formula for us all.

A third threat to democracy and human rights is complacency.

During the past quarter century, democracy has advanced on every continent. More than half the world's people live under elected leaders. That's never happened before. But we cannot take further progress for granted. There is nothing inevitable about democracy.

We may hear from time to time that freedom is on the march, but a slogan can easily come unhinged from what is really going on. We know from experience that democratic transformations are possible, but we also know that they entail much sacrifice and hard work. When the euphoria ends, the hard work begins. It is not enough to pick a colour and hit the streets. It is not enough to make broad statements about liberty and God's will. As we are seeing in Iraq, democracy is not instant coffee. It is a process that must brew gradually from within. A democracy will prosper only if it reflects the character of a nation. As outsiders, we cannot change any nation's character, but we can help the desire for freedom find the room it needs to grow. Good democracies, like good neighbours, can help and strengthen each other by sharing knowledge and providing aid. There is a name for this: solidarity.

We know that democracy is not the answer to every problem. But it is the best system of government we have ever devised. And the only system that values and

respects the rights of all. That is why so many brave men and women have sacrificed their lives and pledged their honour in freedom's name. That is why the struggle to defend and strengthen democracy from the threats posed by coercion, corruption and complacency is as important as any we could wage.

And that is why we have returned to Warsaw and Gdansk this week, inspired by the heroes of the past, and determined to meet our own obligation to generations to come.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much for your speech. I would now like to ask Lord Dahrendorf to take the floor.

Lord Dahrendorf:

It is appropriate that on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the great strike in which *Solidarność* was born, we not only look back but also around us today and into the future ahead. The success of setting up an "independent, self-governing trade union" in those last days of August 1980 made it clear to all who had eyes to see and ears to hear that even post-Stalinist *nomenclature* communism was not to stay. While it lasted another nine years before the Polish *refolution*[2] turned into a revolution in all Central European communist states, the events of Gdansk showed how "hard" the "soft power" of organized protest can be. *Solidarność* set an example which remains instructive and encouraging to all those who cherish liberty above all.

Solidarność marks the beginning of the end of twentieth-century totalitarianism. Fascism had come to grief in a final orgy of murder and mayhem in 1945. In 1989 communism collapsed when the evident failure of this "alternative" to the liberal order showed up by the victory of those who for long were described as dissidents. This was not everywhere a "velvet revolution", but certainly Poland set an example of fundamental change without major bloodshed. I really do believe that after 1989 totalitarianism – the total mobilization of all in the name of a quasi-religious ideology and through the instrument of an all-powerful party, as well as pervasive instruments of persecution – is no longer likely. There is Cuba, to be sure, and North Korea, and there are other vicious dictatorships in several parts of the world, but the great temptations of totalitarianism which dragged Europe into the abyss of liberty during the "short twentieth century" have now waned.

This is different from the "end of history". That phrase was always rather silly. In fact it could be argued that history began again after the rigid confrontations of the Cold War were ended. The opening of that barren confrontation also opened the gates of globalization as well as those of a whole range of varieties of liberty. At the same time, history revealed the ambiguities, indeed ambivalences of human

[2] A term introduced by Timothy Garton Ash, describing a political process between revolution and evolution.

endeavours. The new beginning of history also saw new threats to liberty. These are not as serious as the totalitarian threat. They do not demand (as yet) the kind of courage to the point of self-sacrifice which was needed to bring about the revolution of 1989. But they do require the alert and active defence of the values which prevailed first in 1980, then in 1989.

One set of such threats requires our special attention. It consists of what I shall call the "politics of frustration". In my little book *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* – which was written in the spring of 1990 after a long conversation with the then President Jaruzelski – I suggested that the postcommunist countries would face a difficult time of transition, a "valley of tears". This would be the period in which the old structures, notably of the economy, were dismantled, but new ones have not yet been set up in their place. Things, I surmised, would get worse before they get better. This had been the experience of every system change, including even Germany's recovery from the defeated Nazi regime in the years after the currency reform of 1948. Moreover, I argued, the trek through the valley of tears would be long, certainly longer than one parliamentary period of four or five years. In the process, people's expectations of democracy, indeed of liberty, would be sorely tested. There would even be the risk of a nostalgic attempt to return to the certainties of the failed old system.

Sixteen years after 1989 it is easy to find examples of this syndrome almost everywhere in the postcommunist world. It is possibly asking too much of people to expect them to keep trusting the promise of the eventual benefits of a period of hardship and doubt. Poland provides its own examples of the politics resulting from a time of frustration in which the old is gone and the new is not yet there. My impression and belief, however, is that Poland has set an outstanding example of the courage of hope while passing through the valley of tears, and is reaping the first fruits of this attitude. Perhaps the prospect (and now reality) of the European Union has helped in this case, not least because of the force of the Copenhagen Criteria which the EU agreed in 1993 as preconditions of accession. The EU is not known for being a particularly generous, or even open organization; but the Copenhagen Criteria helped establish the rule of law in new member states and also supported the anchoring of democratic institutions in their civil societies.

At the time of my *Reflections* I was slightly worried that the frustrations of the valley of tears might encourage new variants of fascism. Today I am convinced that this risk is minimal, at any rate in the member states of the European Union. At the same time, a greater threat to liberty has emerged from a deeper frustration in countries undergoing the fundamental process of modernization in other parts of the world.

Some Latin American states may be an example, but the most serious problem is presented by countries of Asia, and by virtually the entire Islamic world. The description is partly misleading; it is not Islam as a religion which is the issue. It is rather the widespread frustration, especially among young men, in countries which have tasted the enticing fruit of modernization but lack the wherewithal to produce and spread it themselves among their citizens.

Such metaphors are dangerous. What I mean is that in countries modernizing late, there seems to be an inevitable phase in which the old values and structures of traditional societies have lost their grip, but the new values and structures of civil societies have not yet developed. People are uprooted and cannot find the soil to break new roots. They have seen at least images of a new world which is often called "Western", but they are not a part of it. This is the very deep valley of tears of the great transformation of modernity. It produces millions of frustrated people who resent the unfulfilled promises of the modern world.

Some of them may succeed in the kind of development which we call "progress". Many dream of leaving their frustrating home countries, and quite a few actually emigrate, often to the United States, or to Europe. There, some succeed, but others fail again. This is the material from which hate preachers make their poisonous concoctions. In a sense, Hitler was such a hate preacher in Weimar Germany; indeed Germany may well be the first example of the politics of frustration. But today's hate preachers, of whom there are quite a few – notably, though by no means only in the Islamic world – are not usually able to mobilize majorities. However, they mobilize individuals and lead them to engage in the kind of hopeless "war" which we have come to call "terrorism". Perhaps we need another name. Terrorism has historically been associated with recognizable purposes, usually related to what has unfortunately come to be called "the self-determination of peoples". Such movements and their leaders too use the politics of frustration for their objectives. But the more serious issue of our time is the generalized attack on the values of enlightened and civil societies, of the liberal order.

Ultimately, this attack may not be successful. Its mixture of modern weapons and anti-modern values is almost bound to fail. But while it lasts, the politics of frustration is a multiple threat to the societies of the free world. For one thing there are countries in which the politics of frustration sustains vicious regimes in power. We should not forget what Saddam Hussein's Iraq was like. It was certainly a case in point. There may be others not entirely unlike it. They all raise the question of what those of us who believe in the liberal order should do. In my view one of the most serious issues facing the international community, and the United Nations in particular, is the question of controlled intervention in the internal affairs of evil tyrannies. Such regimes are likely to be threats to their own citizens, but also to those around them. They may well strive to have weapons of mass destruction. We simply cannot let this happen, though we have not yet found a satisfactory way of responding.

This is true also when it comes to the way in which we organize ourselves to combat terrorism within the countries of the free world. The fight against terrorism seems to strengthen a trend which is present in many democracies in any case, and which can be described as creeping authoritarianism. By that I mean a slow, incremental process of reducing the involvement of citizens in the governance of their affairs. Somehow decisions slip away to the executive, that is to governments, to unaccountable quasi-governmental organizations and institutions, and also to a sphere which is removed from all familiar checks and balances. Authoritarianism

is not totalitarianism. It means that people are left in peace as long as they quietly go about their own business and let those in power do theirs. Strikingly, terrorism is sometimes used these days to extend such authoritarian power. Without much noise, governments take away elementary rights like *habeas corpus*. They try to assume powers which violate not only human, but civil rights. Democracy and the rule of law are, as it were, stolen from under our eyes.

Let me repeat: what I have described is not the return of the scourge of totalitarianism. There are dictatorships, and there are massive violations of human rights in many parts of the world, and they require a response. A new trend of authoritarianism in the free world also needs checking. This is in fact my main point. The job of liberty is never done. Democracy and the rule of law are always at risk. The threats may not be as visible as they were in the age of totalitarianism, but that should not lull us into inactivity. If there is one lasting lesson of the great Polish movement which we are celebrating during these days of *Solidarność*, it is that those who seek the liberal order and want it to flourish, must do something against all the threats to its integrity. No constitution, no great text of freedom will ultimately guarantee our basic rights. In the words of Andrzej Gwiazda[3] on that memorable 30th of August 1980: "Our only guarantee is ourselves".

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much for your speech. I would now like to ask this morning's last speaker, Mr Marek Antoni Nowicki, to take the floor.

Marek Antoni Nowicki:

THE COSTS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

I join you here this morning as a human rights veteran in Poland, but primarily I am here today as the United Nations appointed Ombudsperson in Kosovo. In the five years since being appointed to the position, I have worked with the people of Kosovo to put their dramatic past behind them. The hope all along has been to help foster the conditions for everyone, irrespective of ethnicity, to have the possibility and the perspective for leading a normal life. No more and no less than what is fundamentally defined as everyone's *basic* human right.

In this way, I consider the task I am performing in Kosovo to be a sort of sharing of my understanding of what our *Solidarity* movement was about. In my Pristina office, a large *Solidarity* poster hangs on the wall. Minister Rotfeld acknowledged it during his recent visit to Kosovo. The poster is not an accident. It is a reminder that a Kosovo Ombudsperson with such a background is simply an outgrowth of *Solidarity* and its values.

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[3] Andrzej Gwiazda, a leading opposition activist before August 1980, member of the Inter-factory Strike Committee, member of the NSZZ "Solidarność" National Commission. Today an adversary of Lech Wałęsa.

To begin this subject – let me say that I am not here today to deny, in any way, the need for international intervention as a means of preventing human suffering in parts of the world. On the contrary, even if I have been very critical regarding certain aspects and performances of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, I do endorse a recent document prepared for upcoming discussion on the reform of the United Nations, stressing *inter alia* the existence of a "responsibility to protect" as a common concern of the international community where intervention is in question.

Kosovo is itself the Petri dish for the doctrine of international intervention. And, the case of Kosovo has led me to believe that there are definite question marks to be raised as to how we should or could perform such a task and which lessons should be learned for any future similar undertaking.

There is no space in the context of my contribution to this panel discussion to again raise justifications or international law issues related to when interventions are warranted. As we know, these issues have also been raised with Kosovo. Suffice it to say that when one juxtaposes large-scale human rights violations in a sovereign state with the need to reach international consensus on when to intervene in order to alleviate suffering, one must acknowledge the inherit limits of acting in such instances. It is obvious that one cannot use such an instrument in every instance which may require such action, simply because there are times when the example involves dangerous perpetrators who are simply too strong even to consider such manoeuvres.

As one observes Kosovo's current situation, it is certain that six years after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing of the former Yugoslavia and after the 1999 establishment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo through a UN Security Council Resolution, Kosovo's future is still very much undecided and there are contradictory political weather forecasts.

As I stated in a recent interview for *Der Spiegel* – if the political status process is not developed according to Kosovo's Albanian expectations, it would be difficult to avoid a relapse to violence in the province. NATO commanders have said that security risks could escalate ahead of planned talks on the province's final status.

This is, no doubt, also due to the ad hoc nature of the intervention, lack of clear exit strategy and prolonged status quo, which was mainly created by the protracted indecisiveness of the international community on the question of which way to go, and the resulting political, economic and social problems that have ensued.

What can one expect from the Kosovo society if the latest figures put general unemployment rates at around 60% or even higher in the case of minority communities? The province's infrastructure has improved at a snail's pace – power and water cuts are still very much a feature of daily life. The justice system is hampered by corruption and inefficiency; organized crime and trafficking is prevalent. And, as I stressed in a recent report when speaking about the human rights situation in the province – although things have, to a degree, improved, the

general level of human rights protection is still far below minimum international standards. Moreover, security for Kosovo's Serb and Roma communities continues to be a major concern, and hampers the return of internally displaced persons to their homes. I am not alone with this observation. The special UN envoy for Kosovo Standards, Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide, has stated to the press that much still must be done to assure that the remaining Serbs and Roma living in Kosovo are free and can move about without fear of violence.

In the context of international intervention, one must, therefore, ask oneself: is it at all possible to build a stable society with the help of such an intervention? And if so, how does one go about completing such a difficult task?

It is a given that the international need to respond to crisis is often time-specific and requires a fairly swift response. However, where such intervention is being considered, apart from military factors, it is of utmost importance to focus international policy discussion on the rapid deployment of a civil, not only security presence in particular where human suffering is the result of internecine conflict – both for the perceived victims of the conflict and very much as a protective mechanism against the potential backlash that would allow for victims to become the victimizers.

The lack of the immediate deployment of an adequate civilian presence was exactly the problem in the Kosovo case.

NATO peacekeeping troops alone were not directed to stop the abductions, disappearances and retaliation killings and massive destruction of properties by groups of ethnic Albanians, something which led to a vast reverse ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population – thousands of Kosovo Serbs and Roma in particular fled the province. Hundreds of them were killed or disappeared, as were Albanians perceived to be complicit, even objectively, with the former Serb regime.

In the town of Mitrovica, the whole Roma quarter, the oldest in the Balkans, was burned to the ground under the watch of international forces.

In addition to the absence of a proper civil and security presence, the overall lack of legal mechanisms assuring a swift dispensation of justice for crimes committed creates an additional dilemma in which Kosovo itself is an example. Unfortunately, the early idea of the Kosovo international criminal court was dropped almost at the outset – officially for budgeting concerns. But, one does not exclude political considerations as well. The consequences of that can be felt today.

Thus, in my estimation a lack of justice weighs heavily on whether the seeds to this conflict, which prompted the intervention, are to be rooted out in order to avoid future unrest.

There is no chance for even the beginning of the much needed forgiveness process, not to speak about future reconciliation, without justice being served, or at least a serious effort in this direction, as well as satisfactory progress towards investigating the fate of the missing, which are significant in numbers on both sides of the Kosovo conflict.

The international community must devote more time in helping former combatants and other people contemplate their collective responsibility, no matter how direct or indirect their personal involvement. Otherwise, any effort to improve the situation would be akin to building a house on the unstable terrain of a sand dune.

In short, without effective efforts for calming the conflicting parties, and creating conditions for the new internal and external political stability, one can say that intervention does not guarantee the dimension of success and moral certitude that presumably drives the need to intervene in the first place.

When we speak about Kosovo, stability is not something that can be described as a reality even six years after the intervention. There are some 18,000 NATO peacekeepers still stationed there. Recent statements made by NATO officials indicate that there are plans to be in Kosovo for a long time to come – I quote "to guarantee that the political process will be concluded successfully".

Which brings me to a reiteration of a key point in this discussion: a workable entrance AND exit strategy is paramount to the international dialogue on future similar interventions.

According to the doctrine of the "responsibility to protect", intervention does not, necessarily, imply the need for military action. Prevention should be the obvious first choice here and ought to be enforced as the main component to a full intervention strategy. This implies a greater understanding of what challenges exist in conflict areas where human suffering between groups is a possibility, and an exploration of more effective means of dealing with such a conflict. Vigilance by international observers and diplomacy is of primary importance here. I refer in this context to proposals that appeared last year in the Human Security Doctrine for Europe report that put a primacy on a bottom-up approach to intervention – relying on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with local populations in order to improve early warning capabilities, intelligence gathering, and the mobilization of homegrown support where the implementation and sustainability of intervention is being considered as a remedy for human suffering.

Here, one should stress that the mechanisms for preventing conflicts and early warning capacities must be considerably strengthened, particularly in relation to prospective conflict zones. Large scale human suffering rarely springs up overnight. History teaches that there is build-up to conflict.

However, if those acting within prescribed legal mechanisms, namely those approval by the UN Security Council, deem international intervention credible, then defining the exact nature of such measures with a clearly enough delineated criterion for what constitutes a "success" would then also allow for a proper exit strategy. This has been very much an uncertainty in Kosovo.

Indeed, one can say that it is the relative criterion for success that continues to plague Kosovo. At the same time, people have a right to know what to expect where their future is concerned – the 'what's next' scenario, if you wish. We could discuss what is successful and what is not, but because it is always about the people, they should be part of the final jury adjudicating the success of the intervention.

One shining example of the difficulties of defining success in the context of international intervention is the current Standards for Kosovo formula. The Standards are a set of democratic benchmarks aimed at improving areas like the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions, economic growth, protection of minorities, and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons – progress in these areas is apparently what will determine when status talks are to begin.

Standards, however, were devised only in December 2003, more than four years after intervention, and they were advanced in practice as a viable political tool only after the March 2004 riots.

Before coming to my conclusions in today's discussion, I cannot avoid another aspect of the problem.

When considering the example in Kosovo, one can say that the innocent civilian victims of the bombing campaign themselves have never truly had their grievances redressed. The euphemism of "collateral damage" has superseded the potential legal consequences of negligence or common errors. Last year, the Secretary General of NATO in replying to my concerns wrote to tell me of his deep regrets at the civilian injuries that resulted from the Kosovo bombing campaign. He stressed however, "NATO could not be held liable for any collateral damages associated with the military intervention". Could such a statement close any further discussion on this subject? For me, the question remains: how to adequately address the grievances of those who were the unintended innocent civilian victims in this or other similar cases?

Thus, we are left, in conclusion, with questions. Certainly, as someone rightly said, it is easy to bomb, but it is much more difficult to create a solid, sustainable, civil society. Moreover, when intervening, how are we to avoid the risk of creating greater crises or problems also within the international context than was occurring before the intervention?

(Jackson Allers contributed to this speech)

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

I would like to deeply thank all of our speakers for combining precise analysis, valuable thoughts and a certain dose of conciseness, due to which we now have more time for discussion. Therefore, I would like to ask Ms Jery Laber of the Human Rights Watch to take the floor.

Jery Laber:

I am an American human rights activist, one of the founders of the U.S. Helsinki Watch which grew to be Human Rights Watch, the largest human rights organization in the United States. Helsinki Watch actively supported *Solidarity* from its inception, and its wellsprings even before. In 1979 we met with KOR leaders – including Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik, and Zbigniew Romazewski – and at that meeting helped establish the first underground Polish Helsinki Committee.

I well remember a subsequent trip I made to Warsaw in the fall of 1981 to help plan a *Solidarity*-sponsored international human rights conference in Poland. A few weeks after that visit, Martial Law was imposed and the conference, of course, was indefinitely postponed.

Throughout the 1980s the U.S. Helsinki Watch translated and published reports by the Polish Helsinki Committee on human rights abuses in Poland. We sent lawyers to observe the trials of *Solidarity* activists. We spread the word throughout Central and Eastern Europe that *Solidarity* was alive and flourishing underground and that it should remain a source of inspiration throughout the region.

That international human rights conference finally did take place – in Nowa Huta in 1988. It began as an underground event, but in the course of the meetings *Solidarity* leaders were called to Warsaw for the Round Table discussions with the government. The rest is history. By April 1989 we were able to hold an open meeting in Warsaw of our International Helsinki Federation, where we celebrated the Council of Europe's 1989 Human Rights Prize, awarded jointly to Lech Wałęsa and the Helsinki Federation.

This occasion – the 25th anniversary of the formation of *Solidarity* – is a very moving one. I am very happy to be here. At the same time, however, in discussing "Contemporary Threats and Challenges to Human Rights", I must inject a painful note. The government of the United States, a staunch supporter of *Solidarity* through all those painful years; the government of the United States, perhaps the most influential government in the world, has in recent years been violating basic human rights agreements and principles. Human rights groups in the United States are now reporting on violations by our own government.

I will mention a few specifically:

1. The U.S. government has refused to join the International Criminal Court and has attempted to sabotage that court through economic pressure.
2. The U.S. government has refused to grant Prisoner of War status to the prisoners held in Guantanamo.
3. The U.S. government has rewritten the definition of torture, which has led to abuses in U.S.-run detention camps.
4. The U.S. government has been using what it calls "renditions", i.e., deporting suspects to other countries for interrogation, countries known to use torture freely during such interrogations.
5. The U.S. Patriot Act is being used domestically to curtail the long-established civil rights of U.S. citizens.

When I first got involved in human rights work, back in the 1970s, I felt privileged to be an American. I believed I had a responsibility to people in the world less fortunate than I was. I was proud of my country – of its freedoms, of its respect for individual human rights, of its openness and its ability to allow its citizens to speak out and criticize our authorities without fear. I wanted to help others achieve such freedoms.

I am ashamed of what is happening in the United States today.

I never dreamed that I would see the day when torture would be taking place in American-run detention centers, torture that is not just the aberration of a few bad people, but is tacitly condoned by US government policies.

We have all seen the shocking photographs that emerged from Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad, taken by the very soldiers who were abusing Iraqi prisoners and humiliating them in unspeakable ways. These soldiers, untrained for the jobs they were doing, believed they were softening up the prisoners, that they were following orders from above. And they were. *Because* the U.S. government asserted that the rules of war would not apply to terrorist suspects, *because* it denied Prisoner of War status to detainees, *because* it redefined the definition of torture, it opened the way for the illegal practices that followed. And these crimes to date have been investigated only by the Pentagon itself. Only low ranking soldiers have been punished. The government so far has refused to appoint an independent counsel to investigate what has been going on in detention centers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. Human rights groups in the US are determined to see such a counsel appointed.

In Guantanamo, the US has been holding some 500 suspects indefinitely, without the right to legal representation, and interrogating them in harsh and brutal ways. These people were picked up by US forces in the course of the Afghanistan war and deemed enemy combatants. They have been denied POW status and thus have not been granted the protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Most have not been charged, nor have they yet been given a chance to defend themselves before any court or tribunal. There is reason to believe that some of these people are ordinary farmers and workers, including some children, innocents caught up in the net.

The US Patriot Act, passed by the United States Congress in October 2001, threatens long held civil rights in the United States. It gives law enforcement agencies sweeping powers: the right to monitor political and religious organizations; to eavesdrop on prisoners' conversations with lawyers; to search homes when residents are not there; to gain access to private papers, email and internet files; to subpoena information about book store purchases and library readings; to prosecute librarians and others if they reveal the names of those under investigation; and to establish secret military tribunals to be used at the president's discretion, with no meaningful right of defense, no opportunity to appeal to a civilian court, and effectively controlled by the executive branch of our government alone.

In its struggle against terrorism, the US government has joined forces with countries that are human right abusers and ignored the behavior of those countries toward their own citizens. It is setting an example for dictatorships in various parts of the world – that anything goes when it comes to terrorists. And these dictatorships often justify the repression in their own countries by saying that they are doing what we Americans do. They are "fighting terrorism".

* * *

I still believe in the democratic system. I believe right-minded Americans will prevail. There are many such Americans – and the number is growing. I believe there will be an independent bipartisan commission to investigate torture and abuse in US detention. I believe that due process and the rules of war will eventually be applied to those who are being held by US forces. I believe that our government will eventually see that there is more to lose than gain by restricting the freedoms of ordinary Americans in the fight against terrorists.

We are still a long way from realizing these goals, however. We need international support. Poland, for example, is important to the United States government. It is part of what is sometimes called the "Coalition of the Willing" in Iraq. The Polish government could use its leverage to push for changes in human rights policies, especially as they affect prisoners taken in the war in Iraq. Just as American human rights activists called on the US government to help Polish citizens in the struggle against Communist rule, so Polish citizens can now support us by urging their government to pressure the United States government to change some of its current practices and policies.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Vuk Drašković, journalist and author, one of the best-known oppositionists to Slobodan Miloševic's governments in the 1990s, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro.

V*uk Drašković*:

I don't know what tomorrow will bring. But I know today that the European Union mustn't forget the region of the Western Balkans, which means the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia, plus Albania. There are two opportunities, two possibilities: the Europeanization of Western Balkans, this is the first one. The second one is Balkanization of Europe. In the middle is Kosovo.

Mr Nowicki, thank you very much for your statement. I am not ready to go back to the past. I'm trying to find a way for the future. I think Belgrade is offering a truly fair compromise and sound European formula to our Albania friends. More than autonomy, but less than independence. Practically, Belgrade wants two things. First – a European level of the protection of the rights of Serbs in Kosovo. And secondly, the present borders of Serbia and Montenegro with Albania and Macedonia must not be changed or unnamed. But at the same time we are ready to sign tomorrow's settlement on the non-existing status of those borders. Existing on the maps, in the documents, but not in practice. Unfortunately, Albanian politicians in Kosovo, more or less all of them, believed that is what started the war against Serbia in 1999. Serbia wasn't in a war with NATO. Milosevic was in that war, he provoked that war. I am not in any sense about to say anything good about the bombing of my people, about the bombing of my nation. But I can tell you we

didn't want that. And we pro-European oriented Serbs and pro-European oriented forces in Serbia were the main victims of that bombing.

But the question is: did NATO bomb Serbia to avoid a humanitarian disaster for the Albanians or to promote an independent state on the territory of an internationally recognized independent state? I hope NATO did it to prevent a humanitarian disaster. Otherwise all of us will face very many questions, legal questions, moral questions, and the door to the future will be closed.

The truth is that the Albanians today are blackmailing not only the Serbs, but the international forces, too. The message they send is: "look, allow us territory for states in the Serbian state, otherwise we will kill the rest of the Serbs, and even international policemen and soldiers who are now in Kosovo". Excuse me, this is also the language of Al-Qaeda. If we want to fight terrorism, and I'm voting completely for a common struggle against global terrorism, then there can be no double standards. Terrorists in New York are terrorists, just as are the terrorists killing children and innocent civilians in Kosovo.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much for your remarks. I would now like to ask Mr Sergei Kovalyov, veritable one-man institution and legendary figure in the defence of human rights in Russia, to take the floor.

Sergei Kovalyov [translation from Russian]:

I have a feeling that I have taken the microphone only to confirm my reputation as an *enfant terrible*, but the beginning words of my statement should appease this opinion.

I would like to congratulate the organizers of today's session. To ask such crucial questions is a sign of decisive thinking. A lot has been said today on very important subjects, although I think two key words were missing: Moscow and Chechnya. These are two closely connected places.

The question of humanitarian intervention is a painful and unsolved one. On the one hand we are faced with a situation reminiscent of a game of chess, where we must make a move, but every move only worsens the situation. For example, the case of genocide in Kosovo. The state must take certain measures. On the other hand, however, when one state or a group of states makes a decision, it impersonates the defendant, prosecutor, judge and court bailiff – and this is not good. We are thus faced with a situation in which the reform of the rules governing the international arena is a must, and Minister Rotfeld was absolutely right in highlighting this issue and speaking of the surrender of the Security Council's veto in certain problematic issues. Please excuse me, my dear Minister, but who is to surrender their veto? China? Russia? And how are they to agree on this? Which issues are to be taken into account with regard to surrendering the veto? I think that such proposals are doomed to failure. I think

that traditional politics does not provide the mechanisms necessary to improve the situation in the world. Much more substantial changes are needed. In the UN there is the outrageous rule that there cannot be any claims against the state officials seated there, because they are officially fulfilling their duties. They are representing what are called the national interests of the countries which gave them their posts. Exactly – countries, not citizens! And they continue to diligently fulfil their duties. Countries make fools of themselves by saying that they have the right to national interests, which are the interests of the citizens, but that is not the case. The proof of this lies in those two words – Moscow and Chechnya. If the statement I am presenting here were an address and not a short comment, I would prove to you that for a long time there were "death squads" operating in Chechnya, ones that were inspired by the Kremlin. I would quote an example of manipulation of the law by the Kremlin. And what do traditional political methods, traditional political standpoints give us in this situation? The Secretary of State, Mr Powell, says that democracy is blooming in Moscow. Therefore, I have a question – is the US Secretary of State misinformed? Is he led astray? Because surely he cannot be that stupid. Therefore, there is reason to believe he is lying. He is lying, as it is commonly done in traditional politics. But this is a dangerous lie, and not only for his reputation. It is also dangerous for all of us. And this is where the problem lies.

I think that the 21st century must decide on how to meet these challenges. And I think the only thing I can suggest – what Andrey Sakharov suggested in 1972 – is to use the international community. Not only international institutions, but also organizations of civil society that should possess the appropriate plenipotentiaries, as they can provide a forum for discussing and searching for solutions to the problems of this new day and age. But this also needs to be thought over. As of now, I can only put forward a blasphemous offer. The seriousness of the problems connected with Moscow's former "evil empire", which is making an encore, is very grave, all the more so as that empire disseminated so many of its bad habits in the Third World. This includes terrorism. We very well remember who was the one organizing terrorism, for example in Palestine. And this contagious example still wrecks havoc. For Moscow is ruled by a man who prides himself on his KGB background, and despite this he is hailed by all the Prime Ministers, Presidents… This is simply abominable! Just imagine a former SS or Gestapo officer who is posed the question: 'Your Excellency, how do you feel about your past service?' and then answers by saying that he is proud of it. Alas, today's world leaders are not ashamed to shake his hand.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Raffi Hovhannisyan, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of independent Armenia. The floor is yours.

Raffi Hovhannisyan:

These have been wonderful days of analytical and critical congratulations as we look retrospectively 25 years into the past to understand the achievements of *Solidarność*, the great *Solidarity* movement that had implications not only for Poland itself, but for the whole of the Soviet Bloc. *Solidarity* was a veritable guiding light from the Cold War to the unification of Europe. All want to see themselves included that retrospective.

Yesterday we saw the chain reaction, if you will, which began 25 years ago in Gdańsk. And there were wonderful scenes of the chain reaction, of national dignity, human rights, respect for rights and the rule of law. Unfortunately, however, we did not see the great demonstrations in 1988, between the origin of *Solidarity* and the ultimate liberation of many of the subject nations, of the 1 million people who hit the streets of Yerevan. Not only for demanding liberty, sovereignty, security, and democracy in Armenia and Mountainous Kharabagh, but in solidarity with *Solidarity*, and with the movements in the Baltics, and ultimately with the nations that were able to secure their re-liberation in the modern period.

While post-genocidal, totalitarian histories might write out certain chapters, democratic histories must be inclusive and always base their approaches not on selective history, but on a full history. Especially as nations such as our, who have registered significant retreats in terms of democratic credentials, find themselves now on the threshold of new democratic transformations. And for that we need a full register of history, not its opposite.

And finally, *Solidarity* is also about the future. Not only a retrospective, but the imperative of creating a prospective, a meaningful application of the lessons of *Solidarity* to all human rights, democracy, national dignity situations around the world regardless of their provenance and regardless of the threat to them. We know that violations of human rights, attacks on democracy, terrorism, genocides have taken place on both sides of the Cold War divide. And that's why it is very important to apply the lessons of *Solidarity* outside the Soviet Bloc, too. To package it as lessons that are universal, that are not limited regionally or temporally, and ultimately will serve as a guiding light for the generations yet to come.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Because the list of people willing to take part in the discussion is getting longer and longer, I suggest we shorten the break.

I would like to ask Mr Wiktor Osiatyński to take the floor, and please remember to keep your remarks brief.

Wiktor Osiatyński:

There are three issues that I would like to mention. The first concerns international politics and the new challenges and changes in this domain. Marek Antoni Nowicki brilliantly explained to us the practical delimitations of armed

intervention and the difficulties in undertaking such intervention. The importance of the Community for Democracy Project was based on the fact that intervention would not be necessary in a situation where international aid and trade were to be made conditional on human rights standards. True, this could well have been possible and valid a few years ago. Today – and I say this from a perspective of practical actions aimed at improving human rights standards not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Central Asia, Africa, South America – this is undoubtedly harder. China is becoming one of the main international oil importers, and is undergoing phenomenal economic growth as never before seen by any other country. China is the main buyer or potential player in Angola, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and they will not uphold any human rights criteria to their trade policy. This is a change of great importance.

The second issue concerns democracy and human rights. We tend to pair those terms, but today we know that in a number of countries, not only in Iran, but also in the countries where truly free democratic elections take place, in Egypt or many other countries, the winners of democratic elections there will not be very fond of human rights, and may even disrespect the very essence of human rights.

And this leads me to the third issue, namely what is the essence of human rights protection in the national perspective, in the perspective of individual countries, because this is what human rights are principally based on. Here I see three universal threats, ones which occur all around the world, or almost all around the world.

The first is exclusion. In my short statement yesterday, I recalled the motto of *Solidarność*: there is no bread without democracy. But as the experience of the past 15 years shows us, freedom itself does not guarantee bread. There is a growing problem of exclusion. Thus, in South American countries, for example, where American diplomats pay visits and say that the fundamental human right is the right to free trade, the whole concept of human rights is rejected for this very reason.

The second is the fact that a person or group of people whose rights are violated will obviously not put forward a demand for armed intervention. They should, however, have access to human rights protection institutions. I postulate that just as in the past the condition of democracy, of recognizing democracy, was essential to the creation of a mechanism mediating between the state and the voters – so today should liberal democratic theory recognize that the mediating, established and regulated factor is represented by the various human rights and public interest organizations that guarantee such access.

And finally: access to what? To courts. Because in most of the world's countries the majority of complaints concerning human rights violations and corruption are linked to legal violations in courts and to corruption in courts. We are therefore faced with an immense problem that needs us to take a decisive stand and act. Just as many years ago when people like Jery Laber and others created the Human Rights Watch and Helsinki Watch, I think that today there is the need to create a worldwide movement called *Court Watch* to monitor court activity, respect for the law and the transparency of proceedings in the courts themselves.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much. I would now like to ask Henryka Bochniarz, president of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers, to take the floor.

Henryka Bochniarz:

I would like to add one point to the list of threats to democracy presented by Ms Madelaine Albright. A point which I feel needs mentioning here, 25 years after the creation of *Solidarność* and on the occasion of this great celebration. Namely the threat posed by unemployment here in Poland in the year 2005. I feel that if this problem remains unsolved, if we don't change the fact that 20% of the population and 30% of young people are unemployed, our freedom and our democracy will truly be threatened. Despite many efforts, this issue remains unresolved. I feel that a great way to celebrate the 25th anniversary of *Solidarność* would be to return to the method which lay at the very basis of the *Solidarność* movement – namely, to a new social contract that would oblige employees, employers, non-governmental structures, and the government to search for compromise in this issue. I think that today's *Solidarność* trade union could once again play an active role in solving this problem.

Since we are speaking here today of human rights, I would like to mention another aspect, one I consider important, and speak out in the name of women's rights. Yesterday we were at the US Embassy at a seminar dedicated to the role of women in *Solidarność*. Two of those women – Helena Łuczywo and Barbara Labuda – took part, and many other ladies were present. I think that it is a great pity that neither at our conference nor on our panel is either of these great women present. I sincerely hope that on the 30th anniversary of the creation of *Solidarność* there will be many of them.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Ambassador Christian Strohal from the Office for Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Christian Stohal:

I would like to make two points on why it has been such a pleasure for my institution to support this conference from the very beginning with its preparations.

I speak for the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, which is based here in Warsaw. which I think is the best place this office can be.

I would like to make two points in this connection, ones relating to both aspects of this wonderful conference, both the celebration and the remainder. I would like to start with a quote from President Ford when he signed the Helsinki Final Act. He said that it doesn't matter which promises we make, but which promises we keep. Not the making of the promises, but the keeping of the promises matters.

Solidarność, which I see as perhaps the most forceful reminder of this principle, arose just a few years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

One point I would like to make concerning *Solidarność*'s example is that of bringing the protection of human rights from the conference room to the field. What I mean is that we were able to bring such protection from the political and diplomatic arena to the ground, to the workplace, to those who actually were in need. My institution has a certain role in this in terms of election observation, where we are most visible perhaps and most successful. But we also offer reform assistance to governments and seek to develop civil society. This is a point that Foreign Minister Rotfeld has made. And that brings me to my second point, which is the important and essential role of civil society. Just because we have been successful in supporting civil society does not mean there are no threats. This wonderful panel has listed a number of them. I would just like to add a couple more *en passant* as these are threats that are very much on the agenda on the OSCE and which have not been mentioned so far. One is the ongoing manifestations of racism and anti-semitism throughout the whole OSCE region, and the other is the trafficking of human beings and the connection of trafficking human being to organized crime. Both of these are complex illnesses of our society, of our societies, and both are being tackled by this organization. But they of course need not only the determination of governments, but also the support from civil society, which I think is the stronger of the two. And it is in areas such as this that I think we need to strengthen our support for NGOs, for activists, not only in the practical work we are doing, but also in bringing it back to the political arena. To have it on the agendas of summits, of foreign minister' meetings. We do our part. For example, we brought several hundred NGO activists to Warsaw here to the seat of my institution at the annual implementation conference. I think they cherish this opportunity to network among each other. But we need a continuous action also at the political level. And for that I think the *Solidarność* example, not only the celebration, but the crucial role of civil society, is a central element of this conference. Thank you very much for this panel discussion.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

The next speaker will be Vladimir Kolas from the Club of the Byelorussian Intelligentsia, an activist of the committee "For a Dignified Life", created ahead of the 2003 municipal elections in Belarus.

Władimir Kołas [translation from Russian]:

I am not only the chairman of the Club of the Byelorussian Intelligentsia, but also the director of the Byelorussian Humanities Lyceum. It is a great honour and joy for me to be able to express my gratitude towards the Poles, especially Mr Onyszkiewicz, for the aid, support and solidarity which has been granted to our

high school. At this moment, our lyceum is operating illegally in Belarus[4]. This summer we had the chance to come to Poland and work in normal conditions, which we don't normally have in Belarus. We have never received such help before.

We were shocked by the enormous amount of letters and words of solidarity and support that came to us after news about the fate of our lyceum reached Poland. This is another example which shows that *Solidarność* ideals are not utopian, but a realization of the goodness in human beings – it is a positive example and one which should be followed. We envy this conference very much, but we hope that one day we will also celebrate our victory and be able to look back on our struggle and the price we had to pay. In this respect, we are studying the *Solidarność* experience and analyzing the past situation.

Allow me to put forward a few comments. I am very grateful to Gabor Demszky, who spoke yesterday, for his reflections on the fact that, with all due respect to the *Solidarność* movement, is should be mentioned that this movement was helped a lot, also from within the communist system. As a man from the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain, I would also like to share with you a personal experience. In the second half of the 1970s, I was a student in Moscow and my lecturers were high state officials, some of them being responsible for the economy of the USSR. One of them made a statement which I will long remember. It was the Chairman of the Central Planning Office. He said that the Soviet economy is a rotting corpse! To hear such words at the end of the 70s during Leonid Brezhnev's rule was tantamount to hearing at the time of the inquisition from the Grand Inquisitioner that God doesn't exist. We knew he was right, but nonetheless for that it came as a shock to us visitors from the Soviet republics.

It was clear that the system was degenerating, dying, also in the physical sense with respect to its political leaders. It was no longer the system of the Stalin era. It would be naive to think that those who were preparing the change, who came about after the "funeral parade", thought about democratic ideals or about benefits for the nation. Not at all! Gorbachev was only the tip of the iceberg. What appeared during our fight for democratic ideals, for the strengthening of democratic standards in society, for cultural and linguistic revival – was simply a redistribution of property. Private property came from collective property. Therefore, those who were closer to the epicentre of change first claimed the property, and then seized power. In Belarus, this change was made in the purest of forms. We now have the so-called oligarchic capital, and the main oligarch is our dictator!

What should be done with this situation? It must be noted that the Solidarność experience is being analyzed not only by the democrats, but also by the authoritarian regimes created after the break-up of the USSR. Interesting conclusions can be made. Firstly, that the Byelorussian regime does not strive to

[4] The Jakub Kolas National State Humanities Lyceum, the only high school in Belarus where all subjects were taught in Byelorussian, was closed as a result of the protest of teachers and pupils against the naming of a Russian-language principal by the authorities. The Lyceum is currently operating as a private school.

maintain any contacts or negotiations with the opposition. It understands that such actions are potentially fatal. Therefore, it does not give the opposition any chance whatsoever to exert power, no matter how deplorable that power may be. Secondly, the authorities will never allow for a situation where the price of meat will be lower than the electorate's purchasing power. And in this sense the command system, which ignores all economic signals, has managed to function in my country for a sufficiently long time.

In order to bring about positive change, we must get help. We need to see signs of solidarity! Byelorussian propaganda is touting the myth of a Byelorussian economic miracle. It's true – coming to Minsk, one sees clean and well-lit streets, and outside the city – sown fields. Not everyone understands, however, that the crops gathered from these fields do not repay the costs of sowing them. Agricultural production is sold below prime costs. This is how the Lukashenka regime functions.

Here we must return to the question of solidarity, which should be on the agenda of both the United States and the European Union. It must be noted that the amount of Belarus' turnover with EU countries and the USA is constantly rising and is already higher than turnover with Russia. This means that there are people in Europe for whom the money doesn't stink! Some do not even possess the sense of smell! Economic co-operation with the West has allowed Byelorussian oligarchs, thanks to their huge monopolies, to attain enormous wealth.

What are the conclusions arising from this? Attaining democracy in Byelorussia is, of course, the job of the Byelorussians themselves. Nonetheless, the Byelorussian dictatorship is not only a problem for Byelorussians themselves, as depicted by the recent events concerning the Union of Poles in Belarus. What happened to the Union also happened earlier to our Lyceum. The only difference is that in our case nobody set up a second pseudo-lyceum. Unfortunately, new authorities have recently been chosen to replace the former ones. This is nothing new. In Belarus, there are two communist parties: the proper one (supporting the president) and the improper one (not supporting the president). In Belarus there are many such "double" organizations. The situation of the union of Poles in Belarus proves that this can be dangerous, not only for Belarus.

There remains the problem of the third term of Lukashenka's presidency and the possible unlimited extension of his government. This issue is also related to Russia. If Russia were to interfere with Byelorussian affairs, if it were to introduce a sort of state of emergency and the political opposition were to become totally eliminated, then the instability could become so very large and dangerous that everyone could plainly see that it would stop being an internal Byelorussian problem and the situation would become serious and dangerous. That is why we are asking the honourable participants of this conference to take notice of this problem. We suggest it be solved with solidarity. How shall this proceed? Elections will soon take place in Byelorussia, and they will probably be rigged. Our common goal is to prevent the rigging of the Byelorussian presidential elections in 2006.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

The discussion time is coming to an end. I would like to ask the remaining speakers to make but short remarks. The next will be Shevah Weiss, former Speaker of the Israeli parliament and ambassador in Warsaw. The floor is yours.

Shevah Weiss [translation from Polish]:

I would like to quickly point out that I'm not the only the Israeli citizen here. There are three of us. For present with us is my professor from Hebrew University, Professor Shlomo Avineri. And there is an honorary citizen of Israel, Professor Władysław Bartoszewski.

Being here among you, please allow me to speak Polish, for I feel surrounded by my fellow countrymen.

As I've listened to the delegate from Russia, from Belarus, from other countries, I've clearly understood that so very much would not have been possible without Gdańsk, without *Solidarność*. If you open your eyes and ears, you see and hear that Europe is very different from the Europe of 25 years ago. I think that the collapse of the Berlin Wall began in Gdańsk.

Poland does not need to convince anybody that it is a part of Europe, just as I – despite the fact that I left Poland as a small child – consider myself a European. Because being a European signifies humanism, a humanistic approach to all religions, creating a peaceful atmosphere – these are the roots of a deep democratic culture. And today Poland is, I would say, the Eastern border of the democratic system. But democracy is like an epidemic, it will spread through borders, spread further. And that is what I wish you.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

Thank you. The discussion time is over, and I apologize to all those who did not have a chance to speak. I hope there will be other possibilities to make statements, for our conference is not yet over.

I would very much like to thank all of our panelists for their speeches. I trust it was a fine intellectual pleasure for all of us. Thank you very much. The break will last until 12.00.

5th SESSION
Hopes and Fears: The Image of *Solidarność* in the World Media

Chairman: *Eugeniusz Smolar*, Programme Director of the Conference;
Participants: *Neal Ascherson*, British journalist, author of the first book on the Gdańsk Shipyards' strike. Recipient of the Polish Order of Merit;

Bernard Guetta, former Polish correspondent for "Le Monde";

Jim Hoagland, Associate Editor and Chief Foreign Correspondent of "The Washington Post";

Leopold Unger, long-time co-operator of the Paris-based émigré monthly *Kultura* and Radio Free Europe, writes for "Gazeta Wyborcza" and "Le Soir";

Jürgen Wahl, writer and journalist, for many years with the "Rheinischer Merkur".

Eugeniusz Smolar:

I'd like to apologize to the participants of the conference for including a book in the conference materials which the organizers of the conference don't under any circumstances wish to support. We have made a mistake. The book in question was presented to us, but we neglected to check its contents and, as it has turned out, this is a publication which contains demeaning statements about people and institutions that command great respect. Many times we have spoken about these people and institutions during the conference and they have appeared and reappeared in the addresses delivered both by our Polish guests and foreign friends. I need to state this strongly, this is a book which – by being very one-sided, scandalous and aggressive – radically departs from the intentions of the organizers.

Outside in the narthex you will find numerous documentary and analytical publications – for example, ones dedicated to Jacek Kuroń, whom we miss very much today. We recommend books by the poet Adam Zagajewski, and the special edition of *Zeszyty Literackie*. We wish to encourage you to stock up on these books, for they are of an honest and objective nature.

Returning to our conference itself, I wish to say that many actors who played important parts in the events that occurred both in Poland and abroad, and who should have been mentioned here, have not been mentioned. For example, the role of the world labour union was not stated here in a strong enough manner. During the last session we spoke a lot about human rights organizations that

played an immense role. We mentioned the US Helsinki Watch, today called the US Human Rights Watch, but we failed to mention Amnesty International, for example, or the contributions of the "Index on Censorship" magazine[1], as well as the "Uncensored Poland" bulletin edited in London by Krzysztof Pszenicki. I had the opportunity to closely co-operate with that weekly review of current events, noted for its insight into the situation in Poland from the point of view of both the underground and the government, as well as for its presentation of the position of the Catholic Church in Poland. Yesterday Yoshiho Umeda spoke about China and noted the interest of the Chinese authorities in the phenomenon of *Solidarność*. I can confirm this interest. The Chinese subscribed to 10 copies of "Uncensored Poland". The bulletin was also widely bought by Western embassies in Warsaw and by the Foreign Offices of many countries as an important, trustworthy and unbiased source of information on the situation in Poland. Also published in London was the "East European Reporter", which was a Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian magazine – one could say a predecessor of the Visegrád Group. The Czechoslovak materials were prepared by Jan Kavan, who later went on to become the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the democratic Czech Republic. We have the honour of his presence with us today. The Hungarian materials were prepared by today's MEP for Hungary George Shöpflin, and I was in charge of the Polish texts.

We haven't really talked about the role of Poland's political emigration. Bogdan Osadczuk mentioned the Paris-based émigré monthly *Kultura* and the person of Jerzy Giedroyć, but I would like to remind you that there was also a Polish London, represented here today by the former President of the Polish Government-in-exile, Mr. Ryszard Kaczorowski, whom we would like to cordially welcome. The Polish London – by means of Mr Kaczorowski – passed on the insignia of government to Poland's first democratically elected President, Lech Wałęsa.

Referring back to the last session, which dealt with terrorism, I would like to recall a great friend of *Solidarność*, Giles Hart, who was killed in the July 7 bombing in London. Giles Hart was a one of the main organizers and a long-time chairman of the "Solidarity with Solidarity" organization in Great Britain.

Now let's take up our present session's topic. It is no coincidence that we chose to entitle it "Hopes and Fears: The Image of *Solidarność* in the World Media". I believe that the issue is well illustrated by an anecdote which is linked to a person who is here with us and whom we would also like to cordially welcome – Richard Davy, one of the main commentators for the London "Times" in those years. When Adam Michnik was allowed to leave Poland in the late fall of 1976 and came to London in 1977, together with Professor Leszek Kołakowski we organized a press conference on the situation in Poland after the formation of

[1] "Index on Censorship", a British magazine founded in 1972 by the poet Stephen Spender and Michael Scammell, which was intended to defend the rights of authors and the promotion of freedom of speech. Amongst the authors there were and are some of the greatest contemporary writers. Today there is also a Russian and an Arabic version.

KOR. The journalists kept asking: aren't you afraid of Soviet intervention? Both somewhat surprised, Kołakowski and Michnik answered that nobody was considering that in Poland. They stressed that the Workers' Defence Committee had been founded and that what was important was to help the repressed workers after the demonstrations of 1976, that we should fight for the freedom of speech, etc. Soon finding himself cornered, Adam Michnik said that if this or that were to happen, then perhaps…, adding that Poles of course remember 1956 and Budapest as well as 1968 and Prague. Richard Davy wrote a brilliant *compte rendu* from the conference which was published under a title imposed by his editors: "Polish Dissident Warns of Imminent Soviet Invasion". This anecdote – it seems to me – gives a snapshot of the problems that foreign journalists writing about Poland had to deal with in the eighties, as well.

Now I would like to give the floor to Neal Ascherson, author of one of the first books on *Solidarność*. Neal worked for the British press for many years, amongst other titles, writing for the "Observer", the "Scotsman" and the "Independent".

Neal Ascherson:

Solidarity would not have had the foreign image it did, if foreign journalists had not been present. That seems obvious. But in fact their presence was astonishing. When the decisive wave of strikes began, reaching Gdańsk in August, the regime did nothing to keep it secret or discourage reporting. The *Wybrzeże* – the Baltic coast – did not become a closed zone. The permanent Western correspondents in Warsaw did not have their movements restricted. And, most extraordinary of all, Polish embassies abroad went on handing out visas to the tidal wave of press, radio and television journalists who swept over the press councillors and visa officers as the strikes focussed on the Lenin Yard at Gdańsk.

I believe there were some exceptions. But on the whole, Polish diplomats abroad worked day and night to hand out ringside seats for what might, many thought, become a "national tragedy" as the Polish communists lost control and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact intervened. Why did they do that? Did somebody in the PRL leadership calculate that the presence of the world media might deter Brezhnev and his Politburo from invading Poland? That is what we journalists suspected at the time. Was it true? Was it the sight of the armies from the big US television networks pouring into Warsaw and buying up the best camera sites for covering the entry of the tanks – was this what put the Soviet generals off? I would like to know.

Did we do a good job? The journalist Patrick Cockburn wrote the other day that journalists are not really as good at finding out secrets as they pretend, but instead are very good at passing on and publishing things which other people want the world to know. They act as conduits rather than as spies. This was true in Poland in August 1980. In the shipyard all we had to do was understand what people were trying to tell us and transmit it. There were communications blocks from Gdańsk and the Coast, but we merely commuted to Warsaw to transmit our stories. In Warsaw,

nobody tried to cut our phone and telex links in those pre-cyberspace days, although 16 months later the communists showed how effectively they could have done that.

There were not many secrets. Everything at Gdańsk was in the open. When they turned off the sound system in the negotiation room, we could try and lip read as we stared through the glass walls. There was a press service for the strike and the MKS. But as soon as we foreign reporters squeezed through the gate, we became aware of the intense loathing which the strikers felt for their own journalists, whom they regarded – often unfairly – as liars and police agents. In contrast, they had touching confidence that we would tell the truth for them to the world outside. Many of us had interpreters from Interpress, a government agency the strikers detested, and this was known to lead to misunderstandings.

But the sheer openness of everything created a problem of choice. So many different people – old workers, young students, ultra-left fanatics, priests, novelists, engineering apprentices, spooks, professors – all of them wanted to sell us their own slant on what was happening. All their versions were dramatic. But sorting out which ones mattered was not easy.

Neither was it easy to explain to Western readers the inwardness of what was going on. "Brave Polish workers risk all to claim freedom" – that was basic enough. But it was hard, for instance, to get across that the central problem was the terrifying weakness of the regime, not its repressive strength. *Solidarity*, as it emerged, at once saw that its duty to the nation was not just to win the 21 Postulates, but also to save the PRL – the People's Republic of Poland – from total collapse. For that would have made Poland look like a failed state crying out for humanitarian – sorry! – for fraternal socialist intervention. This notion puzzled Western news editors. It was too ironic for them to grasp – a common problem when reporting from Poland.

National media in different Western countries found other aspects of August hard to interpret. West German commentators, for instance, were nervous about the impact on East-West relations and their Nebeneinander with the GDR. Even "Die Zeit" sometimes suggested that Polish intellectuals were being irresponsible and unrealistic. The British media also had some reservations behind a general and genuine enthusiasm. The right-wing papers were uneasy about the idea of political revolution through a trade union – trade unions were very unpopular among British Conservatives then. The religious commitment of *Solidarność* – those yard-gate Masses made pictures on every front page and TV set – reassured them a bit. As the old ex-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wickedly put it, "How refreshing to see the working-class on its knees!".

On the other extreme of British opinion, some of the old Labour Left found the birth of *Solidarność* upsetting. The PRL might indeed represent distorted socialism, they thought, but it was still socialism. The sight of thousands of proletarian engineering workers demonstrating behind the Cross for national freedom gave the old British left something like heart failure. Elements of that view could also be found in some newspapers.

In my opinion, the French did the best job covering events. It was only the French media which offered newspaper readers a sophisticated and three-dimensional view of what was going on. The French editors and reporters found it natural to appeal immediately to history. They could discuss 1980 in comparison not only with 1970 but with 1944, 1863 and 1830. Even more important, some of the French journalists took very seriously indeed the obvious central fact about *Solidarność* – that it was a trade union, and the spearhead of a very special type of workers' movement.

This was something the rest of us found hard to make interesting to our foreign desks. But, re-reading my diaries from those days and nights 25 years ago, I remember how much time I spent discussing the details of this wonderful utopian structure. A self-managing society, albeit virtually without central authority, formed as it was by thousands of democratically-elected workers councils. Was it a dream of anarcho-syndicalism? It certainly had – as the French pointed out – very Polish roots in the so-called "Polish strike" tradition. But who remembers that noble vision today?

Did we, in what we wrote, predict the real consequences of *Solidarność*? Yes and no. I think most of the Western journalists realized that Polish communism was left brain-dead by the drama at Gdańsk, that it lay on Polish society with the weight of a huge corpse. What I certainly did not realize was that the Soviet imperial system in Europe had been fatally damaged – a ship holed far below the waterline, like the Titanic – and that from now on it would begin to sink.

Let me change the metaphors. In that shipyard hall, the concrete in the Berlin Wall began to soften, the key-rings in Wenceslas Square began to tinkle, men and women held out hands towards one another in a chain from Vilnius to Tallinn, an unmarked grave began to open in a Budapest cemetery, a man began to clamber onto a tank outside the Parliament in Moscow. We were watching the end of the "short 20th century". But nobody in that room knew that. We journalists knew that History was happening around us. But just how grand, we didn't understand.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Thank you very much. Now I would like to give the floor to Bernard Guetta, who worked for "Le Monde" and now works for "L'Express" and French Radio. Bernard related the events of the Shipyard Strikes. I hope that he will be able to share with us some of the dilemmas of French politics. For we cannot forget France's position after the imposition of Martial Law and the pursuit of the French establishment to sweep everything that happened in Poland under the carpet as fast as possible. Consequently I would like to ask you not only to go back to your own emotions and memories of that time, ones we of course recognize to be deeply embedded in you. *Monsieur Guetta*, I would also ask you to conduct a journalistic and political analysis, for that will be of greatest worth to this session.

Bernard Guetta:

I will take up your request in my last point. But first I would like to say a few words about the exceptional and – I think – extremely important relationship between many journalists, some of whom are present here today. For instance, I am pleased to see Jaś Gawroński[2] in the second row. I also wish to speak about the exceptional ties that were created between the Polish intelligentsia and some thirty or forty international journalists.

It is often said that we journalists did Poland and *Solidarność* a great favour. Let's not be overly modest, for that would be hypocritical: of course we did a favour. But what did you, what did *Solidarność* do in return, for us? Thanks to you we made it to the first pages of our newspapers. But this wasn't the most important aspect – you taught us very, very much. You taught us – well, in any case, you taught me – an enormous amount, and surely you did not act without self-interest – we were your representatives in the international press. Of course, we wholeheartedly aspired to that role, because we had become fighters for your cause.

Now my second point. Yesterday we spoke a lot about Helsinki, the international atmosphere, the relations between the Western democracies, the United States and the European powers, the communist world, and of course about the Soviet Union, but also about what were then called the peoples' republics. Speaking about them, reading the words of this or that politician, one can get shivers down the spine. What deference we presented at the time towards the communist world, what willingness to appeal to the Soviet Union!

If we ponder about why so many journalists were fascinated with Poland, we will realize that it was thanks to the richness your intelligentsia. What was this richness composed of? I would say that – for me, at least – of two things. The fact that Poland was, at the time, a melting pot of the best the three great universalisms could offer. I mean Catholic universalism, communist universalism, and of course – though this may come as a shock to some – Jewish universalism. All of these had their place in Poland. Also, there existed the experience of the many struggles, of the war-time resistance, of the experience of 1956 and of subsequent struggles. But all of these struggles were only partially triumphant; they were always followed by repression. Despite this, however, in each case they were also victories, steps in the right direction. We journalists were therefore dealing with wise and experienced people who were extremely dedicated towards achieving their goals.

I began covering the Polish political situation in the mid-1970s, especially in 1976-1977 during the beginnings of the Workers' Defence Committee, the beginnings of the underground "Flying University", and the time of the DiP publications, which in my opinion were too widely distributed. I was amazed by the level of activity, yet my friends from the intelligentsia told me repeatedly: "You know, the Flying University is just a 20th-century reincarnation of 19th-century forms of resistance". At the time, we treated it as a way of defending culture and a sign of *Solidarity* among Poles.

[2] At the time, Jaś Gawroński was a correspondent for Italy's RAI television.

Coming back to our topic, please allow me recount an anecdote. When the July strikes began in Lublin, I immediately applied for a visa to come to Poland, for my friend Aleksander Smolar kept urging me to come: "hurry! come to Warsaw!", he implored. I of course made the visa application. And I waited and waited. I kept on calling, but all I heard was the Embassy press attaché say, with a wonderful accent and utter hypocrisy: "You know, Mr. Guetta, it's very complicated, this bureaucracy of ours, ha ha ha, you know what it's like, what with the beginning of the holidays and everything…" The visa was of course ready after the first wave of strikes. But I took it and asked them to make it a monthly visa. Why did they not simply refuse me the right of entry? Because of the Helsinki agreements and because they simply didn't have the right to refuse me a visa.

I was granted the visa and this allowed me to be in the Gdańsk Shipyard already during the first day of the strikes and to stay there until the signing of the agreements. I arrived in the shipyard during the first night of the strikes, when the Inter-factory Strike Committee was working on the 21 Postulates. And I saw Andrzej Gwiazda, I didn't know his name at the time, with Lenin's bust in the background. There on the stage were Gwiazda and Lenin, and I was standing next to them and listening. Gwiazda began quoting the international conventions signed by Poland concerning trade union rights and workers' rights. Here I must emphasize the surpassing place occupied by international law, negotiation, and hammering out agreements.

There is also a third dimension, one that hearkens back to the question asked by Neal a moment ago. The Polish authorities could have told me: "agreements or no agreements, we don't care. You will not be granted a visa". True. But who was the First Secretary of the Communist Party at the time? Mr. Gierek. Mr. Gierek was educated in France. Mr. Gierek spoke French. Mr. Gierek read "Le Monde", and "Le Monde" was Mr. Gierek's Bible. A good friend of Mr. Gierek and his banker was none other than Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, the French president at the time. Mr. Gierek was not in a situation in which he could refuse me, a 28 year-old kid, a visa. Because I represented France, his bank, his newspaper. And it was this situation which meant that the Warsaw "Le Monde" correspondent was someone very much liked by the opposition, but also someone who possessed a great possibility of humiliating the authorities.

Here I will return to the point raised by Neal. I must say that I did not have any problems with the Polish authorities after Martial Law. I did not have any problems with anyone in France whilst commenting on those events. On the contrary. Because this was 1980. Just as the previous decade was important for Poland, so too was it for France. Two important events had taken place in France. Firstly, people who belonged to the May '68 movement, my generation, considered indisputable the fact that the Soviet system and communism were hideous things. There were no disagreements as to this. My generation, demonstrating in May '68 in the streets of Paris, shouted: Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Toyko. Why Warsaw? Because we identified

ourselves completely with the students protesting in Poland. For us, it was the same fight. We were the generation that redrew the post-WW II geopolitical and ideological divisions. Yes, we were slightly lost intellectually, politically, but nonetheless we erased the divisions we had encountered. In the 1970s, our generation was publishing new philosophers in France. At the time, the non-communist left launched a full offensive against the French communists, who found themselves in total retreat from an ideological point of view. The socialist party was seeing a rebirth. An interesting phenomenon was the relation between young people hailing from a communist background with people from the Catholic Workers' Campaign and the Christian Student Youth, at the time situated on the left side of the political arena. These organizations joined forces with a large part of the left in what was a fundamentally anti-communist movement, the aim of which was to break the neck of the French Communist Party. Contrary to what many of you may have thought, not only did Solidarność in holding masses in front of the shipyard gates not shock the French, it in fact spoke to them. What was the French perspective on those events? It had turned out that France's Catholics, workers, and intellectualists were – to use the West European term, I'm of course exaggerating, but nonetheless – were either Christian democrats or social-democrats. And this was the growing tendency in France at the time, and we and the readers of "Le Monde" viewed ourselves as its vested representatives. You desired the same things we desired; we desired the same things you desired. With the very minor difference that we were living in a democracy and you were living under communism.

The problems started appearing for me as a journalist together with the imposition of Martial Law. For Martial Law was taken as proof of the fact that there is no exit from communism, that communism was an "evil empire". Thus, Martial Law was seen at best as being akin to the Czechoslovak "normalization", and at worst as being akin to the bloody pacification of the Budapest uprising. In addition, General Jaruzelski's dark glasses so strongly reminded us of Pinochet's that, by way of analogy, we were made us think of the stadium full of prisoners, the torture, the murders, etc. When I began writing my reports, I stated with a sigh of relief that blood was not flowing in the streets of Warsaw. In a second text, written just after the imposition of Martial Law, I stated that we were dealing neither with "normalization", nor with a "Hungarian" bloodbath. On the contrary, I wrote that Martial Law entailed the first defeat of communism in history. Why? Because the Soviet Union did not dare intervene, and it surely had sound reasons for not doing so. Secondly, the communist regime was forced to resort to an extremely vulgar, trivial tool: military dictatorship. It could not return to a totalitarian system; this was absolutely impossible. To explain all this in France in 1982 was much more complicated than to take part in that exceptional and ubiquitous enthusiasm for *Solidarność* in France and Italy, the other country which wholeheartedly sympathized with the events in Poland. But even so, *Solidarność* was much less complicated than what I had to explain when reporting on events in Moscow

during *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. For that matter, if the truth be told, those events remain misunderstood to this day.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Thank you. I would now like to invite our friend from Germany, Jürgen Wahl, who for many years oscillated between the career of a politician and that of a journalist. He worked for the "Rheinischer Merkur", and at one point was their main correspondent.

Jürgen Wahl:

I shall concentrate on German and Austrian media coverage of *Solidarność* and the commentary provided on its development in 1980 and later.

When the strikes began in 1980 most print media, and above all television, faced a problem which concerned the entire West: until then, coverage of Poland had been minimal. It had followed the rules of the Cold War, which stipulated focusing on economic problems and which regarded opposition against communist rule as the brave but impotent pronouncements of a small minority. That was the fate of Charter 77 in Prague, and also that of KOR in Poland.

Most of Germany's influential politicians and journalists classed the events in Poland far behind the developments taking place in East Germany. The Social Democrat government in Bonn from 1969 had come to terms with the continued existence of two German states and counted on the communist system to reform itself by means of a policy of improved relations with the West. Which is why the leaders of the SPD, barring a few exceptions, viewed the creation of *Solidarność* with scepticism, After *Solidarność* had signed the Gdańsk Accords with the government in Warsaw, they feared that the situation in Europe would again be "destabilized" by unreasonable Poles.

All this is summed up by the opinion of the SPD government, practically unopposed by its coalition partner, the Liberals, that improved relations between Bonn and the GDR were again beginning to decline, something compounded by the quasi-uprising in Poland that was threatening the peaceful detente in Germany.

Since independent studies have shown that approximately 70% of German journalists belong to the left wing of the political spectrum, it comes as no surprise that *Solidarność* received quantitatively large coverage. But in the course of 1981, more and more warnings appeared about Polish "immoderateness" (examples: Süddeutsche Zeitung, ZEIT, Frankfurter Rundschau, ARD commentaries). Verbal or material support for the Poles from the critics of the Bonn government was usually regarded as "perpetuation of the Cold War". The USA was on several occasions advised to remove Radio Free Europe from Germany.

The coverage of *Solidarność* was also afflicted with objective problems. First, the German population's awareness of Polish history, German-Polish problems and Poland's internal development had sunk to almost zero since 1945. Secondly, it was

more difficult for Germans to travel to Poland than to, say, Hungary. Thirdly, eastern neighbours like Poland or Hungary were perceived by millions of German and Austrian expellees only through the prism of 1945.

Another objective problem was the fact that from its beginning *Solidarność* was not truly a trade union – it was just called that for tactical reasons. I found out about these tactical reasons from one of the future advisors to Lech Wałęsa as early as January 1971, just after the Gdańsk Uprising of December 1970. By 1980, *Solidarność* was a truly popular, and thus heterogenic movement – an opposition in search of a profile, neither clearly left-wing nor right-wing. It was primarily a freedom movement, to a certain extent deferent to the Church, but in actual fact to a far lesser degree than the West assumed.

Polish realities had been misrepresented by renowned newspapers and TV stations (ARD and ZDF) well before 1980 – indeed, ever since 1956 they had been sending to Warsaw mainly correspondents sympathetic to Bonn leftists, with their belief that communism could be reformed. The one notable exception was "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung". Worse still, having misjudged the role of the Catholic Church in Poland, the media even sent declared atheists, for whom the forms of expression of *Solidarność*'s fight in 1980 were simply too alien.

Some even went so far as to manipulate their reports. For example, ARD practically never presented advisors like Mazowiecki or Geremek, preferring strike leaders who fantasized about a better socialism. This was all very understandable. Whoever held the belief that the Polish Church was reactionary, and that the Cardinal Primate was against democracy, he could be counted on to neglect the fact that *Solidarność* could never have been a success without the Church's support.

As I have already mentioned, the German media audience was poorly prepared well before 1980. There was, however, an exception: The intensive and always accurate documentation of the Polish opposition since 1956, and particularly since 1972, in "Der Spiegel" was in a league of its own. German and Viennese newspapers and television in the post-Gomulka era depicted representatives of the regime as half-democratic. This was especially true for later Prime Minister Rakowski. Surely, in many respects Poland was indeed more liberal than East Germany, but the Polish communist party and its associates were still a far cry from being democratic. The German-language media, instead of providing a detached analysis of the situation, were busy blurring the distinction between facts and fantasies concerning Poland.

After the imposition of Martial Law on December 13, 1981 the tide turned, but only for a few weeks. First, there was a great outcry against Jaruzelski, Moscow and even against Honecker. Yet criticism of Helmut Schmidt's "regrets" that "this had to happen" in Poland was rare. On a more positive note, however, all German and Austrian media supported and promoted material aid for Poland, something millions of citizens rallied to provide.

Nevertheless, from 1983 onwards, criticism of *Solidarność*, and of individual dissidents, began once more to prevail, accompanied by sympathy for Poland's so-

called reform politicians. Those who cautioned against false impressions, like my friends Władysław Bartoszewski and Andrzej Szczypiorski, were accused by the Bonn leftists of disrupting its eastern policy. A small group of social democrats remained supportive of Poland. Their leader was Hans Koschnick, activist of the DGB trade union Christoffersen, who was aided by a few diplomats. However, they were loudly opposed by people like Egon Bahr, the SPD's General Secretary, who told journalists that Moscow was more important than Warsaw, both for him and for Germany as a whole.

Today the unified Germany is facing problems similar to those in 1980. Once again Poles are not believed to have the capacity to be sufficiently democratic. This time the fault lies not with the leftists in German media, but with the growing number of incompetent persons too indolent to acknowledge new facts. They are the ones clearing the way for a rekindling of historical prejudices – very old ones dating back to Bismarck's times, and brand new ones stemming from Gerhard Schröder's friendship with Vladimir Putin.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Thank you very much Herr Wahl, for that extremely interesting address. I would now like to turn the floor over to our friend Jim Hoagland, who not only was present in Poland at that time and informed public opinion about those events, but also occupies the extremely responsible post of foreign editor at the "Washington Post".

Due to time limitations we need to finish at half past one, and there is a number of people who would like to take part in the discussion. So, I would like to ask you to summarily present the dilemmas of a journalist ever having to react to news flowing in from Poland and Central and Eastern Europe at large.

Jim Hoagland:

Thank you, I'll certainly try to be very brief. But as soon as I get back to Washington I'm going to recommend that we hire the organizers of this conference, its editors, because they brilliantly made our deadline lunchtime. I'm quite aware that I'm what's standing between you and lunch. So you can be assured of my brevity.

It's proper to pay tribute to the iconic importance of the *Solidarność* movement, as the image of *Solidarność* is the subject we're supposed to talk about. And those events have often been described as the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire, and then the Soviet Union. In fact, those events are much more important than that. The Soviet empire effectively ended in Poland in the period between August 1980 and August 1981 for reasons I'll explain very briefly in this talk. We of course took much longer to understand that that's what had happened and it's not always clear even now that it really happened for the good. But one of the most valuable things about being here today to celebrate one of the 20th century's finest moments is to be reminded of the ebb and flow of events. To be focused on how great events had this ebb and flow over what seemed, when you were living through them, like a collection

of eternities. It's particularly important for today's Americans to have that perspective as we work our way through a very difficult time. Particularly important for those of us involved in producing what we at the "Washington Post" call the daily miracle. It's a miracle that we ever get a newspaper out in 24 hours in the limited space that we have. But it's not only the image of *Solidarity* that we journalists, particularly editors, should discuss today. It's also the meaning of *Solidarity*. For *Solidarność* and the mass protests and the mass movements that it sparked left a clear imprint, particularly in the 1980s, in what I call the international subconscious. The collective sense of an event or a trend formed in the minds of men and women wherever communications can reach. The saga of *Solidarność* is a useful reminder that these collective impressions are not fixed, they shift with events. They're not necessarily accurate in one given time frame, but they are capable of settling into judgements, based on common sense more than any other single thing over the long term, over what the French called *la durée*. Let's take a few examples, particularly from the perch of someone who was sitting in Washington most of the time during the early years of the *Solidarność* struggle. Exactly 25 years ago this week, the "Washington Post" greeted its readers one morning with a headline over an analysis by our State Department correspondent, a brilliant man named Murray Martyr, and that headline was: "Saving Poland Without Starting a Nuclear War". The headline writer, the editor who put that in the paper – it wasn't me by the way – clearly thought we had the capability of saving Poland. And we in fact worried very much about the possibility of a nuclear war, and that Poles could spark one. This was followed a week later with this page-one headline: "Poles Sign Strike Accord, Soviets Bitterly Attack Polish Anti-socialism". You can see that the first important reactions of the people directing the news file in Washington were about us. That may not surprise you, that of primary concern were our stakes in the Cold War, and yours. That would continue for a while, but gradually our headlines became more and more about you, as the seriousness, and I would use the word "responsibility" of *Solidarity* vis-a-vis the weakness of the government became apparent. By September 5, 1980, our headline was "Hold-out Miners Reach Accord in Southern Poland". Three days later, it was that "Polish Cardinal, Strike Chief Meet in Show of Unity". And then four days after that, "Old Unions Vow Radical Change To Satisfy Poles as New unions Flourish". I did a computer scan of hundreds of headlines through the long struggle in *Solidarity*, and what's clear as you go through the headlines is that you took control of your story. Just as you took control of your factories, your streets, your country, that is, of yourselves. I had been foreign editor of a small but talented staff at the "Washington Post" for about a year, and *Solidarity* actually played a role in enabling me to double our foreign staff over the next five years. We had a special contributor based in Belgrade who came to Poland named Michael Dawes. Michael is what you called a stringer then. He did a brilliant job in covering the *Solidarity* movement. And I was able to make him our first full-time correspondent in Poland. He did outstanding work for us. Throughout the winter of 1980 and 1981 our headlines reflected the

compromises reached and the perils leading right up to the brink. Indeed, there was a kind of a brinkmanship all along the way, but one in which power seemed to lie in the streets. Soon the Post was endorsing the view that it was the weakness of the communist government that was really striking. As was *Solidarity*'s determination not to create the kind of crisis that could in fact trigger what was still a major concern in Washington: Soviet intervention. But then, in June of 1981, the story really began. I say that because I came to Poland in 1981, and one of the things we say in our business, something any foreign correspondent will tell you, is that "the story doesn't begin until you get off the plane". Everything that's happened before that is irrelevant or ancient history. It's only when you bring your eye to it that it becomes "the story". So I stepped into your reality, and I would never look upon the world in the same way again. You held the streets, and you also upheld your country's finest ethos. From then on I would assess other mass movements, such as the People Power movement in the Philippines, or, more unhappily, the Tiananmen Square incidents, in the light of what I witnessed with *Solidarność*. You became the standard. So it was significant for me in Beijing that it was when the workers in China began to get actively involved in the protest in the streets, that the communist government in Beijing staged a massacre to crush those demonstrations. I feel that the example of *Solidarność* was very deeply imprinted in the Chinese subconscious. What struck me instantly on coming here, as I wrote, was that suddenly the fear that had been the cement of Soviet rule evaporated. About Gdańsk I used the example that the party and its police fear the people – not vice-versa. It was reminiscent for me of growing up in the segregated South, and watching the civil rights revolution happen there, and watching a subject people lose their fear, and then witnessing the change that was in their power to bring about. Polish men and women, I wrote, are excitedly telling themselves the story of what had happened to them and their country under 35 years of rule. It was an amazing experience. What I came to understand was more than the Cold War, more than the ideological struggle. It was the human experience that shaped the lasting image of *Solidarity*. I would say that by 1981 things were clear, and that is I wrote that any invading Soviets would find that the revolution they came to stop had in many ways already occurred, at least on a psychological level. By June 1981, you had liberated yourselves in a very visible way, though it took the Americans, the Russians, and I suspect even you, another 8 years to fully realize that.

Let me finish by talking about a subject we haven't covered very much, but one that struck me very much sitting in Washington and then coming here to Poland. I'm thinking of the economic crisis, of how it was the set of economic and social forces that really shaped *Solidarity*. My understanding of what happened in Poland made me very sceptical about the prospects for reforming communism in the Soviet Union. Let me end in the way that I ended this dispatch some 24 years ago, because we are still learning from your experiences. What I was told was that Poland had become an exercise in labour without meaning. People working a lot, but their labour deprived of all meaning in that the goods they produce cannot be used,

cannot be sold for more than they cost to produce. When work becomes senseless, the only sensible behaviour is to strike. We're now in an area of globalization, of truly cataclysmic changes in the world economy. For me they sometimes echo, if only faintly, that situation in Poland. So we are still learning from that situation in Poland, learning from your experience. As a modest proposal, a modest suggestion rather in a Swiftian sense, I wonder if you might consider opening *Solidarność* bureaus in many neighbourhoods around the world.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Thank you. This proposal is related to the next session, to the questions: what *Solidarność*? which *Solidarność*? from which period? And so on and so forth.

Now I am giving the floor to Leopold Unger, onetime journalist of "Życie Warszawy", long-time commentator for the "International Herald Tribune", today at "Le Soir". Over to you.

Leopold Unger:

I must say here at the outset that, despite the fact that I have always been an optimist, in 1980 I would have never believed that one day I would be speaking live (literally and metaphorically) at the 25th anniversary of *Solidarność*, especially with such honourable guests.

My situation was different from that of the other veterans of the "information front". First of all, not only could I not travel to Gdańsk, I couldn't travel to so much as a mudhole. Secondly, this specific situation influenced the way my commentaries were perceived. For many, I was an Eastern refugee, an instigator, an emigrant, who through his writings was settling his score with Poland and communism. All the more so because in the West, everybody who sharply criticized the Soviet system and the country itself was discredited by communist newspapers and so-called influence agents.

My situation as a commentator on Polish events was therefore very difficult. I was saved by my knowledge of the Polish language, my contacts with eminent Polish personalities, by the short but important period during which I had exclusivity to interviews with Wałęsa, by getting Michnik to write for the newspaper, and by cooperation with both the Parisian journal *Kultura* and, most importantly, with Radio Free Europe.

The problem was in convincing public opinion that the Soviet Union, like every imperialist state, is condemned to atrophy and decay because the satellite countries are bent on gaining internal sovereignty from the metropolis. And hence that subsequent revolts and uprisings are not isolated exceptions, but rather links in the same chain. How is one to convince people that the post-Yalta division of Europe is an instable one? And how to present the fact that the Eastern part of the continent is also Europe, insomuch as everyone knew Adenauer's quip, uttered upon flying over the Elbe en route home from Moscow (where he had negotiated the release of surviving German POWs): "Finally, we've left Asia". As we all know,

there was disagreement with regard to basic facts. How could we reach agreement if for the Belgians WW II began not on the first, nor even on the third of September 1939, but in June 1940 with the 3rd Reich's invasion of Belgium – when it ended for them not in May 1945, but a year earlier, when Belgium was liberated?

On the other hand, it did not require much effort to raise fear about what was happening in Poland. The typical urban reader of "Le Soir" was convinced that each rebellion in the East has to end like the 1968 Prague Spring, and that the Soviet Union was ready to use all necessary measures, including war, to maintain its sphere of influence, that the main victim of the Polish mishap will be détente, which may lead to the end of prosperity. All the more so because Poland was considered an unpredictable country. There was something going on there at all times, once every couple of years the world received news of new disturbances in Poland. Aside from this, 1980 was not a "good" time for new shocks. The USSR was nervous after the invasion in Afghanistan, the Moscow Olympics were hardly a success, tensions concerning human rights were still appearing five years after Helsinki, and in these circumstances the "whims" of disgruntled Poles could only destabilize the situation and strain the delicate fabric of international relations.

The West held that Moscow viewed the Polish caprices with extraordinary calm and that they should not add fuel to the flame, all the more so as the Soviets' "Pravda" headline stated that "The crisis in Poland endangers security of USSR", and the TASS agency was emphasizing that Poland was a member of the socialist community and that the West should keep out of this family affair. The speculations of a Soviet intervention were simultaneously neutralized by the view that the cost of such a venture would be too high. For Poland wasn't Czechoslovakia, where it was mainly the intelligentsia that took part in the revolt. In Poland the Soviets would be faced with resistance from the whole of society, and the Kremlin didn't want another Kabul in Warsaw, so General Jaruzelski should manage by himself. This is why the West kept on advising: don't exacerbate, keep patient, all the while clandestinely helping *Solidarność* financially and by sending necessary equipment.

That is why after the imposition of Martial Law, the West gave out a sigh of "disgusting relief", one much like that after Munich in 1938. The media were shouting that "the putsch is a scandal", Martial Law is a travesty, but luckily the Poles have managed by themselves, Moscow did not directly take part. So basically, apart from a few minor disturbances, the politics of détente were still binding and the West could and may maintain proper relations with the East. As Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister of the socialist French government, stated: "the French government is of the opinion that the decisions pertain to the internal sovereignty [of Poland]". When asked what France would do in this situation, France's Foreign Minister said: "we won't do anything, of course".

The NATO countries seemed to be caught off guard and they condemned the imposition of Martial Law only after a few days. Well, condemned or not, things must still move forward. Prime Minister Mauroy was very frank when, after signing a contract with the USSR for Soviet gas supplies to France, he explained

his decision, one which had breached economic sanctions on the Soviet Union: "We will not add to the suffering of the Polish nation the suffering of the French people deprived of gas". A similar stance was taken by the Federal Republic of Germany: they went by the principle of non-intervention, which the Kremlin applauded. In this case, I wrote a commentary entitled "From Ostpolitik to Realpolitik", where I stated that the Soviets know very well what they like: "Nobody knows the issue of non-intervention into Polish internal affairs better than Germany and Russia". European communist parties were divided. The Italian, Belgian and Spanish parties condemned Martial Law, but for the Portuguese and French parties and the CGT communist trade unions all this was but "cynical cacophony", as "L'Humanite" put it. European trade union central offices in general condemned the delegalization of *Solidarność* and quickly passed on financial aid and contacted the *Solidarność* office in Brussels, set up by the Temporary Coordinating Committee of *Solidarność*, which was illegal in Poland. I conducted an interview with the chief of that bureau, Jerzy Milewski, in which I referred to him as "Ambassador". A huge affair erupted – what do you mean, Poland has two ambassadors in Belgium? The Socialist International, led by Willy Brandt, was dithering in adopting a position on Martial Law. The United States also needed a few days to announce its position on the Polish crisis. The date of the imposition of Martial Law was greatly unfortunate for the Americans – they had just sat down to talks with the Russians in Geneva to negotiate a medium-range ballistic missile treaty. But they reacted quite decisively – President Reagan even accused Jaruzelski of breaching the Helsinki Final Act accords and went on to impose sanctions. He halted the export of oil exploitation and processing equipment, new technologies, grains, he prohibited Lot and Aeroflot aircraft to land at American airports, but… he did not halt relations with the Soviet Union.

Europe was thus calmed down – blood had not been shed. "Le Soir" newspaper expressed its hope for Poland to quickly regain not so much her stability, but solvency, and then recalled the amount of debt. In any case, nothing that had happened disrupted the division of Europe. The situation therefore seemed hopeless, but – as it turned out – not for long. Ten years later Europe was no longer divided.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Andrew Nagorski from "Newsweek International", another hero among those who reported from and about Poland.

Andrew Nagorski:

I would just like to add a few words to what Leopold said. Radio Free Europe, as we all know, was very important for *Solidarność* activists, for people to know what is being said and done in other regions. Radio Free Europe, BBC, Voice of America, Radio France International were important not only for Poles, but also for us, the foreign correspondents in Poland. After all, our articles were read on the air in Radio

Free Europe – and this is why one could say that people felt they knew us, that they were in contact with us and that they could talk with us. This was very important.

I would also like to add a little about when it was most difficult to write about Poland. The period of the strikes in 1980 and 1981 was sometimes hard to explain, but it wasn't difficult to convince our editors to write about Poland. The hardest period for me and for many journalists were the mid-1980s, when we weren't certain what was really going on. Today we look back and say: that was just a short pause and then *Solidarność* won. But that wasn't so obvious for the activists, nor was it always obvious for the journalists. Nonetheless, we had to carry on with making the case that even though dramatic events weren't taking place, we still had to cover Poland. Of course, the communist authorities' spokesman Jerzy Urban and others kept explaining that this was the end of the movement, that they weren't important any longer and that we had to concentrate on how the system would reform itself. This was often the opinion in Germany, but not only. There were also efforts to block correspondents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, who wanted to write too much. Not always were visas granted quickly. But during this period we were helped by *Solidarność*'s inborn adeptness at promoting itself. When *Solidarność* was but a small group, Zbigniew Bujak, for example, though in hiding as the most wanted man in the country, would organize interviews with correspondents. I myself once had the occasion of interviewing him. Yes, I was altogether impressed at the amount of people engaged in this, ones who led me to Bujak and then helped me return safely so that the interview could be published.

Thus it has to be said that our work was possible through what *Solidarność* activists were doing inside the country and their help.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Thank you very much. I would now like to ask Karol Małcużyński, a Polish journalist who was in the Gdańsk Shipyard, to make a brief statement. Karol worked for subsequent BBC correspondents in Poland. One of them, Kevin Ruane, is here with us. Was it hard to explain the language of the protest, the language of the strikes to your journalist friends?

Karol Małcużyński:

Everyone here is giving praise to the way the strike was organized, the magazines, the agencies, and so on. I think that everything boils down to the people, for example Kevin Ruane, who in the 70s unrelentingly fought his way through to his BBC editors with stories on Soviet dissidents. Again, that was no mean achievement, because everyone thought the matter of dissidents insignificant. Or David Sells, also from the BBC, who, at the time when the secret police hindered the meetings of the Workers' Defence Committee, smuggled out a film from one of those meetings that was then shown on BBC television. We must remember about the people who believed in what they were doing and were able

to convince their bosses that these stories were important, that all this mattered. That would be all in terms of the struggle and its veterans.

To answer your question, it was possible to explain to some and impossible to explain to others. Some were smarter, others less so. Today we have the pleasure of speaking with the smarter ones.

So far, we have been speaking almost only about the past. Meanwhile, I'm interested in what Leopold Unger and Bernard Guetta think about modern-day Poland, that is, about a country which was dominated by a foreign power for so many years and today is one of the most enthusiastic allies of another power, and is taking part in a war supported by the whole Polish political establishment, though opposed by a large majority of society. But I understand that we don't have time for that discussion.

I would like to finish off with an anecdote on journalism. I don't know if Mr. Unger or Mr. Guetta claimed that we were *objective* in our work. I once participated in a BBC meeting in which one of the directors stated: "We'll no longer use the term objective. From now on, the BBC is *impartial*". He then gave an entire lecture on what it means to be "impartial". When he finished there was complete silence. Finally someone asked: "very well then, but a crucial question remains: who are we impartial against?". I would therefore like to pay homage to journalists for always being impartial, but always being impartial against evil.

Eugeniusz Smolar:

Though there is much more to say – and many willing to do so – I'm afraid our session has run out of time. I would just like to add something to Karol Małcużyński's comment. That discussion at the BBC was later continued. The question "What is the BBC's impartiality based on?" was answered: "The BBC is impartial, but it is not independent from the values of the country it is operating in". This means the values of a pluralistic society and the free market. This is why the BBC does not treat equally those who are on the side of democratic values and those who are against them. The latter are given the right to speak, but the BBC as an institution and as its individual journalists represents democratic values. This is understood and appreciated by viewers and listeners from around the world. When it comes to how this is applied in journalistic practice and in particular programmes, that is another question.

I would like to sincerely thank all of you for being here and ask you to come at 3 pm sharp for the next to last session, after which the President of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso, will speak. Thank you very much.

6th SESSION
The Legacy of *Solidarność*

Chairman: *Aleksander Hall*, journalist, activist in both the legal and illegal *Solidarność*;
Participants: *Paul Thibaud*, French philosopher, historian and journalist. Editor-in-chief of the Catholic monthly "L'Esprit" for many years;

Denis MacShane, trade union activist, Deputy of the House of Commons from the Labour Party;

Aleksander Smolar, political scientist, Chairman of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw;

Paweł Śpiewak, historian of ideas, sociologist and journalist.

Aleksander Hall:

A very warm welcome to all of you. The topic of this session is the legacy of *Solidarność*. There is no doubting the fact that August of 1980 saw events of historical magnitude not only for our country, but also for Europe and the world. Neither are there any doubts as to whether *Solidarność* as a great civic movement – *de facto* an independence movement – fulfilled its historical role in striking a blow that the communist regime was unable to counter, and thereby led Poland to independence. Inasmuch as this is the case, the question remains open on whether *Solidarność* has left any specific message or legacy, and whether this legacy or any of its elements are still relevant today. This is a vibrant issue in Polish public debate, where there exist many radical views, ones sometimes pronounced by the main characters of the events. On the one hand we may hear the opinion that *Solidarity*'s ideals were betrayed, on the other is the view that we have fully succeeded, that the ideals of *Solidarność* have triumphed and that the Poland of today is the Poland we had been fighting for. This internal Polish debate will be touched upon by at least two of today's panelists.

But we will first listen to our foreign guests. I would like to ask Mr. Paul Thibaud to take the floor.

Paul Thibaud [translation from French]:

MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH *SOLIDARITY*

The exact title of this speech, albeit slightly complicated, would be "Misunderstandings with solidarity with *Solidarity*". For that would show that

Poland's 1980 movement elicited a range of sympathies, especially in France. Some even identified themselves with it, though on partially unrealistic foundations. This is why the initial romanticism was followed by a distancing and disappointment that culminated in the dispute between Poland and Western Europe, in particular France, of course. I could have also entitled my reflections after a well-known movie: "We were so much in love". But that would be too nostalgic. Be that as it may, my aim is not to strengthen the feeling of bitterness, but to try and understand the disappointments. For such understanding can contribute to a healing and renewal of relations between the two Europes.

The common chord of the Polish movement and French opinion was readily heard, but it quickly faded out. That common chord was twofold. To borrow from Bronisław Geremek, it consisted of anticommunism and the utopia of civil society.

The fear of communism

In the 1970s and up to the end of the Brezhnev era, many French harboured feelings of hate and fear toward communism – a fear of both an internal and external kind. Firstly, François Mitterrand chose to govern together with the communists and even to seal a program alliance with them. Many people from both left and right asked themselves how this adventure would end. Since Budapest "real communism" was widely negated, since Prague 1968 it was judged incapable of reforming itself, and since Solzhenitsyn we knew its criminal character. Paradoxical though it is from today's perspective, it then seemed that for the first time in 30 years the French would be ruled by communists, though the general population was hurling insults at them. In these circumstances, the Polish demonstration was the occasion for a sort of exorcism of the communist menace. One could even say that many French felt nauseous at the very mention of communism, which had earlier been a part of their or their parents' culture. Only Italy, where sympathy for *Solidarność* was particularly strong, was similar in this aspect to France.

The perceived menace was not only an internal one. It corresponded with the military expansion of communism in the Brezhnev era in Africa and Asia, from Cambodia to Ethiopia. Soon an important author, Cornelius Castoriadis, would put forth the theory that the Soviet Union had ceased being a communist regime and become a "stratocracy". This defensive anticommunism, a common French feature at the time, manifested itself even before *Solidarność*, during the "Carnation Revolution" in Portugal. The complacency of "Le Monde" vis-à-vis the tendencies which seemingly proposed the establishment of a people's republic on the Iberian Peninsula was widely criticized. The Afghan resistance also generated exceptional interest in France, where commandant Massoud would enjoy heroic status until the end of his days. This sensibility to the menace of militarized communism, this anti-Brezhnevism partly explains where the powerful and immediate protests against the December 13 coup came from. General Jaruzelski was the epitome of French fears of military communism –

and to such a point that in the beginning some people, and here I include myself, were inclined to exaggerate the scale of the repressions.

This state of mind is underlined by the French attitude (typical of both the ruling elite and common citizens) during the SS-20[1] crisis, which especially rocked Germany during the *Solidarność* period. In this case, de Gaulle's legacy was decisive: the acceptation of nuclear weapons as a "striking force" necessary to meet the responsibility of defence. De Gaulle, although favourable to the politics of "détente", always considered Soviet excesses to be intolerable.

The closeness of the French to the Poles was real, but partial: it would have become even less certain if communism had become less expansionist and confrontational. In 1969, at the end of his life, de Gaulle wrote in "Memories of Hope" about the Soviet system: the aim is to "step by step make the totalitarian systems loosen their grip". He did not specify, however, if this should be done by taming or civilizing them, or by confronting them. French governments, contrary to French opinion, interpreted the Gaullian formula more as an authorization to accommodate themselves to the existence of communism in the hope that it would reform itself, than as advice to combat it.

A beautiful civil utopia

The second Franco-Solidarity convergence concerned the utopia of civil society. This utopia seduced many French people for various overlapping reasons. The distrust of a portion of the left towards the etatist "common programme" (nationalization) explains the interest in self-governance. Those who wanted to change society by nationalizing production confronted an opposition that wielded the example of "real socialism", which showed that it would be better to change the method of exercising power instead. This attitude is rooted in a certain Catholic tradition and in the older idea of a non-materialistic socialism characterized by social values and not by economic organization. What in the 20s and 30s was called "moral socialism" resurfaced after the unrest of 1968 as the "second left" – or, more and more often, the "antitotalitarian left". This left could not resist what Polish and some Czech dissidents had formulated: the idea of a self-organizing society that would liberate itself from the clutches of the state. Even *Solidarność*'s thoroughgoing religious character did not deter sympathy – and this at a time when the "new philosophy" was unmasking what could be called "closed imminences" (an example of which was communism), i.e., systems that claimed to fully embody the values they arose from. Some time earlier, in fact, we saw Khomeini's "religious revolution" (which succeeded in controlling and disarming a feared police force in Iran) gain the support of Michel Foucault[2] for the fact that it referred to a spiritual dimension. This same Michel Foucault was later to actively support *Solidarność*, as well.

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[1] The Soviet SS-20 missiles, possessing nuclear warhead capabilities, were aimed at Western European cities and as a tool to frighten Western Europe in the 1970s.

[2] French philosopher and historian. Died in 1984.

The problem, it seems, is that the conditions in which *Solidarność* functioned prevented it doing anything which would bring it closer to the utopia or myth of a self-organizing society. Alain Touraine[3] and his group, which included Jan Strzelecki, demonstrated this fact: "*Solidarność* never took over the workplaces or any social sector, never made any lasting compromises which would grant it a working margin. For this reason *Solidarność* never possessed the capacity to work together, never produced an elite, never invented ways of incorporating its principles. In the face of a vacillating state – albeit one unable to reform, to limit itself, to truly negotiate – *Solidarność* had to remain a force of resistance and self-affirmation, one of spiritual and national mobilization. It did not become a social movement".

This lack of becoming an historical embodiment of ideals makes *Solidarność* an heir to that eternal Polish model, that eternal Polish fate, the fate of a nation which heroically searches for confirmation of its existence in the oppressive environment into which it was thrown by others. This time the strait-jacket was the "leading role of the Party", in principle accepted by the Gdańsk accords. This sidelined *Solidarność* from practical social affairs and thus condemned it to symbolic existence – where it was hoped her energy would wither. But this time the delimiting framework had cracked, dislocated itself in the consequence of a process in which the people's cultural and religious resistance played an essential but indirect role. It was the evident lack of contentment on the part of society that forced the system into attempts to buy itself a modicum of acceptance by taking Western loans – something which led to its bankruptcy.

Solidarność's dispelled hopes

Even if *Solidarność* undeniably represents a true success of this period of Polish history, this does not change the fact that from the point of view of the French "partner", many of the hopes placed in *Solidarność* were subsequently dispelled. I well remember coming to Poland on Tadeusz Mazowiecki's invitation in the beginning of 1979, between the election of John Paul II and his first Papal pilgrimage. I was fascinated, bedazzled even, by this Polish spring, this renaissance, the meetings of workers and intellectuals, laymen and Catholics. I brought Adam Michnik the French edition of his book on that latter topic – *The Church, the left, dialogue*[4] – which had just been translated. Yes, those were heady days, and one could hope for miracles to happen when looking upon all that was flourishing: civic Catholicism, neither conservative nor laicized, not the proprietor of the nation, but rather an inspiration for it, for a community founded on common values and possessing confidence in freedom. These hopes were embodied in people of action capable of overcoming both revisionist illusions and the sometimes narrow horizon of Catholicism; in people who knew how to hammer out compromises not with a sense of regret, but with a feeling of success, and who thereby achieved promises for the future.

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[3] See: Alain Touraine, *Solidarité*. Fayard, 1982.

[4] Adam Michnik's pivotal 1977 work *Kościół, lewica, dialog* was published in English as *The Church and the Left*.

Today I feel that if miracles really did happen in Poland, it was not those which had been anticipated. Poland didn't provide an answer to the Christian crisis in Europe, to its negative influence on politics and on nations themselves. Neither did it find, in the ideal of democratic individualism, the social response to destabilization. Maybe these hopes were unreasonable, but we may well ask ourselves why the cultural and spiritual riches of *Solidarność* ended in the simple aspiration to become Europeans like others. When in the 1960s we had the habit of speaking of the "other Europe", we were expecting it to bring something new.

Today the grand and historic legacy of *Solidarność* is unchallenged, something which President Kwaśniewski, who fought against the movement 25 years ago, can vouch for. But it is an electorally devaluated legacy, a legacy we dare not wield against the rules of the market. Should we not aver that the political failure of many of those who built *Solidarność* displays an incompleteness of the movement and is tantamount to the fact that it was more a mobilization in protest and a form of declaration than a discovery made by History? Stefan Nowak's[5] works, which speak of the chasm in Polish society between family ties and national belonging are well known. Did *Solidarność* manage to give a coherent and legally-binding status to the space between these two extremes? Do we see Polish visions of society that stand out from the two nostalgias: one representing the drab security of the Gierek period, the other treating tradition as something invariable? Is entering the market not symptomatic of the lack of a third option?

The posthumous significance of *Solidarność* is to be looked for in spheres other than Polish social life. The widespread emotion at the time of John Paul II's death depicts this. It was almost a repeat of the shockwave of 25 years ago, and was thus a reminder of its indissoluble national and religious nature. The way in which Poles identify themselves with ex-Soviet nations fighting for independence also shows the persistence of *Solidarność* in Polish memory. Today, more than during its beginnings, is *Solidarność* is seen as something specifically Polish, something linked to her history and geography. If only to examine one reference point, the television broadcast of John Paul II's funeral, we see the unevenness of emotion throughout Europe. The largest indifference was that of the Spanish, whose entrance upon the road to democracy was accompanied by opposition to the Church.

It seems that as the memory of *Solidarność* inscribed itself more strongly into Polish national and religious conscience, it distanced itself from the social movement and entered into a sort of sacral dimension, becoming of less and less interest to Western Europe. Without passing judgement, I would say that *Solidarność* and the part of Western Europe I belong to were united in fears that were dispelled and in expectations that were not realized. In these conditions, when the fervour dies down and the fears disappear, the political visions dissipate and become poorer, each in its own manner. On the one hand pseudo-realistic

[5] Stefan Nowak, professor of sociology, author of many books on the methodology of social sciences. Died in 1989.

myths return, such as the one not to anger Moscow, as do pseudo-revolutionary myths – like that of the new alternative. On the other hand, the escape into national mythology may be a reaction to what is considered Western European mediocrity.

What was always lacking in this tough and emotional relationship was the possibility to create history together, to walk the same road, through creative clashes. The direct and obvious reason was that the Poland of *Solidarność* was excluded from history; despite resisting with all of its strength, it was confined in a strait-jacket, in the very negation of historic creativity which was Sovietization. But Western Europe and the West in general did not try to liberate this trapped creativity and remained a compassionate spectator rather than an active one. One could dream that if in the years 1980-81 a spectacular aid initiative had been made, with the condition of implementing the Gdańsk accords, the malicious spell could have been broken differently than it ultimately was. Reforms could have been imposed on communism and the encounter of the two Europes made possible in a more cooperative mood than that which we later experienced. Eastern Europe would have presented itself at that encounter with many innovations, and not solely with the demand to become that other Europe, a demand which perhaps indicated a lack of self-esteem. This manner of departure from communism was perhaps impossible – and indeed, nothing of the kind was really tried.

This explains the difficulty of the encounter, the insistence – which seemed like a reproach – in the demand for European Union membership, and the undoubtedly necessary, albeit partially ideological, admission of the new members into the market. This entry did not provoke a European crisis, but instead revealed an already existing one. Europe under the cover of artificial institutionalization saw that it is limited in its essence to democratic law and free trade, which makes it vulnerable to acquisition by international globalization.

What I see as a defeat for the European Union in its current form is a contrario to the point in which a new common history could begin. Our misunderstandings reveal that we aspire to such a history and that we maladroitly try to engage in it. What was not realized in the *Solidarność* era – because of the non-reformable and totalitarian nature of communism (even when it became a totalitarianism in ruins) and because of the passivity of West European governments – remains for us to accomplish. We must give content to the historical undertaking which combines the contributions and aspirations of both sides. But in order to do this we must, on both sides, wake up to the simple and radical question: what is Europe? This is a question that is drowned in the West, where we content ourselves with a sort of mechanics, as it is in the East, where Europe is both a myth and a demand.

Therefore, what is Europe? Here, I can only try to sketch my own answer:

1. First of all, Europe is not a market;
2. Europe is the fruit of history, essentially a history of Christianity and of particular nations;

3. Europe is a "family of nations" united through an act of perpetual peace, which makes it a space open to curiosity and to the initiatives of all Europeans;
4. Because of its international experience, Europe promotes a vision of globalization based on equal relations between nations, very different from that which currently prevails – where work, contrary to the desire of John Paul II, is not only a merchandise, but also a merchandise whose value is incessantly being reduced.

In a Europe which would be not only a simple geographic term, but also a perspective on the world, a vision of the world, the ethos of *Solidarność* could constitute a valuable contribution. And *Solidarność* could therein find an opportunity for a new incarnation.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you. I would now like to ask Mr. Denis MacShane, who will tell us about the *Solidarność* experience in international politics, to take the floor.

Denis MacShane:

I first came to Gdańsk as a trade union official to address the executive committee of *Solidarność* in October or November 1980. I remember I asked my interpreter how I should begin my remarks. Maybe, *Dear comrades*? "No", she said, "that's communist language". "*Brothers and sisters*"? "No, that's the official communist trade union language", she replied firmly. "*Chers collegues*. *Dear colleagues*"? "No, that's the official front organization language". "For God's sake, I have to address them somehow!", I said. "Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the most appropriate form", was her reply.

So Ladies and Gentlemen, here I am as a trade union official. I have to say to my dear colleague, comrade Thibaud, I don't quite agree with your vision that Europe isn't a market. I think that if in 1980 there had been more commerce, ideas and trade, Poland would have been a happier place.

I'm glad to see outside in Warsaw such retailers as Carrefour, Auchan and French *mondialisation* generally making huge profits in Poland. And given that in my country all the electricity supplied to Downing Street is supplied by a French firm, the streets are cleaned by French firms, and many of the water companies are owned by French companies, I have to ask if French *mondialisation* is so bad for *le monde*, why is France so good at exporting it?

But these are points for a political debate. As perhaps the only trade unionist addressing this conference, I want to focus on the trade union organization of *Solidarność*, and to pay tribute to the men and women who really threw all their weight, money and political support behind the workers of Poland in the fall of 1980 and 1981. I think of Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO[6]; I think of Francis Blanchard

[6] AFL-CIO – American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations, American trade union federation.

of the ILO[7], who brilliantly used the ILO as a platform to support *Solidarność*, not just during its legal period of existence, when Wałęsa came to Geneva to address it, but after its suppression, as well. This was aided enormously, because the United States, in one of its fits of bad temper against a UN institution, wasn't at the time – 1980-81 – a member of the ILO, for Dr. Kissinger had pulled America out of the Organization. And that meant that the Russians and Americans didn't have to face off in the ILO. And Blanchard, a Frenchman, a great Frenchman, a great international civil servant, used the ILO brilliantly to support *Solidarność* and put the Soviet Union under international pressure.

Because *Solidarity* had a big impact all over the world, in every country the trade unions were eager to make contact and support *Solidarity*. I had the pleasure of seeing *Solidarity* representatives in the United States, in Japan, or in South Africa at trade union meetings. I'd have to say that my favourite meeting was in France, with another great French trade union leader, Jacques Chereques of the CFDT, who gave tremendous support to *Solidarity* at the time. Two Polish metalworkers from *Solidarność* came to a metal workers congress of the CFDT. The French trade unionists could not believe their eyes. They just did not believe what they were seeing – the men were workers, proletarians, trade unionists, from behind the Iron Curtain. This was like somebody then coming from the dark side of the moon. Intellectuals like Bronislaw Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki could travel a little bit. There were possibilities of contact. But no French trade union had seen workers or trade unionists from a democratic trade union behind the Iron Curtain. The Poles spoke well. Even through interpretation, they held enthralled the entire audience of 1,000 trade unionists from the metal industries in France. And at the end of the speech the representative of *Solidarność* sat down, said *Dziękujemy bardzo – We thank you very much*, and the entire hall rose as a man to applaud him. Every fist went in the air, the song of the Internationale rang out – "*Arise, the damned of the Earth…*" – French workers waved their fists in tune with the words to celebrate solidarity with *Solidarność*. The Poles looked horrified. "No, no, for God's sake, we've just escaped from Sovietism and obligatory singing of the Internationale, we want to escape from all of this international communism", they seemed to say to each other.

This is an example of the contradictions and misunderstandings between the Eastern unionists and the Western left and Western trade union movement that haven't yet been fully discussed. At one level, Poland in 1980 wanted to escape from anything that seemed socialistic or Marxist, and yet the form chosen for that moment of liberation was a trade union – the brain-child of socialism and Marxism meant to represent the working class against the oppression of the capitalist economy.

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[7] ILO (International Labour Organization) – an organization acting alongside the UN, the aim of which is the protection of workers' rights around the world. The organ of the ILO is the annual General Conference, gathering government representatives, workers' and employers' organizations from member countries. In 1984 the ILO issued a report on the violation of workers' rights in the People's Republic of Poland.

Last week I was in Washington, I live in London and I'm often in Paris. And it struck me that, to my knowledge, there isn't a single book published in the West commemorating the 25th anniversary of *Solidarity* on sale in English, French or German. I do not mean a propaganda book, an occasional booklet, but an analysis, a reflection on the part of Western trade unionists and politicians about the *Solidarność* phenomenon, the social movement that led to such profound changes in the world. Why? Is it because people are nervous about drawing certain conclusions? I think some of the conclusions Dr Brzeziński and other distinguished speakers have drawn are actually quite difficult for the present holders of power in all our countries, whether in politics, trade unions, or in the economy.

Clearly *Solidarność* was both a vindication and a rejection at the same time of the *Ostpolitik* developed by Germany's Willy Brandt and the détente politics of Kissinger. The lowering of tension implicit in détente – symbolized by Jimmy Carter giving a big kiss to Leonid Brezhnev – allowed space for Polish communist leaders on the one hand and for people like Mazowiecki and Geremek and Wałęsa on the other to shape the Gdańsk agreement of 25 years ago. But what wasn't understood was that the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians wanted more than just another 20 years of detentist politics. They wanted freedom! The classic freedom to speak, write, travel, organize, to worship, and yes, to do business as you pleased, but those freedoms cannot co-exist with communism even when tempered by friendly handshakes between Brezhnev and Carter in the 1970s – or friendly handshakes in Beijing today.

In Britain and in other countries around Europe and in North America there was this passionate excitement in trade unions about *Solidarność*. It took the form of a trade union, but it had specific Polish characteristics. It was nationalist, it was romantic, and above all it was inspired by the late Pope John Paul II. This characteristic of the trade union organization sometimes confounded its Western friends. Yet *Solidarność* defined itself as a trade union, as a free movement of workers and thus gave encouragement to democratic trade unionism all over the world.

We can see two international responses to the creation of *Solidarność*. There was the political response in Russia with the attempt to develop perestroika and glasnost under Gorbachev. And there was the development of Chinese capitalism, the material or economic response of bringing in open market economic ideas that have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. And it's interesting to see how the effort to shape a political response in Russia didn't work, but the attempt to build a material response in China so far has worked. One of the big tests of the 21st century will be to see if we finally arrive at a fusion between Marx and Mammon, between communism and capitalism. Will capitalism and market economics be able to co-exist with Chinese communist rule, which denies the need and the right to democracy as classically understood? I think the answer has to be "no", but it is one of the most important questions the 21st century will have to answer.

The other fascinating consequence of *Solidarność*, and here I would like to speak about my experience as a trade unionist, was the incredible surge of energy

sent to trade unions around the world. Neal Ascherson rightly spoke this morning of *Solidarity* being the last great moment of proletarian power. But I wrote a book about *Solidarity* published in English in early 1981 and I found it translated into different languages. *Solidarność* inspired independent trade unions to conduct strikes. In Brazil, the metalworkers' leader Lula – now the country's president – organized the workers into powerful independent trade unions that went on strike and conducted factory occupations. And it was the metalworkers of Brazil, inspired by their fellow metalworkers in Poland, who helped create the democratic space to push Brazil's ruling generals 25 years ago back into their barracks.

In the 1980s I was regularly in South Africa, because at the time the black workers were organizing independent trade unions. The South African workers were fascinated by and interested in *Solidarność* and were eager to hear about how *Solidarność* fought for freedom. At seminar after seminar in factories there, and in discussions with union leaders and their support networks of intellectuals and lawyers, they used the model of the independent organization of workers as it could be applied to South African circumstances. And in fact, it was the black workers of South Africa, not the pin-prick terrorist attacks of the South African ANC organization, that destroyed apartheid from within.

Very few people know that in South Korea in 1987, in July and August, there was a wave of sit-in strikes and occupations in Hyundai, in Daewoo, in Kia. Just like in Gdańsk and Katowice, the steel and autoworkers of Korea went on strike and occupied their factories. These strikes took away the authority that the generals had and the South Korean workers began a long and less than perfect process of moving South Korea towards democracy.

In 1982 I was in Dallas, Texas at the convention of the American autoworkers' union. The imposition of Martial Law was a top issue at the convention. The trade union delegates there raised $100,000 to be smuggled into Poland to help support the publications and other activities of the underground union. The next day I was in Fort Worth, where air traffic controllers had been on strike. The authorities in the United States who liked strikes if they took place under communism had a different reaction when workers went on strike in America. The air traffic controllers' strike was judged illegal. At Fort Worth I saw a local strike leader being taken out in chains to go to prison. The United States is a great and free country, but it was chilling to see a simple worker with chains around his wrists, arms and legs being transported to prison for defending workers' rights.

The *Solidarność* effect did not last long. Indeed, historians will date the decline of trade union membership and the weakening of trade unions as a social power block in many countries. I am not suggesting cause and effect, but the last 25 years have seen a very big decline in the membership and power of trade unions in mature industrial democracies.

When *Solidarność* was suppressed and the "state of war" was declared in December 1981, there was a TV show of statements from world leaders which was

transmitted around the world. I watched with amusement as up popped Mrs. Thatcher, who was doing everything to undermine worker's rights in Britain. Because Turkey was then under a military dictatorship, I could not believe my eyes when next there appeared a Turkish general. So while one General in Poland, Jaruzelski, was being condemned for suppressing democracy, the West invited a general in Turkey, who had also suppressed democracy, to join the condemnation of his fellow military officer in Poland.

The colonization of the trade union and social values of *Solidarność* by right-wing political forces is one of the tricks that history likes to play. For me, the late Pope's greatest encyclical was *Laborum exercens* – his powerful critique of uncontrolled market economic forces that stressed the need for social justice in today's world. It is one of the most powerful descriptions and critiques of contemporary capitalism – as well as an appeal for a socially just and morally equitable model of how the world economy should be organized. It got little publicity in Mrs Thatcher's Britain or Ronald Reagan's America. People liked the Pope as a champion in the fight against Soviet totalitarianism. The Pope, who was a champion of worker rights and social justice, wasn't allowed much space in the political worldview that was being developed in much of the West in the 1980s and 1990s.

The events of 25 years ago in Poland did terminal damage to much of the traditional 20th century European left, as Neal Ascherson correctly pointed out this morning. It fundamentally robbed the European left of the moral authority, if you like, that had descended from Marxism. It killed European communism stone dead. In 1980 you'd go to any trade union conference in Europe and there were communists there. Today British communists, French communists, German communists, Italian and Spanish communists have all but disappeared as major actors in European politics. To be sure, there still is a few communist parties and unions around, but they are incomparably weaker. Undoubtedly, the sight of Polish workers calling for trade union organization in order to repudiate communism meant that it was clear from 1980 onwards that the claim of European communism in the Soviet sense to represent workers was fatally undermined. *Solidarity* took away from the European left much of its historic sense of what it needed to do.

I myself am a member of the Labour Party, a European social-democrat, but my political family is without bearings, is without project, is without any sense of the direction in which it needs to go. In several weeks' time Poland will have elections. I don't know who will win the Presidency, but I think there will be a right-wing majority in the Sejm. Similarly in Germany I expect we will see the right-wing emerge on top even if in a coalition. That means 21 out of 25 European Union countries will be under the control of the center-right, along with Japan, America and Canada.

We may therefore argue that *Solidarność* buried the old left and old communist trade union organization in the West. Hence I think that the experiences of *Solidarność* do need to be made avail of and put into a powerful new analysis of the direction Europe needs to go.

Solidarność's revolution was defined as a self-limiting revolution. What we need today are new limits on an uncontrolled world vision that says: consume or die, get rich or die, and never flags in insisting that the values of social justice and social solidarity are passé and irrelevant. The need to revive these values in new shape is one of the key lessons of *Solidarity*.

By winning freedom for themselves, the Poles widened the horizon of our freedom. I was in Brussels three years ago when Poland was formally admitted. Tony Blair asked me to represent the United Kingdom. I thought about all the Polish pilots and soldiers who gave their lives to save Great Britain after their own country was invaded in 1939 by two armies: Russian and German. I thought about the hopes of the Poles. Poland holds up the East end of the European Union and Britain lies at its West end. But they are linked by the will to make the European Union a political and economic success, to make it a source of hope for the better for both European nations and nations from outside our continent.

Europe should thank *Solidarność* as bringing the gift of freedom to many millions and showing that when workers are united they will never be finally defeated in the eternal quest for fairness and justice in a complex, often cruel world.

***Aleksander Hall*:**

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Aleksander Smolar.

Aleksander Smolar:

THE WANING AND RETURN OF *SOLIDARNOŚĆ*

August 1980 is a date of historical importance. We all agree that this is true, although we will differently emphasize various aspects of the events: the national and insurrectionist dimension, the democratic, the social, trade unionist or religious dimensions. But since there is such widespread agreement as to August's significance, how does one explain the fact that the sovereign and democratic Poland has had problems with commemorating successive *Solidarność* anniversaries? This concerns even the participants and heroes of those events, not to mention August's adversaries. Why is our memory awakening only now, twenty five years later, and reminding us of the importance and the feelings of those events?

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When did we start forgetting? Probably as early as during Martial Law. The hopes, enthusiasm and emotions of 1980-1981 began to be remembered with mounting perplexity. A large part of society, weighted with the feeling of defeat and under the influence of official propaganda, began to view Martial Law as something inevitable and to believe in a lack of realism of yesterday's expectations. Ironically, the victims often looked for guilt within themselves, and saw the crime's perpetrator as the nation's saviour.

The reasons for *Solidarność* being pushed into oblivion can also be found in the disintegration process of the great movement. The most serious and dramatic breach was the result of the banishment of the masses from the public arena. A large part of the participants went home, into apathy, amnesia and not seldom into remorse. The departure and the feeling of powerlessness needed rationalization. The latter often turned against yesterday's hopes and idols.

Breaches also appeared in the more active milieux. Many stopped believing in the realistic and symbolic past of the NSZZ "Soldarność" trade union. Hopes of a better freedom were linked with the Church, which was to be the real representative of the Nation. In the Church itself, the attitude towards *Solidarność* and its leaders was here and there quite ambivalent, suspicious. Primate Józef Glemp, in his words and actions, was a good example of this.

Others sought to conduct their activities and life in agreement with the authorities, who seemed unconquerable. Some liberals hoped for a "Pinochetization" of Poland, a capitalist modernization enforced by the Martial Law authorities. Nationalists of the likes of Antoni Macierewicz saw the possibility of agreement with the "patriotic" army of General Jaruzelski. Others still consulted the General in the council he created.

Solidarność was reborn, albeit in a completely different shape, in the 1988 strikes, but especially in 1989, together with its re-legalization. The great *Solidarność* myth was put through a tough test. Broken was the amazing synthesis of unionist, social, religious, democratic and national aspirations. The political hopes, when any real chances of realizing them appeared, were represented not by *Solidarność*, but mainly by the intelligentsia's Citizens' Committee of Lech Wałęsa and the movement created around it. The union contributed to its demise after the elections in June 1989, but it could no longer take the political initiative – political parties and democratic state institutions were being formed. The amazing bonds created in the past between various social groups began to break. This is because they were the product of a specific situation, in which the machine, which was the People's Republic of Poland, homogenized society and made it relatively uniform, covering over the nation's internal diversification. Nowadays, due to market mechanisms and democratic politics, the sense of community is growing weaker, there is more and more diversity and loneliness, a variety of situations, views and values, attitudes and interests. Some discover proletarian status; others make use of entrepreneurial possibilities and earn their bread honestly or in a less noble manner, morally speaking. Others still, people without prospects, on the margins, people lacking work and opportunity, fall into the abyss of social non-existence. One result of these breaches, tensions and feelings of unfairness is that of the ever stronger mutual distrust and hostility. Those who chose different ways, even for noble reasons, have often been called traitors or turncoats.

It has been difficult to respect differing values, cultures, and even interests, since until very recently the group was united, had similar dreams, similar pains,

and jointly propagated the importance of solidarity. Mutual accusations contributed in society's eyes to a discrediting of the past and of the milieux that played a vital role in it. Until recently this was pursued with a vengeance.

Solidarność has endorsed successive governments. It served as an umbrella for Taduesz Mazowiecki, who carried out essential and painful reforms. It is identified with the governments of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Hanna Suchocka and with Jerzy Buzek's cabinet, which under the patronage of Marian Krzaklewski, led – so it seemed – to the final collapse of the great myth.

But in reality society has identified itself with *Solidarność* throughout the entire period after 1989, also during governments led by the Democratic Left Alliance, as the postcommunists are known. For society saw in *Solidarność*, not without good reason, the source of a new chapter of Polish history. And society appraises post-1989 Poland quite ambivalently. Even in the public opinion polls conducted just two weeks ago ("Rzeczpospolita", August 16, 2005), one is struck by the preponderance of negative opinions on *Solidarność*. Respondents see advantages in the realm of freedom and political benefits, but only costs in the social and economic areas. It is thus easy to deduce who is considered a winner and who a loser of the last quarter century. One cannot therefore be surprised that *Solidarity*'s anniversary commemorations are here and there seen as a celebration for the beneficiaries of the *Solidarność* revolution, and not of its privates, workers and other participants, without whom the peaceful revolution would not have been possible.

NSZZ "Solidarność", which in the 90s reacted to the social breach, the rise of inequality, the mounting feeling of injustice and a mass exodus of its elites into politics, began to evolve toward more conservative, national and populist standpoints. This trend was always present in the union, but was never dominant. Now it is beginning to affect the vision of the great *Solidarność* and often leads to its negative reinterpretation in the journalism of the liberal and left-wing intelligentsia. At the same time, the union and this portrayal of its tradition is being identified with more and more people who in the 80s condemned *Solidarność* to failure and searched for solutions elsewhere.

The downfall of the *Solidarność* myth happened with the contribution of elites of various party stripes and professions who saw in the trade union a threat to Polish modernity. Numerous politicians, ideologues and journalists stated more or less overtly that not only a strong union, but also democracy itself does not comply with the needed reforms. Social activism, historically linked to *Solidarność*, was seen a threat to state stability and the exigent civilizational changes. This thought was stated the most directly and openly as early as in 1989 by Stefan Kisielewski: "...liberals and socialists will not manage the task. What is needed is an anti-socialist dictator. Parliamentary politicians are too much dependent on public opinion, which is Sovietized, and unused to any form of bottom-up economic initiative"[8].

[8] "Gazeta Wyborcza", October 12, 1989.

The downfall of *Solidarność* and the post-*Solidarność* bloc in public opinion led to a situation in which only a few months prior to the autumn 2005 elections (Mirosława Grabowska noticed this) right-wing parties arising from the *Solidarność* tradition, although conservative in their programmes, sought legitimization in projects of radical change, often reminiscent of revolution, or in the historical past (the Warsaw Uprising, the epopee of the Home Army) – not in the tradition and successes of the *Solidarność* era or even in the successes of *Solidarność* governments. The situation changed only during the preparations for the 25th anniversary of *Solidarność* celebrations, and consequently the atmosphere around the union's heritage changed as well. Both main right-wing parties (and even the Democratic Left Alliance, which reminds us of the 21 Postulates!) begin to wave *Solidarność* flags and refer to its heritage. Some emphasized the social aspect of the unions, others mainly the aspect of freedom.

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When and why did the return of *Solidarność* occur? The sources of the current celebration can be found in the years 1989-2000. We were then faced with a twofold commemoration: ten years after the 1989 breakthrough and 20 years after August 1980. Neither celebration evoked strong reactions in Poland. The unstable framework for living conditions and the high costs of change were sources of fear, unhappiness, and a certain nostalgia for the *ancien regime*. A quick return to power by the former communists relativized the importance of the accomplishment of 1989.

Despite a visible indifference, a certain shock was felt in Poland in relation to the way of celebrating these anniversaries in the West. 1989 was almost entirely identified with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Other important events, including the *Solidarność* revolution and our Round Table talks, were kept out of the spotlight. A symbol of this may be the information presented in the "International Herald Tribune", the journal of the world's elite: a bare sentence underneath a photo of baroness Thatcher stating that she had been granted honorary citizenship of Gdańsk in relation to the anniversary of the 1980 strikes.

The public debate pointed to both internal and external reasons of this forgetfulness. Foreigners were accused of ingratitude, even of bad will, as present in the oblivious attitude of the world. For instance, Marian Krzaklewski spoke at a trade fair in Germany that this expressed the West's sense of guilt for Yalta. But grievances were often directed at oneself – we destroyed the *Solidarność* myth ourselves, we are unable to commemorate this huge achievement, or display our care for national heritage. It was forgotten that in Western perception, Germany was the main arena of confrontation with the USSR during the Cold War. Thus the fall of the Berlin Wall – apart from the power of the image – was the symbol of the end of the Cold War and the divided world. Whilst remembering internal conflicts, various reasons were omitted, some of which we only touched upon slightly, and which caused *Solidarność* to be blamed and marginalized in social consciousness.

However, the competition between August 1980 and the Berlin Wall for a place in the history of freedom possessed another, bilateral dimension, one represented by the fear felt by some Poles in relations with Germans. For a few years now, there has been a growing feeling in Poland that within the Federal Republic of German there is a dangerous reinterpretation of the past underway. Germany's current attention on the tragic fate of its own people seems to push aside the problem of Germany's responsibility as a nation for the barbarianism that flooded Europe. There are growing concerns that the Germans are trying to occupy a place, alongside the Jews, as the main victims of World War II. Moreover, together with the disclosure of the Jedwabne massacre[9], there appeared the fear that the "historical politics" of our Western neighbour will, consciously or not, push Poles into the position of "perpetrator", the victims of whom included both Jews and Germans. This is why we saw the nervous reactions and the mobilization of governmental offices, the press and public opinion in relation to the use in some parts of the world of the term "Polish death camps", when in reality it concerns German camps located on the territory of occupied Poland. A relevant dimension of the Polish fears is linked to the possible repossession by Germans of the property left by them on the current territory of the Republic of Poland.

Commemorations of great historical events – especially the anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising and August 1980 – cannot of course be reduced to a simple "battle for remembrance", an effort to counteract the "aggression" of German remembrance, but neither can this aspect be omitted. The same applies to the fears aroused by efforts to interpret the history of World War II, in which the achievements of the Red Army are glorified, and the role of the Polish forces is omitted – with silence covering the Soviet massacres committed on Poles.

Polish remembrance, the feeling of being under threat, and struggling for Poland's rightful place in contemporary history – thus has a fight begun with both traditional enemies on two of the most important fields of symbolic struggle: for the status of the victims of the murders committed by Poland's neighbours, and for a place among the greatest winners and heroes in the fight for freedom.

* * *

The popularity gained by "historical politics" is nonetheless of primarily internal sources. One of the most basic mistakes after 1989 – as the argument of radical, right-wing critics goes – was to abandon Polish identity, patriotism, and the problem of Polish remembrance. The fascination with modernity, democracy and the market was accompanied – they claim – by a naive faith in the spontaneity of the mechanisms of development, in the automatism of social and national integration. The important duty of the elites was left aside, i.e., the patriotic and historical education crucial in forming a modern nation and state. It is true that in the

[9] Wherein some Poles were complicit in the Nazis' mass murder of Jews from Jedwabne and its surrounding vicinity.

atmosphere of the optimism and large reforms of the 1990s, more people looked into the future, concentrating their attention on the great challenges that stood before Poland. But is there anything unusual in this? In every society there exists – as Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote – a "party of hope" and a "party of memory". The "party of memory" was the dominant one then. The ambiguity so strongly emphasized today arose from the fact that this choice was identified with by the "party of non-memory", those who wished to forget about the times of the People's Republic of Poland. The present moral revolt was brought about by the combination of a lack of hope on the part of much of society and the governing practice of the "party of non-memory", which was rife with vainglory, arrogance and corruption.

The August anniversary played a crucial role in the fight for the interpretation of Poland's most recent history. For years, there were debates about the real beginning of the regained freedom. In the newly formed mythology of national rebirth, the Round Table seemed to occupy a privileged place. The peacefulness, the capability of reconciling enemy forces – these aspects were inspiring, were an example for other nations to follow. But the myth of those negotiations was constantly being questioned by a large party of the political right, because it was seen as a legitimization of the privileged place of the postcommunist left in the new regime. The last few years, with the disintegration and embarrassment of the Democratic Left Alliance, have retrospectively cast a serious shadow on the Round Table. The language of the radicals gained a strong, psychological validity. In the event, it greatly undermined the mythical status of the spring 1989 negotiations in the national history of freedom.

For now, the fight for the "most important date" has been solved. The 25th anniversary commemorations of *Solidarność* are an act that lay the cornerstone into the foundations of an independent and democratic Poland. And it is a date which can be accepted by both the supporters of the III Republic of Poland and the ideologues of the IV Republic, by anti-communists and former communists, who already long ago had admitted the greatness and importance of the events of 1980. But in contrast to the Round Table and despite the participation of hundreds of thousands of Polish United Workers' Party members in the great movement, they could not in any way aspire to be treated as the co-authors of August 1980.

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Solidarność has returned because Poles are tired, have a feeling of moral crisis and are ready to choose the "party of memory". They counter the threats of the modern world by answering the question of their own identity, of who we are, what we are like and what is our place among the nations of the world. August has returned because it seems an exceptional event, because it is associated with victory, because it cannot be tainted by memories concerning its sources nor of its' consequences. But one can, and this is done repeatedly, reinterpret the essence of August 1980 and take away commemorative medals from some, and retrospectively

create other heroes. This is because *Solidarność* can already be placed on a shelf next to other national souvenirs. It doesn't hurt, it doesn't create any threat, there is no need to fear the longing and hope in which, after 1989, people saw the potential of rebellion and collectivism. *Solidarność* – the real, historical *Solidarność* – has finally placed itself in the realm of great and harmless national myths. Now one can pay it due homage and display national pride.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. I now wish to ask Paweł Śpiewak to take the floor.

***Paweł Śpiewak*:**

I know of at least one powerful example of the fulfillment of the hopes cherished by *Solidarity*. It is my son's school – the first non-public school in Poland. It belongs neither to the state nor to any profit-making private enterprise. It was organized by parents, most of whom were members of *Solidarność* and participated in *Solidarność*'s underground activity during Martial Law. It breaks the state monopoly on education. The school was set up by a community that decided on a certain education plan, the curriculum, the type of teachers to search for. This was and is a type of bottom-up social initiative, one that created a school in which teachers do not treat pupils like objects. They don't force them to do things, they negotiate. Pupils aren't treated like children but as adults, who are asked, not ordered. In the curriculum, one is shocked by the great attention paid to subjects such as philosophy, civil education, as well as by the stress on skills that help develop abstract thinking, language culture and the ability to express one's thoughts. The school boasts its own parliament, composed of teachers, parents and pupils. There exists a court system, before which anyone with a say in school affairs can stand or be made to stand. The school has its own media: a newspaper, a website and a radio station. Its principal aim is not only to prepare for higher education, but also to teach something that one may call a civic spirit. The school gives students, parents and teachers a very strong sense of identity. Because of its exceptional nature, it creates the impression of elitism. Perhaps the pupils get away with quite a lot, and maybe sometimes they are given too much freedom, but they are treated like responsible and serious people, almost like adults.

I have come across many such schools, and each time I had a strong feeling that this is the true manner in which to implement the *Solidarność* ethos, putting it into practice and embodying it in institutions. These schools are places where the young are presented with the real experience of *Solidarność*. This of course is but one way of pursuing *Solidarność* ideals.

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The question about *Solidarity*'s legacy is first and foremost a question about the movement's mission. I am convinced that it can be treated in neither anticommunist nor anti-totalitarian terms. It is impossible to define it using the division found in

Polish political language of left- and right-wing. We may call it the last national uprising. Or, as Lech Wałęsa currently wishes, the beginning of a new wave of globalization. *Solidarność* was puzzlingly free of any "isms". We know very well that when a political programme consists of "isms" (liberalism, socialism, nationalism), it ceases to be something authentic, and turns into just that – a "programme". *Solidarność* not only rejected all "isms", it simply took no note of them, transcended them, and put aside all barren ideological discussions. If any "ism" were to be found, it would have something to do with anticommunism, although most of the *Solidarność* activists clung to a socialist economic utopia. Their imagination was restrained not only by the movement's strong egalitarian bent, but also by the lack of careful analysis of the free-market economy. The fact that *Solidarność* never looked beyond the socialist economic horizon was not only due to the constraints imposed by the socialist authorities, but also because its political imagination didn't reach that far forward. Those who wrote, perhaps with some exaggeration, that the main message behind *Solidarność* was egalitarian, not individualist; social, not free-market, were most probably right. An equal share of power and goods – this was the aim that animated underground activists. The gates of the striking factories were covered with posters of the Virgin Mary and beside them slogans such as "Socialism – yes, distortions – no!". What is certain is that almost everyone wanted independence. And an end to one-party rule, the lies, violence, censorship and closed borders. But did they really want a change of the political system?

Solidarność was, or turned out to be, I am inclined to say, primarily an ethical project that indeed does seem to be describable in the language of papal homilies or Solzhenitsyn's catechisms, beginning with the most important of all commandments: do not lie, do not denounce anyone to the authorities, and do not cooperate with the totalitarian rule. It was a civilian ethical project consisting of 3 principal values: equality of expression, dignity and justice. Reading and watching *Solidarność* in its different forms of activity astounds almost every observer and participant to the movement: the importance attributed to words, discussion, negotiations, the care taken to abide by democratic rules. In the autumn of 1980 and spring of 1981 especially, as well as during the 1st *Solidarność* Congress, Poland turned into a deliberating and debating body. Everything was discussed. There were no top-down constraints and taboos stating what could and could not be said, discussed. The limits were set only by our imagination and by the immediate needs of the situation. We discussed how to better organize factory production, ensure the protection of social rights, change the university system, curb poisonous emissions, lead strikes for the release of detained colleagues, shorten the queues, publish better newspapers. Every community had begun its own debates: from policemen to shipyard workers, from professors to coalminers, from party members to ardent opponents of communism. The hot summer and autumn of 1980 produced postulates composed of many points. People linked most of their expectations in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres to the

existence of *Solidarność* cells. Almost symbolically, *Solidarność* created hopes for a better and more dignified life – "we were given it so that the realm of self-fulfillment can be open to us", as the sociologist Ireneusz Kamiński rightly said. Not only the people spoke out. So did building walls covered with posters and graffiti; factory walls scattered with portraits of the Pope and the Virgin Mary. One can say that suddenly a variegated communicating community had sprung to life on an unprecedented scale. This community was concerned not only with fighting for its rights, but also with ensuring that everyone was assured the liberty of expressing themselves, something known in ancient Athens as *isegory*.

By creating this independent space for group communication, the state media monopoly was broken, as was social isolation and atomization. For political communication to function, the barrier of fear and distrust also needed to be broken. This stemmed from the dearth of social ties and the lack of established, solid communication patterns between different groups, social strata and regional communities. The effects of the process of social atomization, lasting dozens of years, were being felt. Between the strong national identity and the family-friend groups there stretched a vast, cold emptiness of distrust and animosity. This new space was to be filled by the independent, self-governing trade unions, and by all the other organizations reinstated or created under the protective umbrella of the *Solidarność* movement. The newly secured freedoms were used to build what was later called a civil society.

At the very basis of ethical and political communication lay the word 'dignity'. The program resolution states that *Solidarność* represents "the heritage of independent activities of the workers, intellectuals and youth and of Church efforts to uphold moral values of the struggle for human dignity in our country". Examples of violations of human dignity were the long hours spent in queues to buy everyday items such as cheese or shoes, low wages and the all-powerful political *nomenklatura*, or communist-party crony-system. The lies of communist propaganda, the censorship and absurd bans concerning the organization of the health service also constituted such violations. Dignity is non-negotiable. It cannot be curtailed or circumscribed to a single aspect of life. Such a declaration amounted to a significant commitment. "In this aspect, which preceded the political and intellectual one, the aim was to inform oneself and others about the presence of truth, goodness, faith and hope in human existence". This message concerned not only what was shared by the movement's participants, but also the ethical grounds of existence which we shared even with our enemies. It called for a dialogic stance, free from acrimony and hate. This dignity not only manifested the quality of our existence, but also created the conditions for the existence of dialogue and of the communicating community itself. It stood above the "billows of fear, distrust, disorientation and callousness", as the Lódź region *Solidarność* bulletin informed us. This was the ethical communication stance. It defined the "we" of the movement, an open "we", in which everyone could participate, regardless of his or her political views. Democracy in this understanding is a state in

which the dignity of every single one of us is guaranteed and where we have the right to manifest it. The principle of justice is its necessary complement, treating all people as having equal rights.

In the Polish *Solidarność* context, this right to dignity was justified because it was a realization of the objective hierarchy of values. It cannot be upheld without the assumption that God exists. This assumption was not a practical one in the movement. Nor was it a theoretical postulate. It was something experienced very strongly. All the more so after the first visit to Poland by the Polish Pope. Religion was not only in the centre of our experience, but also, like in American democracy, its warp and woof, the very condition of upholding democracy. As instructed by Alexis de Tocqueville well over a century and a half ago and implemented in Poland, religion not only teaches respect for that which is immortal in us, worshiped and protected, but also puts limits on all earthly power. "The godless maxim (atheism), which in the age of freedom was most probably created to validate the doing of all future tyrants. If the law grants the American society omnipotence, religion throws a dam against the free flow of ideas, it forbids you going with anything you wish." The situation was similar in Poland. I am convinced that religion, with its fundamental ideal of dignity and human rights, was looked upon and, moreover, experienced as the basis of ethical and political order, its refuge and its protector against the arbitrariness and manipulation of propaganda and ideology.

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No one in his right mind questions the scale of changes that Central and Eastern Europe underwent after 1989. We make good use of the freedom to travel, freedom of speech, of the free use of goods. Poland is going through a fantastic educational revolution, free and pluralistic elections take place. The basic rights of man and of the citizen are protected not only in theory, but also in practice. We are becoming part of Europe, of the West. Our country has gained full independence. Foreign troops are not present on our territory. One can say that *Solidarność*'s primary political aims have been achieved. But our problems cannot be reduced to the more or less objective indexes defining the quality of life in Poland after 1989. Our past aims have also been accomplished by countries which did not witness a mass anticommunist movement: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In these states, they were accomplished not because of a *Solidarność* experience of their own, but because the world's balance of power changed, because communism imploded.

I am inclined to search for the specificity of the *Solidarność* experience in this ethical message behind the movement, which combines the idea of equality of speech, dignity and justice. I would even say that, in a way, *Solidarność* remains within us not only as the lost or past homeland, but also as our promised one. Of course, in normal times it is hard to retain that same set of expectations and emotional tension. But the *Solidarność* experience and the memory of both the

"time of carnival" and Martial Law leaves us with two social hungers: firstly, the hunger to participate, which translates the ideal of civil society not simply into a procedural vision of democracy. The second is the hunger for a clear moral community representing two central values: dignity and justice. Ever since August 1980 *Solidarność* has not been recognized by the shape of its logo or by the names of its leaders (how many have come and gone), but by the ethical principles that the union awakened. I would locate the problem of *Solidarity* not in the language of simple political divisions, but in the pre-political sphere, in the realm of something called, for want of a better name, political theology. It should concern the values which contribute to the establishment of a new order; it should grant the freedoms rooted in our common fate and historical existence…

I have read dozens of statements by *Solidarność*'s ex-activists. In most cases, they do not speak of their triumph, of the happiness stemming from a job well done nor of their gratitude towards thousands of similar activists. In their statements, one is shocked by the screaming feeling of failure, disappointment and discouragement. I treat these accounts as being incredibly important, for they are given by the people that built *Solidarność*, who have the right to consider themselves depositaries of *Solidarity*'s values. In all of their statements they repeat the following: a low degree, or total lack of identification with the III Republic of Poland, which is a reason for the very low election turnout, among the world's lowest; the small degree of social organization, the frailty of civil society, the increase, and not decline, of mutual distrust. Also, they often speak of a great distrust of national institutions and of the rise in an attitude I would call social individualism. Last but not least, there is disproportionate social stratification and enormous unemployment, the highest in Europe. This very critical attitude can be seen both among politicians with links to the communist party and those of the post-*Solidarność* factions.

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From these statements arises the clear point of view that what we have achieved as a result of the *Solidarność* victory, after fifteen years, is a soft, weak, and at the same time overly-bureaucratized country, full of corruption and partisanship – factors which mutually enforce themselves. And this is an essential problem in Poland. Looking at Poland in this manner, one would have to state that the transformation was a defeat not in the economic aspect, not in the independence aspect, but in the aspect of ruling mechanisms.

What is the cause of this? The problem is an ethical one. As many *Solidarność* activists claim, a major reason is the fact of not reviewing the past – forgetting the many vile behaviours of the people of the previous system and, what is worse, the fact that many political and intellectual milieux consider that vetting and decommunization is a kind of witch hunt, efforts to stir up hate and libelous slander. This is what allowed the postcommunists to evade responsibility for the People's Republic of Poland and its totalitarian crimes. This lack of checking the

past has led to a situation where the model of ruling is still similar to that of the People's Republic, in which postcommunist elites occupy key positions in the political system not only as a party, but also as a political and economic power. The mechanism of buying or corrupting the political authorities has become one of the most essential political and, I emphasize, ethical problems. All the more so because not only people from the postcommunist camp are part of it, but also those from the post-*Solidarność* camp. Which means that former *Solidarność* activists act just like postcommunists; they yearn for political and economic power just the same. Sometimes people from *Solidarność* say that this is a way of building their own economic power, the group's power. But the mechanism is the same – corruption and demoralization. If this mechanism of ruling is starting to be a fundamental problem, then of course from the citizens' perspective, from the perspective of millions of citizens, it turns out that this is not only one of the ways, but simply the only way to fight for influence. From the citizens' perspective it turns out that the balance of power and the fight for power isn't much different than that from before 1989. Or, to frame it another way, though the expression may sound dramatic, the division into "us and them" is beginning to rebuild itself.

Of course there is another problem, namely that the transformation was started by post-*Solidarność* governments. In this situation the postcommunist party stands in the defence of the people who were on the losing side of the transformation process. It defends people who were pushed aside, who are going through economic difficulties or who are unemployed. That is why I think that the ethical problem is important, and the hunger for values is being felt as one of the most important factors.

I have often wondered why governments become delegitimized so quickly, why such parties as the *Solidarność* Electoral Campaign and the Freedom Union lost so badly three years ago, and why the Democratic Left Alliance will lose so badly now. I think the reason is an ethical one. Political elites are blamed for being cynical, corrupted, rotten. And I emphasize this, citizens are moving away from power, do not want to take part in politics, they treat it as a sphere of vile behaviour, vulgar language, base motivations. This means that, firstly, the political system is becoming alienated. Secondly, and what is much worse, it loses much of its legitimacy, because the right to govern comes not only from the voters, but also from certain values. If this is so, then the ethical problem is reminded by *Solidarity*. The stake here is not only whether the left or the right, or anyone else for that matter, will come to power. The stake is not even the direction the changes will take, the level of economic development, but, I would say, the stake is political involvement itself. If these values become questioned by society, if it feels offended in its sense of justice by both sides – by the post-*Solidarność* side and the side of the ruling Democratic Left Alliance – then at this point the very ideal of democracy will become the anti-hero of the Polish transformation process.

Many people in the world think that the greatest threat to democracy is fundamentalism and point to Al-Qaeda, of course. I'm of a different opinion; I think

that the greatest enemy in Poland and generally to democratic processes is simply cynicism and the instrumental treatment of values. *Solidarity*'s values can now be used, because we are in a real need of the ethical standards to which right-wing parties refer to when they talk of an ethical revolution, of the need to demolish *nomenklatura* pacts, of the strengthening of the judicial system. I will not go into whether this is instrumental, if this is simply a game. What is relevant is that they touch upon a real moral problem that falls into the motto "from *Solidarność* to freedom", but should also be accompanied by another motto, albeit not less important: "from freedom to *Solidarność*" – representing the rebuilding of ties and work for the common good.

Thus the Polish problem, if one considers *Solidarność* as being an ethical project, is the need to return to ethical rules in which the problem of justice is a principal aspect.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. It is high time we start the discussion, for many of you wish to take part. The statement time is around three minutes and I would like to ask you not to exceed this limit.

The first on the list is Mr. Miklos Haraszti, the Hungarian writer and journalist, human rights defender and the OSCE's representative on Freedom of the Media. The floor is yours.

Miklos Haraszti:

There have been too few words told about the most important legacies of *Solidarność*, namely freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Both in its emergence, in its aftermath, and in its afterlife *Solidarity* was enormously important both in my country and, I believe, in the wider realms to the east of Poland today.

I remember in May of '80 I stayed with Jan Lityński. I arrived in Warsaw only to be envious of the NOWA publications edited by Adam Michnik. Yet he and Jacek Kuroń were very disappointed that nothing was happening in Poland! But in two month's time there was *Solidarność*. I was still living with Jan Lityński, and I saw piles of the "Robotnik" paper in his apartment, and I was amazed how that can happen. I was very jealous about the printed version of samizdat because in Hungary at that time we had only typed samizdat. Even so, Hungary was the second strongest samizdat country. We have never hidden the fact that we were pupils of the Poles in that domain.

The so-called failure of *Solidarity* and what happened after Martial Law was introduced, that was a moment for most Hungarians, including both society and the ruling establishment, when we believed that nothing had happened. Our communist authorities sought to prove that during the 500 days of *Solidarność* the Poles hadn't learned the lesson that the Hungarians learned back in '56.

But the samizdat people, the pupils of KOR and of *Solidarność*, took it as an inspiration because we saw the sociological fact that in any single city of Poland

there was more samizdat than in the whole of Hungary, even after the introduction of Martial Law. And that was the reason why Hungary came in second in the negotiated settlement putting an end to communism and in its own version of the Polish Round Table.

I am today working in one of the successor organizations of the Helsinki spirit. In fact, I'm working today in a situation frighteningly similar to that of late communist or authoritarian rule, if you wish – Poland and Hungary in the 80s. I see today's samizdat in Belarus as being in the same situation sociologically, legally, politically, and psychologically. And I see nominal democracies totally monopolized by TV. I see pluralism of the press exiled into the print press. I see an infant Internet that is increasingly replacing the print press in its role as the main provider of pluralism, just like the samizdat used to be.

The reason I asked for the right to speak here is to urge you all, both Poles and non-Poles, as friends of *Solidarity*, to maintain this very important legacy of *Solidarity* and help us make societies understand that there can be no freedom and no democracy without a line of independent communication, without free speech in society. Please help us and help those societies, particularly in fostering their institutions of civil society. That would be a fitting legacy for *Solidarność*.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. I would now like to ask Professor Tadeusz Kowalik, historian of economic thought, to take the floor.

Tadeusz Kowalik:

It is time we refer to the title of the conference. It can be approached in two ways. Firstly "From *Solidarność* to freedom" can be understood as the birth of a child that made its mother lose her life. But the difference between this analogy and reality is such that in social choices other solutions are possible. In fact, there is the question of whether this very child had to be born at all and whether this is the reason for the defeat of this way of thinking, the defeat of *Solidarność* and its heir the political party Freedom Union.

It seems that the question of unemployment is a completely marginal issue for politics, or perhaps politicians have simply got used to the catastrophically high rate of unemployment. Now for a few facts. The first fact: it is not true, as Ms Bochniarz said, that Poland has a 20 percent unemployment rate. There is a CBOS public opinion office study from last year which shows that each third Polish family is touched by unemployment, and one of the directors of the Central Statistical Office said that at least a third of all people looking for a job are not registered and will not register. They will not register because many of the unemployed do not have the right to a benefit. According to official data, only 13% of the unemployed have the right to benefits, the rest can only benefit from social help. This happens when there is a rapid increase of national income.

Another Polish record is that workers are time and time again not being paid their salaries, which has become a typical pathology of the system. Another record achieved in Poland, which 25 years ago was home to a mass movement of 10 million *Solidarność* members, is that in the private sector, which produces some 76% of the national income, trade unions practically do not exist. Spoilt private corporations, which in the West would never have been able to ban trade unions, here, officially and openly, do not allow unions to be created. If we take into account this fact, then it is clear why the parties that led to this were duly punished in their electoral defeats.

This conference was also organized as a preparation for the elections, to be held in two months. Thus, I take it as no coincidence that no one from the left is sitting behind the presidium table.

I would also like to remind everyone of the person of Jacek Kuroń, who often explained why the defeat of *Solidarność* occurred. Firstly, in the 1994 brochure *A Republic for Everyone*, he wrote that the participation of trade unionists in the administration and government destroyed the *Solidarność* movement. During the introduction of important state social reforms, especially the economic reforms, *Solidarność* did not take care of those who were pushed aside by the free market. Because of this, frustrated citizens threw themselves into the arms of the left, all the more eagerly when the costs of toppling communism became more and more visible.

To finish I would like to say, as an expert of the Inter-factory Strike Committee in the Gdańsk Shipyard in August 1980, that yesterday one of the striking workers came up to me and said: "it was me who let you in the shipyard; today, I don't know if it was worth it". But he then added; "maybe it was a good thing that you taught us how to negotiate, otherwise we would probably have ended it all with a quarrel and broken off the talks".

Aleksander Hall:

The next person to speak will be Mr. Zharmakhan Tuyakbai from Kazakhstan, candidate of the united opposition Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan for the office of president in the upcoming elections, which will take place in December. The floor is yours.

Zharmakhan Tuyakbai [translation from Russian]:

I must say that today's conference once again convinced us that the ideals of democracy, freedom and independence, combined with hard work, can turn out to be a success. I hope that the achievements of the free Poland during this long period of the fight for democracy and freedom will take place in the independent countries of the post-Soviet region. I would like to concentrate on the situation which exists there.

After the fall of the Soviet empire, independent states were created, which, on the wave of democratic change, also introduced certain changes at home. But the people who took power there during the first few years had earlier been regional

communist leaders. Under different alleged reasons they usurped their right to power, changed the constitution and are leading their countries towards totalitarian rule. Currently it is hard to speak of freedom of speech in these countries, of upholding fundamental rights and civic freedoms. The processes taking place in these countries are almost all the same. And this is not a surprise – the legacy inherited by these countries comes from one and same source: the Soviet Union. The same mentality and historical experiences remain for the whole region.

But right now something else is most important for us. Western democratic nations approach our issues with a double standard. They do not understand the specificity of the individual nations, whereas the processes which took place in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan were caused by the same factors: the corruption and lawlessness of the authorities. But the yearning for democracy is the same all across our region! That is why we ask other countries for help, for we know that they want democratic processes to continue taking place in the post-Soviet region, just like they so notably did in Ukraine, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan.

The tragic end of events in Uzbekistan[10] was a link in the same chain. A lot depends on the attitude of the old democracies and their opposition to the repressions employed by the leaders of authoritarian states. How much will be allowed to happen as a result of indifference, like it did in Uzbekistan? The civilized world did not react to those events like it should have! That is why if we don't want this to happen again, if we want democratic values, freedom and human rights to be respected in the same way everywhere, we must demand that Western states and their leaders not apply double standards, that economic interests not dominate over the respect for democratic principles, freedom and human rights. The most important thing for us is to get back on the path of democratic change.

Today we have a strong democratic opposition that will soon take part in elections. We know that these elections will not be fair, that they will be rigged, and that threats and blackmail will be used. We would like you to take part in these elections as observers, to ensure a fair as possible course of events. This may help the forces which value freedom and democracy to prevail.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Mr. Eric Chenowetz from the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) in the United States.

Eric Chenowetz:

I would like to speak some about the international legacy of *Solidarity*, because I think it's been a little bit lost. I also wish to amplify on brother Macshane's earlier comments.

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[10] On May 13, 2005, during riots and demonstrations in the Uzbek city of Andijan, the army opened fire on the crowds. According to official data, almost 200 people were killed; unofficial sources cite some 700 dead.

The first point I want to make is that *Solidarity* successfully restored the human rights framework to international law. I think that it went beyond Helsinki. Especially important in this regard was the UN Commission on Human Rights. Before it was simply a Cold War battleground with the Soviet Union, and there was no accountability for any communist state over any human rights violations. Poland set the precedent, and it was Solidarity, through its human rights representatives, which insisted that after Martial Law the Polish People's Republic be brought to account. It did not stop, and the effort was relentless and involved a lot of people. I recall that we worked with Jery Laber a great deal to try to do that, on the international arena as well.

That precedent established, for example, that Cuba could not get away with its human right violations without being brought to account in the UN Human Rights Commission. This is work that is not complete, for China certainly gets away with, literally, murder. But it was *Solidarity* that restored the principle of universalism to the UN Human Rights Commission. Second is the International Labour Organization and its conventions.

Solidarity restored meaning and purpose to the UN convention number 87 on freedom of association and to ILO convention number 98 on collective bargaining. Cuban workers look to the ILO convention, Chinese workers look to the ILO conventions today. Poland is the only country where a democratic revolution took place on the basis of ILO conventions. This represents a living heritage and it shouldn't be forgotten.

The third legacy I want to mention is that of the international trade union *Solidarity*, as here it speaks again to the importance of *Solidarność* as a trade union. I thank brother Macshane for mentioning the AFL-CIO which led the international effort, including in the dark days, when there were not many followers, to help keep *Solidarity* alive. There are three people who are not with us anymore, and I would like to mention them. One is Lane Kirkland, and I think it bears mentioning that not only did he make sure that there was support for *Solidarity*, he was the rock that made sure the Reagan administration took action on Poland. If it were not for Lane Kirkland, there would not have been any strong action by the Reagan administration. Two others who were involved were Erwin Brown, who started his work helping restore free trade to Western Europe and ensuring democracy to Western Europe after the War, and ended his career trying to help workers in the Eastern Bloc to rise up. The third person is Lane Kirkland's foreign policy assistant, Tom Kahn, who was director of the Polish Worker's Aid Fund.

I view the idea that *Solidarity* was not a trade union because it had too many members as simply absurd. Such a misconception cannot provide basis for any analysis of *Solidarity*'s legacy at all. For it was only as a trade union that *Solidarity* could have an institutional form. Hence, to neglect and forget that legacy means a poor understanding of *Solidarity*.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. I would like to ask Jacek Kurczewski, Professor of Sociology, former Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, to take the floor.

Jacek Kurczewski:

I have just two comments concerning our ongoing dispute, on *Solidarność*, its essence and heritage. Aleksander Smolar, surprised by the sudden rise of interest in *Solidarność*, tried to explain this phenomenon. It might be worth putting forward an interpretation different than his. As we all know, every society needs a founding myth. Such a founding myth for the III Republic of Poland was the Round Table, which in a way replaced another tradition, other reasons. We all know very well, so I won't go into the details, how quickly this myth began to be criticized and that practically the whole political crisis in Poland is an explanation of this. There is one quite obvious matter. Namely that in 1989 the other side of the Round Table could not take the place of *Solidarność*, its tradition. Today we are witnessing a situation where the constitutional power, might I say, of the Round Table is gone; almost no one wants to admit it. Nobody is willing to be the author of what once was considered a success. When this power ran out, we began looking for another myth, a more dignified myth – and we've chosen the myth of *Solidarność*. This myth is so strong and so necessary that the people who were then on the other side are admitting to their faults. The heirs of the Polish United Workers Party, the adversary of *Solidarność*, are writing the Gdańsk postulates into their party programme. Is this a coincidence? No, there is simply no other justification for the III Republic, and in the name of this myth there is even struggle to created a IV Republic.

The fierceness of the dispute we are observing, about who is to organize the anniversary celebrations and who shouldn't, who is the real union, who created it, what the truth is, all of this shows how much the issue has become a political one. We are witnessing the fight to take control of the founding myth, the last one which can be politically backed by Polish society.

The second remark refers to what Professor Śpiewak said about the *Solidarność* legacy. There appeared some beautiful words – justice, independence and the like. Well and good, it is important that the ethical aspect also has a social perspective. But it is very sad to remind a professional colleague that justice also means social justice. After years of communism we remain afraid of this term. I am scared of it myself – I say this with some fear, feeling that this is a taboo. But the fight for social justice was also essential to *Solidarność*, and we cannot forget this because if we need *Solidarność* as a founding myth, then solidarity in this aspect will leave us with a feeling of remorse. When in 1988 I asked Poles if they have too little freedom, most said that yes, they did. I asked whether they had too little equality, a majority also answered yes. It is not that we traded equality for freedom; neither existed under communism.

When I asked the same a few years later, already a majority said that they have enough freedom; some said that they even have too much. But the need for equality

was still unfulfilled. But then it was finally being said that freedom is more important than equality.

When I asked the same questions a year ago, a majority said that equality is more important than freedom. This is a very dangerous moment. I am only stating a fact. I don't know what the solution is, but let's remember that the lesson of *Solidarność* cannot be a lesson showing that instead of social justice people will get political freedom, economic freedom. The lesson of *Solidarność* understood in this way may, unfortunately, lead to failure, if we forget for example what Madelaine Albright said today, that there are ethical needs, needs for the social structure to become fairer. This *Solidarność* message is valid and will remain valid for a few good years to come.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. The next person to speak will be Mr. Andrzej Wajda.

Andrzej Wajda:

Allow me to say a few words about an issue which seems to me a little marginalized here. We speak about the heritage, about legacy, but to have heritage and legacy, one has to gather something first, in order to then be able to lose it. Yet all I'm hearing here is that everything is lost. So I wish to say that in the process of gathering and preserving heritage, a large role is played by artists.

It turns out that we are witnessing a strange kind of phenomenon. Namely, artists, who during the People's Republic of Poland weren't that bad off, joined the adversaries of the system. That they weren't bad off, I know from a very good source – my file in the Institute of National Remembrance. I looked into it and saw that they called me a luminary. Should I bear a grudge that some critic called me that; that in some magazine, in some review, somebody called me that and so the communist secret police was calling me a luminary?

How was it that great artists, such as Tadeusz Kantor, that tens, then hundreds, and later even thousands of artists were joining *Solidarność*, as if it was the thing that they had long been waiting for? I will give just two quick examples of how these people behaved at the time when it was not yet known which side would be victorious. It's a story of how two great artists behaved when the monument in memory of the victims of Gdańsk's 1970 events was being erected a decade later. The organizers of the monument's construction called us at home and asked us to contact Czesław Miłosz, for they wanted to quote a part of his poem on the wall beside the monument. We managed to contact him. Miłosz said that the poem was ours, of course. But the workers had another request, namely they needed only two stanzas, because the last stanza, which is the whole point of the poem didn't suit them ("Lepszy dla ciebie byłby świt zimowy/I mur i gałąź pod ciężarem zgięta miała wypaść" – "Better for you would be a cold winter dawn/maybe a wall – or a branch swaging low, a dead weight upon"). For them, *Solidarność* was at the time a beautiful religious, ecumenical movement, but that branch suggesting a noose… that just

could not be accepted. As a result, the workers cut two stanzas from our Nobel laureate's poem. Czesław Miłosz did not oppose them over this and the poem ends like the workers wanted it to. Suddenly the workers began to have their rights and the great poet living in California decided to yield to their decision.

After a while we got a second telephone. This time I was to be the one to take on the job. The workers stated: we are organizing the monument's inauguration. We need Penderecki to provide us a piece, not an old one, a new piece for the unveiling. So I call one of the world's great masters of music and tell him, "listen the workers in Gdańsk want you to get them a piece of music for the unveiling of their monument". And Krzysztof says, "Of course, I have *Lacrimosa*, a mourning piece. It will be suitable. Tell them the piece is at their disposal".

This was something beautiful. I think that the artists were looking for some sort of inspiration for themselves, for a place in this great *Solidarność* movement, because it was spiritual and I think that when, today, we speak of the heritage which is so important and essential, it would be good to think about those tens, hundreds, thousands of fabulous artists who put their talent and their art at the service of *Solidarność*.

I will just add that among them were numerous young people who decided not to appear in television during Martial Law. When I spoke of this in Paris, French actors were astonished – are they crazy, they only have one youth, if they don't show up in television now, nobody will know them when they get old! Yves Montand was endlessly amazed at how it was possible: what does television have to do with *Solidarność*. But our younger friends decided that that was what they would do. And so it was. A large part of our young actors simply disappeared from the general field of interest because they refused to take part in television. I think that today is a fine occasion to think about them, because they paid a great price for their support of *Solidarność*.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you. The next person on the list of speaker is Mr. Cai Chongguo from the "China Labour Bulletin" published in Paris.

Cai Chongguo [translation from French]:

The *Solidarność* heritage in China is quite considerable. I realize that many of you may not know this, China being so far away. But I remember very well that in the 80s Chinese newspapers wrote every day about *Solidarność*, about the history of *Solidarność*. The name Wałęsa was very, very well known. Why? Because at the time there was a rupture between China and the Soviet Bloc. Thus, the Chinese Communist Party wanted very much to show that Soviet communism wasn't true communism, socialism. They said – look, the working class is rising up against false socialism. But here in China is true socialism. Therefore they spoke every day about *Solidarność*. But from 1989 on it was strictly forbidden to speak about *Solidarność* in China.

Thus when I listened to you yesterday, and this is rare for someone like me, I was both happy at the same time I was extremely sad. This is because during that period in '89 when the Round Table Talks were being held, and later when *Solidarność* won the parliamentary elections – at that exact time I was on Tiananmen Square. This was when the democratic movement was crushed before my very eyes. I saw tanks run over 11 students.

In '89 I worked for the cause of independent syndicalism in China, my organization being based in Hong Kong. I was in Paris, I wrote a lot. This was first of all aimed at showing the Chinese what *Solidarność* was. That together we must defend our own interests and rights. Even when we are well-off, even then should we defend others, our companions, and their the rights. That was what we had to teach the Chinese – the *Solidarność* spirit. This was the heritage of your movement for the Chinese worker.

For the last 16 years, the name '*Solidarność*' has still been resounding in my country. The lesson of *Solidarność* was that the Polish communist government was not firm enough – this was the case made by Deng Xiaoping in 1989. We must crush every attempt at creating an independent syndic organization. Thus, from '89 there was very strong repression of any such efforts in China. The Catholic and Protestant Churches were severely punished by the Chinese government, which had mastered its techniques for repression.

In examining the history of *Solidarność*, it is the Chinese worker who pays very dearly for the democratization of Eastern European countries. Not many people know this. When I was watching the film last night before the concert I was sad, because I knew very well that the Chinese authorities had watched these films thousands of times in order to work out methods of repression. So it was the Chinese who paid the price. Today, there is talk of a Chinese economic miracle. Many politicians and businessmen, especially European and American, speak of it. But I listen to all of this with great sadness; it has very little positive consequences for the worker's movement in China. In the 80s, everybody was observing Poland. Today politicians, businessmen are speaking of an economic miracle in China. But very little attention is paid to the miserable lives of Chinese workers. There are mines exploding every day, ones that kill hundreds of workers. There are women and children who work 16 hours a day, without days off. Occupational diseases are spreading rapidly in China. There is very little talk of this, of the fact that it is the Chinese worker who pays for this. Today there are strikes practically everywhere and every day. In 2004 there were very many more than in 2003. In fact, the Chinese government is very troubled. But there is very little talk of this. So it is the Chinese worker who continues to pay for this. For there are the Chinese government bureaucrats and the businessmen who promote the image of a Chinese miracle. The trade union workers, the peasants should also profit from this. But this is not the case. There is misery in our society, for only 15% of the rich profit from our development. But according to the numbers, even the official numbers, the number of people who do not have even minimum income is enormous.

The authorities say that without independent trade unions, workers can also profit from development, but this is an illusion. The businessmen who promote this image of China do it also to stifle the heritage of *Solidarność*. The heritage of *Solidarność* shows that without independent trade unions workers will not have better lives. This is what I believe. The legacy of *Solidarność* is menaced by the so-called Chinese miracle. In fact, workers' rights the world over are menaced by the mass exportation of Chinese products.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much for those remarks. I would now like to ask Mr. Stefan Niesiołowski, long-time opposition activist, to take the floor.

Stefan Niesiołowski:

After that last statement I am wondering whether or not to refer back to the statement by Mr. Bernard Guetta from the morning session, who was so kind as to say that *Solidarność* was composed of three universalisms, and that one of them was the communist universalism. He said that this would probably shock some people in the audience, which in my case was absolutely correct.

I hold the people present here in too high an esteem to explain to them what communism is. For that matter, not much can be added after that speech on the situation in modern-day China. As a prisoner of communism I suffered incomparably less than the victims of communism in China, and this is worth remembering. Universalism carries a positive message, universalism is a proposition, it is something good, at least this is how it is understood in the Polish language. So what was Mr. Guetta talking about? What sort of universalism are all those things that communism gave to the world? I of course respect and appreciate the work and services of Mr. Guetta, but such things should not be stated. For if we have a problem in Poland with overcoming the legacy of communism, which we have spoken of here, it is at least in part due to the fact that statements such as these are made at serious conferences. And this cannot be left without reply.

In Poland, fascism has been eradicated and this problem does not exist, although I sometimes get the feeling that that's not entirely true. But young people in Poland gather under communist symbols, they demonstrate under the portraits of the murderer, the criminal Che Guevara, who killed people, who has blood on his hands. That is why speaking about communist universalism is too reckless a thing. It should not be done.

Now for the second issue I would like to touch upon. I do not fully understand these complaints, these grievances, these resentments towards *Solidarność* that were present in so many comments today. These grievances of course differ from the resentments of the many frustrated people who make a living out of badmouthing Lech Wałęsa. This is not worth commenting on, but there were also some voices of disappointment here, as in the statement by Professor Śpiewak. But

these are normal problems in a democracy. After 25 years we have a democratic state with its specific problems, which no one else will solve for us.

It's true that in our society we seem to be more fascinated by defeats, and that we are most active when celebrating a catastrophe. But the same goes for the II Republic of Poland of the interwar period, which today, for good reasons, is considered an example. This is our history, with all its quarrels, disputes and accusations. But this legacy is accompanied by the *Solidarność* legacy. Today's anniversary is very beautiful It is a great triumph, of which I am very proud.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you. The next speaker will be Ewa Kulik, one of the bravest female activists of the underground *Solidarność*.

Ewa Kulik:

I would like to continue with the issue of the remembrance and return of *Solidarność*, but of *Solidarność* as a value. I think that *Solidarność* as a value belongs more to the order of things from before the systemic transformation and before the market economy. I would like to remind you that the word *Solidarność* appeared in the democratic movement even before the independent trade union was created – namely, in the movement I came from, the Students' *Solidarność* Committee. What we meant was *Solidarność* among students, but also *Solidarność* with the workers who were crushed in Ursus and Radom in 1976. The word "*Solidarność*" appeared in the title of a strike bulletin in August 1980, even before anyone had the idea to call the trade union that. For us *Solidarność* meant helping people, helping each other, being together. There was a feeling that being together, workers, students, intellectuals, artists – that this means strength. In the underground *Solidarność* in the years 1981-1989 this also meant bringing help to the imprisoned, the repressed and their families, helping the people in hiding.

After the transformation, *Solidarity*'s ideals were replaced by new values. I will add here to what Miklos Haraszti said, namely that a large part was also played by the free press, which felt that it must take part in the revolution creating the market economy and the foundations of democracy. And it was so indulged by this creation that it created new idols, new icons and new values. *Solidarność* became supplanted by competition, enterprise, resourcefulness, which – as it later turned out – unfortunately often meant sly craftiness. What became important was the success of the individual, not the success of the group. New idols, entrepreneurs such as Bagsik, Gąsiorowski, Grobelny and others who fell afoul of the law, replaced the union activists and workers' leaders whom we admired so much in August of 1980. Young people began thinking in a way in which one's career, one's personal success is most important, and those who don't make it are not worth noticing, they should be avoided, that they are losers. In a sense, the word 'decency' started being a synonym of idiocy and naivety. 'Social worker', a term meaning somebody who helps others,

also became replaced by the word 'volunteer'. And here I will refer to the sector in which I now work, namely non-governmental organizations. It is a very interesting phenomenon, that 'social worker' is a 'no' word, volunteer is a 'yes' word, because in fact volunteer work is today treated in quite a mercenary fashion, because it's useful to note in your CV that one has worked as a volunteer, because it will help you get a better job later on.

As I already said, our political and intellectual elites and the free press unfortunately played an important role in this. They contributed to the effacing of the remembrance of those who brought democratic change. This process had many reasons of political and economic nature. It was the sign of some kind of shame and aversion, nobody knew what to do in this new reality with the people who deserved to be distinguished in *Solidarity*'s victory. Aleksander Smolar listed the elements which were not included in the foreign press, I however remember articles in the Polish press which appeared on the occasion of various anniversaries linked to *Solidarność*. During the anniversaries of August, of Martial Law, the interviews which appeared in the press concerned only one side of the story: there was Kiszczak, Jaruzelski, Urban, they spoke about the past. There was a huge aversion on the part of our milieu to speak about the decent people who behaved respectably in those times. There was a fear that remembering the achievements of *Solidarność* was a sign of "veteranism", that it would be used in some political career, that it would be appropriated by some other group. True, at one point, a political group basing itself on *Solidarność* – the *Solidarność* Electoral Campaign – came to power. But besides the members of the *Solidarność* Electoral Campaign, there are many people forgotten today who in the 1980s dedicated their whole lives, and who then fell into oblivion, became non-existent, who were not done justice and were not allowed to feel the satisfaction that they were victorious – if not in a material way, at least in a moral way. Here I disagree with Professor Śpiewak that the intelligentsia has profited from the transformation. If by intelligentsia we also understand my friends who work as teachers, I must say that they haven't profited. They hardly make ends meet.

To all those dedicated people from the underground era, who really need help now, for they are not able to make on their own, we can of course say: well, it didn't work out for you. Tough, you must leave for the scrapyard of history. But let us at least pay homage to them for all they have done for us.

Now, twenty five years after the creation of *Solidarność* and fifteen years after the systemic transformation, the younger generation is looking for new values and is admitting to patriotism, something which was clearly visible during the last Warsaw Uprising commemoration. Our young people today want to discover the history of *Solidarność*. I was in the Gdańsk Shipyard recently and I saw many people wearing *Solidarność* badges, teenagers shouting "there is no freedom without *Solidarność*". Meanwhile we, the older generation, are suffering from amnesia; we don't even remember what was meant by the sign of two fingers pointing up in a V shape. If we have such faulty memories, how are we to help the

young people who no longer wishe to live in the cult of individual success at all costs and is looking for new values, including those represented by *Solidarność*?

I fear that some historians from the Institute of National Remembrance will ruin *Solidarność* by writing articles on the history of *Solidarność* basing them only on the acts and sources in the secret and overt police forces. The book which was handed out here and which Eugeniusz Smolar spoke about is a scandal. I read it till four in the morning and I am willing to say that there is not one true sentence in it, everyone is slandered in it. It insults people whom we cooperated with in the underground by stating that in fact since 1983 we were controlled by the secret police, because that is what captain so-and-so and some colonel said. And I am afraid that this represents a *post mortem* victory for communism. I think that now is the moment that those who were active in the underground should be lauded and honoured as heroes, because after a few more years and it will be too late. We'll all have Alzheimer's and nobody will remember anything. Without our testimonies to the truth, all that will remain will be a list of informers and agents. We must give our testimonies as quickly as possible, even if chaotically, so that a list be available of people who contributed to the fact that we now have a democracy.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you very much. Mr. Prime Minister, the floor is yours.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki:

I signed up for the discussion after the speech by Aleksander Smolar. I will not comment on the later statements, which in my view exceed certain limits of a conference dedicated to *Solidarność* and enter a very serious dispute, one that is incomprehensible for our foreign guests. I will only say that Poland is in the midst of a dispute which is aimed at destroying the last 15 years with the motto of destroying the III Republic and instituting a IV Republic. If such a change is to be the result of an ethical craving, then I represent a different ethical attitude and I wouldn't like the things we put so much effort into destroyed in the name of ethics and ethical values. I would like the professors who hail the IV Republic to reflect some more on this.

However, I would like to say that as we deliberate on this anniversary of the event and movement which we all loved and idealized we of course feel a longing for those moments of purity, an understandable and needed longing. But between the feeling of paradise and the feeling of political hell, which we now have in Poland, we must search for some kind of balance. We mustn't simply move about in the realm of a heavenly solidarity or a hellish solidarity.

I think that historical politics and coming to terms with the past always were and always will be needed, but I will never agree to compare history with current politics.

Secondly: of course there is the need of social collectivism, of a liberal, market economy; there is our obligation to restore a feeling of dignity to those people who

lost it due to the cult of money and success. And the phenomenon of not paying salaries which Taduesz Kowalik spoke of is of course an absolute scandal.

And finally my last comment. Germany's unification was felt as European unification, because the fall of the Berlin Wall was more important, because Western Europe was completely unprepared for what happened in 1989 and had begun in 1980. It was unprepared mentally and it wasn't able to find its bearings in the new situation, one that changed the shape of Europe. In my view – and I've said this many times – it was an absorption and not a conjoining that took place, and we ourselves in a way abandoned the idea of forcing it to be a conjoining in a moral sense. We abandoned the effort to infuse our own experiences into the united Europe.

I do not think that the Round Table was any kind of founding myth and that now such a myth in Poland is to be that of *Solidarność*. Meanwhile, the "Tygodnik Powszechny" weekly has published a very interesting article by an American political scientist who states that *Solidarność* may become a new myth for integrating Europe, perhaps replacing or complementing the myth of Franco-German unification, which was one of the sources of the European Union. *Solidarność* can become this integrating myth if we aspire for a united community, in which human rights will play a primary role, including in the foreign policy of the EU.

Once again: let's not move about solely in the categories of heaven or hell.

Aleksander Hall:

Thank you. We close this session and invite you to the final meeting in Warsaw, during which Professor Geremek will summarize our conference, and then Mr. Barroso, the President of the European Commission will speak. Thank you all once again.

7th SESSION
Closure of the Proceedings in Warsaw

Bronisław Geremek:

It is our privilege today at the "From *Solidarność* to Freedom" conference to be able greet the President of the European Commission, Mr. Jose Barroso. I welcome you very warmly on behalf of our entire conference. I also welcome the Polish member of the European Commission, Ms Danuta Hübner.

I have obtained the approval of the President of the European Commission for his address to be the session's closing statement. But first I wish to present my own closing remarks.

We have reflected on what characterized the path from *Solidarność* to freedom, and this has helped us to understand the essence of what some call a Polish miracle. Why was it Poland that began the process of change in Central Europe? We are also conscious, and this must be stressed, that the vision of this astounding Polish success is clouded by quite some bitterness. It is a bitterness resulting from the things we were not able to achieve, that we let others destroy – or destroyed ourselves. This bitterness need be present in our thoughts about the *Solidarność* experience. However, I would like to remind my friends who are present here today, especially those who are the most critical towards the *Solidarność* experience, I wish to recall to you the words of Winston Churchill, who once said that Poles who achieve victory are horrible, but they are wonderful when they suffer defeat and failure. This opinion has always hurt me, but I sincerely would like us to ponder whether we ourselves don't sometimes ruin those things which are our Polish victories.

After a year of Poland's membership in the European Union, we can say that, contrary to the outcries that only vodka would remain truly Polish, we now know that Poland's entry into the EU was and is a great opportunity for us, one which we have been able to put to good use. Moreover, it is an opportunity for the European Union. Hence, we are mindful that a year after our entry we have cause to be proud.

That is why I wish to call for an end to the atmosphere of recriminations that demeans our own work and spoils our own image. Conversely, I would also like us to be able to move past the atmosphere of celebration, festivities, demonstrations and calmly give thought to what happened.

We have never concealed that the *Solidarność* tradition has gotten dusty, that in both Polish and European remembrance it has become obscured under the dust

of the past years, and at other times by the glare of perhaps more stunning visions. I remember the moments of happiness when I watched the Berlin Wall fall, when I watched Germans gather in Berlin and Dresden. But at the same time I think that we have the right to say that our *Solidarność*, which changed the face of Poland, also changed the face of Europe – and, in part, even the face of the world. That is why it must be restored to its historical importance.

Firstly, I would like to say a few words about why we owe so much to others for our own success. Let us remember those past times when type-written pages, the pages of a Russian samizdat, circulated among us and the "Chronicle of Current Events" was our source of truth about what those Russians who did not accept their system actually thought. When we warmly welcomed Sergei Kovalyov, who wants help from us, from Europe, it is worth remembering that those first sparks also leapt from the bravest Russians, from those who created the Russian samizdat. And for this we owe them our gratitude. We may also remember that the events that took place in our part of Europe – East Berlin in 1953 and Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 – these were vital lessons for us. Therefore, we also owe those courageous people our gratitude. Furthermore, we owe much to Western policies, the policies of President Reagan, who was able to mount such pressure that the West – as we viewed it, representing the world of certain important values and defending the traditional values of our civilization – the West turned out to be an ally without which we wouldn't have succeeded.

At yesterday's and today's session we had a dispute, maybe not all that explicit, but a dispute nonetheless, over whether the process of Central European's liberation was started by Poland's *Solidarność* or by Mikhail Gorbachev's politics of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. I think that future historians will be able to say more, but allow me to state what I think today. I am of the opinion that Lech Wałęsa is right in saying that if Gorbachev had succeeded, he would have reformed communism as a whole. *Solidarność* would not have led the changes, and we wouldn't be here today debating and thinking about a world that is moving towards freedom. But at the same time I would like to say that without Gorbachev's policies, the scenario could have been completely different. Finally, despite the fact that we say it so often, and stress it on the appropriate occasions, I think that we will never adequately express how much we owe to John Paul II, how much we owe to the Polish Church. So I call on us to express this debt of gratitude in analytical categories, as well. Our political analyses need highlight the role of the Pope and the Catholic Church in Poland as one of the elements that propelled and guided us along our path to freedom.

I would like to refer to the words spoken in this room, that we remember about all those who are not on the first pages of newspapers or on television, about those who created the might of *Solidarność*, this movement of 10 million people who were brave enough to belong to it and support it in its most difficult moments. Hence, I wish all of us to be ever mindful of the fact that alongside *Solidarność* stood the fabulous students of the Independent Student Association (NZS). Who doesn't

remember the role of the NZS in those difficult moments of conflict, when the students were able to organize themselves around the same values that *Solidarność* was espousing, whether on their own or together with us? The same applies to the farmer's union comprised of those for whom agricultural tradition is so important. The survival of private ownership in rural areas was important for freedom, and the organization of farmers in a structure similar to *Solidarność* was a tremendous thing. We will never adequately express our thanks to the world's trade unions that helped us. I am very pleased that this has been mentioned at the conference. Lech Wałęsa and I recalled our first trip, when we were invited by Francis Blanchard, the General Director of the International Labour Organization in Geneva, and we met there with representatives of other trade unions. We also remember the fabulous unionists who supported us during the hardest days, both the people from the European trade unions and those from the AFL-CIO. I would like to express my deep and personal gratitude to one person – Mrs Irene Kirkland, who is with us here today, and tell her how much we owe to her husband. We will never forget him. I would also like to thank a whole crowd of trade union leaders, including subsequent General Secretaries of the European Trade Union Confederation. And to especially sincerely thank our friend and compatriot Jan Kułakowski – the Secretary General of the World Confederation of Labour, which groups Christian trade unions – for his great help. We remember all of them – and we always shall.

I will not try to conduct any concise review of the achievements of these two days, which have been a time of extremely fruitful debate in having touched upon many important ideas and themes. Instead, please allow me to present a very personal and short analysis.

First of all, and I'm speaking here mainly to President Barroso, we tried to discuss the problem of human rights. We reflected on the extent to which the Helsinki Final Act awakened the spirit of freedom in captive Europe. Indeed, the impression was made that it was this very Act and the philosophy of human rights that gave us a certain means to find, in the dilemma of hope and hopelessness that Sergei Kovalyov spoke of, arguments for hope. We also saw that workers' rights constitute an element of human rights. Human rights, even as a formal reference, nonetheless created certain references for our legitimization. But I must say from my own memories that the talks we had at the time rather gave the impression that the Final Act was a document that would finally seal the division of the world and Europe, and strengthen the advantage of the Soviet Empire over us. It seemed to us at times solely a realization of politics, that – to quote the words of Lenin – we will hang the West on the rope of its own making. We often expected more, we hoped to be able to break Europe's indifference. Prime Minister Mazowiecki will surely allow me to recall our 1981 meeting with European Community leaders who hosted us with utmost cordiality and almost joyfully listened to our account of events in Poland. However, they were careful to intimate, "don't count on us much, the world is divided and decisions are made by the nuclear powers". We tried to

stand up against this vision of a divided world, this determinism stipulating that there is no place for freedom or for those who are weaker – that there is no place in politics for the strength of the weak. For us, the main arguments were primarily of an ethical nature: it was the feeling that we must work towards a fairer world. But I think that our main passion was freedom.

The first antitotalitarian revolution took place in Poland. Somebody said yesterday that it was the first velvet revolution. However we label it, it was a revolution without guillotines, without bloodletting, without violence, but one which managed to changed the world. That is why when we speak in Europe and the European Union, when we look at what is happening in Ukraine, at what happened in Georgia, what may happen in Belarus, we do this because we will never forget that moment of weakness, when we were alone and at the same time we felt that what we were fighting for is Europe's greatest value. For we were fighting for freedom.

The *Solidarność* ideal – as described yesterday by Cardinal Lustiger – was forged in a space in which the official ideology remained silent. In this space of silence there existed the problem of human dignity, of the meaning of life and of work, because work was senseless, life was senseless and that is why we tried to change all of this. This space was untranslatable into the language of thoughts. In it lay the problem of the human condition and human dignity. Simple references – but this created a situation in which we invested our hope in freedom. We wanted this feeling of human dignity to become part of our everyday lives. This desire was very important during the period of the 500 days of *Solidarność*, as it is often said, because we lived in a world where people were constantly being humiliated by their poverty, their powerlessness, by the empty shop shelves and the belief that nothing depended on them.

Cardinal Lustiger later went on to say that a social tsunami may threaten us if we fail to take a stance on what happens elsewhere. I think that this is one of the elements *Solidarność* introduces into the debate on the shape of the world. Zbigniew Brzeziński talked about this yesterday, but he also wrote what I feel is an immensely important article and one which needs to be discussed. He stated in it that the problems of globalization and international terrorism are issues that should send a very powerfully message to politicians that societies have awoken, that they want to participate in politics. We can talk about this neutrally, as it were, in the sense that this is a revolt of the masses against a politics that takes place without their consent. *Solidarność*, that 10-million strong movement, created the space for human decision beginning with some basic facts: for instance, at every *Solidarność* election there was always a couple of people who would grasp the ballot box and turn it upside down, to show that nobody had placed any ballots inside, that the elections would not be rigged. This is what is meant by civil activism.

I therefore think that we are speaking up for the remembrance of *Solidarność* not in order to get a place in history, but because it may be useful in today's world and for future generations. It is useful both for countries from our region, which took the path together with us, and for countries that entered that path later. I spoke

of Ukraine, but today we also heard voices from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia. These are voices which make us reflect on how relevant an antitotalitarian programme is in places where a totalitarian regime persists. How can such a programme be put to good use in places where there still remains a totalitarian system? The meaning of this question is obvious and important.

We thus face the legacy of *Solidarność* with a certain anxiety and we sometimes think that we will be unable to pass it on to others. I would like to say, however, that in my opinion we do not appreciate the importance for modern Europe of the generation of men and women who wore the *Solidarność* badge in their suit lapels in countries all over Europe. We do not appreciate the importance of the fact that great philosophers came as truck drivers from France, Italy, Germany or Great Britain bringing food and medicine. This is a generation which carries *Solidarity* in its blood. When I listened to Denis MacShane, our friend from the early years of *Solidarność*, when I listened to the passion he spoke with today, I had a strong sense of how *Solidarność* had smitten so many. For Denis MacShane's is a generation of Europeans that remembers *Solidarność*. Concerning another member of that generation, if I may risk being a little indiscrete, my first conversation in Strasbourg over a year ago with the President of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso, was not even a conversation about the European Union, but about Europe, why we want Europe, what is important for Europe. President Barroso stated: "I will never forget the Polish experience. I read the works of Poles – for instance, Leszek Kołakowski's article about that liberal-conservative social-democrat, I remember that article very well and I have even implemented it a little".

When we hear from our French friends of the dangers created by the Polish plumber, well, what can we say? Such nonsense! All of you here know that there are not that many Polish plumbers in France. Besides, we need them in Poland. I tried to explain to my French friends that the first Polish plumber was in fact Maria Curie-Skłodowska, who thanks to her knowledge taken from a Polish university then gave France two Nobel prizes. Minister Jean Bernard Raimond, knowing me and my sympathy for France, will surely understand these words as kindly towards France. It is important that the image of Poland as a worrisome country that can bring instability be changed into an image of a brave and imaginative Poland, a country and people who knew how not to cross the thin line between peace and war during the *Solidarność* revolution, and knew how to calmly and deliberately bring about regime change.

Lord Dahrendorf, author of one of the classic analyses, wrote brilliantly of developmental perspectives, but he also cautioned with some concern that during the transformation it will perhaps be necessary to cross the "valley of tears". This was an amazing statement, because this problem has returned in an obvious way in our discussions today. In words we shan't forget, he said that this could have been an element leading to the violation of principles of democratic authority. However, Poland did well – he stated today – in crossing this path during the first

15 years of the transformation, and was not tempted to violate the principles of civil liberties. And today Poland is a democratic country. This is the Poland we are still working on and we want her positive image to serve both us and Europe.

I hope that at tomorrow's final session of our conference we will also gain an understanding of our ambitions, so that Europe and the world will understand our need of remembering *Solidarność*. We want this to serve the museum of Freedom and *Solidarność* in Gdańsk, but maybe it would be beneficial if the great institutions of the European and international arena were to make a gesture regarding this issue.

I would like to say that we could continue this conference for a long time yet, but it has achieved its goal. I looked at today's panorama of the international press, and despite a visible weariness with the fact that there is so much talk of *Solidarność*, for the first time the Western press has so thoroughly evaluated what happened 25 years ago. And we should be very happy with this. As with the fact that our guest today is the President of the European Commission and that he wishes to present an address about *Solidarność* and Europe. We all feel very privileged. Mr. President, the floor is yours.

Jose Manuel Barroso:

SOLIDARNOŚĆ AS A BASIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Not every anniversary is a cause for celebration, just as not every birthday is a cause for celebration. But today we can and should celebrate 25 years of *Solidarność*, and I am honoured as President of the European Commission to participate in this event.

I do not think this is the last anniversary of *Solidarność* which will be celebrated. I suspect that in 100 and 200 years time what happened in Poland in 1980 will still be recognized as a very significant event in the history of Europe after the Second World War. It is one of those moments which will continue to grow in importance as it is viewed through the telescope of history.

Why? Because of the courage and determination of *Solidarity*'s leaders, who provided such an inspiration to so many. Because it showed the evidence of vibrant democratic life beneath the dull mud of communist dictatorship. Because *Solidarność* did not wither and die. It spread its roots wide and deep beneath the surface of political and social life in Poland, and then blossomed in the peaceful revolution of 1989.

Historians will also celebrate the creation of *Solidarność* because its influence did not stop at the Polish border. The roots of dissent and democracy were spreading throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s. So when the cracks began to show in the communist structure, it took not years but months, weeks even, for it to come crashing down across the region. And the consequences of those dramatic and wonderful events are still being felt today.

"Solidarity" was an inspired choice of name for the union that was born from the strikes in Gdańsk. It was a name which conveyed strength, determination and focus. It reflected the Poles' cohesion, their ability to withstand the tremendous pressures

put on them. It enabled many different kinds of people, from factory workers to intellectuals such as you, Professor Geremek, to come together in one cause.

I speak with some feeling on this because of my own experience. In 1974 I was 18 and filled with drive and desire to know the world. And what was the world on offer in Portugal? One controlled by a dull, grey, backwards dictatorship. The anger it provoked in me was not just caused by the abstraction of a dictatorial system, but by the day to day details of life under it; that I could not buy the books I wanted to read, the records I wanted to listen to. So my fellow students and I reacted, just as thousands of workers in the Gdańsk shipyards reacted.

My generation in Portugal, Spain or Greece, just as the *Solidarność* generation in Poland and elsewhere in Europe, did not inherit freedom and democracy as part of the normal order of things. We had to fight for it. And we did so not just as Poles or Portuguese, but as Europeans. Because when I looked for inspiration beyond the borders of Portugal, I looked to Europe.

So did many others – and not just in Europe. Europe stood as a global symbol of liberty. In other parts of the world, such as South America, a new generation was challenging the abusive dictatorships which controlled their countries. Europe represented to me, and to them, freedom, opportunity and values. And one of those values was, and must continue to be, solidarity.

Solidarity can express itself in many ways. It is help given by a man to that woman, her burnt face covered by a mask, staggering away from the double-decker bus blown up by a terrorist in London. It is the technical and financial assistance provided by EU members to those countries fighting natural disasters, whether floods or fire. It is the support being provided by the European Union and European taxpayers to help with the modernization of Poland. It is the thousands of Europeans, many volunteers, working to alleviate extreme poverty and disease in some of the most desolate parts of Africa.

Solidarity is a value that has concrete meaning – and many expressions – for every European. Solidarity ties us Europeans together. It forms part of our shared identity and fosters the will to act for our common good, and for a fairer and safer world. I believe the concept of solidarity will remain essential in bringing the European Union closer to its people and in helping induce more of the humanity that is sometimes lacking when we try to illustrate the value that our Union adds to our peoples' lives.

Solidarity is also part of the social values embedded in the European project – values which have typically been upheld by trade unions. There is no real freedom without solidarity, as *Solidarność* famously proclaimed. The two are inseparable in the history of the EU.

This autumn, we will engage in such reflections on the occasion of a European summit dedicated to the European social model. Poland and the other new Member States have an important and distinctive contribution to make in this debate. I urge the politicians and organizations of our new Member States to come forward and share their experience and visions.

Celebrating the anniversary of *Solidarność* also reminds us of the critical role, one too often overlooked, played by social dialogue and consensus in economic reform processes. This is why, for example, the shift to a knowledge-based economy in the EU should always be accompanied by strategies for traditional industrial sectors and their workers. This applies, for example, to shipbuilding, the industry whence *Solidarność* emerged in Gdańsk.

Solidarity has been an essential underpinning to the process of enlargement that has been a constant feature of the EU ever since it was founded. Successive enlargements have increased the Union's diversity; whether in terms of the geography of the new members, their size or their relative prosperity. EU membership, and the obligations which come with it, have always been accompanied by solidarity, both political and financial, to help the new members to make the significant reforms necessary as part of their membership. Solidarity is not charity. It is a crucial element in ensuring that Europe is more than just the sum of its members' interests.

And I want to say today that solidarity, and enlargement, have been of enormous benefit to all the EU's members. Let us start with the Member State that is hosting us today. The prospect and now membership of the EU has, I think, been an essential element in the extraordinary and welcome transformation of Poland over the last 15 years. It is for Poles, not me, to judge whether Poland has become a better country in the last 15 years; but from the outside, it certainly looks that way. The economic statistics show more trade, greater wealth, greater investment. But economic statistics cannot tell the whole story. There is also the human dimension, shown in the energy and dynamism and diversity which any visitor feels on coming to this country.

But the benefits of enlargement are not enjoyed only by the new Member States. They are spread more widely. Poland and other countries are providing new markets for export and investment. They are providing new holiday destinations for tourists from Western Europe keen to see a new part of their continent. They are sources of innovation for policies and ideas.

The Union as a whole benefits as well; from the economic dynamism of the new members, from their knowledge of and proximity to regions of strategic importance to the EU – Ukraine, Russia, the Balkans; and from their reaffirmation of European values. Freedom tastes a little fresher here in Warsaw.

So enlargement brings democracy, stability and prosperity. Unfortunately it also brings myths.

Perhaps the biggest of these is that enlargement slows Europe down. Much has been written on the apparently eternal question of "widening or deepening". As if there were a conflict between the two. There isn't. It is both widening and deepening, not either/or.

Successive waves of enlargement, in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s have not been a brake on integration. They have been a motor for it. Look at the facts. Most of the big policies with which the EU is associated; the euro, the single market, regional policy, are products of an enlarged EU. In some cases they were inspired by

enlargement and by the new countries to have joined the EU. Look at the inspiration which Spain gave to cohesion policy, or Finland to the EU's approach to the Baltic. Now it is the turn of the new members to bring their own ideas and contributions to the EU. To put John F. Kennedy into a European context, do not ask what the EU can do for you, but what you can do for the EU. I can say that the new Member States are already contributing a great deal, both in the Commission and in the Council.

Another myth is that enlargement will lead to an uncontrollable migration from the new members, with a consequent increase in unemployment. This was the worry when Portugal, Spain and Greece joined the EU. And, in truth, there was migration – but in the opposite direction, as people from the old Member States moved to the new members.

Then there is the myth that new, poorer Member States will weaken the economy of Europe and be a drain on taxpayers in the wealthier members. Again, this is not true. Poland's forecast growth of 4%, and its booming market for foreign investment, are good for Europe. And the support which is provided by European taxpayers is one of the ways in which Europe expresses its solidarity, and one which I believe benefits all European citizens in return.

So enlargement has been one of the great successes of the EU. And solidarity is a crucial part of it. Moreover, it remains a more popular policy than one might imagine. The latest Eurobarometer shows that half of the respondents in the 25 current Member States are in favour of further enlargement of the European Union in future years. But there are concerns as well. This number has fallen by 3 points since last year. And there is a split – the nine countries where there is less than 50% support for enlargement include all six of the founding members of the EU.

What should the Commission's response be?

We should base our work around three key concepts: **consolidation**, **conditionality and communication**.

Consolidation. Firstly, we must honour our word. It was very important that – after the 'no' in France and in the Netherlands to the Constitution, the June 2005 European Council reconfirmed its existing commitments. That means that Bulgaria and Romania will join the Union in 2007, if they fulfill the conditions. The "if" matters. Membership brings obligations as well as rights. They must be respected.

Therefore, we should maintain the European perspective for the Western Balkans. It is a region which was at the source of some of Europe's bloodiest conflicts at the beginning and end of the 20th century. The Europeanization policy which we have in place offers an opportunity to keep those conflicts where they belong – in the history books. It must of course be accompanied by conditionality. And it is. The benefits of that conditionality are already evident. To give one example, Bosnia/Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro have handed over 20 indictees to the tribunal in the Hague since this European Commission took office. I do not think this would have happened without the clear and formally implemented policy we have adopted.

Consolidation also means that accession negotiations will start with Croatia and Turkey, once those two countries meet the strict criteria. That is the position of the last European Council, held in June.

Conditionality. As we have seen with the 'new ten', who became EU member in 2004, conditionality works. Sticking to strict criteria is the key to a successful enlargement. The best way for candidate countries and potential candidate countries to realize their European ambitions is to fulfil the conditions of accession to the letter. This includes tough reforms.

The last key word is **communication**. We, the Commission, but also the EU's national governments, need to better communicate the benefits of the enlargement process in terms of stability and economic growth. The Commission has presented a proposal to facilitate dialogue between the current and future citizens of the EU. We must combat prejudices and show the benefits of enlargement.

That is what I think we are doing today. We can look backward, at what is now history, but we can do that usefully if we look forward; so that the spirit of *Solidarity*, which burnt so brightly in Gdańsk 25 years ago, remain alive. *Solidarność* is one of Poland's greatest gifts to Europe. We must use it well.

Bronisław Geremek:

I would like to thank the President of the European Commission very sincerely for his address. I think that after these words of acknowledgement for Poland's oeuvre and the *Solidarność* ideal, the conclusion of our conference could be similar to the final conclusion of the session chaired by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Just as the American administration of President Carter and Zbigniew Brzeziński introduced human rights into the international arena and bestowed on them an important value, the ideal of *Solidarność* should become the object of our effort, the effort for it to become a great benchmark for the European ideal. May this be the thought with which we will close our session.

Tomorrow's session in Gdańsk has a more formal character, thus I would very much like to thank all those who made this conference possible: the programme director, Mr. Eugeniusz Smolar; the executive director, Mr. Henryk Sikora; Mr. Andrzej Bobiński, who ensured a proper functioning of the media; and the huge, brilliant team of young people who made our work possible. A sincere thank-you also goes to our interpreters, who have had two days of hard work.

Thank you very much, I proclaim today's session closed.

Gdańsk, August 31, 2005

SPECIAL SESSION
It All Began in Gdańsk

Bronisław Geremek:

Mr. President of the Republic of Poland, Messrs Presidents, Mses and Messrs Prime Ministers, Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Dear Friends!

"From *Solidarność* to Freedom" is the journey we are remembering today. So this is a special day, not only for Gdańsk, not only for Poland, but, we hope, for Europe, as well.

We want everyone to remember that it began in Gdańsk. And we would like our special pride to be understood – as when we Poles witnessed the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Kiev, and sensed that the *Solidarność* ideal is alive and relevant.

Opening this final session, a session of outstanding importance, for it is taking place in its proper place, in Gdańsk, I would like to ask the host of our meeting, the historical *Solidarność* leader, President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Wałęsa, to take the floor.

Lech Wałęsa:

I must say that if I had my druthers, I'd speak last, but oh well…Do please hear me out. Given the applause and the fact that fate had me lead the struggle, I should now speak for at least two hours, following Fidel Castro's example, but that probably won't be possible, as we've got a very tight schedule.

We here should jointly try to understand and organize our thoughts about what happened in Gdańsk 25 years ago. We should also try to understand why it happened and how we together can convey the ideals of *Solidarność* to other countries and continents.

The previous generation left us with a world divided. After the War, political blocs were created and national borders heavily guarded. Poland and many other countries had this division imposed upon them. This was an artificial division which greatly hampered development. And we did not accept it. We Poles were the only ones to protest after Yalta, but we were not powerful enough to oppose the great powers. However, in the 40s and 50s we took up arms and fought for our rights, but internal and external communist forces crushed our aspirations for Poland.

So we tried to improve our fate and force Poland's development through demonstrations and strikes. In 1968 our young people stood up. The workers revolted in 1956, 1970, and in 1976 – but all these events were brutally squashed, as were similar such revolts in other Soviet Bloc countries. The authorities imposed a situation predominated by pessimism and the feeling that little could ever succeed. In this state of powerlessness and lack of faith, those thinking patriotically waited for their chance. We would probably have so waited for a very long time if not for the fact that something completely unexpected happened: a Pole became Pope. In just less than a year after his nomination the Holy Father came to Poland. He said to us: "do not be afraid!", and he showed us how numerous we were. In fact, we came to believe that almost the entire nation was with us.

For about a dozen years up until that period, I had managed to win over maybe 10 people to fight communism. The rest did not believe it was possible. Or they thought the price to pay was too high. I might have gone on recruiting people for another dozen years, and maybe I'd have found another ten. But the words of the Holy Father awakened the Polish nation, awakened other nations and small, organized groups were able to mobilize the people to strike, protest, and conduct talks and negotiations. Moreover, our example was followed by other countries. That is how we attained the possibilities we have today.

Here today we must contemplate why this was done. I firmly believe that this had to be done in order to usher in a new era – one without divisions, without political blocs. The era we are living in today is one of intellect, information and globalization. No other generation had the chances we have today. We have the chance to achieve peace and prosperity. But our drama lies in the fact that although we live in a new era, the old way of thinking prevails. We are living in a new era, but we have the old equipment, both when it comes to political structures and programmes.

That is why in ending my speech, I would like to ask you to be more active, to discuss whether we are similar in seeing the challenges of our era, be they economic, political, structural or programmatic challenges. This is very important, because the world is racing ahead, not standing idly by. I would not like people to say about us that we knew how to wrest victory with finesse, with solidarity – but after our victory, when we had the chance to unite Europe, that France pulled the European Union in its direction, Germany in its direction, and Poland likewise. That was not how things were meant to be, that is not what the workers and Gdańsk fought for. They fought for being able to seize the opportunity to build things – jointly and with solidarity. If we want to live in peace, if we want to live in prosperity, then it is above all through know-how, for we must enlarge structures, and also change them.

It wish you all a pleasant time in Gdańsk. I wish you insightful, creative discussions. And I ask you to take into consideration my appeal that we not squander the enormous opportunity that stands before our victorious generation.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Cautioning us to heed our time-constraints, I would now like to ask Mr. Janusz Śniadek, today's Chairman of NSZZ "Solidarność" to take the floor.

Janusz Śniadek:

Mr. President, Distinguished Guests, I would like to thank all of you for being here today, for the exceptional resolutions and for all other tokens of respect for the Polish workers who in 1980 set forth the avalanche of events which brought freedom to captive nations, which ended the Cold War and the arms race. The 20th century, because of the World Wars and the terrible murderous ideologies, was the most dramatic and bloody period in the history of humankind. The best thing to have happened in that century was the peaceful break-up of the evil empire, the Soviet Union. The fanciful dreams of freedom dreamt by many nations had, it seemed, become reality.

What was the meaning of the Polish events, the creation of *Solidarność*, this independent trade union, in relation to the realization of those dreams? Social resistance after the imposition of Martial Law and the gradual decomposition of the communist system played a role in this. Both in the Soviet Union and in individual bloc countries crisis situations flourished. It may be discussed whether these were symptoms of an inevitable break-up, one that was only a matter of time. But even if we agree that the collapse of the communist system was inevitable, still the process could have followed various other scenarios. Communism's agony could have been drawn out over long years and – as history shows us – huge bloodshed cannot be excluded. I hold the view that the *Solidarność* revolution, with its non-violent form of struggle, was crucial both to hastening the empire's collapse and to ensuring its peaceful demise. Thus, the nature of communism's collapse was influenced decisively by the workers' movement that was inspired by the teaching of John Paul II. For the August revolt would not have occurred without the Polish Pope.

Today, when all of us are unanimous in our judgement of the positive consequences of the uprising and *Solidarność*'s non-violent fight, I am of the opinion that its moral and social dimension cannot be neglected. It is the lack of progress in the moral and social domain, the efforts to bypass them, that are often the sources of Polish social embitterment and the feeling of a lack of security. Everywhere in the world, such frustrations contribute to irrational social impulses. The European Constitution in France and Holland fell victim to such impulses. Not because of the carefully thought out intention to question its contents, but as a reaction to the feeling of powerlessness and endangerment. How, therefore, should we build the feeling of security among people? Only a rational and objective-oriented social policy, worked out mutually by way of dialogue between equal social partners, with the participation of civil society is able to soothe the most nagging problems. The free market by itself, without the principle of solidarity – the stronger helping the

weaker – will not solve the problems of the modern world: the problem of hunger, unemployment, unequal development and the terrorism they spawn. Today it is extremely important to understand this as the most important conclusion arising from the Polish experience embodied by the victory of *Solidarność*.

This is why I am very glad that August 31st has been named in Poland "a day of solidarity and freedom". The recognition of such a day in Poland and the world, which may be the subject of today's discussions, will become the basis for reflection and action to spread *Solidarity*'s ideals among people and societies, bringing us closer to solving the most important problems and challenges of today, and I wish this to all the countries and people in the world. May *Solidarność* prevail!

Bronisław Geremek:

I would now like to ask Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, to take the floor.

Aleksander Kwaśniewski*:*

The Poles did not themselves invent the ideal of solidarity. But in the past quarter century it was our nation that did much in order for it to regain its force, to move the hearts and minds of millions of people, to begin to transform the contemporary world as we knew it.

Born 25 years ago right here in Gdańsk, the ten-million-strong social movement did not just display the ideal of solidarity on its banners. It realized this ideal. It caused ordinary people to recover hope, gain confidence in the power of their own actions, and to demand respect for their dignity. *Solidarity* became the road to freedom.

And this message spread the world over. Today the ideal of solidarity is among the most important answers to the problems of globalization and other challenges of the 21st century. Thus, the seed planted 25 years ago is now bearing fruit which in sundry ways benefits almost all of our planet's inhabitants.

In the name of Poland and of the Polish people I should like to welcome all the exceptional guests attending this conference. To welcome you in a country of people who, without recourse to violence, but through dialogue alone, came to realize their dreams. To welcome all those who showed us, and still do show, their solidarity, who implement its ideal in their own countries. It is a significant and a happy occasion that this commemoration of the Polish August – the 25th anniversary of the Gdańsk Accords – has managed to gather together, here in Gdańsk and earlier in Warsaw, such excellent company from all over the world. This constitutes ample proof of the international community's appreciation of my compatriots' magnificent oeuvre.

We thank you for your kindness! For your friendship, and your presence! The special hero of our Polish epic of liberty is surely the legendary leader of the *Solidarność* trade union, Mr. Lech Wałęsa, a man whose face and name is for the majority of people around the world the very embodiment of the ideal of solidarity. A man whose name is already guaranteed a place in the history books next to figures

such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, or Vaclav Havel, who has kindly honoured us with his presence and whom I wish to sincerely welcome.

Mr President Wałęsa, Mr President Havel, please accept our expressions of admiration and respect. And to all those known and unknown, all the nameless people of *Solidarność*, of the democratic opposition here in Poland and elsewhere, please accept the simplest of words – thank you. We are well aware how much we owe to You Messrs Presidents, and to all You Ladies and Gentlemen.

When in the summer of 1980 one Polish city after another bore witness to labour strikes – in Świdnik, Lublin, Szczecin, and especially in Gdańsk – nobody suspected that we were on the verge of a turning point in the history of Europe. *Solidarność* was born – and nothing would ever be the same. Thus, in the very heart of the Eastern bloc a great civil movement came into being. Independent and self-governing. Outside the control of authoritarian power. Here, in a place where the rules were set by the Soviet empire, this must have resounded like a gunshot. The shock was all the more severe as not a single shot was actually fired. There was resolve. There was composure. There was the common will of millions. The Polish revolution shunned violence – and this rendered it all the more powerful.

Yet for the sake of remembrance, of historical earnestness, we ought to mention that the conditions for these historical changes were also the work of Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Nor let us forget the Polish Round Table, which expressed the will to change by means of agreement, without recourse to violence, which laid the prospects of transformation, and which was neither treason nor collusion. The Round Table was a reasoned, peaceful idea for fundamental systemic change. With no victims and no bloodshed. Poles drew the lesson from the traumatic, tragic experiences of risings and battles which had cost hundreds, thousands of lives, and which ultimately failed. Let us not forget that either. But the exceptional role was played by the experience of Polish *Solidarność* – the experience of the millions of people who conquered their fear and proudly raised their heads. It was this experience which engendered the domino effect whereby awakened civil societies toppled one authoritarian regime after another: in the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and in the Baltic States. It was this experience that caused the Berlin Wall to tumble, that brought about German reunification and threw the "Iron Curtain" to the wastebasket of history, thus uniting a hitherto divided Europe. All this constitutes *Solidarność*'s historical fruit.

It is symbolic that UNESCO includes the original sheet of plywood bearing the 21 Postulates of the Inter-Factory Strike Committee in the Memory of the World Register, which lists the documents that were most influential to the fate of the world.

That is why, Ladies and Gentlemen, today's commemorations of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the August Accords and the creation of the *Solidarność* trade union are important not only for Poles, not only for Europeans. This is a day of celebration for all people who cherish the values of freedom,

democracy and human dignity, and who prefer discussion and agreement over conflict and building new walls.

Solidarność's message still lives on, still carries inspirational force. We saw this recently on the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities during the memorable events of the Orange Revolution. In them, Poles saw a reflection of their own past dreams, their protest, their fight for truth and freedom. During that time the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said: "without the hot Gdańsk of 1980 there would be no cold Kiev of 2004". Viktor, we welcome you here, in the historic city of Gdańsk! With our shared hopes, our best wishes, we welcome you with solidarity, solidarity with transformation, with Ukrainian democracy, with your efforts.

Solidarity seen in this light, as solidarity with those who fight against lies, lawlessness and oppression – will always remain one of the foundations of politics, I believe not only in Poland, but all over the world. Today and in the future. Poland has been continuing along this path for 16 years. We have ventured towards unification above the painful experiences of history; we built close partnerships and cooperation, the essence of which is the feeling of a common fate connecting all the people of our region. We have supported our neighbours' and friends' aspirations on their path into NATO, and today into the European Union. It is part and parcel of Poland's *raison d'état* which, I am sure, no government, no authority in the Republic of Poland shall ever wish to repudiate. It also marks the importance of modern solidarity!

Solidarność has influenced the course of history and changed the face of the post-Cold War world. However, the world of today once again needs solidarity. It is in need of this ideal and the bond it creates; as well as the fruit it bears. Our great compatriot Pope John Paul II spoke of this. He remains in our memory as a pilgrim of peace, goodness and the brotherhood of all humankind. It is here, on the Baltic Coast, in the difficult moments of 1987, that he said:

"For the sake of both the future of the individual and of humanity the word *solidarity* had to be uttered. Today, it flows like a great wave through a world which has grasped that we cannot live according to the principle of "everyone for himself", but only in accordance with the principle of "everyone for everyone else", "everyone joined together",. […] Solidarity entails the way for human pluralities, the nation, for instance, to live in unity, with respect for all the divergences and all the differences that exist between people. Hence unity in plurality, hence pluralism – all this is conveyed by the term *solidarność*."

And I am convinced that it is this solidarity – as described by John Paul II – that the modern world requires. It concerns spheres such as development, fighting poverty and injustice, providing universal security, the joint struggle against terrorism, and opening borders, structures and organizations to all those outside them who aspire to join either NATO or the European Union, along with other organizations that spread freedom, security and development and enforce respect for human rights, themselves respecting human dignity. This is the most modern message of the great ideal dating back 25 years.

I am happy that over the past 16 years Poland was able to do so much to realize this ideal. I am happy that I myself, during my 10 years as President, was able to participate in this process and to meet so many great allies along the way.

I am convinced that we have met together today in the perfect place and at the perfect time to tell everyone in the world that solidarity is a value that we should loyally adhere to, that much can be achieved through cooperation and setting aside our differences, that the heritage left by this great movement 25 years ago is still alive, and that we can look back on it and draw power from it.

That is why, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is here, in Gdańsk – the place and city in which the Nazi crusade against Poland and the world began 66 years ago, but also the place whence the push to revive a united Europe was boldly commenced a quarter of a century ago – that I proclaim, and we all proclaim: let us live in solidarity! Solidarity in Poland and Europe and the world. Let us unite in the face of evil and violence, against terrorism, against poverty and injustice. Let us – the people of the 21st century – come together! And let us never oppose each other! May the day of August 31st be honoured as we today have appealed, may it be present in the world's memory as a day of freedom and solidarity.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you very much, Mr. President – also for your willingness to abbreviate your speech. We expect the same from all of our distinguished and very dear guests. The next speech will be presented by Jose Manuel Barroso, Chairman of the European Commission. Mr President, the floor is yours.

Jose Manuel Barroso:

It is a great honour and privilege for me to be here with you today to commemorate August 31, 1980, the day that will always mark a new chapter in the history of Europe.

It is with you, the heroes of that day and the custodians of that memory that I wish to celebrate the second anniversary of the launching of the *Solidarność* movement since Poland became part of the European Union.

I have also come to Gdansk, this city that is so full of memories, to be among you, the people who wrote this page of history, to revisit the spirit of solidarity that infused your movement and tore down the borders.

Solidarity was a victory of freedom. It created a new world, offered a new perspective, forged new relationships between peoples and restored human dignity to a nation. This was a moment when people who had been reduced to objects took charge of their own destiny.

The word *solidarność* – solidarity – conveys the opposite of selfishness and solitude. By its very nature, solidarity cannot exist without others. This is why the history of humanity has always been accompanied by the image of hands that join together to make people stronger. Just as in Portugal in April 1974, when thousands of hands clutched carnations as a sign of solidarity in the face of dictatorship, in 1980 millions of Poles adopted the victory sign to signal the beginning of the end of a regime.

The signing of the agreement in August 1980 launched an irreversible process and laid the foundations for civil society throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The lesson you taught is a fundamental one: freedom is a fundamental human right. You said there is no freedom without solidarity – *Nie ma wolności bez solidarności*. You had the courage to say 'no' to violence and lies and to demand that respect for everyone. This was the courage Pope John Paul II urged you to show in Warsaw in 1979.

Your efforts mobilized the parts of Europe suffering under the Soviet yoke around the idea of democracy. This was the wave that led to the reunification of Europe. It enabled us to overcome the schism of the two Europes, to repair together the rupture in our history. Today, those two Europes have become one, united in their diversity.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you very much. I would now like to ask Mr. Horst Koehler, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to take the floor.

Horst Koehler [translation from German]:

Mr. Chairman Geremek, most distinguished President Kwaśniewski, most distinguished President Wałęsa, Excellencies from the world over, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I was extremely happy upon receiving the invitation to celebrate with all of you the 25th anniversary of the signing of the agreement which led to the creation of the Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarność". Twenty-five years ago, the eyes of the whole world were fixed on the Gdańsk Shipyard. It is here that Poland fought for its rights and freedom. Everybody came together in *Solidarność*: workers, farmers, the intelligentsia, the whole nation, everybody whose greatest wish was expressed by the song *Please return our independent Fatherland to us, oh Lord*. This was yet another instance of Poland giving the world an unforgettable example of its love for freedom and patriotism. I recall very well the television images from August of 1980, the image of Pope John Paul II on the Lenin Shipyard gate, the workers kneeling and praying in the street, Lech Wałęsa being carried on the shoulders of his friends. I will never forget the huge pen with which you, Beloved Mr. Wałęsa, signed the agreement.

The communist regime then tried once again to quell the overwhelming wish for freedom that became reality here in Gdańsk. I am very happy to see, especially now, during my official visit in Poland, that Poles are still very willing to remember the spontaneous, neighborly help and human solidarity which the Germans offered them at the time. Since that moment, we can say that Poles and Germans will always be there for each other.

In the end, Poles did not only liberate themselves. They began a process of historical importance, which still resounds today. President Saakashvili and President Yushchenko are witness to this. Poland threw off the burden of communism, and this

was the condition for European unity and thus also German unity. All of this fills every freedom loving human being in the whole world with gratitude, and that, Ladies and Gentlemen, is why I am here today.

In this cheerful day of celebration of the August anniversary, I would like to pass on to you the salutations, congratulations and thanks from my German compatriots. Tomorrow I will also be here in Gdańsk. On that day, together with the President of Poland, we will go back to the darkest chapter of our history, the German attack of September 1, 1939. This invasion brought upon Poland a long and murderous suffering, and flooded the whole world with death and destruction. In the end, the War and the expulsions struck the Germans themselves with all their ferocity, adding to the countless number of innocent victims.

Today and tomorrow are two historic dates, two anniversary celebrations so very different that it is almost impossible to imagine a bigger difference. But I am filled with confidence by the fact that Poles and Germans are jointly commemorating both anniversaries. Also, perhaps most importantly, we wish to keep and cherish our common experiences in our attitude towards history. Nobody is allowed to reinterpret history. We want Poles and Germans to speak about history sincerely and with a spirit of reconciliation. This binds us together even more strongly, as expressed by President Kwaśniewski and Federal President Johannes Rau two years ago, here in Gdańsk, in the Gdańsk Agreement[1].

Poles and Germans are linked by numerous personal encounters and neighborly projects. In Berlin itself, there live and work over 100,000 people whose native language is Polish. Germans, on the other hand, invest in Poland, work here and spend their holidays here. This way, my compatriots get to know the beauty, rich culture and history of Poland. I am especially pleased by the fact that more and more youth meetings are taking place, as it is obvious that very much depends on our youth. This is why Polish-German youth meetings and exchanges are so important. Because of this, I have become involved in supporting and strengthening them. And this is also why President Kwaśniewski and I, at the end of my visit, want to talk to Polish youth on the subject of good neighborly attitudes and friendship between our nations.

The common future of Poland and Germany is a united Europe. Its denomination is freedom and solidarity. We Germans are especially happy that Poland has finally become a member of the European Union. Poland is no longer oppressed by overpowering and jaundiced neighbours who plot against it above its head. *Nic o nas bez nas* – "Nothing about us without us" – this is Poland's right, and we in Germany will be happy to help accept this as an obvious fact.

The Polish love for freedom and preparedness for reform gave the European Union new impulses and I expect further such action. I believe that Poles and Germans will work together towards the further development of the European

[1] On October 29, 2003, the Presidents of Germany and Poland, Johannes Rau and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, signed a declaration in Gdańśk in which they called for a: "sincere European dialogue on the issue of people uprooted, expulsed and forced to flee".

Union, an even more dynamic enlargement and the realization of the political vision of the union of Europe. We must make use of the phase of contemplating Europe that we are currently in, so that we can tighten the gap which has been created between Europe's citizens and its institutions. Germans and Poles are well aware that the European Union is and wishes to remain a partner to the United States and cannot turn against that relationship.

Working towards a united, peaceful Europe in soldarity, we are moving towards the vision of *Solidarność*. We beyond Poland's borders are thus also becoming its worthy heirs, because freedom, peace and general prosperity are still topical and standing aims. This is what we want to achieve and preserve. Let us continue cooperating in that spirit.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you. I would now like to ask Mr. Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, to take the floor.

Viktor Yushchenko [translation from Ukrainian]:

Most distinguished President of the Republic of Poland, most distinguished Messrs Presidents and Heads of Governments, Dear Friends!

We are celebrating an event which a quarter of a century ago changed the course of history. It has survived not only in archives and film chronicles. The Polish move to freedom, which took place during the *Solidarność* period, is respected both in Poland and many other world countries. This is exemplified by the fact that the move towards freedom is taking place in many nations and forming a new face of Europe. Every Central and East European nation is moving towards democracy in its own way. *Solidarność* has become a signpost for all.

In the declaration of support for *Solidarność* issued by Ukraine's underground Helsinki group, which protects human rights, we read the following words: "You made an enormous contribution, but this is not all". These words turned out to be prophetic. Kiev's Independence Square has proved that the ideals upon which *Solidarność* was created are still victorious today. They are simple and understood by all. Civil society is stronger than the state machine. People are motivated not only by their own material interests. The need for freedom and human dignity can unite millions. Only dialogue, a round table and acceptance of non-violence can lead a nation out of crisis. The appearance of Lech Wałęsa on our "Orange" Independence Square in Kiev was a symbolic event for Ukrainians. For millions, it was a signal that the flag of independence has already made it to Kiev. Before that, we witnessed its victory in Warsaw, Prague, Berlin, Budapest and Tbilisi. The great victory of freedom in Ukraine opened the history of the 21st century. In my opinion, it will become a chronicle of unity, a grounding of common values and a victory over old divisions. We see the future of Ukraine in a united Europe and we are fully aware of the difficulties we must overcome. We hold in high esteem the support for our efforts that

we receive from European nations, and we value the initiative of the many governments that want to leave the door to the European Union open to Ukraine.

I would like to present the people of Polish and the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, with special thanks for their support and help in realizing our European choice. The Polish President is the great architect of Polish-Ukrainian partnership. I expect his words to be heard in every European capital: "Ukraine needs Europe, but Europe also needs Ukraine". I feel that this statement is but a continuation of an earlier statement oft'times repeated in the 1980s by Jacek Kuroń, one of *Solidarity*'s intellectual leaders "There will not be a free Ukraine without a free Poland, and without a free Ukraine there shall not be a free Poland". That was the first step towards forgiveness and the reconciliation of our two nations.

Today, independent Poland is a friend and a strategic partner of independent Ukraine. We do not lack the courage to read both the shining and doleful chapters of our history. I believe that after honouring the Polish burial grounds in Ukraine, we will soon witness the honouring of the graves of Ukrainian soldiers here in Poland. This historic Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is a continuation of the path towards freedom initiated by Franco-German reconciliation. Pope John Paul II believed that Europe will breathe freely only with both its two lungs – the West and the East. Today we are witnessing the realization of his faith.

Young democracies between the Baltic and the Black and Caspian Seas are capable of freeing this region from its divisions and simmering conflicts and turning it into a source of stability through economic and cultural cooperation. To support this willingness, Ukraine and Georgia have presented an initiative to organize a meeting of the region's state leaders and create a broad community of democratic choice. The support for this project will testify to the fact that solidarity is the basis of European order, just like it was for Poland 25 years ago.

It is here in Gdańsk that the slogan *Nie ma wolności bez Solidarności* – "There is no freedom without *Solidarność*" – was created. We Ukrainians said the same in other words: "We are many! They will not defeat us". *Solidarność* and reconciliation bear the fruit of freedom. We are reminded of this by today's celebrations. We are reminded of this by our entire history. We need remember its lessons.

Bronisław Geremek:

After the Orange Revolution, the Rose Revolution. The next speaker is the President of Georgia, Micheil Saakashvili.

Micheil Saakashvili:

Mr. President Wałęsa, President Kwaśniewski, Colleagues, Dear Friends.

It is truly a great dream come true for me to be in this beautiful city of Gdańsk, which is ten times more beautiful than I imagined.

When I was a 12 year-old kid growing up in the Soviet Republic of Georgia, it was a time when the Soviet Union met certain obligations under the Helsinki accords

and allowed foreign newspapers to be sold. They used to bring in "The Financial Times" from London, leave whatever could be left, and then sell it in the very exclusive hotels for foreigners. My friends and I used to enter those hotels from different entrances, of course without getting noticed by the KGB, and we would buy that newspaper for Soviet rubles. I remember when we managed to get into one of those hotels and got "The Financial Times" just four days after the proclamation of Martial Law in Poland. As you probably know, the first half of "The Financial Times" is politics and the second half is economy. And the first half was totally blank. There was nothing there. They were simply selling papers without articles in them… I was very angered, and made to realize what kind of a system I was living in, what kind of a country it was that was afraid of newspaper articles on elementary truth and fact.

The 25th anniversary of the creation of *Solidarność* has shown that it is important for people to understand how history functions and how states can be governed. When the Rose Revolution in Georgia happened, when the Orange Revolution in Ukraine happened, we thought that if the Russians don't blank out newspaper pages, they will surely falsify the facts. They still have considerable power in some countries, saying that this is all engineered by the CIA, the scenario was written in Washington, and this is all being imposed from abroad. But as we have stressed, the scenarios were not written by CIA analysts, but by Lech Wałęsa, by Vaclav Havel. So we in Georgia thank you for being an inspiration to us.

Our changes were a result of the whole *Solidarność* chain that winds through countries and travels through time. Yes, we learned how to organize a peaceful and non-violent political movement from you, President Wałęsa, and from you, President Havel. We learned how to organize human chains from Lithuania and Estonia. From Serbia, we learned how to link people in faraway regions into one great human chain via the multitude of cars and trucks and buses and tractors that brought them to our capital, Tbilisi.

I remember President Yushchenko referring to the Polish example, but we Georgians have also been inspired by the successes of independent and free Ukraine, which was an absolutely determining factor for all of us. Indeed, this fact manifests our great solidarity.

We are talking about the second wave of liberation of Europe. The first wave was initiated by Polish events, by the Polish revolution. But then there was the second wave started by Georgia, and the third wave that lifted Ukraine. I fervently believe that there will be subsequent waves – indeed, even as we speak. At the same time, in neighboring Belarus activists who were "uncomfortable" for the government have been arrested and kept in prison. My friend from Belarus explained to me that they are kept there simply because they traveled around the country daring to criticize the government.

But freedom cannot be stopped. Freedom and democracy will prevail everywhere, including in Belarus. I'm totally confident of that. Of course, these things need organization. This is why we in Georgia, together with Ukraine, made

a common declaration calling for the creation of a new democratic coalition of states. We are not waiting for others to recognize us, we need to help ourselves.

I think one of the main things we should stop today is the attempt to revise history. In this vein we must always remember that it was because of what happened in Poland that the Soviet Union started to disintegrate. This was the best thing that happened in the history of the 20th century, indeed it was its greatest geopolitical victory. Thus, any attempt to revise that fact of history is unacceptable. The process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union is something good not only for nations like Georgia or Ukraine, but also for the Russian people, in that the end of the USSR liberated so much freedom and energy in Russia.

Of course, democracy is not an easy thing to have. We all know this, we all know how embittering it can be to govern at times. President Wałęsa knows that, and President Yushchenko has learned about that. Governing is like surfing – you have to keep on the wave all the time. If you are a good surfer, you will stay there for a long time. But other, more powerful waves can come along and wash you away. But that's the only way to make life exciting.

We know this, that nobody is going to stay up on the wave forever. So the main thing is to have perspective, to understand the moment – and this can be done when there is freedom.

My dear friends, I am overwhelmed to be here. It's a terrific honour to be among such historic personalities, as all of you are. Thank you for what you have done and for what you still will do for humankind, for our shared future.

Bronisław Geremek:

The next speaker will be the President of Hungary, Laszlo Solyom.

Laszlo Solyom:

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The message of the history of the Polish people is the unconditional faith in liberty and independence. This has set an example for the world. The history of Poland and Hungary developed in close connection, and in many instances we fought together for freedom, and history has made us brothers. Our brotherhood continued throughout the period of communism, too. I clearly remember the first slogan in the Hungarian revolution of 1956, when a man was shouting to a schoolboy in the demonstration: "Poznan, Warsaw, Budapest". This expressed more than just a chronology of the cities to have risen up in protest. It also bore a message from our Polish brothers, one of freedom and independence.

Solidarity's victory 25 years ago on this very day was the beginning of the agony of the attempt towards an inhuman society. It ushered in the end of communist rule. The Poland of the 1980s has become an example and a reference point for groups of intellectuals and social movements of workers that have turned against their regimes. It had a determining impact on the formation of the Hungarian opposition, as well as on the awakening of Hungarian civil society.

The symbol of the 1956 Hungarian revolution is the red, white and green banner with a round hole in the middle, from which the coat of arms of the communist state was cut out. Since 1980 freedom has been symbolized by the white and red badge of *Solidarność*. The August of 1980 showed that civil society can rise up, even in Central and East European countries, and the whole population can act in unity and solidarity against the oppressive communist system.

As for me, the example of Poland was also a personal experience. In the 1980s I had contacts to the liberal Catholic intellectuals in Kraków. Then as a participant of the 1989 Round Table discussions we paid attention to the course of those talks and on the affirmation of the constitutional system. I feel fortunate that I could participate in the formation of the proposal of a civil movement, fortunate that politics can be different, and that in my first speech delivered abroad I can call upon the anniversary of *Solidarity*'s victory.

President Wałęsa, the success of the movement you led was the result of the encounter between interest advocacy and a deep faith in human values. Such moments of grace are rare in history. But even in normal times we must not give up our faith in freedom and human dignity. Freedom, human dignity and the rule of law must be respected and protected day in and day out. This is the lesson that we have drawn from *Solidarity*'s struggle for freedom. On behalf of the Hungarian people, I would like to express our deep respect and gratitude for the admirable and historic role of *Solidarność* , for it was an important example for us.

Bronisław Geremek:

Mr Boris Tadic, the President of Serbia, will now take the floor.

Boris Tadić:

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends of Liberty, I was here with you, 25 years ago, even though I have never been here before. My thoughts were with you as you suffered. As you fought for your freedom, I was demonstrating in your support in the streets of Belgrade. What began here was a contest for the soul of Europe. You won, and we all won. We defeated communism. It is proper for us to celebrate the courage, resilience, and sacrifice of the Polish nation. *Solidarity*'s bloodless insurrection took 10 years to succeed in part because its leaders sought to re-unite Poland, not further divide it.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, during the 1990s, during that dark decade of the repressive tyranny of Slobodan Milosevic – Serbia's lost decade – we reapplied the lessons of *Solidarity* and hundreds of thousands of ordinary people joined in the march to liberty. When they beat us with sticks, we did not fight back with our fists. Once again, some of us were sent to jail, some had to flee the country.

Later when young policemen from the provinces came to Belgrade armed with rifles and were given orders to harm their fellow Serbs, little girls and grandmothers gave them flowers to put in their barrels. We avoided Serb-on-Serb violence,

because we always remembered the example of *Solidarity*. We remembered that victory required unity. Victory required solidarity, fraternity. All of Serbia had to come together against tyranny.

In one month – on October 5 – I will lead the celebrations of *our* peaceful revolution. We have achieved much in the five years since we peacefully overthrew Milosevic. But there is still much road to travel. To secure our liberty, we must rid ourselves of the nightmare ideologies of the past. We must fully understand that nationalism divides us while patriotism unites us. We must finish building our country's institutions of liberty. And to secure democracy in Serbia, we must also demand that all our neighbours do the same. The region must rise together, otherwise it will fall back into the abyss together.

Our path to the future, to a future which is Poland's gift, is clearly marked. We seek what Poland has achieved with great impatience – a European and a Euro-Atlantic future. What is at stake is the triumph of the values defended here 25 years ago – the values of the West. You will all remember how you felt when a son of Poland returned to his homeland and repeated, time and again, "be not afraid!". Today we in South-East Europe are also unafraid.

Bronisław Geremek:

Now America. Mr. James Baker, former Secretary of State and Personal Representative of the President of the United States, will be the next speaker.

James Baker III:

Mr. President, President Wałęsa, Chairman Geremek, Honoured Guests,

We gather here today to honour the heroes of 1980, shipyard workers, their supporters around Poland and the then-unemployed electrician who joined together to demand justice and freedom and democracy for their country. Their efforts helped to free this country, and of course end the Cold War. Their courage inspired other fighters for freedom, at first throughout Europe, and today throughout the world.

President Jimmy Carter and then Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, both of whom I had the privilege to serve, supported the people of Poland in their inalienable demand for freedom and for dignity and for justice. Before the victory was won, of course, they had to endure Martial Law, they had to endure prison, and in some cases years of persecution in hiding. Yet *Solidarity* never wavered, either from its determination or from its democratic principles. And *Solidarity*'s leader, Lech Wałęsa, never wavered from his confidence, and the victory of the movement he led and the cause that he championed.

The United States is proud of its consistent support, the support that it provided to *Solidarity* and the support that it has provided to the Polish people. Lane Kirkland, whose widow our companies will meet today as part of our official delegation, Lane Kirkland rallied the American labour movement behind *Solidarity*,

the one truly representative labour movement in the former Soviet Bloc. During those dark years of Martial Law, President Reagan put the strength of the United States at the service of freedom. The first President Bush stood with Poland in 1989, coming to this city as the Round Table talks broke the lock of communist power, opened the door to elections and then to a free Poland, which now of course has reclaimed its place in a Europe whole, free and at peace.

As American Secretary of State during the first months and years of Poland's regained freedom, I had the enormous pleasure to lay the cornerstone of the great Polish-American alliance. Today Poland and America stand together in support of freedom for others in the world, just as America stood with Poland in the years of its struggle.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a profound honour to be with you today in this place and a privilege to read the greetings of our current President Bush to the freedom fighters and the Polish patriots who began that successful struggle for freedom 25 years ago. The President's letter is as follows:

"I send greetings to those gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the *Solidarity* movement 25 years ago, when the Gdansk shipyard worker led by Lech Wałęsa won the right to strike and to form independent trade unions. This victory gave birth to *Solidarity*, a union and a movement in which men and women from different backgrounds came together to demand political rights and better living standards. This milestone is the opportunity to recognize the *Solidarity* movement for its vital and important contributions to the spread of liberty.

Poland is a stronger nation because of the historic events of 25 years ago. Since the establishment of *Solidarity*, Poland has become a free and a vibrant society and serves as an example of the transformational power of freedom. Today the United States and Poland share great responsibilities, responsibilities to expand freedom and to advance the cause of peace worldwide. The Polish people have demonstrated their commitment to freedom in their own country and around the world, through their contributions and their sacrifices in the war on terror. Poland is a good friend of America, and I look forward to strengthen the ties between our two countries.

As we commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Solidarity movement we are reminded that all people are entitled to choose their form of government and their form of leadership. Those striving for democratic rights need our support, and they can look to *Solidarity* as a shining example of liberty and justice.

Laura and I send our best wishes on this special occasion. May God bless the people of Poland. Signed, George W. Bush."

Bronisław Geremek:

Now time for an especially valuable moment of concentrating on and appraising *Solidarność*. Our next speaker today in Gdańsk is Vaclav Havel.

Vaclav Havel:

Presidents, Prime Ministers, Dear Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to thank the organizers of this conference and especially my friend Lech for inviting me. I am very glad to be here today, for this opportunity to greet and congratulate the founders and supporters of *Solidarność*, something all the more fitting on this important.

I remember very well what happened 25 years ago. I was in a prison together with some of my friends from our movement Karta 77. We read about the events in Poland in the official Czech newspaper "Rude Pravo", and you can imagine what they were writing. But we were able to read between the lines and we understood that something amazing was happening, and this encouraged us. Some policemen cautioned us: "Don't bother hoping. We are not in Poland", but we sensed what *Solidarność* meant. It signified the first close cooperation between the intellectual opposition and public movements, workers. We read in "Rude Pravo" about the leader of *Solidarność*, that around him were our old friends Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń, Zbyszek Bujak, Jaś Lityński and others. They were named as advisers of this huge workers' movement. And our main feeling was that this was the beginning of the end. And it was.

I think that if this day is to be a day of freedom and solidarity, it is necessary to mention that there are countries where people are not completely free and where there are also dissidents, minorities fighting for freedom, for better living conditions. I am thinking about Belarus, about Cuba, about Burma, about North Korea.

I think that solidarity and freedom also means responsibility. If we are responsible we have to think now about those people and we have to send them signs of our support.

Bronisław Geremek:

Thank you very much. The next speaker will be Zbigniew Brzeziński.

Zbigniew Brzeziński:

Solidarność was born in Gdańsk. I was born in Warsaw. That is why I will speak in Polish.

Dear countrymen! Our *Solidarity* hinges on the answer to a fundamental question: did *Solidarność*, apart from being a rising and an overthrow, also constitute a breakthrough? A rising or a breakthrough? I shall return to this issue in a moment, but I must, of course, begin by underscoring *Solidarność*'s geopolitical import. It is certainly – and without exaggeration – guaranteed a place in the pantheon of great revolutions, on an equal footing with the American, the French and the Indian (Gandhi's). *Solidarność* was the explosive epicentre of a political tsunami that swept away the Soviet Bloc, followed by the Soviet Union itself, and buried a vicious ideology which at a certain point strove for world domination.

Today it is easily forgotten how mighty the Soviet Union looked, how self-assured the communist authorities appeared, when you in Gdańsk threw down the gauntlet with the world watching. From *Solidarność* ... to Freedom! It was an act of remarkable historical courage and a prodigious social uprising.

At the time, you were practically alone: in Europe – the beat of the great Polish heart could be heard in but one Western capital. During a conversation I had with the Holy Father – Holy in the literal sense – and Father Dziwisz, I recall being struck by their absolute conviction that Martial Law would not last. But I also remember a remark by one Western head of government that Martial Law was, alas, inevitable. In Europe, Poland were rather isolated.

But not so in America. President Carter was convinced that the time was ripe for human rights to take hold, that the violence stemming from a primitive ideology and imperial cruelty was historically obsolete, that it was America's duty to help those who are prepared to fight for their freedom. This is why already in 1979, for the first time during the long years of the Cold War, the United States engaged in direct support for the Afghan resistance movement in its armed struggle against the Soviet army.

We then believed that the birth of political *Solidarity* in Poland amidst the new international situation provides Polish society with room to manoeuvre, to evolve politically without engendering a bloody revolution – that it is our obligation to steadily, yet decisively lend our support to *Solidarność*. And this we did, especially in December 1980 when we warned Moscow of the possible dangerous consequences of any armed intervention in Poland.

Why did *Solidarność* prevail? Because it was something far more momentous than just a political movement, a trade union, or even a desire for independence. It was not only a movement. It was also Spirit – a powerful moral force, a coalition founded on democratic, religious and human values. A coalition free from national or class hatred, a coalition whose aim was not to avenge past wrongs, but to build a brighter future based on social reconciliation and reconciliation with its neighbours. This Spirit was the source of triumph for *Solidarność* – which in all likelihood marked history's most significant and successful bloodless revolution.

Today Poland – along with the entire world, and especially with America itself – again requires something like *Solidarność*. Not just an uprising, but a breakthrough.

An uprising is a feat of courage; a breakthrough constitutes qualitative change.

Poland needs to rejuvenate its political life, to raise the level of public debate, to clear government of the grime brought on by graft, to rouse that same feeling of dedication to a greater cause once reserved for freedom. Poland needs *Solidarność* in order to be Poland, that is, a just and modern nation ruled by law.

But *Solidarność* bears even greater historical significance: as a guide to the future. As a reminder for the whole world, and for super-powerful America in particular, that in this day and age one cannot dogmatically impose upon humanity – which for the very first time in all its history is fully awake and increasingly anxious – a unilateral vision of the future. Today's new political quality necessitates a breakthrough in fundamental political concepts.

Social and international solidarity alone is a moral and politically justified response to the challenges of globalization, modernity and the injustices still prevalent in a world that is concomitantly going through a severe spiritual crisis.

Only respect for personal dignity – in its ethnic, national and religious aspects – not slogans about the universal import of some single model of democracy, can help democratize the world. The sole formula for a better tomorrow for humanity as a whole is pluralistic solidarity consciously striving towards Global Civil Society.

And for this, for today's free Poland as a guide to a better tomorrow, I thank you with all my heart.

Bronisław Geremek:

I would now like to ask Professor Timothy Garton Ash to take the floor. He, too, will have a problem as to which language to choose, but that remains his decision.

Timothy Garton Ash:

On this day and in this place it is right that we should remember *Solidarność* at its best. And what was *Solidarność* at its best? It was a peaceful, civic mass movement for national and individual liberation. It was a workers' revolution against a so-called workers' state and a spontaneous manifestation of human dignity.

At its best, it showed us that even complete strangers from very different backgrounds – worker, intellectual and farmer, religious and secular, from left and right – can, in such exceptional moments, become like brothers and sisters. And not, to recall the old Latin adage, like competing wolves: *homo homini lupus*. The men and women we should remember above all today are those, wrongly called '*ordinary* people', whose names are not recorded in any history book, but who in those days, each in their own way, did this extraordinary thing. *They* made *Solidarność*.

With hindsight, we can see that this Polish revolution was the beginning of the end of communism in Europe, of the Cold War, and thus of the unnatural East/West division of our continent that we called in shorthand 'Yalta'. In fact, the Cold War divided not just our own continent, but the world, as well. In this sense, we might even say that the "Polish August" was the beginning of the end of the short twentieth century.

Some ill-informed persons sometimes suggest that 'the Europeans' don't care enough about freedom. Yet here once again it was Europeans who were fighting on the front line in the battle for freedom, as they have done so often before. But they fighting by peaceful means. This was a struggle not just *for Poland to be Poland* but *also for Poland to be Europe*.

On this 25th anniversary of the "Polish August", I believe we can venture a still larger claim. This Polish revolution, which in truth unfolded across a whole decade – from the visit of Pope John Paul II in the summer of 1979 to the triumphant summer of 1989 – the Polish revolution pioneered a new model of revolution, replacing the violent model which for two centuries since 1789 had been what people thought of if you said 'revolution'. That's why we felt the need to festoon the world 'revolution' with qualifying such adjectives as: self-limiting, peaceful, evolutionary, negotiated...

Traditionally, revolutionaries – whether Jacobins, Bolsheviks or Islamist – have said 'the end justifies the means'. *Solidarność* understood, as did Vaclav Havel and

other courageous and far-sighted pioneers of central Europe's self-liberation, that the methods you adopt themselves determine where you arrive. You cannot lie your way through to the truth, or murder your way to love. As Adam Michnik explained at the time: those who start by violently storming the Bastille will end up building new Bastilles of their own.

None of the formidable cohort of Western journalists present in Poland in 1980 – many of them here again today – had the bright idea of calling this a Velvet Revolution. That had to wait until Prague in 1989. But in effect, this was the first velvet revolution. Other velvet revolutions have followed: from Central Europe in 1989 to Serbia, Georgia and, most recently, Ukraine. But they have also taken place on other continents, from the Philippines to South Africa. Each country has done things its own way, with new and distinctive features. All have developed and changed the model. But in every case, they too have needed solidarity: solidarity between citizens in their own countries, and international solidarity from a growing world community of democracies.

On this memorable day, our shared hope and our common purpose must surely be that this new model of peaceful, negotiated revolution, one that lays the foundations for future democracies, will prevail for at least another 25 years – and in every land that still has need of it.

In this widest sense, let me conclude: *Niech żyje solidarność*! – Long live solidarity! The one with a small "s".

Bronisław Geremek:

It is a fitting and just decision that we present here in Gdańsk the message of *Solidarność* as a great phenomenon of Polish and European history, along with the topicality of the oeuvre created by Polish workers in 1980. This oeuvre created the possibilities of toppling an evil system and restoring freedom.

This is why we proclaim at this historical moment in Gdańsk that the day of August 31 should be present in the memory of Europe and the memory of the world as a day of freedom and solidarity.

I would like to thank all the speakers and participants. With that, I close the conference.

GDAŃSK DECLARATION ON THE 25th ANNIVERSARY OF "SOLIDARNOŚĆ"

Twenty five years have passed since the wave of strikes launched by Gdansk Shipyard workers under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa, since the August Agreements, and since the emergence of the legendary Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarność" (*Solidarity*), which, rejecting the use of force, shook the very foundations of the world communist system. It is a historical truth that the Polish August of 1980 – when Polish workers backed by millions of people from all walks of life began a struggle for bread and freedom – paved the way to political change not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in many other countries of the world that were languishing under totalitarian oppression.

We, the participants of the 25th anniversary of "Solidarność":

- Bearing in mind the words of Pope John Paul II, that "we cannot live according to the principle of 'everyone for himself', but only in accordance with the principle of 'everyone for everyone else', 'everyone joined together'", which is why "For the sake of the future of both the individual and of humanity the word solidarity had to be uttered",
- Recognizing the growing importance of the notion of solidarity in international relations, as expressed by the Millennium Declaration on managing global processes in accordance with the basic principles of equality and social justice,
- Mindful of the fact that freedom and social solidarity are among the shared values deeply rooted in European tradition,
- Recalling that solidarity between countries, nations and societies is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union,
- Bearing in mind the message of the First Congress of "Solidarność" to the working people of Eastern Europe, which expressed the common destiny of that part of Europe,
- Recalling that the introduction of Martial Law by the communist authorities against the 10-million strong "Solidarność" trade union failed to crush the pursuit of freedom by Polish society,
- Considering that due to the sacrifice and determination of people non-violently fighting for their rights, and owing to the support of democratic organizations the world over, Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries became democratic, free and independent and our continent became an area virtually free of totalitarianism,
- Mindful of the fact that parts of the world continue to await international assistance and solidarity, particularly countries with totalitarian or authoritarian governments, where repression and persecution are the order of the day and drastic instances of human and civil rights violations occur,
- Convinced that determined striving for freedom and reasoned, united human efforts in the pursuit of a just peace and sustainable development create an opportunity to respond properly to today's challenges,

at this historic moment, hereby express the conviction that August 31 should be enshrined in the world's memory as A Day of Freedom and Solidarity.

SPEAKERS' BIOGRAPHIES

MADELEINE KORBEL ALBRIGHT

Born in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Emigrated to America with her family after the communists took control in 1948.

In 1997 she became the first woman to hold the position of US Secretary of State and the highest ranking woman in US history. Her accomplishments included the expansion of NATO and NATO's successful campaign to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the promotion of peace in the Balkans, the reduction of nuclear dangers from Russia, the expansion of democracy around the world and the expansion of America's relationship with China.

She was the Director of Women in Foreign Service Programmes and a Research Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University during the decade prior to her return to public service.

She has written extensively on change in communist systems, particularly on the role of the media. Her thesis at Columbia University was entitled "The Role of the Press in Political Change: Czechoslovakia 1968" (1976). In 1983 she published a book "Poland, The Role of the Press in Political Change". For her research, she travelled to Poland in the fall of 1981, meeting many leaders of the *Solidarność* movement, including L. Wałęsa and B. Geremek, as well as many people working for *Solidarność* newspapers. Her autobiography "Madam Secretary: A Memoir" was published in September, 2003.

NEAL ASCHERSON

Born in Edinburgh in 1932. Worked in several British newspapers, among others in *The Observer*, *The Scotsman*, *The Independent*. He first visited Poland in 1957, and has been back almost every year since then as a reporter. He was present at the formation of *Solidarity* in the Gdańsk strike in August 1980, and later wrote two books about Polish modern history: "The Polish August" and "Struggles for Poland".

He holds the Polish Order of Merit.

TIMOTHY GARTON ASH

Professor of European Studies in the University of Oxford, Director of the European Studies Centre at St Antony's College, Oxford, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

After reading Modern History at Oxford, his research into the German resistance to Hitler took him to Berlin, where he lived, in both the western and eastern halves of the divided city, for several years. From there, he started to travel widely behind the Iron Curtain. Throughout the 1980s, he reported and analyzed the emancipation of Central Europe from communism in contributions to the *New York Review of Books*, the *Independent*, the *Times* and the *Spectator*. He was Foreign Editor of the *Spectator*, editorial writer on Central European affairs for the London Times, and a columnist on foreign affairs in the *Independent*. He also contributes to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.

He is the author of eight books: " 'Und willst Du nicht mein Bruder sein' … Die DDR heute"; "The Polish Revolution: Solidarity" (1983), which won the Somerset Maugham Award; "The Uses of

Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe" (1989), for which he was awarded the Prix Européen de l'Essai; "We the People: The Revolution of '89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague" (1990; US Edition: "The Magic Lantern", translated into 15 languages); "In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent" (1993), named Political Book of the Year in Germany; "The File: A Personal History" (1997 – appeared in 14 languages); "History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990s" (1999); and, most recently, "Free World" (2005.)

JOSÉ MANUEL BARROSO

Born in 1956 and grew up in Lisbon. He studied law at the University of Lisbon, followed by a Masters in Political Science at the University of Geneva. For over twenty years since then his career has moved between academic and political life.

He joined the Social Democratic Party in 1980, aged 24. In 1985 he won his first seat in the Portuguese Parliament. Promoted first as State Secretary for Home Affairs and later State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs, a position which he held until 1995. Became President of his Party in 1999. Successfully led his Party to a general election victory in 2002.

At the age of 46, Mr. Barroso took up office as Prime Minister of Portugal where he introduced a far reaching programme of financial and structural reforms for the economy. In 2004 he was approached as a candidate for President of the European Commission and was confirmed as European Commission President in November 2004.

Author of a number of publications on political science, international relations and European Union issues, including "Sistema de Governo e Sistema Partidário" (*co-authored*), Lisbon, 1980; "Le systeme politique portugais face a l'intégration européenne", Lisbon and Lausanne, 1983; "Política de Cooperaçao", 1990; "A Política Externa Portuguesa" 1994-1995; "Uma Certa Ideia de Europa", 1999; "Uma Ideia para Portugal", 2000, "Mudar de Modelo", 2002 and "Reformar Dois Anos de Governo", 2004.

Holder of over twenty decorations, notably including Portugal's Gra-Cruz da Ordem Militar de Cristo in 1996; chosen Personality of the Year in 1991 by the Foreign Press Association in Portugal; winner of the Casa da Imprensa prize in the area of politics in 1992; named Global Leader for Tomorrow by the World Economic Forum in 1993.

JAN KRZYSZTOF BIELECKI

Born 1951, he completed his studies and started his career as an economic lecturer at Gdańsk University in 1973, until losing his job in 1981 for his anti-communist political activities.

He was involved in the historic strike at Gdańsk shipyard in 1980. *Solidarność* activist in 1980-1981 and an economic advisor of the Union in 1981. During the first half of the 1980s, he continued to play an active role in the then illegal *Solidarność* – publishing underground political materials and acting as liaison officer for the executive committee of the Union. During this period Mr. Bielecki contributed to the formation of the movement's economic policy by developing a market-based approach as an alternative to Poland's communist state central planning.

The newly elected President L. Wałęsa requested J.K. Bielecki to form a government (from 5.01.1991). His cabinet successfully negotiated foreign debt reduction and the EC Association Agreement. The government resigned following democratic parliamentary elections in December 1991.

As Member of Parliament (1989-1993), he was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Chief Delegate of the Sejm to the European Parliament until July 1992, when he was nominated Minister for European Integration in Ms H. Suchocka's government.

In December 1993 Mr Bielecki was appointed to the Board of Directors at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London, where he represented Poland until September 2003. Since October 2003 he is the President and CEO of Bank Pekao S.A.

Mr Bielecki has published a number of articles for both foreign and Polish specialist papers and magazines, including *The Wall Street Journal*, *Die Welt*, *Rzeczpospolita*, *Gazeta Bankowa*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Wprost*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and many others. He is co-author of the book "Histoire de l'Europe", published in Paris (1997).

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIŃSKI

Counsellor, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington, DC.

1977-1981 – National Security Advisor to the President J. Carter. In 1981 awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom "for his role in the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the United States."

He is, among others, Co-Chairman, American Committee for Peace in Chechnya; Member, Board of Directors/Trustees of Jamestown Foundation, Freedom House, International Crisis Group, Trilateral Commission, Polish-American Enterprise Fund and of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation, American Friends of Rabin Medical Center; Member, International Honorary Committee, Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw.

International advisor to major U.S./global corporations; frequent participant in annual business/trade conventions; also a frequent public speaker, commentator on major domestic and foreign TV programs, and contributor to domestic and foreign newspapers and journals.

1966-68 – Member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State; 1985 – Member of the President's Chemical Warfare Commission; 1987-88 – Member of the NSC-Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy; 1987-89 – Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (a commission to oversee U.S. intelligence activities).

1973-1976 – Director of the Trilateral Commission; in the 1968 presidential campaign, chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force; in the 1976 presidential campaign, principal foreign policy advisor to Jimmy Carter. In 1988, co-chairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force. Past Member of Boards of Directors of Amnesty International, Council on Foreign Relations, Atlantic Council, the National Endowment for Democracy.

1960-89 – on the faculty of Columbia University; 1953-60 – on the faculty of Harvard University. Ph.D., Harvard University, 1953; B.A. and M.A., McGill University 1949 and 1950.

His most recent book is "The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership"; also author of: "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives"; "The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th Century", as well as of "Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century"; "Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest"; "Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981"; "The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan"; "Between two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era"; "The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict"; and of other books and many articles in numerous U.S. and foreign academic journals.

ZBIGNIEW BUJAK

Born in 1954 in Kielce voivodeship. In 1977 he graduated from the Electroenergetic Technical School while employed at Ursus' mechanical division. From 1978 he circulated the underground press and was involved in opposition activity. Member of KOR, co-organizer of Ursus' *Solidarność* chapter. In 1980-81 he was in *Solidarity*'s highest authorities. After the imposition of Martial Law he led *Solidarność* in the underground and was the person most successfully to have evaded capture – his arrest occurred not until 1986. Released from prison during the general amnesty, he again joined *Solidarity*'s highest leaders.

Co-founder of "Polish-Hungarian *Solidarność*". From 1991-1997 an MP to the Polish Sejm, where he represented the parties "Democratic Union" and the "Union of Labour". Since

1998 a member of "Freedom Union". For several years he worked as the head of the Central Customs Bureau.

In 1998 he graduated from the political sciences department, University of Warsaw. Following his unsuccessful bid to be elected mayor of Warsaw he withdrew from politics. Currently he is pursuing doctoral studies.

JERZY BUZEK

Born in 1940 in Śląsk (Silesia). After completing his studies at the Department of Mechanical Engineering of the Silesian Technical University, he started working in the Institute of Chemical Engineering at the Polish Academy of Science (PAN) in Gliwice. In 1969 he finished his doctoral studies and completed a scientific internship at Cambridge in 1971. Mr. Buzek went on to become a professor. In 1992 he headed a national team of experts from PAN which prepared an expertise in the field of environment protection and co-founded the Consortium of Air Protection.

A *Solidarność* organizer since 1980, he was a delegate at the first National Congress of the Union in 1981 and chaired its second round. During Martial Law he was the representative of the Silesian Region in the clandestine Temporary Coordination Committee of *Solidarność*.

1997-2001 Prime Minister of Poland.

2002-2004 Vice-Rector at the Polonia University in Częstochowa.

In 2004 elected to the European Parliament. Mr. Buzek is a member of the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and of the Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. In 2004 he was an EP official observer at the presidential elections in Ukraine.

He is the Vice-President of the European Energy Foundation – the second biggest such organization in Europe.

Lord DAHRENDORF, RALF, KBE, FBA

Social scientist, Cross Bench Member of the House of Lords.

Born 1929 in Hamburg, Germany. Father Gustav Dahrendorf, Social Democrat member of Reichstag; active in anti-Nazi resistance, survived war in prison. Ralf Dahrendorf arrested for schoolboy anti-Nazi activity in 1944-45. After the war, studying philosophy and classics at the University of Hamburg (Dr.phil. 1952), and sociology at the LSE (Ph.D. 1956). Professor of Sociology at Universities of Hamburg (1958), Tübingen (1960) and Konstanz (1966). Visiting Fellowships and Professorships at the Center for Advanced Study in Palo Alto, Columbia University, Princeton University, the University of British Columbia, and the Russell Sage Foundation in New York.

From 1966 held various public and political offices in Germany. Government adviser on educational reform. Member of the Land Parliament of Baden-Württemberg (1968-70), and of the Bundestag (1969-70) for the Free Democratic Party. Junior Minister for Foreign Affairs in Willy Brandt's first government (1969-70). Member of the Commission of the European Communities responsible for foreign trade and foreign affairs (1970-73) and for research, science and education (1973-74).

Regular contributor to newspapers and journals. Author or editor of over forty books including: "Class and Class Conflict", 1959; "Society and Democracy in Germany", 1967; "Homo Sociologicus", 1968; "The New Liberty", 1975; "Life Chances", 1978; "On Britain", 1982; "The Modern Social Conflict", 1988; "Reflections on the Revolution in Europe", 1990; "LSE – A History of the London School of Economics", 1995; "After 1989", 1997; "Liberal und unabhängig, Gerd Bŭcerius und seine Zeit", 2000; "Universities after Communism", 2000; "Über Grenzen", 2002; "Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Ordnung", 2003; "Der Wiederbeginn der Geschichte", 2004.

GÁBOR DEMSZKY

Born in 1952. As a student at the Faculty of Law of Budapest University he was suspended for a year for organizing a student demonstration in 1972. He completed his studies and was awarded a doctorate in 1976. Due to difficulties in finding employment as a lawyer, he took part in a number of sociological research projects. 1976-1981.

In 1979 he signed the Act of Solidarity with the Czechoslovak Charter 77. He is a founder of SZETA, the Fund for Supporting the Poor. Because of his political activity he lost his job, passport and the right to publish. In the spring of 1981 he travelled to Poland to study publishing techniques of the Polish opposition in order to start a samizdat publishing house. In 1981, together with present Member of Parliament László Rajk, they organized a publishing house named AB Independent Publishers. In spite of police raids, arrests and court orders they were able to start publishing, first printing a collection about Polish resistance movements. Gábor Demszky has also regularly written for the samizdat paper Beszélo and several others.

In 1983 he was sentenced to 6 years in prison – finally he received a suspended sentence. In 1984 the International Association of Publishers awarded him the Freedom to Publish Prize.

He is one of the founders of the Network of Free Initiatives and the political party Alliance of Free Democrats. He was elected to the Executive Board of the party in 1989. At the first free election in the spring of 1990 he was elected Member of Parliament. He is also the founder and one of the directors of the Association to Save Children.

In 1992 elected vice-president of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Council of Europe, re-elected in 1994. In 1990 elected Mayor of Budapest and re-elected in 1994 and 1998 for consecutive four-year terms.

JIŘI DIENSTBIER

Born 1937. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia 1989-1992.

He graduated in 1960 from the Faculty of Philosophy, Charles University in Prague.

1958-69: a Radio Prague commentator, correspondent in the Far East, Europe and the USA.

After the Soviet-led military invasion of 1968, until 1989 he worked as an archivist, night watchman and stoker. During that time he published clandestine journals in samizdat, kept in touch with Western politicians, academia and journalists as well as independent organizations both in democratic and communist countries, including the Polish Workers Defence Committee - KOR. He was one of the first signatories and most important activists of Charter 77, which was intended to defend human and civil rights and preparing democratic political changes. In 1979 he was sentenced to three years of prison together with five other members of the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted.

After the establishment of the Civic Forum in November 1989, he became the spokesman of its Coordinating Centre until December 1989, when he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (until 1992).

2001-2003: Visiting Professor in the USA and Charles University, Prague.

Founder and Chairman of the Czech Council on Foreign Relations since 1994, member of the International Press Institute and the Commission on Global Governance. Personal representative of the Czech President to a special Group of 16 heads of states for multilateral cooperation and reform of the United Nations (1994-2000). 1998-2001 he was a Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

J. Dienstbier has published hundreds of articles and essays at home and abroad. His most important books are: "Indonesia – from Sukarno to Suharto", "Radio against the Tanks", "Dreaming of Europe", "From Dreams to Reality", "Tax on Blood".

Recipient of many honours and awards including the Czech Medal for Merits grade I and the T.G. Masaryk Medal, the Pro Merito of the Council of Europe, German Das Grosse Verdienstkreuz mit Stern und Schulterband, the Berlin Bär Kultur Preis and World Press Freedom Hero (IPI Congress, 2000). He holds a *honoris causa* doctorate from the University of Burgundy in France.

BRONISŁAW GEREMEK

Graduate of the Faculty of History at Warsaw University and of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. Lecturer and head of the Polish Culture Institute at the Sorbonne (1962-1965), professor of the College de France (1992-1993), he is currently head of the Department of European Civilization at the Natolin campus of the College d'Europe. His main area of academic study is the history of culture and medieval societies.

In the late 70s supported the democratic opposition and participated in the unofficial educational activities of the "flying university".

In 1980, when strikes broke out in Gdańsk and Szczecin, he signed the letter of 61 intellectuals, which called on the authorities to find a political solution to the conflict. He joined the workers and became a member of the Experts Council of the Striking Committee in the shipyards. Became one of the chief political advisors to L.Wałęsa and *Solidarność* in 1980-1981.

On December 13, 1981 he was interned – freed in late 1982. Supported the underground Union and became one of the chief advisors to the underground National Executive Committee of *Solidarność*. In 1989, during the Round Table negotiations with the communist authorities he was one of the leading strategists of the opposition.

1989-2001: Deputy to the Parliament , where he headed i.a. the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Constitutional Committee and the European Law Committee. One of the founders of the Democratic Union (later the Freedom Union) and Chairman of the party's parliamentary club in the years 1990-97.

1997-2000: Minister of Foreign Affairs. An active proponent of Poland's attainment of full NATO and European Union membership.

Awarded many international and national decorations and distinctions, among others, the German Order of the Great Cross of Merit with Star, the French Legion of Honour, the Order of the White Eagle of the Republic of Poland, the Charlemagne Award, the Grand Prix de la Francophonie, the W. Averell Harriman Democracy Award. He also holds over 20 *honoris causa* doctorates. A member of many prestigious institutions, such as: Academia Europea, Académie Universelle des Cultures, The Royal Historical Society, The PEN Club, The Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Professor Geremek's academic career has been marked by numerous articles, papers and publications as well as ten books translated into 10 languages.

In June 2004 Professor Bronisław Geremek was elected a Member of the European Parliament on the Freedom Union ticket.

BERNARD GUETTA

Journalist and an international affairs specialist. Editorialist of L'Express and radio "France Inter". He is also a columnist-at-large at *La Republicca*, *Le Temps*, and *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

From 1969 to 1979 he was a journalist for *Le Nouvel Observateur* and from 1979 to 1990 a correspondent for *Le Monde* in Vienna, Warsaw, Washington and Moscow. Between 1991 and 1993 he was the editor-in-chief of *l'Expansion* and from 1996 to 1999 editor-in-chief of *Le Nouvel Observateur*.

He is the author of "Eloge de la Tortue", co-author of a series of interviews "Patron, mais...", "Pologne" and of the documentary "URSS-USA: Le Grand Jeu (1977-91)".

Has received many French and international awards.

ALEKSANDER HALL

Born 1953 – Historian, writer, politician.

An active member of the Gdańsk opposition movement since the 1970s, co-founder of the Young Poland Movement, editor of the underground press journals *Bratniak* and *Polityka Polska*. Took part in the strike at the Shipyards in Gdańsk in August 1980.

Participant of the Round Table talks. Minister in T. Mazowiecki's government in 1989/90. Deputy to the Polish Parliament – Sejm (two terms).

Currently writing mainly for the "Rzeczpospolita" and "Gazeta Wyborcza" dailies. Author of the books: *Polemiki i refleksje* ("Polemics and Reflections"), 1989; *Jaka Polska* ("What kind of Poland"), 2004; "Charles de Gaulle", 2002; *Naród i państwo w myśli politycznej Charlesa de Gaulle'a* ("Nation and State in the Political Thought of Charles de Gaulle"), 2005.

VÁCLAV HAVEL

Writer, dramaturgist, last President of Czechoslovakia and first President of the Czech Republic.

Born 1936 in Prague he grew up in a well-known entrepreneurial and intellectual family, which was closely linked to the cultural and political events in Czechoslovakia from the 1920's to the 1940's. Following the Moscow-backed coup of 1948 he and his family were shunned for having been wealthy capitalists and pro-German 'collaborators' and he had difficulties studying beyond the basic level, but took evening classes and studied briefly at the Czech Technical University (1957). After military service (1957-59) he worked as a stagehand in Prague (Theatre On the Balustrade) and studied drama by correspondence. His first publicly performed play was "The Garden Party" (1963). His best known play in the West is "Largo Desolato".

Following the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 he was banned from the theatre and became more politically active. This culminated with the publication of the "Charter 77" manifesto. His political activities cost him five years in prison.

He became famous for his plays, staged all over the world, and for his other writings: one of his most powerful essays of that time was "Power of the Powerless" which played an important role in Poland and Hungary and served as a flagship anti-communist manifesto. A passionate supporter of nonviolent resistance, he was a leading figure in the Velvet Revolution of 1989.

On December 29, 1989, as head of the Civic Forum, he was elected president by the Federal Assembly. After the free elections of 1990 he retained the presidency. Despite increasing tensions, Havel strongly supported the retention of the federation of the Czechs and the Slovaks during the breakup of Czechoslovakia, known as the Velvet Divorce.

Havel is very popular around the world, not least because of the strong stand he takes on moral responsibility in public service.

JIM HOAGLAND

Associate Editor and Chief Foreign Correspondent of *The Washington Post*.

Born 1940, he graduated in Journalism from the University of South Carolina at Columbia in 1961. He studied also in Aix-en-Provence, France in 1961-1962.

Began his journalism career as a reporter with the *Rock Hill Evening Herald* in 1960 and became a copy editor for the New York Times International Edition in Paris in 1964. In 1966, joined *The Washington Post*. He was the *Post*'s Africa correspondent 1969-1972, Middle East correspondent 1972-1975 and Paris correspondent 1975-1977. In 1979, he was made Foreign Editor, and in 1981 was appointed Assistant Managing Editor for Foreign News.

1962-1964 he served in the U.S. Air Force. Ford Foundation Fellow at Columbia University 1968-1969. He received the Overseas Press Club award for international reporting in 1977. Hoagland has received two Pulitzer prizes: in 1970 for international reporting, and in 1991 for commentary in recognition of his columns on the events leading up to the Gulf War and the political turmoil within the Soviet Union. He is the author of a book, "South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict", published in 1972.

Hoagland was appointed to his present position of Associate Editor and Chief Foreign Correspondent in 1986. He writes a column on international affairs which appears twice weekly in *The Washington Post* and is internationally syndicated.

SERGEI ADAMOVICH KOVALYOV

Born in 1930 in Ukraine. Graduated from the Faculty of Biology of Moscow State University (MSU) in 1954. Professor of Natural Sciences.

1964-1969: Head of MSU's Interdisciplinary Laboratory for Mathematical Methods in Biology. He has published around 70 works on biophysics.

In the mid-1950s opposed "Lysenkoism" – a Soviet doctrine of biology supported by the authorities.

In 1968 protested against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army and against political trials in the USSR. Involved since then in various forms of open opposition activities. In 1969 he joined the Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR – the first such independent public association. In 1969 he met Andrej Sakharov and became his close friend and associate. In November 1969 dismissed from the university. As of 1971, a leading figure in the publishing of the *Chronicle of Current Events* – a typewritten information bulletin about human rights violations in the USSR. In 1974 he was one of the founders of the Russian branch of Amnesty International. In December 1974 he was arrested and in 1975 sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment in a detention camp and 3 years of exile for charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

At the end of 1984 he returned from jail and exile. Took part in numerous initiatives: he was a member of the organizing committee of the International Human Rights Meeting (Dec. 1987), co-founded the Press Club Glasnost, took part in the organization congress of the Memorial Association; elected a co-chairman (1990) and later the Chairman of the Russian Memorial Association. Through A. Sakharov's initiative he was elected in 1989 as the co-chairman (from the Russian side) of the Human Rights Project Group at the Foundation for Survival and Development of Humankind (which later became the Russian-American Human Rights Group). He also joined the Moscow Helsinki Group.

1990-2003: A deputy to the Republic Council and the State Duma of the Russian Federation. 1990-1993: Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council on Human Rights. 1991-1994: Head of the Russian delegation UN Human Right Committee in Geneva. 1991: Co-chairman of the Russian delegation at the OSCE Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension. 1993-1996: Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. In 1991 he became the first Human Rights Ombudsman of the Duma, dismissed in 1995 following his criticism of the war in Chechnya. 1996-2003: he was a member of the Russian delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. From 2004 co-chairman of the Council of Certified Auditors by the Russian Ombudsman's Office.

He is one the authors of the Russian Declaration of Human Rights (January 1991) – a frame document which set the future constitutional norms in the field of human rights. He played a leading role in the drafting parts of the current Russian Constitution ("The Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen") and a series of acts dealing with questions of human rights.

1994-1996: Head of the Ombudsman mission to Chechnya, which in 1995 became a mission of the NGOs. He was asked by the government to lead the negotiations with Shamil Basayev after the occupation of Budyonnovsk, which ended with the liberation of over a thousand hostages. In order to secure the agreement, he was a voluntary hostage of Basayev's divisions, together with other deputies, journalists and human rights activists.

For his ongoing defence of human rights he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995, 1996 and 2004.

ALEKSANDER KWAŚNIEWSKI

President of the Republic of Poland (1995-2005). Born 1954. Studied transport economics (foreign trade) at the Gdańsk University (1973-1977). An activist of the official student movement up to 1982, having held, among other functions, chairmanship of the University Council of the SZSP – Socialist Union of Polish Students (1976-1977). Member of the Polish United Workers' Party from 1977 to 1990.

Editor-in-chief of student weekly ITD (1981-1984), editor-in-chief of daily *Sztandar Mlodych* (1984-1985), a co-founder of the first computer-science periodical in Poland *Bajtek* (1985).

Minister for Youth Affairs (1985-1987), and then Chairman of the Committee for Youth and Physical Culture till 1990. As a member of the M. Rakowski's government, a cabinet minister and Chairman of the government Socio-Political Committee (1988 – Sep. 1989). A participant of the Round Table negotiations, co-chairing with T. Mazowiecki and R. Sosnowski the task group for trade union pluralism.

A co-founding member of the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland (1990), and its first chairman till December 1995. One of the founding members of the Democratic Left Alliance in 1991. Member of Parliament.

Won the presidential elections twice, in 1995 and in 2000.

Knight of the Polish Order of the White Eagle. Decorated with the highest distinctions of many countries. Also by the Orthodox Church in Poland: The Order of Saint Magdalena, first degree with decorations (1998).

BOGDAN LIS

Born in 1952 in Gdańsk. In 1969 he graduated from the School of Mechanized Off-loading and began work at the Gdańsk Port. A participant of the 1970 protests in Gdańsk and the Baltic Coast. From 1972 he worked in the shipyards of the Elmor company. From 1978 he worked with the Committee of the Baltic Coast's Free Trade Unions. During the strike of 1980 he became a member of the Inter-factory Strike Committee at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk. A signatory of the August Accords and a memeber of *Solidarność*'s Presidium. During Martial Law he organized *Solidarity*'s underground structures. In 1985 he was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison. He was later freed when the communists issued an amnesty. From 1988 he was a member of Lech Wałęsa's Civic Committee. In 1989 he took part in the Round Table negotiations. Senator of the Republic of Poland 1989-1991. Currently he runs his own business and is a ranking member of the Democratic Party – demokraci.pl

Cardinal JEAN-MARIE LUSTIGER

One of the most prominent figures in the French Catholic Church. Born in Paris in 1926 in a Polish Jewish family, which settled in France after World War I. When the Germans occupied France in 1940, he was sent to live with a Christian family in Orléans. Converted to Catholicism His mother was deported to Auschwitz death camp where she died – his father survived the war.

He graduated in arts at the University of Paris-Sorbonne. Attended the Carmes seminary at the Catholic Institute of Paris. Ordained in 1954 and worked at the academic ministry of the Sorbonne and other higher education centres for 15 years. He was also director of the Richelieu Centre and superior of university chaplains in the region of Paris.

In 1969 he became Pastor of the Church of Sainte-Jeanne-de-Chantal in Paris. He was appointed Bishop of Orleans in 1979 and Archbishop of Paris in 1981. Upon entering the College of Cardinals in 1983 he became a close associate of Pope John Paul II. He is an apostolic administrator from February 2005.

He became a member of the Académie Française in 1995.

He is the author of 23 books and compilations of sermons. His most important works are: "If that is the need…", "The Novelty of Christ in the Post-modern Era" , "The Proletariat of 1848 is Knocking on Our Door", "The Suicidal Temptation of the West") and in English – "Dare to Believe, Dare to Live" (1985: Osez croire), "First Steps in Prayer" (1986: Premiers pas dans la priere); "Choosing God – Chosen by God" (1987: Le choix de Dieu.); "The Mass" (1988: La Messe) and Dare to Rejoice (1991).

DENIS MACSHANE

Trade-unionist, Labour politician, born in Glasgow (1948) and educated at Oxford (MA) and London University (Ph.D.).

In the 70s he was a BBC broadcaster and President of the British and Irish National Union of Journalists. Later worked in international and European political affairs. As an official of International Metalworkers Federation, based in Geneva, he strongly supported Solidarność and democratic opposition in other Soviet Bloc countries.

Travelled to Poland in 1980-1981 and during the martial law in 1982. Arrested during one of pro-Solidarity demonstrations in Warsaw. Met L. Wałęsa and other leaders of the union. Wrote one of the first in the West books on *Solidarność* entitled: "Solidarity: Poland's Independent Trade Union", in which he emphasized the trade-unionist, workers' based and democratic nature of the Union.

At that time he also wrote books on the steel industry as well as on global political issues, including the biography of French President, F. Mitterand.

He has been MP since May 1994. He was a Minister at the Foreign Office in 2001 and Minister for Europe from 2002-2005. Active in the process of EU enlargement. He was sworn as a Privy Councillor in June 2005.

He enjoys sport and has run the London marathon twice, raising thousands of pounds for Rotherham charities.

TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI

Born 1927. Since the second half of the 1940s he was an independent Catholic activist. In 1956 Mazowiecki established the Warsaw "Catholic Intelligentsia Club". He was one of the founders of the monthly "Więź" and the liberal Catholic movement "Znak".

1961-1971 – Member of Parliament, elected as a representative of Catholic opposition circles. In March 1968 he was one of the authors of a motion submitted by the "Znak" Parliamentary Group in protest against the persecution of the student movement and the anti-Semitic campaign of the communist authorities. After the December 1970 massacre of workers in Szczecin and Gdańsk he demanded in vain that a special Parliamentary Committee be formed to investigate the events. In 1976 Mazowiecki organized a hunger strike in St. Martin Church in defence of imprisoned workers and KOR (Committee for Workers' Defence) members. Participated in unofficial educational activities of the so called "flying university".

In 1980, when strikes broke out in Gdańsk and Szczecin, he drafted a letter signed by 61 intellectuals, which called on the authorities to find a political solution to the conflict. He joined the striking workers and became the Chairman of the Experts Council of the Striking Committee in the Shipyards. Became one of the chief political advisors to L.Wałęsa and *Solidarność* in 1980-1981.

Following the imposition of Martial Law on Dec. 13, 1981 Mazowiecki was interned for a year. Supported the underground Union and became one of the chief advisors to its clandestine National Executive Committee.

During the Round Table talks in 1989 he chaired the committee working on trade union pluralism and coordinated the work of all the committees on the opposition side.

In August 1989 he became the first non-communist Prime Minister in Central Europe since 1945. In October 1990 he ran in the Presidential Election. After his defeat, Mazowiecki created a political party, the Democratic Union, which later became the Freedom Union, and till April 1995 he was a chairman of that party. In the 1991, 1993 and 1997 elections Mazowiecki was elected to the Parliament and was a member of the Parliamentary Constitutional Committee, of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees and, in the last term, the Chairman of the EU-Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee.

From August 1992 he worked in the capacity of Special Rapporteur on the UN Commission on Human Rights on the Territory of the former Yugoslavia. In July 1995, after the fall of

Srebrenica, one of the "safe havens" in Bosnia, Mazowiecki in protest resigned his mandate of Special Rapporteur not being able to "continue to participate in the pretence of the protection of human rights".

At present he is the Chairman of The Polish Robert Schuman Foundation and a member of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

He has received the highest Polish award, the Order of the White Eagle, French Legion d'Honeur and many other foreign and international distinctions. He has also received many Polish and other awards such as the Freedom Award of the American Jewish Congress, the Giorgio La Pira Award of Peace and Culture, Premio Napoli Award and Polish-German Award.

Mazowiecki authored a number of articles and essays as well as four books: "Crossroads and Values", "Return to the Simplests Questions", "Internment" and "The other Face of Europe". He is also co-author of several books e.g., *Christians and Human Rights*, etc.

MARKUS MECKEL

Member of the German Bundestag, Pastor, former GDR foreign minister.

Born 1952 in Müncheberg/Brandenburg. In 1969 was forced to leave school for political reasons. From 1969 to 1971 attended Potsdam-Hermannswerder Church College; 1971-1978 studied theology in Naumburg and Berlin.

1980-1988: Protestant curate and pastor in Vipperow/Müritz. 1988-1990: head of the Ecumenical Education Centre in Niederndodeleben near Madgeburg. 1988-1989: delegate to the Ecumenical Assembly in the GDR and the European Ecumenical Assembly in Basel.

Active in the political opposition since the 1970s, involved in numerous initiatives and efforts to link political groups; together with Martin Gutzeit initiated the founding of the Social Democratic Party in the GDR (SDP); represented the SDP at the Central Round Table (1989); since the founding of the SDP in 1989 its spokesman deputy chairman and from April to June 1990 acting chairman of the SPD East. Member of the People's Chamber of the GDR from March to October 1990, Foreign Minister of the GDR from April to August 1990.

Member of the German Bundestag since 1990; member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; substitute member of the Committee on the Affairs of the EU; since 1994 chairman of the German-Polish parliamentary friendship group; spokesman of the Eastern Central European discussion group of the SPD parliamentary group; since 2001 deputy foreign policy spokesman of the SPD parliamentary group.

Since 1991 member and since 1998 head of the German delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; 2000-2002 Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Chairman of the board of the Foundation on Coming to Terms with the SED Dictatorship; member of the Board of the Foundation for Science and Politics; member of the Board of Trustees of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation; member of the Union of Chemical Workers; from 1996 to 2000 chairman of the Federal Association of the German-Polish Association; since February 2002 Chairman of the Project Group for Poland/German-Polish Relations of the German Society for Foreign Affairs; since 2003 Member of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation; since October 2001, substitute member of the Conference of the Diakonisches Werk of the Evangelical Church in Germany.

Received many decorations: German Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit, Polish Knight's Cross of the Order of Merit (1998), also Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian and the Viadrina prize in recognition of services to German-Polish understanding (2003).

MAREK ANTONI NOWICKI

Born 1953, lawyer and human rights defender, was appointed as International Ombudsperson in Kosovo in 2000.

From 1982, during the period of Martial Law in Poland, Mr. Nowicki was a columnist for the underground press and a *Solidarność* activist. Co-founder of the unofficial Helsinki Committee, he was the co-author of all the Committee's reports (published by the underground press and in the West) on the condition of human rights in Poland. Due to his activities within the human rights movement, he was prohibited from practising as a lawyer.

1990-1993 – he was a member of the Executive Committee of International Helsinki Federation of Human Rights (IHF) in Vienna and from 1992 to 1993, he served as its president. During this period he participated in fact-finding missions of the IHF to Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.

1995-1998, he was also a member of the National Council of the Polish Bar. At the same time, he was i.a. the co-founder of the Helsinki Human Rights Commission of the Polish Bar.

Mr. Nowicki co-founded the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Poland and became its president in November 2003. He was a member of the Council of the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar Association in New York (HRI IBA) and of the Advisory Council of the European Roma Rights Centre in Budapest.

Has published several books and many articles on Human Rights in Poland and abroad.

JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ

Mathematician, alpinist, Vice-President of the European Parliament.

Born, 1937, in Lwów. Studied mathematics at Warsaw University and received his Masters Degree and PhD there.

In 1975 he reached the summit of Gasherbrum II (8035 m) and also was the first to ascent Gasherbrum III (7952 m). He made the first descent to the bottom of Jaskinia Śnieżna (Snow Cave in the Tatra Mountains). Awarded the Gold Medal for Outstanding Achievement in Sport.

A member of the Senate of Warsaw University in the years 1984-1986, and later member of the Council of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science. Author of works and publications concerning set theory and model theory. He has lectured in Great Britain, France, Sweden, Norway. Holds a doctorate *honoris causa* at the University of Leeds, UK.

In the late 70s collaborated with Workers Defence Committee KOR and the clandestine journal *Robotnik* (The Worker). The spokesperson of *Solidarność* in the years 1981-1989 and member of the union's highest authorities. Interned following the imposition of martial law in Dec. 1981 and later arrested many times. A participant of the Round Table talks.

1990-1992 – the first civilian Deputy Minister of National Defence, later Minister of National Defence (1992-93 and 1997-2000), co-author of Poland's NATO accession.

1989-2001 – member of Parliament. Vice-Chairman of the Sejm National Defence Committee and the Inter-parliamentary Union Executive Committee. Delegate to the North Atlantic Council and the European Parliament.

In 1994 President, and later Chairman of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Association. Former president of the Polish Alpine Association.

Currently Vice-President of the European Parliament.

JEAN-BERNARD RAIMOND

Diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Born 1926 in Paris. He graduated from Ecole Normale Supérieure and Ecole Nationale d'Administration.

Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the fifties. Former ambassador of France in Warsaw (1982-84), Moscow (1985-1986) and the Holy See (1988-1991).

1986-1988 – served as Minister of Foreign Affairs; a member of the French delegation to the National Assembly of the European Union (1993-2000), France's delegation to the General Assembly of the UN and President of the French-Italian Association.

He is the author i.a. of "Le Choix de Gorbatchev" (Gorbachev's Choice), "Jean Paul II, un pape au coeur de l'histoire", a book about Pope John Paul II influence on the fall of communism.

He is an officer of the Legion d'Honeur, the highest decoration awarded by France. Received many other French and foreign distinctions.

ADAM DANIEL ROTFELD

Academic and diplomat, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2005.

Born 1938. Studied international law and diplomacy in Warsaw (1955-1960) and journalism (1960-1962). Wrote his Ph. D. dissertation in modern international law at the Law Faculty of the Jagiellonian University, Krakow (1969). In 1990 he finished his habilitation and in 2001 was appointed professor at Warsaw University.

1961-1989 – member of staff of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), initially as editor, researcher and since 1978 head of the European Security Department.

1973 – participated in the second phase of the Conference For Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and many other multilateral meetings.

Since 1989 leader of research projects at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); in 1991 appointed Director of SIPRI and re-elected for the second term (1996-2002).

1992-1993 – appointed as Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to settle of the conflict in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova. The recommended basic principles for the political solution of the conflict in his report were approved by the OSCE Council of Ministers and conflicting parties.

In 2002 he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Under-Secretary of State, Secretary of State (in 2003) and become Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2005.

Public Activities: President of the Student's Society of Friends of the United Nations in Poland (1962-1964); deputy President of the Polish Society of Friends of the United Nations (1965); a member of PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party – since 1965); member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London (1992); Appointed member of the Governing Board of the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH 1995) and member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Studies (1996).

Awarded many awards and decorations: The Award of the Scientific Secretary of the Polish Academy of Science (PAN) for his work "International factors of Poland's Security" (1988). An award from the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the book "From Trust to Disarmament" (1989). The PISM award for his dissertation entitled "European Security System in Statu Nascendi" (1991). The silver medal of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Studies and the Swedish Polar Star Medal (2001).

He is a member of many scientific societies, editorial boards and consultation committees. He has published and edited more than 20 monographs and over 300 articles.

ALEKSANDER SMOLAR

Political scientist, publicist. Born 1940. Studied Political Economy at Warsaw University, where he participated in opposition activities in the 1960s. Imprisoned after the student protests of 1968. During emigration (1971-1989), co-founder and editor-in-chief of the émigré political quarterly *Aneks*. He played an active role in helping the political opposition and *Solidarność* in Poland.

Currently President of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Poland, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, Vice-Chair of the Academic advisory Board of the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, member of the International Forum Research Council in Washington, member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University.

He was political advisor to Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki and foreign affairs advisor to Prime Minister H. Suchocka.

He has published i.a.: "La Grande Secousse. Europe de l'Est 1989-1990", (with Peter Kende); 1990, "Globalization, Power and Democracy" (with Marc Plattner), 2000; "De Kant a Kosovo" (with Anne-Marie Le Gloannec), 2003.

Numerous articles in *Aneks*, Polish and international newspapers as well as publications in the professional press on the subject of Central and Eastern Europe, communism and post-1989 regime transformation.

EUGENIUSZ SMOLAR

Journalist, Programme Director of the conference. Born 1945. Participant of the opposition activities at Warsaw University in the sixties. Imprisoned following student demonstrations in March '68 and charged with organizing protests against the military invasion of Warsaw Pact armies on Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Emigrated to Sweden (1970) where he studied at the Dept. of Sociology, Uppsala University.

From 1975 in the UK: journalist and later Director of the Polish Section of the BBC World Service in London.

Organizer of the assistance to Workers Defence Committee KOR and other groups of the opposition in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the USSR and to *Solidarność* as from 1980. Co-editor of the émigré political quarterly *Aneks* and of Aneks Book Publishers (in Polish) and *East European Reporter* (in English).

Following return to Poland in 1997 i.a. Deputy Chairman and Head of Programming of public Polskie Radio. Now Senior Fellow at the Center for International Relations in Warsaw.

PAWEŁ ŚPIEWAK

Historian of ideas, sociologist. Born in 1951. MA and PhD at Warsaw University. Professor at Warsaw University, head of the Department of History of Social Thought at the Institute of Sociology; lecturer at the Jerzy Giedroyc College of Communication and Media and the Bogdan Jański College of Social Science.

Member of *Solidarność* since 1980, when he worked in the Mazowsze region branch of *Solidarność*, setting up union cells. In the 70s, co-founder and long-time co-editor of the underground quarterly *Res Publica*.

Member of the Editorial Board of the Gdańsk quarterly *Przegląd Polityczny*. Permanent contributor to *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Wprost*, *Res Publica*, *Znak*, as well as other journals. He is also in charge of the *Biblioteka polityczna* editorial series for *Alethea* publications.

Member of the Polish Writers' Association. His recent publications include: "Anti-Totalitarismus. Eine polnische Debatte", 2003; "Obietnice demokracji" (The Promises of Democracy), 2004; "Księga nad Księgami. Midrasze" (The Book of Books. Midrashim), 2004; "Myśl komunitariańska" (Communitarian Thought), 2005; and most recent book "Pamięć po komunizmie" (The Memory of Communism), 2005.

PAUL THIBAUD

Born in 1933 in Legé, in Breton, France.

French philosopher, historian and publicist. From 1977 to 1988 he was the editor-in-chief of the Catholic monthly *L'Esprit*. The periodical, set up in 1932 by the philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, is considered to be the flagship journal of Catholic personalists, in France and abroad. Particularly close contacts he had with J. Turowicz and the circle of *Tygodnik Powszechny* in Krakow. In the late 70s and early 80s due to Thibaud's activity *L'Esprit* acquainted its' readers with opposition thought and achievements in Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries.

Earlier he was the editor of the magazine *Vérité et Liberté* (*Truth and Freedom*), censured manifold by French authorities for its position on the Algerian War of Independence. Thibaud was arrested twice during the early 60s.

Author of many books, including "Discussion sur l'Europe" (A Discussion about Europe; interviews with Jean-Marc Ferry), "Pour entrer dans le XXIe siecle" (Entering the 21st Century). His essays and articles have been published in: *L'Express*, *Le Monde*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, in

Poland in *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. He deals mainly with questions concerning Europe, religion and democracy.

President of the French Judeo-Catholic Friendship Association, he is a member of or advisor to many public institutions and associations.

LEOPOLD UNGER

Journalist. Born 1922 in Lviv. He spent World War II in exile in Romania.

Since 1948 he worked in Warsaw for the *Życie Warszawy* daily until 1967, when he was dismissed during the anti-Semitic purges that took place at that time. Forced to emigrate in 1969, he made his way to Belgium, where he joined the Belgian daily Le Soir with which he still co-operates today. Regular contributor to the Parisian émigré monthly Kultura and Radio Free Europe. He had a regular commentary column in *The International Herald Tribune*. Since 1990 he regularly publishes his articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

He is a two-time laureate of the Mieroszewski Prize. He has published "Le Grand Retour" (co-authored by Christian Jelen) – 1977; "Orzeł i Reszta" (Heads or tails) – 1986, "Z Brukseli" (From Brussels) – 1991. His work was reprinted many times by Polish clandestine publishers, i.a. books: "A jeżeli rzeczywiście to byli Rosjanie" (What if it really was the Russians) – 1987. In 2000 he published his professional biography "Intruz" (Intruder) and in 2005 "Wypędzanie szatana" (Banishing Satan) – a selection of his monthly columns from *Kultura*. «Le Dictionnaire des Belges» writes the following on him: "Leopold Unger is an expert on Eastern European matters who, thanks to his own sources of information and the quality of his analyses, plays an inspiring role in a large part of Western European press."

JÜRGEN WAHL

Born 1929. Studied chemical engineering, and received an engineer diploma in 1954. He worked in the textile industry until 1957. 1957-1962 – after finishing additional studies, he became a political and social formation assistant in the Düsseldorf centre of the German Catholic Youth Federation.

1968-1970 – he was national affairs editor of the weekly *Rheinischer Merkur*. He then became the Bonn correspondent of the political magazine *Dialog*. From 1974 he worked as a freelance journalist (specializing in European affairs). In 1980 he became Spokesman for Germany of the European People's Party in the European Parliament. 1982-1995 – he wrote for *Rheinischer Merkur*, being its chief correspondent during the few last years. He now is an independent journalist and book author.

His political activity began in 1950 when he entered the European Young Federalists. In 1952 he became a member of the Youth Council of Northrhine-Westfalia. In 1953 he became a member of the Young Union, and in 1955 member of the CDU. 1970-1974 – Chairman of the "East-West-Working-Group" of the Federation of German Catholic Organizations. The main issue it dealt with were German-Polish relations. This is also when his cooperation with Polish ZNAK groups started. 1978-1991 – European Affairs Spokesperson for the CDU in Bonn. In 1988 he became the Polish Affairs advisor to the EPP faction of the European Parliament. He co-founded the *Amici poloniae* club in Brussels. 1979-2001 – a delegate to EPP congresses eleven times. In 1991 he became Vice-Chairman of the European Committee of the CDU in Northrhine-Westfalia.

Jurgen Wahl cooperates with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and is Honorary Advisor on Polish Affairs to the Robert Schuman Foundation in Luxemburg. Vice-Chairman of the German-Polish Association in Cologne/Bonn.

He has been honoured i.a. with the Polish Chevalier Cross, the German Bundesverdienstkreuz and the French Prix Stendhal.

LECH WAŁĘSA

Solidarność activist, former President of the Republic of Poland. Born 1943 in Popowo.

Electrician in the Lenin Shipyard, Gdańsk, 1966-1976, 1980-1981, 1983-1990, often fired from work for the defence of workers' rights. Member of the strike committee in December 1970, 1978 – Independent Trade Union Founding Committee activist; August 1980 – Chairman of the Strike Committee in Gdańsk.

Chairman of the National Coordinating Committee of the Independent Trade Union *Solidarność*, September 1980; chairman of National Executive Committee NSZZ *Solidarność*, 1981-1990; held in detention from December, 13 1981 until November 1982; chairman of the Strike Committee in the Gdańsk Shipyard, 1988; cofounder and chairman of the Citizens' Committee, December 1988; chairman of the opposition delegation in the Round Table talks with the communist government, February – April 1989.

President of the Republic of Poland, 1990-1995.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate – 1983. President Wałęsa holds over 30 honoris causa doctorates from many countries. Recipient of numerous honours and awards, including the highest honours bestowed by Poland and many countries.

Author of *A Way of Hope*, 1987, *The Struggle and the Triumph*, 1991 and *Everything I do*, *I do for my country* 1995.

Lech Wałęsa actively contributes to Poland's public life. Thanks to his international travels, he keeps in touch with world leaders and representatives of various organizations and associations. He founded the Lech Wałęsa Institute in 1995.

In November 2004, Lech Wałęsa took part in the Ukrainian mediation talks between President L. Kuchma and the two rivals in the presidential elections – V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovich, thus contributing to the triumph of democratic values and peaceful resolution of the conflict.

ZHELYU ZHELEV

Former president of Bulgaria, born in 1953. Degree in philosophy from Sofia University(1958), Received a PhD degree for his work "Relational Theory of the Personality" (1987). His fellowship at Sofia University (1961-65) was revoked for differing from communist dogma. Banished from Sofia and forced to live in the countryside (1966-1972). Became a sociologist at the institute for Amateur Art in Sofia (1972-1974) and then won a place as senior research associate at the Institute for Culture (1975-1989).

1988 – Co-founder of the Club for Glasnost and Perestroika. 1989 – fired from the Institute for Culture for his dissident activities. Dec. 1989 – Founded the Union of Democratic Forces (union of all opposition parties and movements). Elected the first Chairman of the UDF's Coordinating Council; June 1990 elected Chairman of the UDF Parliamentary Committee.

August 1990 – Elected President of the Republic of Bulgaria by the Grand National Assembly. January 1992 – Re-elected President for a five-year term by direct popular vote.

Since January 1997 – President of Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev Foundation. Since May 2001 founding member and President of the Balkan Political Club.

Author of several publications and recipient of numerous awards and distinctions: Eight Honorary Doctorates in seven countries, Catherine Medici Award of the International Academy Medici (1991), Transition Award shared with Yitzhak Rabin (1996).

Archbishop JÓZEF ŻYCIŃSKI

Born in 1948, he was ordained in 1972 after finishing his studies at the Higher Seminary in Kraków. Four years later he obtained the degree of doctor of theology at the Faculty of Theology in Kraków. He obtained his second doctoral degree, this time in philosophy, at the Academy of Catholic Theology (ATK) in Warsaw. He achieved habilitation in 1980 ("Simplicity and disconfirmability as heuristic criteria in relativist cosmology").

Deputy dean (1982-1985) and dean (1988-1990) of the Faculty of Philosophy at ATK – the Academy of Catholic Theology. Initiated the editorial series "Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce" ("Philosophy in Science"), published by PAT, *The Vatican Observatory* and Tucson University, as well as the editorial series "The Philosophy in Science Library", published in cooperation with *the Vatican Observatory*.

1990-1997 – Bishop of Tarnów. From 1997 – Metropolitan Archbishop of Lublin. He also holds the seat of the Great Chancellor of the Catholic University of Lublin.

He has lectured among other places at: Oxford University, Berkeley, the Catholic University of America in Washington and the Catholic University of Australia in Sidney.

He is a member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts in Vienna, the Congregation for Catholic Education, the Pontifical Council for Culture, the Joint Commission of [Polish] Government and Episcopate, a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Chairman of the Episcopal Council for Secular Apostolicism, member of the Episcopal Council for Science and Faith, member of Joint Working Group of the Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches (for the 1999-2005 term), member of the Committee of Evolutionary and Theoretical Biology at the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Author of some 300 articles dealing with questions of philosophy and Christian dialogue with modern thought translated into English, German, Italian, French, Spanish, Russian, Slovak and Hungarian. Author of some two dozens books, many of which deal with the philosophy of science.

The Lech Wałęsa Institute

The **Lech Wałęsa Institute,** a non-profit foundation, was established by **Lech Wałęsa** in December 1995. As leader of Poland's freedom movement "Solidarność", the Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 1983, and the first president of Poland's Third Republic, he has modeled his Foundation on similar institutions in Western Europe and in the Americas.

The Foundation works to support those goals to which Lech Wałęsa has remained steadfast all his life. Its activities aim to:

1. Reinforce the development of democracy, of local self-government, and of the free market economy in Poland;
2. Safeguard Poland's national heritage and its traditions of independence and solidarity;
3. Promote Poland's positive image throughout the world;
4. Foster the inclusion of moral principles in politics and in public service;
5. Document and research events in Poland's recent history.

To accomplish its goals, the Foundation sponsors programs such as: *Poland in the world; The state of the Republic of Poland; Social Program for Sustainable Development and Activation of Young People; Lech Wałęsa Grant Program*.

Al. Jerozolimskie 11/19, 00-508 Warszawa, Poland
tel.: (48-22) 622 22 20, fax: (48-22) 625 14 14
e-mail: sekretariat@ilw.org.pl

The Solidarity Center Fundation

The **Solidarity Center Foundation** was established in April 2000 by President Lech Wałęsa, the City of Gdańsk, the Pomeranian Voivodeship, the Lech Wałęsa Institute, the Gdańsk Shipyard, Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski and the Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarność". The Solidarity Center Foundation engages in scientific, educational and cultural initiatives, particularly those which commemorate and promote knowledge about August 1980. The events of that time mark the beginning of a process which led to the transformations in Poland in 1989 and then in the entire former Eastern Bloc of nations.

The Solidarity Center Foundation undertakes activities to:

1. Collect and archive materials which document the post-1945 opposition against the communists;
2. Document and disseminate knowledge about how "Solidarność" has influenced developing democratic movements worldwide;
3. Initiate and organize symposia, conferences and lectures regarding the "Solidarność" movement;
4. Publish materials about the Polish people's struggle against communist totalitarianism;
5. Found and build the European Solidarity Center.

HELP US BUILD THE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CENTER
Our bank account:
Bank Pekao S.A., V oddział w Gdańsku
ul. Wały Piastowskie 1
42 1240 2920 1111 0010 0951 3889

ul. Wały Piastowskie 24, 80-855 Gdańsk, Poland
tel.: (48-58) 308 42 80, fax: (48-58) 308 42 34
e-mail: fcs@pro.onet.pl

Gdańsk, 31 sierpnia 2005 r.

**W XXV rocznicę podpisania w Gdańsku Porozumień Sierpniowych,
które utorowały drogę do powstania Niezależnego Samorządnego Związku Zawodowego „Solidarność" -
pierwszej niezawisłej od reżimu komunistycznego organizacji związkowej za żelazną kurtyną,
a zarazem wielkiego ruchu obywatelskiego, który otworzył Polsce oraz narodom Europy Środkowej
i Wschodniej drogę do wolności i demokracji, a także walnie przyczynił się do prawdziwego zjednoczenia Europy,
uznając historyczną konieczność upamiętnienia przełomowej roli „Solidarności" w najnowszych dziejach Polski, Europy i świata,
niniejszym wyrażamy wolę powołania w Gdańsku Europejskiego Centrum Solidarności.**

**Jest naszą intencją, aby Europejskie Centrum Solidarności było instytucją łączącą funkcje
naukowe, kulturalne i edukacyjne z nowoczesną placówką muzealną oraz archiwum,
dokumentującym działania ruchów demokratycznych i wolnościowych w najnowszej historii Polski i Europy.
Pragniemy, aby ten żywy pomnik - symbol zwycięstwa pokojowej rewolucji „Solidarności" -
stanowił światowe centrum krzewienia idei wolności, demokracji i solidarności.**

**W obecności twórców i uczestników polskiego i gdańskiego Sierpnia '80,
znamienitych gości uroczystości rocznicowych, głów państw i szefów rządów,**

AKT EREKCYJNY EUROPEJSKIEGO CENTRUM SOLIDARNOŚCI W GDAŃSKU

podpisują

H.E. Mr. Lech Wałęsa
First Chairman of Solidarity

H.E. Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski
President of the Republic of Poland

H.E. Mr. Marek Belka
Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland

Mr. Janusz Śniadek
Chairman of the National Commission of Solidarity

o czym zaświadczają

H.E. Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili
President of Georgia

H.E. Mr. László Sólyom
President of the Republic of Hungary

H.E. Mr. Boris Tadić
President of Serbia

H.E. Mr. Ivo Sanader
Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia

H.E. Mr. Jiři Paroubek
Prime Minister of the Czech Republic

H.E. Mr. Andrus Ansip
Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia

H.E. Mr. Vlado Buckovski
Prime Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

H.E. Mr. Jan Peter Balkenende
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Netherlands

H.E. Mr. Mikuláš Dzurinda
Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic

H.E. Mr. Markó Béla
Deputy Prime Minister of Romania

H.E. Archbishop Stanisław Dziwisz
Special Representative of the Holy See

H.E. Mr. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Vice President of the European Parliament

Gdańsk, 31st August 2005

**On the 25th anniversary of the signing of the August Agreements in Gdańsk,
which paved the way for the establishment of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity –
the first trade union organization behind the Iron Curtain independent of the communist regime,
and a great civic movement, which launched Poland and other nations of Central and Eastern Europe
on the path to freedom and democracy, and also crucially contributed to the true unification of Europe,
recognizing the need to commemorate the pivotal role of Solidarity in the contemporary history of Poland, Europe and the world,
we hereby express the will to establish the European Solidarity Center in Gdańsk.**

**It is our intention that the European Solidarity Center should be an institution combining research,
cultural and educational functions with those of a modern museum and archive,
documenting the achievements of democratic and freedom movements in Poland and Europe's most recent history.
We want this living monument - a symbol of the victory of Solidarity's peaceful revolution -
to become a world center for promoting the ideas of freedom, democracy and solidarity.**

**In the presence of the leaders and participants of the Polish and Gdańsk August '80,
distinguished guests of the commemoration ceremonies - heads of state and government,**

THIS ACT FOR THE ERECTION OF THE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CENTER IN GDAŃSK

is hereby signed by

H.E. Mr. José Manuel Durão Barroso
President of the European Commission

H.E. Mr. John Prescott
For the EU Presidency
Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Mr. Jan Kozłowski
President of Pomorskie Voivodship

Mr. Paweł Adamowicz
Mayor of the City of Gdańsk

in witness whereof

H.E. Mr. Victor Yuschenko
President of Ukraine

H.E. Mr. Guy Verhofstadt
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium

H.E. Mr. Sergei Stanishev
Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

H.E. Mr. Matti Vanhanen
Prime Minister of the Republic of Finland

H.E. Mr. Aigars Kalvitis
Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia

H.E. Mr. Algirdas Brazauskas
Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania

H.E. Mr. Janez Janša
Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia

H.E. Mr. Göran Persson
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sweden

H.E. Mr. Tonio Borg
Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Malta

MEDIA PATRONS
of our International Conference

from Solidarność to freedom

gazeta WYBORCZA

POLSKIE RADIO

POLITYKA

TVP TELEWIZJA POLSKA

THE WARSAW VOICE
Polish and Central European Review

TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY

GTS Polska

We present in this volume the proceedings of our International Conference celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Independent Trade Union "Solidarność" in Poland. The conference took place in Warsaw on the 29th and 30th of August, and in Gdańsk on the 31st. Among the participants were many prominent scholars, journalists and politicians from both the West and the former Soviet Bloc, along with several past as well as present Prime Ministers and Presidents.

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